THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

BACK ISSUE SHELF

The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism *Theodore Lowi* 5

The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy *David Easton and Jack Dennis* 25

Political Dualism and Italian Communism *Sidney G. Tarrow* 39

Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests *Richard A. Watson, Rondal G. Downing, and Frederick C. Spiegel* 54

Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model *Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde* 72

Soviet Policy in Latin America *Herbert S. Dinerstein* 80

An End to European Integration? *Ronald Inglehart* 91

Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication *Glendon Schubert* 106

Research Notes

Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association *Hubert M. Blalock* 130

Politicians' Beliefs about Voters *John W. Kingdon* 137

Some Comments on Russett's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations" *John E. Mueller* 146

Communications to the Editor 149

Book Reviews and Notes *Donald R. Matthews (acting ed.)* 154

News and Notes *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 227

EUGENE SHEDDEN FARLEY LIBRARY
WILKES COLLEGE
WILKES-BARRE, PA. 18703

AVAILABLE ON MICROFORM

VOL. LXI **MARCH, 1967** **NO. 1**

Published Quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY: LENIN, TROTSKY, GANDHI

By E. Victor Wolfenstein

Why does a man become a revolutionist? What attributes of personality enable him to become an effective revolutionary leader? What psychological attributes enable a man to effect the transition to power? By focusing on the personalities of three important revolutionists the author hypothesizes a model of a distinctive "revolutionary personality." Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi are discussed in terms of trust, pride, courage, industry, confidence, and drive—the values that result from the successful management of the problems of the various stages of psycho-sexual growth. A *Center of International Studies* publication. *April. 384 pages. $7.50*

THE RUSSIAN ANARCHISTS

By Paul Avrich

Professor Avrich records the history of the anarchist movement from its Russian origins in the 19th century, with a full discussion of Bakunin and Kropotkin, to its upsurge in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, and its decline and fall after the Bolshevik seizure of power. While analyzing the role of the anarchists in these fateful years, he traces the close relationships between the anarchists and the Bolsheviks and shows that the Revolutions were conceived in spontaneity and idealism and ended in cynical repression. The Russian anarchists saw clearly the consequences of a Marxist "dictatorship of the proletariat" and, though they had no single cohesive organization, repeatedly warned that the Bolsheviks aimed to replace the tyranny of the tsars with a tyranny of commissars. *Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.*

300 pages. Illus. $7.50

THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ

By Alfred Vagts

This is both a history of the service attaché, beginning with the Napoleonic era, and a discussion of his changing role, past and present. Professor Vagts shows the military adviser temporarily joined to the diplomatic corps as a person often divided in his loyalties to diplomatic officials and to military leaders. Affected by increasing bureaucratic specialization, he sometimes became a "twilight" figure engaged in political activity and even espionage. Professor Vagts' numerous works on the history of militarism and the military, in both German and English, and his research in the chancelleries of Europe have given him perspective for this book. *425 pages. $10.00*

Princeton University Press

HARPER & ROW ANNOUNCES

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY in World Perspective

William Ebenstein • C. Herman Pritchett • Henry A. Turner
Dean Mann

This comprehensive text analyzes American government in the perspective of other democratic systems and contrasts democratic principles and practices with authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Basic theory is stressed, with due consideration given to pertinent historical information, institutional operations, and political behavior. In four full introductory chapters, the text sets democracy against other systems of government and discusses the philosophical, economic, and psychological bases of democracy. General principles and issues are emphasized in the authors' presentation of the process of American government as it functions and the policies that emerge from it. Additionally, the authors point to the major areas of public policy in which changes are likely—or ought—to occur, thus stimulating discussion of controversial issues and illustrating the problems of American government and democracy. The authors focus on such problems as civil rights, political parties and interest groups, the role of Congress and the Presidency, the welfare state, the role of the government in the economy, and the problem of underdeveloped countries in U.S. foreign policy.

Charts, graphs, and cartoons by some of the greatest artists, from Herblock to Feiffer. Brief, practical bibliographies. Instructor's Manual.

Harper & Row
Publishers

18 17

49 East 33d Street
New York 10016

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
Robert A. Dahl
Yale University

President-Elect
Merle Fainsod
Harvard University

Vice Presidents
Robert Lane
Yale University

Avery Leiserson
Vanderbilt University

Richard Snyder
University of California

Secretary
Kenneth Waltz
Brandeis University

Treasurer
Max M. Kampelman
Washington, D.C.

Executive Director
Evron M. Kirkpatrick
1527 New Hampshire Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Associate Director
Donald G. Tacheron

Managing Editor, APSR
Austin Ranney
University of Wisconsin

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

James C. Davies
University of Oregon
Alex M. Dragnich
Vanderbilt University
Heinz Eulau
Stanford University
Samuel Hendel
City College of the City University of New York
Wallace Mendelson
University of Texas
Laurence I. Radway
Dartmouth College
William H. Riker
University of Rochester
Victor G. Rosenblum
Northwestern University
M. Margaret Ball
Duke University
William Buchanan
Washington and Lee University
H. Paul Castleberry
Washington State University
Herbert Kaufman
Yale University
Charles A. McClelland
University of Southern California
Alfred G. Meyer
University of Michigan
Clara Penniman
University of Wisconsin
Clinton Rossiter
Cornell University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

Frank J. Goodnow
Albert Shaw
Frederic N. Judson
James Bryce
A. Lawrence Lowell
Woodrow Wilson
Simeon E. Baldwin
Albert Bushnell Hart
W. W. Willoughby
John Bassett Moore
Ernst Freund
Jesse Macy
Munroe Smith
Henry Jones Ford
Paul S. Reinsch
Leo S. Rowe
William A. Dunning
Harry A. Garfield
James W. Garner
Charles E. Merriam
Charles A. Beard
William B. Munro
Jesse S. Reeves
John A. Fairlie
Benjamin F. Shambaugh
Edward S. Corwin
William F. Willoughby
Isidor Loeb
Walter J. Shepard
Francis W. Coker
Arthur N. Holcombe
Thomas Reed Powell
Clarence A. Dykstra
Charles Grove Haines
Robert C. Brooks
Frederic A. Ogg
William Anderson
Robert E. Cushman
Leonard D. White
John M. Gaus
Walter F. Dodd
Arthur W. MacMahon
Henry R. Spencer
Quincy Wright
James K. Pollock
Peter H. Odegard
Luther H. Gulick
Pendleton Herring
Ralph J. Bunche
Charles McKinley
Harold D. Lasswell
E. E. Schattschneider
V. O. Key, Jr.
R. Taylor Cole
Carl B. Swisher
Emmette S. Redford
Charles S. Hyneman
Carl J. Friedrich
C. Herman Pritchett
David B. Truman
Gabriel A. Almond

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

AUSTIN RANNEY, *Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin*

ROBERT E. LANE, *Yale University*
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University*
WARREN E. MILLER, *University of Michigan*
WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*
J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*
JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota*
VERNON VAN DYKE, *University of Iowa*
MYRON WEINER, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

DONALD R. MATTHEWS, *Acting Book Review Editor, University of North Carolina*
LEO B. LOTT, *News and Notes Editor, University of Montana*
MARY H. GROSSMAN, *Madison*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor, APSR
North Hall, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director, APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the pages.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Donald R. Matthews, Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514; *News and Notes items* to Leo B. Lott, Department of Political Science, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 59801; *advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence* to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *International Index to Periodicals* index current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the REVIEW, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1967, by The American Political Science Association

The superior DAGMAR SUPER Microfilm Reader gives...



printed-page comfort when reading all sizes and types of microfilm

Only the DAGMAR SUPER is so advanced in design as to provide in one unit a means of reading *comfortably* all microfilm forms—rollfilm, aperture cards, microfiches, microfilm sheets and film jackets. Operates silently; image is read at a comfortable, normal reading position in moderately lighted rooms.

NOTE THESE IMPORTANT PRODUCT FEATURES

1 **SHARP, BRILLIANT IMAGES** Superior Netherlands-crafted optical system projects in moderate light, eliminates need for darkened rooms.

2 **COMFORTABLE READING** Image can be read in normal position.

3 **PORTABLE** Lightweight, only 14½ lbs. Closes easily into compact 9″ cube.

4 **SIMPLE, SILENT OPERATION** Uses 115 or 230 volt, 60 cycle alt. current.

5 **VERSATILE** Clearly projects ALL types and sizes of sheetfilm and rollfilm 16 and 35 mm. Aperture provides full 35 mm. scanning. "Zoom" projection allows adjustment of image size from 12 to 20 times.

6 **GUARANTEED FOR 1 YEAR** (except for lamps or mishandling).

ORDER WITHOUT RISK—
on 10 days approval.



Reader, incl. take-up reels, extra lamp, carrying case $159.95
F.O.B. Waseca

5″ x 8″ Microfilm Holder $16.50 EXTRA
with purchase of Reader
$18.50 separately

Prices subject to change without notice.
Inquire about favorable adjusted prices for Canada.

ORDER TODAY—READY NOW FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT

AVR AUDIO-VISUAL RESEARCH
1517 8th St. S.E., Waseca, Minn. 56093

The American
Political Science Review

VOL. LXI MARCH, 1967 NO. 1

THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM*

THEODORE LOWI
University of Chicago

Until astonishingly recent times American national government played a marginal role in the life of the nation. Even as late as the eve of World War I, the State Department could support itself on consular fees. In most years revenues from tariffs supplied adequate financing, plus a surplus, from all other responsibilities. In 1800, there was less than one-half a federal bureaucrat per 1,000 citizens. On the eve of the Civil War there were only 1.5 federal bureaucrats per 1,000 citizens, and by 1900 that ratio had climbed to 2.7. This compares with 7 per 1,000 in 1940 and 13 per 1,000 in 1962—exclusive of military personnel.

The relatively small size of the public sphere was maintained in great part by the constitutional wall of separation between government and private life. The wall was occasionally scaled in both directions, but concern for the proper relation of private life and public order was always a serious and effective issue. Americans always talked pragmatism, in government as in all other things; but doctrine always deeply penetrated public dialogue. Power, even in the United States, needed justification.

Throughout the decades between the end of the Civil War and the Great Depression, almost every debate over a public policy became involved in the larger debate over the nature and consequences of larger and smaller spheres of government. This period was just as much a "constitutional period" as that of 1789–1820. Each period is distinguished by its effort to define (or redefine) and employ a "public philosophy."

Lippmann's term is taken here to mean any set of principles and criteria above and beyond the reach of government and statesmen by which the decisions of government are guided and justified. This is not far removed from Lippmann's usage, except that he had in mind the abstract but quite specific public philosophy of bills of rights and natural law.[1] A country either possesses it or does not, loses it or regains it. We may end up agreeing that what Lippmann had in mind is the only public philosophy worthy of the name. But by altering the definition as above, we can use it analytically and critically in the mainstream of modern political science: A public philosophy is something that every stable polity possesses. It is the "political formula"—the "legal and moral basis, or principle, on which the power of the political class rests."[2] It is something that can and does change over generations. Some types of public philosophy may be better, in various ways, than others. And it is possible to discover what the prevailing public philosophy is and to assess its significance by straightforward interpretation of the policies of government and their impact, real or threatened, on society.

In the constitutional epoch immediately preceding our own, ending in 1937, the perennial issue underlying all debate on public policy—and therefore the key to public phi-

---

* This article was made possible by a Social Science Research Council Fellowship. Thanks are also due Professors Richard Flathman, L. A. Froman, Jr., George LaNoue, and Grant McConnell for their many helpful criticisms and suggestions. For his considerable encouragement I am grateful to Max Ascoli of *The Reporter*; and to him, to Henry Kariel (in *The Decline of American Pluralism*) and to Grant McConnell I am doubly grateful for their early recognition of problems with pluralism.

[1] See especially Clinton Rossiter and James Lare (eds.), *The Essential Lippmann* (New York: Vintage, 1965), pp. 171ff.

[2] Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 70.

losophy in that period—was the question of the nature of government itself and whether expansion or contraction best produced public good. Liberal and conservative regimes derived their principles and rationalizations of governing and policy formulation from their positions on the question. Expansion of government was demanded by liberals as the only means of combating the injustices of a brutal physical and social world that would not change as long as it was taken as natural. Favoring government expansion became the mark of the contemporary liberal. His underlying assumption was that the instruments of government provided the means for conscious induction of social change; without capacity for such change no experimentation with any new institutional forms or means of expanding rights would be possible. Opposition to such means, but not necessarily those forms or those rights, became the mark of the contemporary conservative.

There was unanimity on the criteria underlying the distinction between the adversaries. All agreed that a man's position was determined by his attitude toward government and his attitude toward deliberate social change or "planning." All agreed (and many persist in agreeing) that these two attitudes are consistent and reinforcing both as a guide for leaders in their choices among policies and as a criterion for followers in their choices among leaders. For example:

> Conservatism is committed to a discriminating defense of the social order against change and reform (liberalism). . . . By the Right, I mean generally those parties and movements that are skeptical of popular government, oppose the bright plans of the reformers and dogooders, and draw particular support from men with a sizable stake in the established order. By the Left, I mean generally those parties and movements that demand wider popular participation in government, push actively for reform, and draw particular support from the disinherited, dislocated and disgruntled. As a general rule, to which there are historic exceptions, the Right is conservative or reactionary, the Left is liberal or radical.[3]

These two criteria arose out of a particular constitutional period, were appropriate to that period, and provided a mutually reinforcing basis for doctrine during the period. After 1937, the Constitution did not die from the Revolution, as many had predicted it would. But the basis for the doctrine of that period did die. Liberalism-conservatism as the source of the public philosophy no longer made any sense. Once the principle of positive government in a growing and indeterminable political sphere was established, criteria arising out of the very issue of *whether* such a principle should be established became extinguished. They were extinguished by the total victory of one side of the old dialogue over the other.

The old dialogue has passed into the graveyard of consensus. Yet it persists. Since it has no real, operable meaning any more, it is almost purely ritualistic. However, its persistence has had its real effects. The persistence of this state of affairs so far beyond its own day, has been responsible for two pathological conditions in the 1960's. The first is that the empty rhetoric has produced a crisis of public authority. Without a basis for meaningful adversary proceedings, there has been little, if any, conflict among political actors at the level where each is forced regularly into formulating general rules, applicable to individual acts of state and at one and the same time ethically plausible to the individual citizen. The tendency of individuals to accept governmental decisions because they are good has probably at no time in this century been less intense and less widely distributed in the United States. This is producing many problems of political cynicism and irresponsibility in everyday political processes; and these problems, in turn, have tended toward the second pathological condition, the emergence of an ersatz public philosophy that seeks to justify power and to end the crisis of public authority by parceling out public authority to private parties. That is, the emerging public philosophy seeks to solve the problem of public authority by defining it away. A most maladaptive "political formula," it will inevitably exacerbate rather than end the crisis, even though its short-run effect is one of consensus and stabilization.

THE OLD FORMULA VERSUS THE NEW TIMES

A brief look at a few hard cases will be sufficient to show how little can really be drawn from the old public philosophy to justify the key modern policies and practices in either the the public or the private spheres. Figure 1 helps to show at a glance just how irrelevant the old criteria are. Diagramming and analyzing policies as "techniques of control" was used to good effect by Dahl and Lindblom.[4] In Figure 1 are arranged a few selected public

---

[3] Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York: Knopf, 1955), pp. 12 and 15.

[4] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economic and Welfare* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), Chapter 1.

FIG. 1. SELECTED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POLICIES ARRANGED ACCORDING TO PROBABLE EFFECT ON SOCIETY

Graduated income tax (potential)						(Kennedy-Freeman farm proposals)
Social Security programs based on graduated income tax	Luxury taxes	Growth fiscal policies Graduated Income Tax (United States)	Counter-cyclical fiscal policies Sales taxes	Social Security programs based on insurance principles (U.S.)	Existing farm programs Restraint of competition (NRA, fair trade, anti-price discrim.)	High tariffs Import quotas Utilities
Civil rights package	Real antitrust		Aids to small business	Direct regulation (e.g., FCC, ICC, CAB, etc.)		Group representation on boards
Low tariffs	"Yardstick" regulation (TVA)			Antitrust by consent decree	Tax on colored margarine	Strict gold standard with no bank money

---

Competition in agriculture	Competitive business	Oligopoly with research competition	Oligopoly without competition (steel, cigarettes.)	Trade associations	Monopoly
New interest groups	Corporate philanthropy		Brand names	Pools	Old interest groups (NAM, AFL-CIO, TWU, etc.)
				Basing points	
	Merit hiring and promotion		Ethnic appeals of political campaigns	Price leadership	
				Fair trade policies	
				Union unemployment and automation policies	

Above the line: Public policies ("liberal")
Below the line: Private policies or practices ("conservative")

Toward the left side: Policies likely to produce change ("liberal")
Toward the right side: Policies likely to maintain existing practices ("conservative")

policies and private policies or widely established practices. They are placed in two dimensions according to the two basic attributes of liberalism-conservatism. Above the line are public policies; below the line are private policies or examples of established business and group practices. This vertical dimension is a simple dichotomy.[5] Therefore, above the line is the "liberal" dimension, and below the line the "conservative" dimension. The horizontal dimension is a continuum. Each policy or practice is placed along the line from left to right roughly according to its real or probable impact upon the society. To the left is the liberal direction, where policies are placed if they are likely to affect a direct change in things. To the right is the conservative direction, where policies and practices are placed if they tend directly to maintain one or another status quo.

If the two criteria—attitude toward government and attitude toward change—were consistent and if together they described and justified programs, then liberal policies would be concentrated in the upper left corner, and conservative policies would be concentrated below the line to the right. Little study of the Diagram is necessary to discover that the inconsistencies between the two criteria are extreme. And little reflection is necessary to see that policy makers are being guided by some other principles, if principles do guide at all. The fact that private and public policies range across the extremes of maintenance and change suggests the simple but significant proposition that no institution with the capacity and resources for affecting the society works always in the same direction.[6] Yet a public philosophy based upon public-private and change-maintenance criteria requires unidirectional institutions. Obviously, the liberal-conservative dialogue made sense only up until, but not after, the establishment of positive government.[7]

Analysis of the real or potential impact of public policies shows how incomplete is the fit between the earlier public philosophy and the policies it is supposed to support and justify. It shows that those who espouse social change in the abstract, especially government-engineered social change, are seldom peddling policies that would clearly effect any such change. Conversely, it shows that those who harangue on principle against government and change are frequently in real life pushing for strong doses of each. If these criteria do not really guide the leaders, they offer almost no plausible justification for the intelligent follower. A few examples in detail follow.

(1) The income tax. All taxes discriminate. The political question arises over the kind of discrimination the society desires. The graduated or progressive income tax is capable of effecting drastic changes in the relations among classes and between man and his property. According to the two criteria in question, then, the steeply progressive income tax is "liberal" both because it is governmental and because it effects social change. Our own income tax structure can be called only mildly "liberal," if at all, because it is only mildly, if at all, progressive, allowing as it does full exemption on interest from public debt, fast write-offs, depletion allowances, host of "Louis B. Mayer Amendments," privileges on real estate transactions, and so on *ad nauseum*. It is generally under-

---

[5] The distance above or below the line is not meant to convey additional information about the degree of public involvement. However, as Dahl and Lindblom's analysis suggests, that is a desirable and practicable consideration.

[6] Placement along the continuum is gross and informal. However, it is clear that no basis for placing these policies according to impact could reduce their spread. And, differences of opinion as to the placement of specific policies (should anti-trust go in the middle or over on the left?) would lead to the very kind of policy analysis political scientists need to get involved in.

[7] Some, especially "liberals," might object, arguing that the true basis of the distinction is public vs. private but that it involves much more than merely change vs. maintenance. Equality and welfare as well as change are the attributes of public policies. Adding dimensions to the one diagram would overly complicate it, but some response to the objection can be made: (1) A strong element of the equality dimension is already present in the sense that those policies on the left do represent change and "change toward equality." However, (2) note the fact that, at least to this observer, "equality" is present among public but also among private policies and practices. Furthermore, (3) many public policies aim at the reduction of equalizing (as well as change) forces in the private sphere. Those in the upper right area of the Diagram serve as examples. Thus, "equality" is not a basis for distinguishing positions any more than "change," with or without consideration of the equality aspects of change. I will not attempt to defend the absence of the "welfare" dimension except to say that no definition of welfare could possibly show that it is strictly within the province of the public or the private sphere. Any diagram based on *any* definition of "welfare" would show policies above and below the line and to the left and the right.

stood that the effective ceiling on taxes is not 91% or 75% but a good deal less than 50%. And considering all taxes together, it seems fairly clear that they comprise a bastion against rather than a weapon for fluidity among classes and channels of opportunity. This is not an argument in favor of the one tax structure or the other, but rather one in favor of the proposition that no trace of a sign can be found of liberal-conservative principles underlying taxation, not even as a guide to compromise. During the legislative action in 1963–64, there was much discussion and debate on the impact of the tax cut on the rate of aggregate economic growth. But there was almost no consideration of the tax structure or the tax cut for its significance to the society. In fact, plans for large-scale tax reform were withdrawn altogether before the tax bill was ever formally proposed. As a consequence, taxation in the United States is a government policy to preserve the established economic relations among people and classes.

(2) The social security system. This is, of course, a bundle of policies, and accuracy would require classification of each. On balance, however, they are "liberal" only because they are governmental; they are conservative in their impact on social structure and opportunity. If they promote welfare, then, indeed, it is important to be able to say that a conservative policy *can* promote welfare. Above all else, old age insurance, unemployment compensation and the like are techniques of fiscal policy. They are, initially, important countercyclical devices, "automatic stabilizers," that work through the maintenance of demand throughout the business cycle and through the maintenance of existing economic relationships without dislocation. In this dimension, "liberals" are a good deal less willing to take chances than "conservatives."

At another dimension, social security in the United States is an even more interesting case of the gap between the old public philosophy and the real impact of established programs. For, social security programs are techniques of social as well as fiscal control, and as such they are clearly conservative. The American system of social security is based fairly strictly on an insurance principle, a principle of the spreading of risk through forced saving. Government's role is essentially paternalistic; speaking roughly, government raises the minimum wage by the amount of the employer's contribution, takes that plus about an equal amount from the employee's wages, and says, "This much of your income we'll not trust you to spend." This principle of contributory social security does not affect the class structure, the sum total of opportunity, or anything else; on the contrary, it tends to maintain existing patterns. It helps make people a little happier to be where they are doing what they are doing. The social security system is consistent with both criteria of liberalism only to the extent that it is based on a graduated income tax or to the extent that it supports those who did not contribute before entering the rolls. And that is a very small extent indeed.

The medicare program is significant as an addition to the scope and scale of social security, but in no important way does it change the social significance of social security. After President Kennedy proposed a medical care bill limited to the aged and based on "actuarial soundness," there was not even any need to debate the social significance of the bill. Actuarial soundness was a sufficient message that social security would remain altogether what it had been, except for the temporary addition of people who were already old and had made no contribution before entering the rolls. The only surprise in the medicare case was the difficulty of passage. But that was not due to a stalemate between liberalism and conservatism. It was due to a stalemate between the unorganized and apathetic elderly and the intensely felt and highly organized trade union interests of the American Medical Association. A program that originated with Bismarck was simply a while longer being needed in the United States.

(3) The farm programs provide an equally good case of the irrelevance of policy to the old public philosophy. High price supports with crop controls, the center of farm policy for a generation, are supported by "liberals"; but they are "liberal" because and only because they are governmental. The entire establishment escaped death in 1949–50 only with urban-labor support, but that support proves nothing about liberalism.

What has been the purpose and what is the impact of such a program? Basically, the aim was to restore and to maintain a pre-1914 agriculture in face of extremely strong contrary financial, industrial and technological developments. The effect of the program has clearly been as intended, for far larger numbers of farmers and subsistence farms remain than are supportable in strictly economic terms. And the program perpetuates the established sizes of a farm and relationships among farmers by basing present quotas and controls upon past outputs, state by state, county by county, and farm by farm. The New Frontier and Great Society proposals must be ranked as even more "conservative," despite their governmental base, because they would have delegated to a few leading farmers or farm group leaders in each surplus commodity area the power to determine the quotas, thus allowing those most involved to decide *for themselves* just what there is about agriculture worth conserving. This is elevation of government-by-conflict-of-interest to a virtuous principle. Early in his presidency, Lyndon Johnson called the leaders of the major agriculture interest groups to formulate new policy solutions to agriculture. This was the beginning of the Johnson round. In music, a round is a form in which everything is repeated over and over again.

(4) Business practices. The "conservative" side of the argument comes out no better upon examination. Competitive business enterprise is a highly dynamic force that usually makes change normal, innovation necessary, and influence by ordinary individuals over economic decisions possible. For these reasons many forms of competitive enterprise should be thought of as supported by real liberals despite the fact that government is only in a marginal way responsible for it. But, except for martyrs from Thurmond Arnold to Walter S. Adams who have sought vainly to use government to decentralize industry, the net impact of attitudes toward business from conservatives as well as liberals has been to restrain the system. One might say that the only difference between old-school liberals and conservatives is that the former would destroy the market through public means and the latter through private means. This is very largely due to the fact that, lacking any independent standards, all politicians depend upon those organized interests that already have access to government and to the media of communication. According to the second criterion of liberalism-conservatism, *all established interest groups are conservative.*[8] Government policy is one of many strategies organized interests feel free to pursue. In this respect it is useless to distinguish between NAM and AFL-CIO. Trade associations, for example, exist to "stabilize the market," in other words, to maintain existing relations among members despite any fluctuations in their respective sectors of the economy. They, in turn, are the primary determiners of private as well as public policies toward business and business competition. Holding companies, pools, market sharing, information sharing, interlocking directorships, price leadership, competition through advertising and not prices, and collusion in bidding are typical non-governmental policies, which become inevitable if they are not illegal. On the other hand, they are functionally in no way distinguishable from such governmental policies as basing points laws, fair trade laws, antiprice discrimination laws, NRA codes, and so on. To the extent that liberalism-conservatism is taken seriously as the source of public philosophy, liberals-conservatives become hemmed in by it, too rigid to withdraw their sentiments as new needs become old, vested interests. They are inevitably betrayed by the very groups that profited most by their support.

The enormous inconsistency between what public policy really is and what the old doctrine supposes it to be may turn out to be merely true but still inconsequential. This might be the case if it could be shown that American public men were the original pragmatists and were never in need of any doctrine other than the loose social code that binds us all. This possibility must be rejected. Stable countries, with their highly rationalized political order, have great need of legitimizing rituals, perhaps more so than transitional societies where expectations are not so high. Moreover, the very persistence of the old criteria so far beyond their appropriate hour can be taken as an index to the need American elites have for doctrinal support.

The old public philosophy became outmoded because in our time it applies to the wrong class of objects. Statesmen simply no longer disagree about whether government should be involved; therefore they neither seek out the old criteria for guidance through their disagreements, nor do they really have need of the criteria to justify the mere governmental character of policies. But this does not mean that public men are not now being guided by some other, widely shared, criteria that do apply to the relevant class of objects. The good functionalist must insist upon being guided by the hypothesis that some political formula or public philosophy does exist. If it is obvious that public men are no longer governed by the older public philosophy, then the next logical proposition is this, that there is some other public philosophy with which public policy behaviors are consistent, but it may be one not clearly enough formulated to be well known yet beyond public men themselves.

---

[8] They are so placed on the Diagram above. Interest groups are not policies strictly speaking. However, individuals and corporations belong to and support trade associations and other groups as a matter of policy; and each such group formulates relatively clear policies supported by the members. Placing "old interest groups" on the Diagram and to the right is meant to convey two hypotheses: (1) that the existence of the group is itself conservative, and (2) that it is highly probable that the policies formulated by such old groups will be conservative.

I contend that such criteria have emerged in a new and already well-developed public philosophy through which public men are attempting to grapple with the pathologies created by the persistence of the old formula. I contend, further, that the new public philosophy is the source of important new political pathologies in America. I contend, finally, that the new public philosophy is pathological because it emerged not out of an evolution of the older but out of the total and complete silence of the older upon those objects with which any new public philosophy had to deal.

INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM

The weaknesses of the old liberalism-conservatism were not altogether clear before the 1960's. This tardiness is due simply to the intervention of two wars and then an eight-year period of relative quiescence in policy making and in the saliency of politics and government to the masses. Truman's Fair Deal agenda, already left over from the end of the New Deal, held fire for over a decade until it became a major part of the Democratic agenda of the 1960's and comprised a very large proportion of the successful record of the 89th Congress, the most actively legislating Congress since 1933. Even the historic *Brown* v. *Board of Education* decision failed to bring about noticeable expansion and intensification of political activity until the Little Rock debacle of 1957. With increasing pace thereafter, new pressures began to be placed upon political institutions, and another round of governmental activity was in the making. In many ways the period that began in 1957 with Little Rock and Sputnik was as much a constitutional revolution as that of the 1930's. In this decade—as measured by Federal budgets, personnel, the sheer proliferation of service and other agencies, or the expansion of public regulatory authority—there have clearly been a civil rights revolution, an educational revolution, and a scientific and technological revolution.

All of this activity proves that there is no end to government responsibility. It is not possible to automate all the stabilizers. The new activity in the 1960's also proves that the political apparatus of democracy can respond promptly once the constitutional barriers to democratic choice have been lowered. However, that is only the beginning of the story, because the almost total democratization of the Constitution and the contemporary expansion of the public sector has been accompanied by expansion, not by contraction, of a sense of illegitimacy about public objects. Here is a spectacular paradox. We witness governmental effort of gigantic proportion to solve problems forthwith and directly. Yet we witness expressions of personal alienation and disorientation increasing, certainly not subsiding, in frequency and intensity; and we witness further weakening of informal controls in the family, neighborhood and groups. We witness a vast expansion of effort to bring the ordinary citizen into closer rapport with the democratic process, including unprecedented efforts to confer upon the poor and ineducable the power to make official decisions involving their own fate. Yet at the very same time we witness crisis after crisis in the very institutions in which the new methods of decision-making seemed most appropriate.

It is as though each new program or program expansion were admission of prior governmental inadequacy or failure without necessarily being a contribution to order and well-being. The War on Poverty programs have become as often as not instruments of social protest. The Watts riots, the movements for police review boards in many cities, the sit-ins and marches even where no specifically evil laws are being enforced against a special race or group, the strikes and protests by civil servants, nurses, doctors, teachers, transport and defense workers, and others in vital occupations—all these and many others are evidence of increasing impatience with established ways of resolving social conflict and dividing up society's values. Verbal and organizational attacks on that vague being, the "power structure," even in cities with histories of strong reform movements and imaginative social programs, reflect increasing rejection of pluralistic patterns in favor of more direct prosecution of claims against society. Far from insignificant as a sign of the times is emergence of a third and a fourth national party movement, one on either extreme but alike in their opposition to centrist parties, electoral politics, and pre-election compromise. Many of these new patterns and problems may have been generated by racial issues, but it is clear that that was only a precipitant. The ironic fact is that the post-1937 political economy, either because of or in spite of government policies and two wars, had produced unprecedented prosperity, and as the national output increased arithmetically the rate of rising expectation must have gone up geometrically—in a modern expression of the Malthusian Law. Public authority was left to grapple with this alienating gap between expectation and reality.[9]

Prosperity might merely have produced a gigantic race among all to share in its benefits. The expansion of the public sector might have increased the legitimacy of government and other public objects through redistribution of opportunities to join the prosperity. Instead, the expansion of government that helped produce sustained prosperity also produced a crisis of public authority. Why? Because the old justification for that expansion had so little to say beyond the need for the expansion itself. The class of objects to which the new and appropriate public philosophy would have to apply should, it seems obvious, be the forms, structures and procedures of government control. There are vast technical, political and ethical questions involved in what are and what ought to be the consequences of the various ways in which power can be administered and employed. What constitutes "due process" in an age of positive government? What impact does one or another administrative process have upon society, upon the specific clientele whose compliance is sought, upon the sense of legitimacy among citizens, and upon the capacity of the next generation to respond, governmentally and otherwise, to the problems of its own time?

Out of the developing crisis in public authority has developed an ersatz political formula that does, for all its problems, offer the public man some guidance and some justification in his efforts to shape, form and provide for the administration of positive laws in the positive state. There are several possible names for this contemporary replacement of liberalism-conservatism. A strong possibility would be *corporatism,* but its history as a concept gives it several unwanted connotations, such as conservative Catholicism or Italian fascism, that keep it from being quite suitable. Another is *syndicalism,* but among many objections is the connotation of anarchy too far removed from American experience or intentions. However, the new American public philosophy is a variant of those two alien philosophies.

The most clinically accurate term to describe the American variant is *interest-group liberalism.* It may be called liberalism because it expects to use government in a positive and expansive role, it is motivated by the highest sentiments, and it possesses strong faith that what is good for government is good for the society. It is "interest-group liberalism" because it sees as both necessary and good that the policy agenda and the public interest be defined in terms of the organized interests in society. In brief sketch, the working model of the interest group liberal is a vulgarized version of the pluralist model of modern political science. It assumes: (1) Organized interests are homogeneous and easy to define, sometimes monolithic. Any "duly elected" spokesman for any interest is taken as speaking in close approximation for each and every member.[10] (2) Organized interests pretty much fill up and adequately represent most of the sectors of our lives, so that one organized group can be found effectively answering and checking some other organized group as it seeks to prosecute its claims against society.[11] And (3) the role of government is one of ensuring access particularly to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders and their claims. This last assumption is supposed to be a statement of how our democracy works and how it ought to work. Taken together, these assumptions constitute the Adam Smith "hidden hand" model applied to groups. Ironically, it is embraced most strongly by the very people most likely to reject the Smith model applied in its original form to firms in the market.

These assumptions are the basis of the new public philosophy. The policy behaviors of old-school liberals and conservatives, of Republicans and Democrats, so inconsistent with liberalism-conservatism criteria, are fully consistent with the criteria drawn from interest-group liberalism: *The most important difference between liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats*—however they define themselves—*is to be found in the interest groups they identify with. Congressmen are guided in their votes, Presidents in their programs, and administrators in their discretion, by whatever organized interests they have taken for themselves as the most legitimate; and that is the measure of the legitimacy of demands.*

---

[9] The preceding two paragraphs were taken, with revision, from the Introductory Essay of my *Private Life and Public Order* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967).

[10] For an excellent inquiry into this assumption and into the realities of the internal life of the interests, see: Grant McConnell, "The Spirit of Private Government," this REVIEW, 52 (1963), 754–770; see also Clark Kerr, *Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing* (Santa Barbara: Fund for the Republic, 1957); and S. M. Lipset *et al., Union Democracy* (New York: Anchor, 1962). See also Arthur S. Miller, *Private Governments and the Constitution* (Santa Barbara: Fund for the Republic, 1959).

[11] It is assumed that "countervailing power" usually crops up somehow. Where it does not, government ought to help create it. See John K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952).

The assumptions of the model and the concluding behavioral proposition constitute, for better or worse, an important part of the working methodology of modern, empirical political science. However, quite another story with quite different consequences is how all of this became elevated from an hypothesis about political behavior to an ideology about how the democratic system ought to work and then became ultimately elevated to that ideology most widely shared among contemporary public men.

Interest-group liberalism: An intellectual history. The opening of the national government to positive action on a large scale was inevitably to have an impact upon political justification just as on political technique. However, the inventors of technique were less than inventive for justification of particular policies at particular times. Hansen, for instance, has observed that Keynes was no social reformer, nor had he any particular commitments to particular social ends.[12] Keynes helped discover the modern economic system and how to help it maintain itself, but his ideas and techniques could be used, and indeed have been used, to support many points of view. "Collective bargaining, trade unionism, minimum-wage laws, hours legislation, social security, a progressive tax system, slum clearance and housing, urban redevelopment and planning, education reform," Hansen observed of Keynes, "all these he accepted, but they were not among his preoccupations. In no sense could he be called the father of the welfare state."[13]

Nor was the doctrine of popular government and majority rule, which was so important in the victory of liberalism over conservatism, adequate guidance after the demise of liberalism-conservatism. If one reviews the New Deal period and thereafter he will see how little propensity Americans have had to use the majority rule justification. The reasons why are fairly apparent. Justification of positive government programs on the basis of popular rule required above all a proclamation of the supremacy of Congress. The abdication of Congress in the 1930's in the passage of the fundamental New Deal legislation could never have been justified in the name of popular government. With all due respect to Congressmen, little discernible effort was made to do so. Statutory and investigatory infringements on civil liberties during World War II and during the Cold War, plus the popular support of McCarthyism, produced further reluctance to fall back on Congress and majority rule as the fount of public policy wisdom. Many who wished to use this basis anyway sought support in the plebiscitary character of the Presidency. However, "presidential liberals" have had to blind themselves to many complications in the true basis of presidential authority and to the true—the bureaucratic—expression of presidential will.[14]

The very practices that made convincing use of popular rule doctrine impossible—delegation of power to administrators, interest representation, outright delegation of power to trade associations, and so on—were what made interest-group liberalism so attractive an alternative. And because the larger interest groups did claim large memberships, they could be taken virtually as popular rule in modern dress. Interest-group liberalism simply corresponded impressively well with the realities of power. Thus, it possessed a little of science and some of the trappings of popular rule. Political scientists, after all, were pioneers in insisting upon recognition of the group, as well as in helping to elevate the pressure-group system from power to virtue. Political scientists had for a long time argued that the group is the necessary variable in political analysis for breaking through the formalisms of government.[15] However, there was inevitably an element of approval in their methodological argument, if only to counteract the kind of recognition of the group that Steffens and other progressives and Muckrakers were more than willing to accord. In 1929, Pendleton Herring concluded his inquiry with the argument that:

---

[12] Alvin H. Hansen, *The American Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957) pp. 152ff.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59. Keynes said ". . . the Class War will find me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie": quoted in *ibid.*, p. 158.

[14] No citations are necessary to emphasize the fact that presidential delegation and subdelegation to administrators is just as extensive as congressional. As to the popular basis of presidential authority, see Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); and Willmoore Kendall, "The Two Majorities," *Midwest Journal of Politicial Science*, 4 (1960), pp. 317–345.

[15] For pioneer expressions, see Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); and E. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929). More recent arguments of the same methodological sort are found in David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); and Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).

> [The national associations] represent a healthy democratic development. They rose in answer to certain needs. . . . They are part of our representative system. . . . These groups must be welcomed for what they are, and certain precautionary regulations worked out. The groups must be understood and their proper place in government allotted, if not by actual legislation, then by general public realization of their significance.[16]

Following World War II, one easily notes among political scientists the widespread acceptance of the methodology and, more importantly here, the normative position. Among political scientists the best expression of interest-group liberalism was probably that of Wilfred Binkley and Malcolm Moos. The fact that it was so prominent in their American government basic textbook suggests that it tended to reflect conventional wisdom among political scientists even in 1948. Binkley and Moos argued that the "basic concept for understanding the dynamics of government is the multi-group nature of modern society or the modern state."[17] Political reality could be grasped scientifically as a "parallelogram of forces" among groups, and the public interest is "determined and established" through the free competition of interest groups: "The necessary composing and compromising of their differences is the practical test of what constitutes the public interest."[18]

The fact that a doctrine has some support in the realities of power certainly helps to explain its appeal as a doctrine.[19] But there were also several strongly positive reasons for the emergence of this particular doctrine. The first, and once perhaps the only, is that it has helped flank the constitutional problems of federalism. Manifestations of the corporate state were once limited primarily to the Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture, with self-administration by the land grant colleges and the local farmers and commerce associations. Self-administration by organized groups was an attractive technique precisely because it could be justified as so decentralized and permissive as to be hardly federal at all.[20] Here began the ethical and conceptual mingling of the notion of organized private groups with the notions of "local government" and "self-government." Ultimately direct interest group participation in government became synonymous with self-government, first for reasons of strategy, then by belief that the two were indeed synonymous. As a propaganda strategy it eased acceptance in the courts, then among the locals who still believed the farmer was and should be independent. Success as strategy increased usage; usage helped elevate strategy to doctrine. The users began to believe in their own symbols.

A second positive appeal of interest-group liberalism is strongly related to the first. Interest-group liberalism helps solve a problem for the democratic politician in the modern state where the stakes are so high. This is the problem of enhanced conflict and how to avoid it. The politician's contribution to society is his skill in resolving conflict. However, direct confrontations are sought only by the zealous ideologues and "outsiders." The typical American politician displaces and defers and delegates conflict where possible; he squarely faces conflict only when he must. Interest-group liberalism offers a justification for keeping major combatants apart. It provides a theoretical basis for giving to each according to his claim, the price for which is a reduction of concern for what others are claiming. In other words, it transforms logrolling from necessary evil to greater good. This is the basis for the "consensus" so often claimed these days. It is also the basis for President Kennedy's faith that in our day ideology has given over to administration. It is inconceivable that so sophisticated a person as he could believe, for example, that his setting of guidelines for wage and price increases was a purely administrative act. Here, in fact, is a policy that will never be "administered" in the ordinary sense of the word. The guidelines provide a basis for direct and regular policy-making between the President (or his agent) and the spokesmen for industry and the spokesmen for labor. This is a new phase of government relations with management and labor, and it is another step consistent with the interest-group liberal criterion of direct access.

---

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

[17] *A Grammar of American Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1950), p. 7.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9. In order to preserve value-free science, many pluralists ("group theorists") denied public interest altogether, arguing instead that there is a "totally inclusive interest" and that it is served by letting groups interact without knowing what it is. Cf. Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

[19] For discussions of the extent to which group theory is a satisfactory statement of reality, see my "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (1964), pp. 677–715, and the excellent essays cited therein.

[20] For more on the expansion and justification of these practices in agriculture see my "How the Farmers Get What They Want," *Reporter*, May 21, 1964, pp. 35ff.

The third positive appeal of interest-group liberalism is that it is a direct, even if pathological, response to the crisis of public authority. The practice of dealing only with organized claims in formulating policy, and of dealing exclusively through organized claims in implementing programs helps create the sense that power need not be power at all, nor control control. If sovereignty is parceled out among the groups, then who's out anything? As Max Ways of *Fortune* put it, government power, group power and individual power may go up simultaneously. *If* the groups to be controlled control the controls, *then* "to administer does not always mean to rule."[21] The inequality of power, ultimately the involvement of coercion in government decisions, is always a gnawing problem in a democratic culture. Rousseau's General Will stopped at the boundary of a Swiss canton. The myth of the group and the group will is becoming the answer to Rousseau in the big democracy.

President Eisenhower talked regularly about the desirability of business-government "partnerships," despite the misgivings in his farewell address about the "military-industrial complex." However, explicit and systematic expression of interest-group liberalism is much more the contribution of the Democrats. There is little reason to believe that one party believes more ardently than the other; but the best evidence can be found among the more articulate Democrats, especially in the words of two of the leading Democratic intellectuals, Professors John Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.[22] To Professor Galbraith: "Private economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it. The first begets the second."[23] Concentrated economic power stimulates other business interests (in contrast to the Smithian consumer), which organize against it. This results in a natural tendency toward equilibrium. But Galbraith is not really writing a theoretical alternative to Adam Smith; he is writing a program of government action. For he admits to the limited existence of effective countervailing power and proposes that where it is absent or too weak, government policy should seek out and support or, where necessary, create the organizations capable of countervailing. Government thereby pursues the public interest and makes itself superfluous at the same time. This is a sure-fire, nearly scientific, guide to interest-group liberalism. Professor Schlesinger's views are summarized for us in the campaign tract he wrote in 1960. To Schlesinger, the essential difference between the Democratic and Republican parties is that the Democratic party is a truly multi-interest party in the grand tradition extending back to Federalist No. 10. In power, it offers multi-interest administration and therefore ought to be preferred over the Republican Party and:

> What is the essence of a multi-interest administration? It is surely that the leading interests in society are all represented in the interior processes of policy formation—which can be done only if members or advocates of these interests are included in key positions of government. . . .[24]

This theme Schlesinger repeated in his more serious and more recent work, *A Thousand Days*. Following his account of the 1962 confrontation of President Kennedy with the steel industry and the later decision to cut taxes and cast off for expansionary rather than stabilizing fiscal policy, Schlesinger concludes:

> The ideological debates of the past began to give way to a new agreement on the practicalities of managing a modern economy. There thus developed in the Kennedy years a national accord on economic policy—a new consensus which gave hope of harnessing government, business and labor in rational partnership for a steadily expanding American economy."[25]

Interest-group liberalism and public policies in the 1960's. A significant point in the entire argument is that the Republicans would disagree with Schlesinger on the *facts* but not on the *basis* of his distinction. The Republican rejoinder would be, in effect, "Democratic Administrations are *not* more multi-interest than Republican." And, in my opinion, this would be almost the whole truth. This principle has been explicitly applied in the formulation of a large number of policies, especially since the return of the Democrats to power in 1961. That is, policy makers have in numerous new programs added elements of official group representation and have officially applied "participatory democracy" to the implementation as well as the formulation of law as part of the justification of their action. There are additional policies where evidence of the application of interest-group liberalism is clear even though not as consciously intended or as much a part of the record of self-praise.

---

[21] " 'Creative Federalism' and the Great Society," *Fortune*, January, 1966, p. 122.

[22] A third major intellectual of the Kennedy Administration was Professor Richard E. Neustadt. That he is a political scientist makes all the more interesting his stress upon the necessary independence of the Presidency rather than the desirability of presidential partnerships and countervailing power. See his *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

[23] Galbraith, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[24] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Kennedy or Nixon—Does It Make Any Difference?* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 43.

[25] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, as reprinted in *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 23, 1966, Section 2, p. 3.

President Kennedy provides an especially good starting point because his positions were clear and because justification was especially important to him. No attention need be paid to the elements of liberalism-conservatism in his program[26] but only to the consistency of his requests with interest-group liberalism. John Kennedy was bred to a politics of well-organized and autonomous units of power. Locally they were more likely ethnic, religious and neighborhood organizations, but they had to be reckoned with as powerful interest groups. The national party he set out to win in 1956 was also a congeries of autonomous factions and blocs; and it has been said that he succeeded by recreating the "New Deal coalition." But there is a vast difference between pluralism inside political parties and legitimized pluralism built into government programs. The one does not necessarily follow from the other, unless leaders believe it is desirable. President Kennedy's proposals and rhetoric mark his belief in that desirability. Many of his most important proposals mark his very real contribution to the corporatizing of the government-group nexus in the United States.

The agriculture problem, high and early on the New Frontier agenda, was to be solved somewhat differently from all earlier attempts, and that difference is much to the point. At local levels, federal agriculture programs had always been corporative, with committees of local farm dignitaries applying the state and national standards to local conditions.[27] President Kennedy proposed simply to bring this pattern to the center and to have the farmers, represented by group leaders, *set* the standards as well as apply them. Essentially, this was NRA applied to agriculture.

There was no attempt to reinstitute an industrial NRA pattern, but there were, just the same, moves toward recognition of the organized side of industry in the "interior processes" of government. First, as earlier observed, by direct presidential act guidelines for profits and wages were set up. Notice was thereby served that henceforth "industrial policy" would be made by direct bargaining between President and each and every leader of an industrial sector. Quite separately, but along parallel industrial lines, this meant the same sort of bargaining between President and union leaders. It is beside the point to argue whether Kennedy or Johnson has been more lenient in applying the guidelines to the unions. It is even beside the point to argue whether this new technique of control means more government involvement and direction than alternative techniques. The point is that the pattern of control and the manner of its impact is basically corporativistic. "Partnership" is the measure of success.

Many other relations of government to industry have tended toward the same pattern in the 1960's ,whether they come this way full-blown from President or emerge from Congress this way only at the end. COMSAT is a combination out of 1930's Italy and 1950's France. Like the Italian practice of "permanent receivership," COMSAT is a combine of kept private companies, sharing in stock and risk with the government. Like the many French public and mixed corporations, there is direct "interest representation" on the Board. The "public" stamp is placed on it by adding to the interest-laden Board three presidentially appointed members; but one of these is a representative of Big Labor and one a representative of Big Industry. By the end of 1966, there was already talk among the carriers (the communications industries) of forming a combine within the combine to regularize and stabilize losses suffered by any of them as a result of obsolescence and competition.

---

[26] By proper application of the old-school criteria, Kennedy was on balance conservative. Most of his programs belong to the right of center (on the Diagram, horizontal axis), and he did an amazing number of things that showed a preference for private sector activity (on the Diagram, vertical axis). Examples include his "actuarially sound" medicare, his investment tax credit and tax cut proposals, his preference for expansion of housing through investment incentives, his reluctance to ask for new civil rights legislation, his appreciation for governmental contracting and other executive powers to deal with civil rights, his opposition to "Powell Amendments" and parochial school aid in federal education legislation, his concerted effort to make agriculture controls work, his support for very permissive depressed areas legislation that would bail out needy businesses and industries while reducing needs or pressures of entrepreneurs to move to some other section of the country.

[27] See for example, "How the Farmers Get What They Want," *op. cit.*

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, for another example, was the first American tariff based upon broad categories of goods rather than single items. From the beginning, categorization of goods paralleled the lines of jurisdiction of the leading trade associations and organized farm commodities groups.[28] The semi-official role of trade associations was expected to increase and expand through those parts of the new law providing relief through subsidy for injuries proven to have been sustained by tariff cuts.

There were, of course, many Kennedy proposals that are economy-wide in intention, but even some of these have one peculiarity or another that distinguishes them less from the interest-group policies than first appearances suggest. The investment tax credit, for example, was industry-wide, but it involved a reduction rather than an enlargement of the governmental sphere. Appalachia involved a bold regional concept overwhelmingly broader than any organized groups; however, the strong veto power given the state governors allows for, and was expected to allow for, maximum return of group representation through the back door. Appalachia is more clearly a case of interest-group liberalism if we include, as we should, state and local government agencies as groups to be directly represented in implementation of policies. This becomes an important characteristic of "creative federalism." In Appalachia the governors in the region commit Federal funds to development plans formulated by state agencies, local agencies, and private groups.

During the Johnson Administration the doctrines and policies of interest-group liberalism have been elevated to new highs of usage and rationalization. It is coming of age by being provided with new and appropriate halo words. The most important is "creative federalism," about which President Johnson and his Great Society team have spoken frequently and enthusiastically. This and related terms—such as partnership, maximum feasible participation, and, above all, consensus—seem to be very sincerely felt by present government leaders. The sentiments are coming to be shared widely among non-government leaders and are at the bottom of the extraordinary business support Johnson received during his most active period of legislative creativity. Probably the most accurate and sympathetic analysis of creative federalism and the role it is playing in the Great Society has been provided by *Fortune Magazine.* As *Fortune* and many other observers would agree, creative federalism is not federalism. Federalism divides sovereignty between duly constituted levels of government. "Creative federalism" is a parceling of powers between the central government and *all* structures of power, governments and non-governments. In fact, little distinction is made between what is government and what is not. It is, according to the enthusiastic definition of *Fortune* writer Max Ways, "a relation, cooperative and competitive, between a limited central power and other powers that are essentially independent of it." The difference between federalism and "creative federalism" is no mere academic distinction. Creative federalism involves a "new way of organizing federal programs . . . [in which simultaneously] the power of states and local governments will increase; the power of private organizations, including businesses, will increase; the power of individuals will increase."[29]

In line with the new rationale, President Johnson and his Administration have expanded the degree to which private organizations and local authorities become endowed with national sovereignty. Corporativistic programs inherited from the New Deal have been strengthened in the degree to which they can share in the new, explicit rationale. This has been particularly noticeable in the power and natural resources field, where policies are now quite explicitly left to the determination of those participants who know the "local situation" best. It is quite at the center of Great Society expansions of existing programs. When still Assistant Secretary for Education, Francis Keppel described federal education policy this way: "To speak of 'federal aid' [to education] simply confuses the issue. It is more appropriate to speak of federal support to special purposes

---

[28] See Raymond Bauer *et al., American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 73ff.

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

. . . an investment made by a partner who has clearly in mind the investments of other partners—local, state and private."[30]

The most significant contribution of the Great Society to the growing ratio such corporativistic programs bear to the sum total of federal activity is the War on Poverty, particularly the community action program. To the old progressive the elimination of poverty was a passionate dream, to the socialist a philosophic and historic necessity. To the interest-group liberal, poverty is becoming just another status around which power centers ought to organize. If one hasn't organized, then organize it. In so organizing it, poverty is not eliminated, but inconsistency in the manner of government's relation to society is reduced. Organizing the poor, something that once was done only in the Threepenny Opera, helps legitimize the interest-group liberal's preference for dealing only with organized claims. The "Peachum factor" in public affairs is best personified in Sargent Shriver. In getting the War on Poverty under way Shriver was misunderstood in many matters, particularly on any insistence that the poor be represented in some mathematically exact way. But one aspect of the doctrine was clear all the time. This was (and is) that certain types of groups should always be involved some way. As he listed them they are: "governmental groups," philanthropic, religious, business, and labor groups, and "the poor."[31] The significance lies primarily in the equality of the listing. "Governmental groups" are simply one more type of participant.

Interest-group liberalism thus seems closer to being the established, operative ideology of the American elite than any other body of doctrine. The United States is far from 100 per cent a corporate state; but each administration, beginning with the New Deal revolution, has helped reduce the gap. And it is equally significant that few if any programs organized on the basis of direct interest representation or group self-administration have ever been eliminated. To the undoubted power of organized interests has now been added the belief in their virtue. There would always be delegation of sovereignty to interest groups in some proportion of the total body of governmental activities. The new context of justification simply means far more direct delegation than the realities of power, unsupported by legitimacy, would call for.

In sum, modern liberals are ambivalent about government. Government is obviously the most efficacious way of achieving good purposes in our age. But it is efficacious because it is involuntary; as one of the founders of modern social science put it, modern government possesses a monopoly of legal coercion in a society. To live with their ambivalence, modern policy makers have fallen into believing that public policy involves merely the identification of the problems toward which government ought to be aimed. It pretends, through "pluralism," "countervailing power," "creative federalism," "partnership," and "participatory democracy," that the unsentimental business of coercion is not involved and that the unsentimental decisions of how to employ coercion need not really be made at all. Stated in the extreme, the policies of interest-group liberalism are end-oriented. Few standards of implementation, if any, accompany delegations of power. The requirement of standards has been replaced by the requirement of participation. The requirement of law has been replaced by the requirement of contingency.

THE COSTS OF INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM

For all the political advantages interest-group liberals have in their ideology, there are high costs involved. Unfortunately, these costs are not strongly apparent at the time of the creation of a group-based program. As Wallace Sayre once observed, the gains of a change tend to be immediate, the costs tend to be cumulative. However, it takes no long-run patience or the spinning of fine webs to capture and assess the consequences of group-based policy solutions. Three major consequences are suggested and assessed here: (1) the atrophy of institutions of popular control; (2) the maintenance of old and creation of new structures of privilege; and (3) conservatism, in several senses of the word.

1. In his *The Public Philosophy*, Lippmann was rightfully concerned over the "derangement of power" whereby modern democracies tend first toward unchecked elective leadership and then toward drainage of public authority from elective leaders down into their constituencies. However, Lippmann erred if he thought of constituencies only as voting constituencies. Drainage has tended toward "support group constituencies," and with special consequence. Parceling out policy-making power to the most interested parties destroys political responsibility. A program split off with

---

[30] Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly*, Weekly Report, April 22, 1966, p. 833.

[31] Jules Witcover and Erwin Knoll, "Politics and the Poor: Shriver's Second Thoughts," *Reporter*, December 30, 1965, p. 24.

a special imperium to govern itself is not merely an administrative unit. It is a structure of power with impressive capacities to resist central political control.

Besides making conflict-of-interest a principle of government rather than a criminal act, participatory programs shut out the public. To be more precise, programs of this sort tend to cut out all that part of the mass that is not specifically organized around values strongly salient to the goals of the program. They shut out the public, first, at the most creative phase of policy making—the phase where the problem is first defined. Once problems are defined, alliances form accordingly and the outcome is both a policy and a reflection of superior power. If the definition is laid out by groups along lines of established group organization, there is always great difficulty for an amorphous public to be organized in any other terms. The public is shut out, secondly, at the phase of accountability. In programs in which group self-administration is legitimate, the administrators are accountable primarily to the groups, only secondarily to President or Congress as institutions. In brief, to the extent that organized interests legitimately control a program there is functional rather than substantive accountability. This means questions of equity, balance and equilibrium to the exclusion of questions of overall social policy and questions of whether or not the program should be maintanied or discontinued. It also means accountability to experts first and amateurs last; and an expert is a man trained and skilled in the mysteries and technologies of the program. These propositions are best illustrated by at least ten separate, self-governing systems (representing over 10 billion dollars per year in spending and loaning) in agriculture alone.[32] There are many other, although perhaps less dramatic, illustrations.

Finally, the public is shut out by tendencies toward conspiracy to shut the public out. One of the assumptions underlying direct group representation is that on the boards and in the staff and among the recognized outside consultants there will be regular countervailing and checks and balances. In Schattschneider's terms, this would be expected to expand the "scope of conflict." But there is nothing inevitable about that, and the safer assumption might well be the converse. One meaningful illustration, precisely because it is an absurd extreme, is found in the French system of interest representation. Maurice Bye reports that as the communist-controlled union, the CGT, intensified its participation in post-war government it was able to influence representatives of interests other than the employees. In a desperate effort to insure the separation and countervailing of interests on the boards, the government issued the decree that "each member of the board must be *independent of the interests he is not representing.*"[33] After a 1964 review of the politics of agriculture and of five major efforts of their post-war administrations to bring the ten separate self-governing agriculture systems under a minimum of central control, I was led to the following conclusion:

> These systems . . . have become practically insulated from the three central sources of democratic political responsibility. Thus, within the Executive branch, they are autonomous. Secretaries of Agriculture have tried and failed to consolidate or even to coordinate related programs. Within Congress, they are sufficiently powerful to be able to exercise an effective veto or create a stalemate. And they are almost totally removed from the view, not to mention the control, of the general public. (Throughout the 1950's, Victor Anfuso of Brooklyn was the only member of the House Agriculture Committee from a non-farm constituency.)[34]

This, I suggest, is a tendency in all similarly organized programs.

2. Programs following the principles of interest-group liberalism create privilege, and it is a type of privilege particularly hard to bear or combat because it is touched with the symbolism of the state. The large national interest groups that walk the terrains of national politics are already fairly tight structures of power. We need no more research to support Michels' iron tendency toward oligarchy in "private governments." Pluralists ease our problem of abiding the existence of organized interests by characterizing oligarchy as simply a negative name for organization: In combat people want and need to be organized and led. Another, somewhat less assuaging, assertion of pluralism is that the member approves the goals of the group or is free to leave it for another, or can turn his attention to one of his "overlapping memberships" in other groups. But however true these may be in pluralistic *politics*, everything changes when some of the groups are co-opted by the state in pluralistic *govern-*

---

[32] "How The Farmers Get What They Want," *op. cit.*

[33] Mario Einaudi *et al.*, *Nationalization in France and Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 100–101, emphasis added.

[34] "How The Farmers Get What They Want," *op. cit.*, p. 36.

ment. The American Farm Bureau Federation is no "voluntary association" insofar as it is a legitimate functionary in Extension work. NAHB, NAREB, NAACP or NAM are no ordinary lobbies after they become part of the "interior processes of policy formation."

The more clear and legitimized the representation of a group or its leaders in policy formation, the less voluntary is membership in that group and the more necessary is loyalty to its leadership for people who share the interests in question. And, the more clear the official practice of recognizing only organized interests, the more hierarchy is introduced into the society. It is a well-recognized and widely appreciated function of formal groups in modern societies to provide much of the necessary every-day social control. However, when the very thought processes behind public policy are geared toward those groups they are bound to take on much of the involuntary character of *public* control. The classic example outside agriculture is probably the Rivers and Harbors Congress, a private agency whose decisions in the screening of public works projects have almost the effect of law. And, as David Truman observes, arrangements where "one homogeneous group is directly or indirectly charged with the administration of a function . . . [in a] kind of situation that characterizes the occupational licensing boards and similar 'independent' agencies . . . have become increasingly familiar in regulatory situations in all levels of government."[35]

Even when the purpose of the program is the uplifting of the underprivileged, the administrative arrangement favored by interest-group liberalism tends toward creation of new privilege instead. Urban redevelopment programs based upon federal support of private plans do not necessarily, but do all too easily, become means by which the building industry regularizes itself. An FHA run essentially by the standards of the NAREB became a major escape route for the middle class to leave the city for suburbia rather than a means of providing housing for all. Urban redevelopment, operating for nearly two decades on a principle of local government and local developer specification of federal policy, has been used in the South (and elsewhere) as an effective instrument for Negro removal. Organizing councils for the poverty program have become first and foremost means of elevating individual spokesmen for the poor and of determining which churches and neighborhood organizations shall be the duly recognized channels of legitimate demand. Encouragement of organization among Negroes and the White and non-White poor is important. Early recognition of a few among many emerging leaders and organizations as legitimate administrators or policy-makers takes a serious risk of destroying the process itself (more on this directly below).

3. Government by and through interest groups is in impact conservative in almost every sense of that term. Part of its conservatism can be seen in another look at the two foregoing objections: Weakening of popular government and support of privilege are, in other words, two aspects of conservatism. It is beside the point to argue that these consequences are not intended. A third dimension of conservatism, stressed here separately, is the simple conservatism of resistance to change. David Truman, who has not been a strong critic of self-government by interest groups, has, all the same, identified a general tendency of established agency-group relationships to be "highly resistant to disturbance." He continues:

> New and expanded functions are easily accommodated, provided they develop and operate through existing channels of influence and do not tend to alter the relative importance of those influences. Disturbing changes are those that modify either the content or the relative strength of the component forces operating through an administrative agency. In the face of such changes, or the threat of them, the "old line" agency is highly inflexible.[36]

If this is already a tendency in a pluralistic system, then agency-group relationships must be all the more inflexible to the extent that the relationship is official and legitimate.

The war-on-poverty pattern, even in its early stages, provides a rich testing ground. I observed above that early official cooption of poverty leaders creates privilege before, and perhaps instead of, alleviating poverty. Another side of this war is the war the established welfare groups are waging against the emergence of the newly organizing social forces. Many reports are already remarking upon the opposition established welfare and church groups are putting up against the new groups. Such opposition led to abandonment of Syracuse's organize-the-poor project and the retreat of Sargent Shriver's Office of Economic Opportunity to "umbrella groups" sponsored by City Hall.[37] Old and established groups doing good works might naturally look fearfully upon the emergence of competing, perhaps hostile, groups. That is well and good—until their difference is one of "who shall be the government?" Conservatism then becomes necessary as a matter of survival.

---

[35] *Op. cit.*, p. 462. For a profound appreciation of the public power of private authorities in occupational licensing, see York Willbern, "Professionalization in State and Local Government: Too Little or Too Much?" *Public Administration Review*, Winter, 1954. See also Arthur S. Miller, *op. cit.*

[36] *Op. cit.*, pp. 467–468.

The tendency toward the extreme conservatism of sharing legitimate power with private organizations is possibly stronger in programs more strictly economic. Adams and Gray reviewed figures on assignment of FM radio broadcasting licenses and found that as of 1955, 90 per cent of the FM stations were merely "little auxiliaries" of large AM networks. They also note that the same pattern was beginning to repeat itself in FCC licensing of UHF television channels.[38] The mythology may explain this as a case of "interest group power," but that begs the question. Whatever power was held by the networks was based largely on the commitment the FCC implied in the original grants of licenses. Having granted exclusive privileges to private groups in the public domain (in this case the original assignment of frequencies) without laying down practical conditions for perpetual public retention of the domain itself, the FCC had actually given over sovereignty. The companies acquired property rights and legally vested interests in the grant that interfere enormously with later efforts to affect the grant. Thus, any FCC attempt to expand the communications business through FM would deeply affect the positions and "property" of the established AM companies and networks. Issuing FM licenses to new organizations would have required an open assault on property as well as the established market relations. Leaving aside all other judgements of the practice, it is clearly conservative.[39] Granting of licenses and other privileges unconditionally, and limiting sovereignty by allowing the marketing of properties to be influenced by the possession of the privilege, are practices also to be found in oil, in water power, in the newer sources of power, in transportation, in the "parity" programs of agriculture.

Wherever such practices are found there will also be found strong resistance to change. Already the pattern is repeating itself in form and consequences in the policies regarding our newest resource, outer space. As earlier observed, the private members of COMSAT very early in the life of the new corporation made arrangements to protect themselves against the impact of new developments on old facilities. In addition to that, and more significantly here, the constituents of COMSAT have moved to exclude all other possible entrants and alternative ways of organizing the economics of space communication. In response to Ford Foundation's proposal for a separate satellite system for educational television, COMSAT officially moved to cut off any chance of a rival by (1) opposing Ford vigorously, (2) interpreting the statute and charter to be a grant of trust for the entire public interest in the field, (3) seeking a ruling to that effect from the FCC, (4) showing that stockholders in COMSAT and in the carrier members of COMSAT, such as A.T.&T., would be dealt an unfair blow, and (5) producing an alternative plan whereby the Ford system would be created within COMSAT, being underwritten by all the major carriers and "users" (i.e., the telephone and telegraph companies and the commercial networks).[40]

There are social and psychological mechanisms as well as economic and vested interests working against change. As programs are split off and allowed to establish self-governing relations with clientele groups, professional norms usually spring up, governing the proper ways of doing things. These rules-of-the-game heavily weight access and power in favor of the established interests, just as American parliamentary rules-of-the-game have always tended to make Congress a haven for classes in retreat. For example, as public health moved from a regulatory to a welfare concept, local health agencies put up impressive resistance against efforts to reorganize city and county health departments accordingly. Herbert Kaufman chronicles the vain forty-year reorganization effort in New York City.[41] An important psychological mechanism working against change is one that can be found in criticisms of the electoral devices of proportional and occupational representation. PR tends to rigidify whatever social cleavages first provide the basis for PR, because PR encourages social interests to organize, then perpetuates them by allowing them to become "constituencies." This is all the more true as interests actually become not merely groups but parties represented by name and bloc in parliament.[42] Even in less formalized situations, legitimizing a group gives it the advantages of exposure and usage as well as direct power, access and privilege.

---

[37] Witcover and Knoll, *op. cit.*

[38] Walter S. Adams and Horace Gray, *Monopoly in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 48–50.

[39] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 44–46, and their discussion, from a different point of view, of the "abridgement of sovereignty by grants of privilege." See also Merle Fainsod *et al.*, *Government and the American Economy* (New York: Norton, 1959), pp. 400–404. They observe the same thing happening in television and for the same reasons.

[40] See accounts in *New York Times*, August 2 and August 29, 1966, and *Time Magazine*, August 12, 1966, p. 38.

[41] Herbert Kaufman, "The New York City Health Centers," Inter-university Case Program. Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman in *Governing New York City* (New York: Russell Sage, 1960), Chapter XIX, generalize on this pattern. They

INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM AND HOW TO SURVIVE IT

Quite possibly all of these developments are part of some irresistible historical process. In that case policy-makers would never really have had any alternative when they created group-based programs. And in that case the ideology of interest-group liberalism simply reflects and rationalizes the realities of power. However, the best test of a deterministic hypothesis is whether real-world efforts to deny it fail. Thus, a consideration of remedies is worthwhile.

We might begin where Truman ended his extremely influential work on pluralistic America. After reviewing several possible "palliatives" Truman concludes essentially that the pluralistic political system is not doomed at all but, to the contrary, is self-corrective:

> To the extent that the kind of dynamic stability that permits gradual adaptation is a function of elements within the system itself, the key factors will not be new. The group process will proceed in the usual fashion. Whether it eventuates in disaster will depend in the future as in the past basically upon the effects of overlapping membership, particularly the vitality of membership in those potential groups based upon interests held widely throughout the society. The memberships are the means both of stability and of peaceful change. In the future as in the past, they will provide the answer to the ancient question: *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Guardianship will emerge out of the affiliations of the guardians.[43]

But it is self-corrective only if there is overlapping and confrontation among groups, and too many examples above suggest that (1) there is a strong tendency, supported by a great deal of conscious effort, to keep confrontation to a minimum and that (2) "membership in potential groups" is confined to values about the "rules-of-the-game" about which there is strong consensus in general but, due to their generality, extreme permissiveness in particular, short-run situations. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the conditions necessary for the self-corrective system necessarily exist. It is wrong to assume that social pluralism (which is an undeniable fact about America) produced *political* pluralism.

However, the important question is not whether Truman and others are wrong but whether the conditions necessary for their self-corrective system can be deliberately contrived. The effort here is to propose some such contrivances. Two introductory observations should be made about them. First, it is assumed that positive government is here to stay and expand. Thus, proposals for return to a principle of lesser government and for policies in the lower left-hand corner of the Diagram, while logical and perhaps desirable, are not acceptable. Second, it is assumed that *real* political pluralism is a desirable form of democracy and that it is a desirable democratic antidote to the "incorporated pluralism" which has been the object of criticism throughout this essay.

1. The first part of the remedy is attractive precisely because it is so obvious. This is to discredit interest-group liberalism as official ideology. Essentially, this is the effort of this paper. Unless we are locked in a predetermined secular trend, a change of ideology can affect the pattern of power just as the pattern of power can affect ideology. Certainly the egali-

---

refer to "islands of functional power" as the formal power structure of the city. Each island enjoys considerable autonomy, each is a system of administrators and their "satellite groups," each resists interactions with other islands. The big city is possibly in an advanced stage of what in this paper is observed as an important tendency at the national level. Because of the tragic stalemate in the cities, these pronounced city patterns might serve as a better warning than my illustrations drawn from national practices. See also Herbert Kaufman, *Politics and Policies in State and Local Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), Chapter V.

[42] Cf. Carl Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), pp. 291–294. See also a classic critique of occupational representation by Paul H. Douglas, "Occupational versus Proportional Representation," *American Journal of Sociology,* (September, 1923); and David Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 525–526.

[43] *Op. cit.*, p. 535.

tarian ideology has affected the distribution of power in every country where it has had any currency at all. A change of ideology could keep to a minimum the number of programs that merely incorporate the forces responsible for passage. Some other ideology would provide a basis for resisting many of the most outrageous claims for patronage and privilege made by organized interests.

2. The second part of the remedy is institutional and also suggests the direction a new ideology ought to take. This is to push direct group access back one giant step in the political process, somehow to insulate administrative agencies from full group participation. This means restoration of the Federalist No. 10 ideology in which "factions" are necessary evils that require regulation, not accommodation. Madison defined faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, *adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.*" As a manifestation of the ideology prevalent today, it is worth noting that Truman quotes Madison's definition but ends his quote just before the parts I emphasized above.[44] That part of Madison's definition should be returned to full faith and credit, and the only way to do that and to be sure that it and the true self-regulatory character of pluralism can be institutionalized is *to keep group interests in constant confrontation with one another in Congress.* Once an agency is "depoliticized" or "made independent" by handing it over to its organized clientele, the number of "factions" is reduced from a competitive to an oligopolistic situation; competition lasts only until the remaining few groups learn each other's goals and each adjusts to the others. Lippmann is concerned for a "derangement of power" in which *governing* has been drained away from the executive to the assembly and to the electorate, and neither is qualified to govern. The American pattern would suggest another kind of derangement altogether, a derangement brought about by Congress's direct extension of its own principles of representation over into the executive.

Pushing group representation and "participatory democracy" back into Congress and away from the executive requires several relatively traditional steps. The first would be revival of a constitutional doctrine that is still valid but widely disregarded. This is the rule that the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies must be accompanied by clear standards of implementation.[45] This involves revival of the rule of law to replace the rule of bargaining as a principle of administration. It does not involve reduction of the public sphere. It *is* likely to make more difficult the framing and passage of some programs; but one wonders why any program should be acceptable if its partisans cannot clearly state purpose and means. Revival of the rule of law would also tend to dispel much of the cynicism with which the most active citizen views public authority.

Another way to restore competition to groups and ultimately push them back to Congress is to foster a truly independent executive. Development of a real Senior Civil Service is vital to this in the way it would tend to develop a profession of public administration, as distinct from a profession of a particular technology and a career within a specific agency. The makings of a Senior Civil Service lie already within the grasp of the Civil Service Commission if it has the wit to perceive its opportunity in its Career Executive Roster and its Office of Career Development and its Executive Seminar Center. The independent Senior Civil Servant, who could be designed for weakness in agency loyalty, combined with the imposition of clearer standards and rules governing administrative discretion, together would almost necessarily centralize and formalize, without denying, group access to agencies. In turn this would almost necessarily throw more groups together, increase their competition, expand the scope of that competition, and ultimately require open, public settlement of their differences. This would throw groups back more frequently into Congress and would also increase presidential opportunity to control the bureaucracies. The legitimacy of these institutions would be further confirmed.

3. A third part of the remedy has to do with programs themselves, although the recommendation overlaps No. 2 in that it has much to do with institutional roles. This is to set a Jeffersonian absolute limit of from five to ten years

---

[44] *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

[45] This rule is made more interesting for the argument here because it was given new currency in the *Schechter Poultry* and *Panama Refining* cases, both of which involved the most extreme instance of delegation of sovereignty to groups, the NRA. For a recent expression, see Judge Henry J. Friendly's *The Federal Administrative Agencies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 5ff.

on every enabling act. As the end approaches, established relations between agency and clientele are likely to be shaken by exposure and opposition. This is as important as the need for regular evaluation of the existence of the program itself and of whether it should be abolished, expanded or merged with some other program. There is a myth that programs are evaluated at least once a year through the normal appropriations process and that specialized appropriations and authorizations subcommittees review agency requests with a fine tooth comb. However, yearly evaluation, especially the appropriations process, gets at only the incremental and marginal aspects of most programs, rarely at the substance. Here is an example of the earlier distinction between functional and substantive accountability. The very cost-consciousness and detail that makes yearly review functionally rational is the basis of its weakness as a substantively rational process.

This proposal, like the proposal for a return to a rule of law, injects an element of inefficiency into the system. But our affluence is hardly worth the trouble if we cannot spend some of it on maintaining due process, pluralism and other system values. It also injects instability, but it is the very sort of instability that is supposed to make the pluralistic system work. It is amazing and distressing how many 1930's left-wing liberals have become 1960's interest-group liberals out of a concern for instability.

4. The fourth and final part of a reform program bears some resemblance to an old-line constitutional argument. Restoration of the *Schechter* and *Panama* requirement would tend to do more than strengthen the rule of law, enhance real political competition, and dispel political cynicism. It might also provide a basis for establishing some practical and functional limitations on the scope of federal power. That is to say, if an applicable and understandable set of general rules must accompany every federal program, then, except in some clear emergency, federal power could not extend to those objects for which no general rules are either practicable or desirable. Where regional or local variation is to be encouraged, State Government is really the proper unit. Argument for restoration of State Government is not based on mere antiquarian admiration of federalism or fear of national domination. It is an immensely practical argument. State Governments have been systematically weakened by Home Rule, by federal absorption of tax base and by federal-local relations. Yet the cities, even with federal help, have proven unable to cope because the problems have outgrown their boundaries. The State possesses all the powers of its cities plus the territorial containment of most of the new metropolitan realities. The State may be the only governmental unit capable of coping with contemporary problems. Unconditional rebates of federal revenues to the States and obedience to a rule of law may leave the way open for expansion of federal activities in which there is reasonable chance of success without loss of federal control and without loss of legitimacy.

No individual interest group can be expected to take fullest account of the consequences of its own claims. This is what Presidents and Congresses are for, and this is what will continue to be delegated away as long as the ideology of interest-group liberalism allows. In effect this means that restoring pluralism as an effective principle of democratic politics requires destroying it as a principle of government. If this is to be accomplished, reform must begin with the replacement of interest-group liberalism with some contemporary version of the rule of law. The program of reform must include at least: debate that centers upon the actual consequences of public policies and of their forms of implementation; a legislative process that regularly treats enabling legislation rather than revision; political brokers that have to deal in substantive as well as functional issues; and adaptation of public controls to local needs through choice of appropriate level of government rather than through delegation of the choice to the most interested parties.

THE CHILD'S ACQUISITION OF REGIME NORMS: POLITICAL EFFICACY*

DAVID EASTON
University of Chicago

AND

JACK DENNIS
University of Wisconsin

In its broadest conception, a political system is a means through which the wants of the members of a society are converted into binding decisions. To sustain a conversion process of this sort a society must provide a relatively stable context for political interaction, a set of ground rules for participating in all parts of the political process. We may describe this context variously as a constitutional order, a set of fundamental rules, or customary procedures for settling differences. But however this context is defined, it usually includes three elements: some minimal constraints on the general goals of its members, rules or norms governing behavior, and structures of authority through which the members of the system act in making and implementing political outputs. To these goals, norms and structures we may give the traditional name "political regime" or constitutional order in the broadest, nonlegal sense of the phrase.

We may hypothesize that if a political system is to persist, one of its major tasks is to provide for the input of at least a minimal level of support for a regime of some kind. A political system that proved unable to sustain a regime, that is, some relatively ordered and stable way of converting inputs into outputs, could not avoid collapsing.[1] Each time a dispute arose it would have to seek to agree on means for settling differences at the same time as it sought to bring about a settlement of the substance of the issue, a virtually impossible combination of tasks for a society to engage in continuously.

A major response mechanism through which political systems typically seek to avert any serious decline in the level of support for an existing regime is to be found in the processes of political socialization. Every society introduces its members to the political system very early in the life cycle. To the extent that the maturing members absorb and become attached to the overarching goals of the system and its basic norms and come to approve its structure of authority as legitimate, we can say that they are learning to contribute support to the regime.

This paper explores an early source of support for a fundamental norm of the American democratic regime. "Norms" we take to be expectations about the way people do or will behave. They may be embodied in laws or constitutional codes; they may be simply customary expectations founded in experience with the system. Through data on over 12,000 elementary-school children we are able to turn to an early stage of the life cycle—childhood between the ages of 7 and 13, a period almost totally neglected in the study of the political regime[2]—in order to discover the origins of attachment to one political norm, called political efficacy.

POLITICAL EFFICACY AS NORM, DISPOSITION AND BEHAVIOR

As a concept, political efficacy appears in three separate although by no means independent guises: as a norm, as a psychological disposition or feeling, and as a form of behavior. Failure to distinguish these three implications of the term has left considerable ambiguity about its theoretical status and utility. For purposes of understanding the contribution of socialization processes to the input of support for this regime norm, it is vital to clarify the relationship among these three elements.

---

* Research from which this paper was drawn has been supported by a grant from the Office of Education under Cooperative Research Project 1078, Contract SAE 9004. The research design and collection of data were executed jointly by the principal co-investigators, David Easton and Robert D. Hess. The analysis of the political aspects of the data is the primary responsibility of David Easton and Jack Dennis. Jack Dennis is grateful for financial support during the analysis phase of this project from the Research and Development Center for Learning and Re-education at the University of Wisconsin.

[1] For a full extension of these remarks and for discussion of the difference between persistence of a regime, compared to a system as a whole, see D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), esp. chapters 12 and 17ff.

[2] Although in this paper we concentrate on a single norm, the research from which the analysis proceeds covers other critical norms of the American regime. For further details on the characteristics of our test population see footnote 8.

As a norm it refers to the timeless theme of democratic theory that members of a democratic regime ought to regard those who occupy positions of political authority as responsive agents and that the members themselves ought to be disposed to participate in the honors and offices of the system. The *norm* of political efficacy therefore embodies the expectation in democracies that members will feel able to act effectively in politics.

In recent years it has been the burden of considerable research to demonstrate that this democratic norm must entail a corresponding *set of dispositions*. If persons are to be able to live up to the norm and to bring their weight to bear effectively on the political process, we would hypothesize that they are more likely to be able to do so if they have become imbued with a sense of political efficacy.[3] Here efficacy identifies a disposition towards politics, a feeling of effectiveness and capacity in the political sphere.

As compared with the simple statement of the norm, political efficacy as a feeling has turned out to be a surprisingly complex phenomenon. It suggests a number of interwoven sentiments. To be efficacious it would appear that a person must sense his competency at the level of his political self-identity. He must construct a psychic map of the political world with strong lines of force running from himself to the places of officialdom. He must come to believe that when he speaks other political actors will listen. He must also so internalize the expectation of competence that his political self-confidence is not easily eroded by what he will take to be the mistaken indifference which the political process frequently exhibits to his desires. The psychological counterpart to the basic regime rule, involving as it will the mutual expectations of the participating member and the responsive authorities, is therefore a firm conviction by the individual that he is in fact politically effective.

The final element embraced by the term applies to the actual *conduct of a person*. He may or may not act efficaciously. Insofar as he is in fact able to influence the course of events and take a hand in shaping his political destiny, he has demonstrated an observable capacity to behave effectively, regardless of whether he is aware of a principle of political efficacy or has a sense of being efficacious. Because we are dealing with children it is appropriate to set aside this third implication of the term and confine our analysis to the first two.

In distinguishing between political efficacy as a norm and as a disposition or state of feeling, we open up the possibility of using two alternative ways for assessing the input of support for the norm itself. On the one hand, through the standard techniques of attitude testing, we might explore the extent to which members of the American political system are willing to express verbal approval of the norm, explicitly stated. If this procedure were adopted we might expect to discover a high level of consensus if only because the norm accords with stereotyped patriotic rhetoric about the expected role of the ordinary person in a democratic regime.

We were precluded from adopting this procedure by the fact that our respondents were children, not adults. Typically, if we ask children whether they should be able to behave in a certain way, they will respond in the affirmative if in fact that is the way they do behave. Expectations and practice are often undifferentiated. Thus a young child is not likely to respond differently whether he is asked: *Should* ordinary people have a say in what the government does, or *do* ordinary people have such a say. This is particularly likely to be true in areas remote from the concerns and awareness of the child, as in the political sphere. We could not expect to find many children, therefore, who could make the intellectual distinction between the expectation that people should be able to master their political environment and a judgment as to whether people do in fact feel they are politically potent. The responses to items tapping both these opinions would be so highly correlated as to be useless.

However, the fact that, in children, norms and sentiments are so closely interwoven that we could not hope to distinguish them empirically can be put to good use. Insofar as children can be brought to provide us with some clue about the state of their feelings in the matter of efficacy, it will provide us with a reliable if indirect measure of their attitudes towards the norm itself. To the extent that we are able to discover the level of their sense of efficacy we will have an important indication of whether they feel that members of the system should expect to be able to influence the course of political life as it affects them.

We can assume, therefore, that, for children, acquisition of sentiments corresponding to the norm will usually represent psychic incorpora-

[3] A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 190.

tion and approval of that ground rule of the regime. This enables us to interpret the presence of a feeling of political efficacy as an attitudinal indicator of confidence in and support for efficacy as a norm in the American democratic regime. In this sense we shall accept the degree to which a child expresses a feeling of efficacy as an index of the extent to which he adheres to the norm.[4]

DEVELOPMENT OF A SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY AND ITS MEASUREMENT

Young children, until quite recently, have been excluded from the sphere of serious political research. They play no manifest or active part in political processes in the American system, adults consider politics to be an arena of interest peculiarly appropriate to themselves, and they have felt that political conflict may indeed be too sordid a tale to bring wittingly before the tender minds of the young. In addition, the child's normal interest in politics in competition with other activities is extremely low.

But in spite of barriers such as these that prevent the child from reaching over into the political sphere, our research reveals that children gradually do acquire an unexpectedly wide range of attitudes and feelings about various aspects of political life. Indeed, it is transparent that if this were not so, sufficient support could hardly be mobilized for major aspects of the political system. By the time that members of the system have reached the degree of social maturity necessary for full participation in the political life of a democratic regime it would be far too late to begin to expose them to the orientations essential for any kind of meaningful involvement. From this perspective it is not really surprising to find that even as subtle and complex a sentiment as that of political efficacy has a tap root that reaches down into the very early part of the life cycle.

---

[4] Our interest in the sense of efficacy is clearly and substantially different from concerns that have prevailed in the vast and still growing literature on the subject. For the most part this feeling about politics has been connected with the nature and extent of varying kinds of political participation and involvement, feelings of alienation, anomie and the like. This has reflected the dominant and restrictive interest of political research with allocative problems, the way in which policy is made or put into effect. It has tended to ignore systems persistence concerns, a subject of central theoretical significance. For this see D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965); *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* The literature on political efficacy and its correlates is vast. See for example: G. A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); R. E. Agger, M. N. Goldstein and S. A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *Journal of Politics*, XIII (1961), 477–506; B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, *op. cit.;* A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); A. Campbell, "The Passive Citizen," *Acta Sociologica*, VI (fasc. 1–2), 9–21; R. A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); E. Douvan and A. M. Walker, "The Sense of Effectiveness in Public Affairs," *Psychological Monographs*, 70 (1956) #32; E. Douvan, "The Sense of Effectiveness and Response to Public Issues," *Journal of Psychology*, 47 (1958), 111–126; S. J. Eldersveld, "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior," *The American Political Science Review*, L (1956), 154–165; H. Eulau, *Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); C. D. Farris, "Authoritarianism as a Political Variable," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (1956), 61–82; C. D. Farris, "Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs as Correlates of Authoritarianism and Political Anomie," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 50–67; J. E. Horton and W. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (1962), 485–493; M. Janowitz and D. Marvick, *Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Bureau of Government, 1956); V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961); A. Kornhauser, H. L. Sheppard and A. J. Mayer, *When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers* (New York: University Books, 1956); R. E. Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," *The American Political Science Review*, XLIX (1955), 173–190; *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); M. R. Levin, *The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); E. Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *Journal of Politics*, XXV (1963), 312–323; H. McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, LVIII (1964), 361–382; H. McClosky and J. H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 14–40; L. W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); P. Mussen and A. Wyszyinski, "Political Personality and Political Participation," *Human Relations*, 5 (1952), 65–82; D. Riesman and N. Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy" in A. W. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper, 1950), esp. 540–547; M. Rosenberg, "The Meaning of Politics in Mass Society", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (1951), 5–15; "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (1954), 349–366; "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (1956), 690–695.

Meaning of political efficacy

Before we can say when and in what degree feelings of political efficacy are acquired, if at all, we need to clarify the kinds of sentiments included in the idea. Beyond that we will also have to show that in spite of the complexity of the attitudes involved, children do in fact know enough about these matters to be able to express an opinion on them, even during what has wrongly been presumed to be the political void of childhood.

To maintain the continuity and cumulative nature of research, we have followed the description of this sentiment first ventured by the Survey Research Center and reported in *The Voter Decides*, with some necessary modifications. As suggested in this volume,

> Sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change.[5]

To measure political efficacy, the authors employed five items calling for a simple "agree" or "disagree."

1. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
2. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country.
3. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.
4. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
5. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.[6]

To investigate the child's development of political efficacy, we adapted the S.R.C. questions and added a number of our own in an attempt to form an index. We were not quite ready to accept a priori the view that this attitude complex is unidimensional. Thus we analyzed it initially to unravel its conceptual elements. We have found at least five closely related but separable ideas to be implied.

The first involves a feeling that the government or authorities are responsive to the desires of individuals like the respondent. Here the S.R.C.'s first item ("I don't think public officials care much what people like me think") is the clearest example. This reports the perception by ego that alter (the authorities) is *responsive* to him. Alter is, if not necessarily benign, at least aware of ego's existence and responsively so.

Second, there is the reverse side of the relationship, a feeling that ego is positively and *autonomously* able to affect the course of government, as expressed in items 2 and 4 above. The individual has the capacity to act with an impact upon the political process; therefore civil action is worthwhile and social change is possible. In this element of the feeling, the member of the system does not depend upon the responsiveness of the authorities but rather upon his own inherent powers. It is not simply a case of alter being responsive to ego (for whatever reason), but a case of ego being able to affect alter.

The third closely associated idea is that of the *comprehensibility* of alter to ego, some knowledge about "ruling and being ruled." To be able to comprehend political processes is a highly important part and condition of the sentiment of being an effective participant. In item 5 above we have an expression of this feature of political efficacy. Ego is or is not able to understand what alter is like, to put himself in alter's shoes, and to know what alter does. In part, this is an expression of the psychic distance of ego from alter; in part it reflects a degree of general competence and possession of the means or requisite knowledge to affect alter. Comprehensibility constitutes therefore a third element analytically distinct from the two connected ideas that the individual is an autonomous political actor and that officials are responsive to his demands. All three are contained in the S.R.C. questions.

Two further ideas can plausibly be considered to constitute empirical elements of this attitude complex. One is suggested by the remaining question, "Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things." Here the basic theme is that the means available to the individual either are or are not limited. We can, of course, conceive of a person who is highly efficacious (on the other items) agreeing to this statement, so that some ambiguity is present. The respondent who agrees but is nevertheless efficacious may do so because he sees the real but singular power of the people in the vote. He believes that voting constitutes the only effective monopoly of legitimate force by ordinary people in the political system; but he may conceive that the effects of this power are quite extensive.

---

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 187.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 187–188. "Disagree" responses to items 1, 3, 4, and 5, and an "agree" response to item 2 were coded as "efficacious". The authors combined these items, exclusive of item 2, which was thought ambiguous, by means of Guttman scale analysis in order to produce scale types. Item 2 happens to be the only item running in a positive direction. Thus the resulting scale may be subject to acquiescence response set.

A fifth possible element, and one we would add to the S.R.C. assumptions, is the idea of general inevitability or intractability of government. It could be that both the individual member and the officials are perceived to be caught up in a predestined, unalterable pattern of events from which no escape is possible.[7]

What we have said, then, is that we can analytically distinguish a number of elements which might serve as part of the meaning of political efficacy: a sense of the direct political potency of the individual; a belief in the responsiveness of the government to the desires of individuals; the idea of the comprehensibility of government; the availability of adequate means of influence; and a general resistance to fatalism about the tractability of government to anyone, ruler or ruled.

Crystallization of political efficacy

The very complexity and multiplicity of sub-dimensions included in the feeling of political efficacy would seem to militate against any expectation that we could find it in young children, especially as early as 7 and 8 years of age. Before it was possible to probe the nature of the distribution of this feeling among our group of children, we had to assure ourselves that they are likely to have and experience these sentiments, a type hitherto associated only with adults. Furthermore, if they do, we had to discover the age at which we could reasonably anticipate this attitude would take shape and the degree to which it was continuous through childhood. At what age could we say that political efficacy crystallizes as a stable sentiment?

In line with our analysis of the meanings congealed in the idea of political efficacy, we tested eight questionnaire items over our total group of 12,052 children to see whether we would elicit the five major elements distinguished above. These items also represented, in slightly modified form, the S.R.C. questions:[8]

1. Voting is the only way that people like my mother and father can have any say about how the government runs things.
2. Sometimes I can't understand what goes on in the government.
3. What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do. It is like the weather, there is nothing people can do about it.
4. There are some big powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not care about us ordinary people.
5. My family doesn't have any say about what the government does.
6. I don't think people in the government care much what people like my family think.
7. Citizens don't have a chance to say what they think about running the government.
8. How much do these people *help decide which laws are made for our country:* Very much, Some, Very Little, or Not at all? Put an X for each person or group of people listed below.

For the first seven items, respondents checked one of the options presented in A below. B was used for the eighth item.

A. 1. ☐ YES 2. ☐ yes 3. ○ Don't Know / No Opinion 4. ☐ no 5. ☐ NO

The Average Person

B. 1. ☐ Very Much 2. ☐ Some 3. ☐ Very Little 4. ☐ Not at all 0. ○ Don't Know

---

[7] Cf. L. W. Pye and S. Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 522.

[8] The eight items were scattered through our eight cities' "Citizenship Attitudes #9" questionnaire which was administered to 12,052 pur-

Included with these items in the questionnaire were many others concerned with the domain of participant orientations and political commitment. Among them were items having to do with partisan commitment, political interest, activity, political issue sensitivity and national community identification. We intercorrelated all these items, using tetrachoric correlation, after we had dichotomized each item. We then performed at each grade level (3–8), taken separately, a principal axes factor analysis of the r_t matrices and a varimax orthogonal rotation of the resulting principal components using as a minimum criterion for rotation an eigenvalue of 1.0.[9] This analysis allowed us to probe related political participant and commitment attitudinal dimensions in children. These dimensions in general were highly consistent and distinct across the grades for our respondents. Inasmuch as this analysis is quite voluminous, we present here only the

TABLE 1. THE POLITICAL EFFICACY COMPONENT IN GRADES 3–8*

	Grade					
	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. "What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do. It is like the weather, there is nothing people can do about it."	.37	.44	.66	.69	.69	.59
2. "There are some big, powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not care about us ordinary people."	.74	.73	.69	.70	.76	.73
3. "My family doesn't have any say about what the government does."	.71	.67	.72	.73	.72	.70
4. "I don't think people in the government care much about what people like my family think."	.73	.74	.79	.76	.75	.76
5. "Citizens don't have a chance to say what they think about running the government."	.65	.69	.78	.80	.70	.71
Other Items with Factor Weights above .30						
6. "If the Democrats and Republicans disagreed on important things, it would be bad (or good) for the country."	—	−.31	—	—	—	—
7. "How much does the average person help decide which laws are made for our country?"	—	—	—	—	—	.33
8. "Voting is the only way that people like my mother and father can have any say about how the government runs things."	—	—	—	.32	.34	—
Percent of communality over all components	6.1	8.4	12.2	12.6	11.5	13.0
Percent of communality over rotated components	9.5	14.1	20.1	20.9	18.9	21.0

* Rotated factor weights ≥.30.

---

posively selected white, public school children, both middle class and working class in origin, in eight large metropolitan areas (two of each of the four major regions of the U.S.). The questionnaire was administered to the children in their regular classrooms in late 1961 and early 1962. These items were located as follows: 1. p. 16 #72, 2. p. 16 #74, 3. p. 17 #18, 4. p. 19 #29, 5. p. 19 #31, 6. p. 22 #43, 7. p. 22 #45, 8. p. 30 #27. Question 8 was part of a series: p. (#22–29).

[9] The computations were performed at the University of Chicago on an IBM 7094 using a variable N tetrachoric correlation routine.

one portion (and a summary of that) having to do with the dimension we have labelled "sense of political efficacy." In Table 1 appear the rotated factor weights of items correlated with this component at each grade, at the .30 level or above.[10]

The content of the four items which load highest at all grade levels pertains to the responsiveness of officials (items 2 and 4) and to the autonomous power of ordinary people (items 3 and 5). These are the elements evidently at the heart of the early learning of the sense of political efficacy and they are from the beginning closely inter-connected orientations. By the middle of this age span they also become bound up with an associated element, the (lack of) inevitability of government (item 1).

Of the eight items originally devised as measures of political efficacy, seven at some point do load on the component as defined at every grade by the five best items. The item "Voting is the only way . . ." loads, if low, at grades 6 and 7 at least. "The average person helps make the laws of our country" item loads low at grade 8. The item which is not weighted at the .30 level or above on this compenent has to do with *comprehensibility* (item 2, p. 29 above), and this may be an artifact of our measure. But it may also simply relate to the fact that the government *is* incomprehensible sometimes to every child, even to those who may otherwise have absorbed into their consciousness the regime norm and who correspondingly feel politically efficacious.

One might be tempted to argue that the five high-loading items are associated simply because of response set. Although we cannot discount this possibility entirely, we have tried to guard against it in a number of ways. We stated these questions negatively for the most part thus making it harder for children who will agree to almost anything that "sounds" right. We also varied the format of the intervening items and spread the efficacy items throughout the questionnaire, as a further measure to guard against response set. More compelling, however, is the fact that an item with the same format which has a priori to do with a sense of political efficacy (the incomprehensibility item) in effect does not load on the "political efficacy" component. This suggests that children *are* differentiating the meanings of the items and not simply responding in a set fashion. In addition, other items running the same way do not correlate with this factor nor do items running the other way (except the one partisanship item) load negatively. Of course, as better measures of these attitudes are developed, we expect that a better understanding of response-set factors will result.

Summary

The most important conclusion emerging from our principal component analysis is that by grade 3 children have already begun to form an attitude, as revealed in the five high-loading items, which we could call a sense of political efficacy. This basic orientation is likely to become crystallized early in the life of the individual and to be maintained at least through these grades. This does not say, of course, that the third-grade child has developed a *high* sense of political efficacy, nor does it assert that any particular proportion of them experience this sentiment at any level of intensity. It only says that an attitude structure has begun to take shape among the children in their early years.

This development apparently does not depend upon the child's ability to understand the government and to interpret the citizen's role within it. This understanding in any full sense comes later. Nor does this general political attitude depend upon the state of the child's information—scarce and confused as it is—even though cognitive awareness may have important effects upon the later course of efficacy. It would appear that this development is an outgrowth of a general understanding which pervades the child's early environment. For whatever reason, young children in our society begin to develop this attitude by third grade.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEASURE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

It would be going too far to suggest that in measuring political efficacy in the child with items that resemble those used for adults, this orientation has exactly the same meaning for children. The situation is considerably more complex than that and it testifies to the extreme caution necessary in speaking about any kind of political attitudes and activities among children. At most we have here a projective measure; from the way we discover the child to think about adults, we infer something about the probable state of his own emergent feelings.

On scrutinizing the five index items—those that load highest—we see that we would not be justified in construing them to refer directly either to the child respondent or, projectively, to other children. Rather, they ask the child to make judgments about adults. Thus items 1 and 2 speak vaguely about "ordinary people." Interviews with children of this age group indicated that they are likely to think of these people as adults, particularly when discussion occurs in a political context. Items 3, 4, and 5 inquire about the relationship between government and the child's family or citizens and, in both cases again, unless the child is directed to think otherwise, adults are evoked by the statements.

---

[10] In error, we included two of our independent variables, reading achievement and I.Q., among the items used for this series of factor analyses. It turns out that these two measures of intellectual ability "load" on this component at grades 5, 6, and 8 (but not at grades 3, 4, and 7). The loadings of these two variables were as follows: reading achievement, .50, .50 and .37 at grades 5, 6, and 8 respectively; I.Q., .37, .41, and .32 at grades 5, 6, and 8 respectively. These have been omitted from Table 1.

The reason for pointing the child's attention to efficacy among adults was simple but compelling. Interviews gave us few grounds for believing that we could sensibly expect children to see themselves as having power over such awesome figures as the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court—some of the first concrete political objects to appear on their cognitive screens.[11] It was realistic only to try to get the child to project whatever nascent attitudes he might have onto adults. We are confronted, therefore, with interpreting the meaning of this projective device for eliciting information about the child's own attitudes toward political efficacy, as a sentiment and as a norm.

Although it would be easy to suggest that his opinions on the extent to which adults seem to him to feel efficacious, as measured by our index items, are accurate projections of his own sense of efficacy, this would be putting the matter too bluntly and too sanguinely. It is preferable to begin by taking the child's responses at their face value and to attempt to arrive at a more modest assessment of their significance.

We do not need to interpret the child's perceptions as an indication that even though he is projecting his own feelings onto adults, the items must therefore indirectly measure a developed sense of political efficacy in himself. It would not seem reasonable to expect a child, by age 13 or 14, to develop the fully formed feelings in this area that we find in adults. His political experiences would appear to be too limited. It is more reasonable to interpret the child's responses as an indication that he is learning to think about adults and politics in a certain way. If the child is to become socialized to political norms, it is vital that he learn how to think of adults with respect to their potency in the political sphere. It is this factor that is initially suggested by our index.

But the fact that the child can think of adults in these terms is only half the story. What is even more revealing for our purposes is that it opens up the possibility that, as he learns from adults and patterns himself after them, the child will even begin to think of himself in similar terms as he learns about the political sphere. In this sense only does the index become a projective device to obtain some hint of how the child himself may be learning to feel about his relationship to control over the political sphere.

We can therefore interpret the attitudinal component represented in the index items only as a first but critical step in the child's acquisition of an orientation to political efficacy *as it relates to himself*. He is building up an emotional frame of reference or loose attitudinal structure through which he has come to think about and view expected relationships between adult members of the system and the authorities. Although in the process of norm and attitude crystallization he has not reached a point where he himself necessarily has fully acquired either a norm or sense of efficacy, his capacity to think of adults in these terms represents a vital preparatory stage in his general political socialization. At some point, perhaps towards late adolescence, he may well begin to think of himself as possessing feelings about his capacity to exercise effective control over government.[12]

The level of the child's sense of political efficacy

Now that we have identified this dimension as having empirical reality in these early years, a score can be assigned to each respondent in order to estimate the distribution of feelings, high or low, on political efficacy at various

---

[11] See our earlier report, "The Child's Image of Government," in R. Sigel (ed.), "Political Socialization: Its Role in the Political Process," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 361 (1965), pp. 40–57.

[12] We are brought to such a cautious and somewhat intricate interpretation because here we are examining a set of attitudes and cognitions still in process of formation rather than in the full-fledged state usually encountered and tested among adults. With children we need to revise our conception of survey research and expect to handle materials much less tractable, in part because they are less well-defined and certainly less stable. Political orientations in process of formation are less easily investigated with instruments designed to detect and measure developed ones. But an exciting aspect of our data is that in spite of this we have been able to discover in children a structure of attitudes towards efficacy that shows a persistent identity as they move from third through eighth grade.

TABLE 2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %	Mean	N Scored*	N not Scored	% not scored†
3	56%	28%	16%	100	8.0	1244	433	26%
4	55	27	18	100	8.4	1427	321	18
5	35	29	36	100	10.0	1622	180	10
6	29	27	44	100	10.6	1602	146	8
7	23	29	48	100	11.1	1624	98	6
8	17	29	54	100	11.6	1615	79	5

* Used as a base for percentages.

† Percent not scored is of the total N at each grade level.

grade levels and for various subgroups.[13] On computing the proportions of children scoring high, medium or low in sense of political efficacy, we find a substantial shift over grades 3–8, as shown in Table 2.

A marked change occurs in these years in the degree of the child's sense of political efficacy. In fact, we see a change consisting of two parts: (1) An increasing number of children at each succeeding grade level is willing to venture an answer other than "I don't know" to the items which compose the index. Thus we can infer that the child is likely to have more and more of an attitudinal basis for responding to these questions the older he becomes. It is noteworthy that only around 5 per cent were not scorable by grade 8 whereas about 26 per cent had been unscorable at grade 3. (2) The shift for those expressing opinions on these questions is distinctly in the direction of a development of a higher sense of political efficacy in these years. Only about 16 per cent of the grade-3 children are high in political efficacy on our index, but about 54 per cent of grade-8 children could be so classified. Correspondingly, those classified as having a low sense of political efficacy show a drop from 56 per cent to 17 per cent over the grades.

The child comes, therefore, both to an awareness of the role of the ordinary individual in the political process and possibly even to some emergent sense of his own mastery of the political world as well. This is not to say that he sees himself as synonymous with the Leviathan of the state. Yet he begins to carve out a small piece of political authority for himself—at his own level of consciousness. He is still far away from any actual role that he normally would have in the political process. Even so he begins to feel his political power when it still involves a high degree of projection to those around him and to his future role as an adult member of the system.[14]

---

[13] Our procedure in scoring was to cluster-score the five highest-loading items, weighting each item equally and giving the child a score from 1 to 16. The precise scoring procedure was to add up the scores on each of the items, which could range from 1 to 4 (eliminating the middle or "don't know" option). For children who answered three of the five questions other than "don't know" we multiplied his three-item score by 5/3. A similar procedure was used for children answering four questions other than "don't know" (i.e., multiplying by 5/4). Children who failed to answer at least three of the five items were not scored. Scores ranged from 5 to 20. Final scores, after subtracting 4, ranged from 1 to 16.

[14] Our findings that this norm appears relatively early in childhood and that there is a fairly rapid growth of positive feeling in relation to it suggest that what several other observers have speculatively proposed, with less direct evidence, is true. Lane, for example, noted in *Political Life* (p. 151) that the S.R.C. data in *The Voter Decides* show a steady distribution of political efficacy over the (adult) age span to the middle fifties. From this he conjectured that "it appears that the standard of influence, then, is established relatively early—and is not the product of occupational experience so much as of the family and strata where one is reared, plus the personality support which such an attitude implies." The authors of *The Voter Decides* (p. 187) themselves refer to political efficacy as a "broader and more enduring" political value and attitude. In *The American Voter* the authors went even further when they argued that "variables of this sort, in contrast to measures of involvement in the current election, may be conceived as lying at a relatively 'deep' level in any hierarchy of dispositions. That is, they represent highly generalized orientations toward the world of politics and could be expected to remain rather stable over a period of time. In this sense they are approaching 'personality' status" (p. 516). This statement suggests that the disposition is likely to

GROUP VARIATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

What is there in the processes through which the child becomes socialized in relation to a regime that helps him to acquire these emergent feelings about political efficacy? We may find that among adults the sense of control over political processes is related to such matters as whether their party has consistently won or lost, or whether they have themselves been successful in any attempt to influence public officials or politicians.[15] But children have no such direct experiences. The influences contributing to their reflected feelings about political efficacy must come from other sources.

Due to the limitations of large-scale survey research and the exploratory nature of our inquiry, we did not find it possible to follow up many conceivable lines of explanation. But it is clear that there are three major directions from which influences might impinge on the general political socialization of the child. First, as he matures he will undoubtedly develop certain personality characteristics relating to his general sense of effectiveness in mastering and manipulating his social environment. We might expect that this would have a substantial impact on whether he would attribute like qualities to relevant adults and the rate at which he would absorb political efficacy norms. Our data do not bear frontally on this dimension of the problem. Adequate measures of personality in children, applicable to survey research, do not exist. But one significant variable influencing individual exposure to politics, and possibly related to some aspects of personality could be readily obtained, namely, I.Q.; and it proved to be a significant predictor of attitudes.

Second, as in other areas of socialization, undoubtedly the major sources from which a child draws his political attitudes and convictions are those persons and institutions in his environment that are capable of transmitting to him explicit or subtly implicit messages about the political sphere. Parents, family, schools, mass media, peers and the like are agents of socialization. For reasons related to the index and the pioneer nature of our research we had to forego a detailed inquiry into the operations of these determinants, important as they undoubtedly are.

But third, it is possible to obtain some gross and aggregate measure of the direction in which these agencies carry the socialization of children by examining differences of socialization associated with the particular social class and sex roles which the child performs. Family, schools, and peers operate in a class environment and although cross pressures of many sorts may arise when agents cut across categoric groups—as when middle-class teachers instruct working-class children—we can expect that the broad consequences of class location will not be lost or even effectively masked. In addition to I.Q., our data shed some light on the possible effect of social class and sex on the socialization of the political norm under consideration.

Exposure potential: I.Q.

One of the general reasons why we might expect a child to acquire any norm of democracy which involves a fairly complicated and in large part abstract set of relationships—as does efficacy—is the child's relative receptivity. We could, of course, in theory apply this to the whole content of political socialization, except for the fact that some "messages" are more difficult to receive and assimilate than others. We would argue that the resources in political communication that the child has are especially likely to affect such acquisition as political efficacy. And our data support this contention when we relate our index of political efficacy to I.Q., as in Table 3.

The relationship between political efficacy and I.Q. is fairly constant over the grades, particularly from grade 5 on. The child who has greater intellectual abilities—as measured by I.Q. tests—is more likely to acquire the norm early and maintain thereafter a greater positive feeling towards it. Probably two things are at work in this relationship, beyond the simple capacity to deal with the abstractions that our questions involve. One is the greater exposure potential of the child with higher intelligence. Although we can only guess as to where cues from his environment originate, the greater the mental capacity of the child the more easily will these cues filter through to him. He is likely to have other supporting informational resources as well. He will have greater facility in recognizing the positive role of the individual in the world of politics if society is teaching that the individual has a role to play.

Secondly, the brighter child will probably enjoy a greater sense of general confidence and effectiveness, other things being equal. He is more likely to maintain the feeling that he can cope with various aspects of his environment successfully and thus with politics. From this perspective his feeling that the ordinary member of the political system has influence is a natural accompaniment of his own greater ego

---

begin to form in childhood, when personality development is at its peak, a suspicion that is now reinforced for the first time by data.

[15] Cf. *The American Voter*, p. 516.

TABLE 3. THE RELATIONSHIP OF I.Q. TO SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	I.Q.	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %*	N†	N Not Scored	Pearson r‡
3	Low	61%	26%	13%	100	361	110	.14
	Medium	53	29	18	100	427	126	
	High	48	32	20	100	203	67	
4	Low	69	22	9	100	467	105	.28
	Medium	50	30	20	100	490	124	
	High	38	32	29	99	302	59	
5	Low	50	29	21	100	475	74	.33
	Medium	34	31	35	100	538	63	
	High	20	26	54	100	420	24	
6	Low	42	26	32	100	522	66	.35
	Medium	28	31	41	100	527	52	
	High	14	21	65	100	414	14	
7	Low	36	34	30	100	543	41	.35
	Medium	19	27	53	99	588	33	
	High	9	24	67	100	362	12	
8	Low	25	35	40	100	559	41	.33
	Medium	15	30	55	100	511	23	
	High	5	23	72	100	392	8	

* Percentages fail to add to 100% in some cases due to rounding error.
† Used as base for percentages.
‡ Computed over the uncollapsed distributions.

strength and trust in his capacity to deal with the world. This fits with the adult-level findings.[16]

Social location

A related independent variable, socio-economic status,[17] shows a similar if weaker relationship to the sense of political efficacy. This is presented in Table 4.

The child higher on the social ladder is at every grade level likely to be a step or two higher in relative sense of political efficacy. Probably a somewhat similar set of background variables are at work in this relationship as is the case for I.Q.[18] The child whose share of social resources is larger is thereby in a more favorable position to receive relevant information, communications, and reinforcement for adherence to this standard. His position and that of his family in the social structure expose him more frequently to events and interests congruent with this sense. His parents are more likely themselves to be interested and participate in politics and to have a higher sense of political efficacy.[19] The consonance of such a

[16] Cf. *The American Voter*, p. 515 n.; E. Douvan and A. M. Walker, *op. cit.*

[17] We used as an indicator of socio-economic status the occupation of the respondent's father or guardian obtained either from the child in the classroom questionnaire administration or from the school files. In cases where neither was available, an estimate was used based on the average rank of the occupations of the fathers of the child's classmates in the child's own grade and school system.

[18] The first-order partial correlations of I.Q. with efficacy, holding SES constant are as follows (where 1 = Eff., 2 = I.Q., 3 = SES):

Grade	3	4	5	6	7	8
$r_{12.3}$	.10	.24	.30	.31	.31	.28

The first-order partial correlations of SES with efficacy holding I.Q. constant are:

Grade	3	4	5	6	7	8
$r_{13.2}$	.13	.15	.15	.10	.10	.13

[19] Cf. *The Voter Decides; The American Voter;* L. Milbrath, *op. cit.*; R. Lane, *Political Life;* H.

TABLE 4. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS TO SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	SES	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %*	N†	N Not Scored	Pearson r‡
3	Low	62%	26%	12%	100	302	96	.16
	Medium	56	27	16	99	673	241	
	High	47	34	19	100	269	96	
4	Low	70	20	10	100	325	71	.21
	Medium	54	28	18	100	678	159	
	High	43	31	25	99	424	91	
5	Low	50	25	24	99	383	48	.22
	Medium	33	32	36	101	745	89	
	High	25	30	45	100	494	43	
6	Low	40	26	34	100	355	49	.20
	Medium	32	28	40	100	738	64	
	High	17	26	57	100	509	33	
7	Low	33	28	39	100	388	37	.20
	Medium	24	31	45	100	728	43	
	High	14	26	60	100	508	18	
8	Low	25	34	41	100	364	37	.22
	Medium	18	31	51	100	753	27	
	High	10	24	66	100	498	15	

* Percentages fail to add to 100% in some cases due to rounding error.
† Used as base for percentages.
‡ Computed over the uncollapsed distributions.

milieu of efficacy and involvement, for the child's own acquisition, is therefore apparent.

Both intellectual ability and social status therefore affect the rate and level of the child's incorporation of a belief that the individual has some force in government. These are quite constant relationships over the grades. They are built into the differential response of children to this norm from the beginning of this form of political awareness. The adult-level findings on social class thus probably reflect a difference which was present in the first learning of this kind. Of course, later experiences related to social class must also have an effect; but we suspect that the effect of social class is a continuing one and something that has roots as deep as the attitude itself. This also leaves the hint that unless I.Q. differences wash themselves out at a later age, it may be that some adult differences in political efficacy are also a product of socialization during childhood. Childhood I.Q. scores of adults may well turn out to be associated with their sense of political efficacy.

Sex

Sex stands as one of the major social categories that distinguishes efficacy among adults. In *The Voter Decides*, for example, it was found that 35 per cent of men but only 20 per cent of women were high in political efficacy.[20] In our data we fail to observe this difference in any marked and consistent way over the grades. Table 5 shows that the sexes come close to being equal. There is a very slight advantage for boys in grades 3–7 but this is reversed in grade 8.

At the very least these data indicate that the sense of political efficacy in females does not begin to drop below that of males before grade 8. Girls show little less confidence than boys that adults are able to handle the complexities of political life and that their involvement in the political process has some significance;

Eulau, *op. cit.*; R. Dahl, *op. cit.*; J. E. Horton and W. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism"; A. Kornhauser, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[20] p. 191.

this reflects for young girls a kind of sentiment almost universally less associated with grown women than with men. Yet the strange thing about the finding that girls rate just about as high as boys across the grades is that in other areas of political involvement, in which we test for such attitudes as political participation and interest, we find girls to be markedly lower. In these areas they definitely foreshadow their roles as less politically oriented adults.

These data lend themselves to an interesting interpretation, at least until additional information about adults becomes available. Something must happen between childhood and later phases of the life cycle that leads females into becoming disenchanted with their earlier expected role in political life that they once shared with boys. It may be that when, in succeeding years, it is gradually revealed to maturing girls that male judgments do in fact command dominant attention and respect in the political sphere, a slow, creeping disillusionment results. The shift during adolescence may be imperceptible but in its outcome the disparity between learned expectations and later opportunity for the expression of political concerns will plausibly lead to some sense of helplessness. This is at least a possible pattern of political evolution from girlhood to womanhood that helps to explain the similarity between boys and girls in our data and the later differences between men and women in the realm of political efficacy. Boys, on the other hand, find their expectations fulfilled and with this reinforcement of the norm, feelings of political effectiveness have a better chance of taking root and growing.

But even though women may rank somewhat lower on a political-efficacy scale than men, this does not justify a conclusion that they are any the less supportive of the efficacy norm than are men. If we accept the preceding interpretation as possessing some plausibility, it suggests that the higher feelings of political impotence in women may arise in part because of the expectations girls had been led to apply to *all* adults and subsequent disappointment with their fulfillment. In childhood, females may have learned their political lessons only too well, that is to say, as well as boys. By adulthood, the evidence reveals only that women have developed a lower sense of efficacy then men. But they may still retain their expectation that in a democratic system all adults should have the opportunity to exercise some influence in political life. In fact, long ago the suffragette movement, and its continuation in many indirect ways today, demonstrated that at least some women took the regime norms of democracy literally. Thus, even though women may feel less efficacious than men, it is consistent with this finding that women may continue to be supportive of efficacy as a regime norm, an attitude that a majority of women may learn in childhood. Unfortunately, research on adults deals only with

TABLE 5. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SEX TO SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	Sex	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %*	N†	N not Scored
3	Boys	55%	28%	17%	100	669	164
	Girls	57	29	14	100	576	269
4	Boys	52	27	20	99	764	131
	Girls	57	27	16	100	663	191
5	Boys	35	28	37	100	825	86
	Girls	34	31	35	100	798	94
6	Boys	31	24	45	100	819	64
	Girls	28	30	43	101	784	82
7	Boys	23	28	49	100	805	48
	Girls	23	30	47	100	820	50
8	Boys	18	30	52	100	762	37
	Girls	16	29	55	100	854	42

* Percentages fail to add to 100% in some cases due to rounding error.

† Used as base for percentages.

their feelings of efficacy, not with the degree of their attachment to political efficacy as a norm.

CONCLUSIONS

The fact that from a tender age children are able even to mirror adult feelings of mastery over their political environment and that this feeling gradually takes on a high positive value for increasing proportions of children has vital implications for the input of support for a democratic regime. This is especially so if we are willing to assume that, like imprinting, what is learned early in the life cycle is more difficult to displace than what is learned later[21]—a not unchallengeable proposition, however—and that for children, acquisition of efficacy as a sentiment implies its acceptance as a norm.

The process of interiorization of this norm is of course a complicated matter. As McClosky and Schaar have observed in connection with the learning of social norms, "what is learned is a function of many things: what is actually 'out there' to be learned; the nature and quality of the teaching process; the learner's own ability and motivation; the strength and frequency of reinforcement; the amounts and kinds of impediments to learning, and so forth."[22] In an exploratory study like ours, we cannot hope to comprehend these several facets of the learning process regarding the efficacy norm. As a beginning, however, we can suggest that early attachment to this particular regime norm does not occur in a uniform fashion for all children. The learner's own ability level bears a definite relationship to the process, particularly for the rate of norm acquisition. The child's I.Q., that is, fosters or inhibits his growth of a sense of political effectiveness and the related norm. Similarly his social status, or that of his parents, produces this effect. The acuity of his mental, antennae, together with his general social resources, affect how quickly he responds to efficacy cues.

On the other hand, placement in one or the other of the sex roles only marginally influences his orientations to the norm in childhood. The culturally defined, differential political capacities of the sexes which are apparent in adulthood have still to make their appearances. But our findings leave as a moot point whether the high level of childhood attachment of efficacy as a norm may not continue unabated into womanhood. The data on adults refer only to the low sense of efficacy in women and bear little obvious relationship to our understanding of their continued attachment to the regime norm.

The fact that there are differences for groups defined by I.Q. and socio-economic status has important implications for where we may expect to find the strongest initial ties to the regime. But the further fact that by grade 8, 83% (Table 2) of our children felt moderately or highly efficacious does suggest some important possible consequences for the functioning of the American political system. This early acquisition of the norm may operate as a potent and critical force in offsetting later adult experiences which, in a modern, rationally organized mass society, undermine the political importance of the ordinary member. But for the inculcation of this norm at an early and impressionable age, later adult political frustrations in modern mass societies might be less easily contained; disillusionment with this norm of democracy might well find more favorable conditions for growth.

In leading to an early attachment to political efficacy as a legitimate expectation, childhood socialization may thus have central significance for the persistence of a democratic regime. It provides a reservoir of diffuse support upon which the system can automatically draw both in normal times, when members may feel that their capacity to manipulate the political environment is not living up to their expectations, and in special periods of stress, when popular participation may appear to be pure illusion or when political outputs fail to measure up to insistent demands.

The implications of our findings may extend far beyond the particular regime we have been examining. Our study suggests that we need not look only to conflicts and cleavages among interests in the political sphere for the basic sources of persistence and change in that aspect of the political system we have designated as the regime. Rather, a concurrent element contributing to the growth or erosion of support may be found in the orientations to norms acquired very early in the life cycle. We recognize that the early development of support for regime norms such as political efficacy may be unique to the American system, or at least to industrialized systems underpinned by popular education and mass communication. But the probability is otherwise. Our research strongly argues for the need for comparative research as a way of revealing the part played by primary political socialization in the growth and decline of support for political systems in their various aspects.

---

[21] Cf. O. G. Brim, Jr., and S. Wheeler, *Socialization After Childhood* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 8, 21 and 35ff.

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 19

POLITICAL DUALISM AND ITALIAN COMMUNISM*

SIDNEY G. TARROW
Yale University

The poverty of philosophy, for Marx, was its formalism. The social sciences, in contrast, are blessed with the ability to adjust theory to experience. In our study of Marxist movements, however, we lack precisely the marxian flexibility we need to overcome a patrimony of ideology, misinformation and rigidity. Writers like Duverger and Selznick, for example, talk about "devotee parties" and "organizational weapons" without considering that their terminology may in some cases be misleading.[1]

The devotee party, writes Duverger, "represents a change from the conception of the party as a class; it is the party conceived as the elite." Its members pledge their "whole human being" to the party while its structure focuses upon "unceasing propaganda and agitation," to the detriment of parliamentary activity.[2] Duverger leaves no doubt that his archetype of the devotee party is the Communist Party. What he never asks, however, is whether a Communist Party may be anything *but* a devotee party.

With a similar focus, Philip Selznick describes "the combat party," whose peculiar property is its "competence to turn members of a voluntary association into disciplined and deployable political agents," and its "adoption of subversion" and "penetration and manipulation of institutional targets."[3] While the model is most relevant in societies in which Communist doctrine is remote and unappealing to the population, Selznick, like Duverger, holds that it "provides a fair interpretation of the Communist vanguard or combat party, wherever it is found."[4]

Each of these approaches extrapolates a marxist party model out of a single political setting—the West before 1950—and a single party strategy—the Leninist strategy of *What is to be Done?* Neither writer considers the elementary marxian proposition that both party strategy and political setting can vary greatly, and that a model of a marxist party can emerge only from the interaction of the two. This article is an attempt to elaborate this proposition in one rich empirical setting: Italy, and particularly southern Italy, where the Italian Communist Party (PCI) is very different from the party of devotion and combat envisaged by Duverger and Selznick.[5] I hope to show (1) that the party's role differs sharply between advanced, industrial North and backward, traditional South; (2) that these variations can be ascribed both to Italy's dualistic political setting and to party strategy; and (3) that these two variables—political setting and party strategy—are the key to understanding marxist parties wherever they are found.[6]

I. THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

When we turn to the Italian Communist Party, we find most students close to the Selznick-Duverger view. For example, in his paper "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," Giovanni Sartori shares Selznick's emphasis on the party's capacity to withdraw members from other group loyalties ("the ability of the party's organizational network to produce a culturally manipulated isolation of given social groups in given areas") and his concern with the dual nature of Communist organization—a party of elite with mass following. He also shares Duverger's emphasis upon organization

---

* The research upon which this article is based was supported by grants from the Ford Foundation and from the Committee on Faculty Research of the Concilium on International Studies of Yale University. I wish to thank my colleagues Donald Blackmer, Joseph LaPalombara, Roger Masters, James Mau, Gianfranco Poggi, and Giovanni Santori, who read the manuscript and contributed many helpful criticisms.

[1] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, 2nd. rev. ed., North translation (New York: Science Editions, 1965); Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, 2nd. ed. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

[2] *Op. cit.*, especially p. 70, p. 2, and p. 58.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. xii, xv.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. vi.

[5] These data are presented systematically in the author's *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.)

[6] Intra-nation comparative analysis is creatively used by Juan Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Eight Spains," in Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); also see Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," in Eric Allardt and Yijo Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki: The Academic Book-Store, 1964).

but implicitly recognizes the weakness of the cells ("the organizational incapsulation and cultural saturation that a Communist *network* is capable of producing").[7] And while both Selznick and Duverger concentrate upon the subversive aspects of Communist activity, Sartori concludes that the PCI is outside the system altogether. He writes, "We thus come to the uncomfortable paradox that the Communist party would make for an excellent opposition if it were an opposition, i.e., a possible alternative government. But since it would replace the *system* as well as the people, the net result is that the country is deprived of its best potential elites. . . . "[8]

While no one would deny the Italian Communist Party's opposition to the present Italian regime, we gain nothing by substituting the scientific word "system" for the less inclusive term "regime." Secondly, Sartori overstresses the disruptive effect of the PCI. In a series of manipulative hypotheses, he maintains that "an extreme centrifugal development is very likely wherever the political system accepts not only as legal but also as a legitimate and somewhat equal and normal competitor a party . . . which opposes the very system, such as a Communist Party." He adds that "Such a centrifugal development will not necessarily follow . . . if the existence of anti-system parties is legally prohibited."[9]

Apart from the fact that these "hypotheses," if realized, would not make for a very democratic theory,[10] are we justified in concluding that the PCI is a devotee party and an anti-system party simply because it is the PCI? I would argue that, so contrary is the evidence and so rare the historical examples of flourishing parties of the type Duverger and Selznick describe, the burden of proof is on the other side.

What is the PCI like in very general terms?[11] Under the guidance of Togliatti and Longo its strategy since 1944 has been a broad national one, rather than the strategy of proletarian revolution and hegemony developed by Togliatti's predecessor, Antonio Gramsci. Returning from Moscow in 1944, Togliatti said "We are the party of the working class; but the working class has never been foreign to the nation," thereby launching what has come to be called the *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. Its general characteristics are: (1) constructive participation in parliament and in elections and local government; (2) a strategy of alliances which has at the same time emphasized the party's proximity to the Socialists, "sincere democrats" and the progressive wing of the Christian Democratic Party; (3) an ideology of "reform of structure" as the preferred means of constructing socialism in Italy; and (4) activity in local government, cooperative associations and stores, which both develops an efficient class of PCI administrators and ties the economic interests of large numbers of people to the party.[12]

Three general points should be made about the *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. First, it was developed by Togliatti as a strategic response to a particular political setting: a modern, industrial society which had been torn by twenty-two years of reactionary extremism. It was possible to interpret the party line in merely tactical terms in 1944 when the presence of Allied troops made revolution impossible, but the party's revisionism has, if anything, increased between that time and the present.

Second, it is not clear that there is anything about the PCI which would justify its classification as an anti-system party or a centrifugal force. I would argue that the symbiotic stability of the Italian political system (which is often confused with the instability of the French Fourth Republic) depends precisely upon the existence of a Communist Party like the PCI. Its broad, popular strategy and stress upon reform have both prevented the formation of radical leftist groups and forced a conservative government upon a path of reform that it would have avoided if left to its own devices.

---

[7] Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 145–147, emphasis added.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 147, emphasis added.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[10] See Sartori's excellent *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1965). The problem of the efficacy of a legal prohibition of anti-system parties may perhaps be settled by a consideration of the impact of prohibition upon the German Social-Democratic Party in the nineteenth century. The ban failed to interrupt its growth but did succeed in turning it into an anti-system party. See Douglas A. Chalmers, *The Social Democratic Party of Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 4.

[11] The party is analyzed in detail in Chapters Five and Six of *Peasant Communism, op. cit.* For a sensitive analysis of its external relations and policy line, see Donald Blackmer, *Italian Communism and the International Communist Movement* (Cambridge: M.I.T., mimeo.), 1966.

[12] Togliatti's important speeches and writings have been collected in three volumes: *Il Partito; La Via Italiana al Socialismo;* and *Sul Movimento Operaio Internazionale*, all published by Editori Riuniti of Rome in 1964. See in particular his "Promemoria sulle Questioni del Movimento Operario Internazionale e della sua Unita," published post-humously in 1964 in *Sul Movimento Operaio Internazionale*, pp. 361–376.

Third, and most important, it is impossible to talk reformism for twenty years and then carry off a revolution. What we see in the PCI is something we may tentatively call the institutionalization of strategy.[13] The communication of its militants, its image among the population and the structure of loyalties at the local level have been conditioned by the party's strategy over the last two decades. Once a commitment to vote-getting is made, a political party, marxist or otherwise, routinizes certain roles and behaviors and endows them with legitimacy. Were these roles and behaviors to suddenly shift, a complicated structure of loyalties based upon personal and group interest, and not upon the devotion of militants, would come tumbling down.

The party's strategy has had an impact upon its membership, its organization, its behavior and its internal unity. First of all, the typical party member is not a dedicated militant whose entire life is devoted to party work. Interviews and questionnaires carried out with PCI federal secretaries in 1964 showed that only 10 to 15 per cent of party members are full-time activists. Moreover, the number of party members has decreased sharply since 1956 and the ratio of members to voters has changed from one member for every three voters in 1956 to one member for every 4.8 voters in 1963.[14] Finally, the ideological preparedness of even the most militant party cadres is very weak. In 1962, a party report concluded that "the problem of launching an elementary activity of ideological education in the party on a wide scale remains an urgent one."[15]

Second, the classical unit of disciplined party activity—the cell—has been progressively weakened in the post-war years, while the party section has become more prominent. The shift is not coincidental; the *Via Italiana* is geared more closely to the loose, horizontally-linked party sections than to the narrow, vertically-linked cells. Between 1950 and 1963, the number of PCI cells decreased from 54,000 to 33,000 while party sections increased from 10,200 in 1951 to 11,000 in 1961.[16] Factory cells have become less important in contrast to the more heterogeneous neighborhood cells and sections.

Third, the PCI pays *primary* attention to parliamentary and electoral activity and has not been observed to dedicate itself to conspiratorial activities more than any other Italian party in the rather Byzantine Italian Party system. The increased importance of the party section is related to this emphasis, for the traditional cell structure is useless in winning elections, while the section functions as a typical party club.[17] In the trade-union field, the party-dominated Confederazione Generale Italiano del Lavoro (CGIL) now shuns the political strike weapon and concentrates upon bread-and-butter union issues. The infiltration of non-Communist organizations, which Selznick postulates as an essential element of combat party strategy, is nowhere evident in Italy, despite the party's substantial popularity.

While the PCI is by far the most disciplined party group in Parliament,[18] its voting patterns in secret parliamentary committees are far less rigid. A research group at Bologna recently estimated that PCI parliamentary committee members vote with the government on a large majority of committee votes. This high level of compromise voting was maintained even during periods of maximum intransigence in the Chamber.[19]

---

[13] The concept of institutionalization as used here is similar to its usage in Philip Selznick's *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957).

[14] See *Dati sull'Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1964), p. 4.

[15] See *Organizzazione del Partito* (Rome: PCI, 1962), p. 59.

[16] See "Modificazioni Strutturali e Politiche del PCI al suo IX Congresso," *Tempi Moderni,* 2 (April, 1960), p. 50; also see the official party statistics in *Forza ed Attivitá del Partito* (Rome; PCI, 1954); *Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1961); *Dati sull'Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1964).

[17] "Modificazioni Strutturali e Politiche del PCI," p. 30.

[18] Giovanni Sartori, *Il Parlamento Italiano* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1963), p. 105. Most of the interviewed Communist deputies felt that parliamentary discipline was not excessive, while the members of other parties interviewed were not at all satisfied with the constraints placed on their voting by the parties.

[19] The author is indebted to the Carlo Cattaneo Research Institute of Bologna for allowing him to refer to its as-yet unpublished study, *La Partecipazione Politica in Italia.* This multi-volume

The party administers over eighty communes in the central provinces of the country—the so-called "Red Belt." These local units perform all the typical functions of local government and maintain majorities which depend upon the satisfaction of concrete personal and group interests. The party administers a whole range of profit-making cooperatives which are essential to relations with workers and peasants. Major dislocations would occur in the economic life of thousands should the PCI suddenly turn to revolutionary strategy. Despite the possible tactical origin of its pattern of participation in Italian politics, the institutionalization of these tactics transforms them into commitments.

Several attitude studies have suggested that Communist leaders and followers have developed political attitudes which correspond to the party's broad strategy. A study of Italian parliamentarians carried out in 1963 revealed that Communist deputies scored lower on the Rokeach dogmatism scale than Christian Democrats.[20] Further evidence was provided by a CISER public opinion survey in the same year which demonstrated, first, that PCI supporters reflect the reformist doctrinal line of the party and, second, that certain key divergencies may be seen within the sample with regard to their presumed support for the PCI in a hypothetical two-party system; for example, only 60 per cent of the sample would choose the PCI in a bipolar choice between their own party and the Socialists![21] Third, Almond and Verba have pointed out that supporters of the left are more likely to be "open partisans" than supporters of the right. They write, "Opposed to the Constitution is a left wing which, at least in part and at the rank-and-file voter level rather than among the party elite, manifests a form of open partisanship that is consistent with a democratic system."[22]

In other words, the following of the PCI is far more pluralistic than has been generally acknowledged. The same appears to be true of the leaders, if the factional strife currently raging in the party is any indication. The right, led by Giorgio Amendola, would go further than Togliatti in examining the crimes of Stalin, in condemning the Chinese and in adapting the PCI to a reformist strategy. The left, on the other hand, returns ideologically to Gramsci's emphasis upon the factory and the trade unions, but seeks more internal democracy in the party and wants to empower the party Congress to make theoretical decisions in place of the bureaucratic Central Committee.[23]

Two facts are indicative of the relationship of the two factions to the PCI's *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. First, the left is neither the old sectarian Stalinist left, nor, as is sometimes imagined, a pro-Chinese group. It arose out of the crisis generated by the anti-Stalin campaign and the Hungarian Revolution and does not criticize the fundamentals of the *Via Italiana*.[24] Second, the new left arose in part with a basis of support in the Communist Youth Movement (FGCI), in whose publication, *Nuova Generazione*, they found an excellent forum, and in the trade unions, whose late leader, Giuseppe de Vittorio, was fond of telling Togliatti that the labor movement is *not* the transmission belt of the party. In other words, the internal diversification of a party which takes up the tasks of day-to-day operation in a parliamentary system encourages the development of internal differences which, if not themselves democratic, are at least competitive.

But the internal differentiation of the PCI is not merely ideological; it is structural and behavioral as well. The *Via Italiana* strategy opens the way to a variety of influences from the political setting. The most important such influence is the dualistic nature of the Italian political system itself. If the analysis up to this point has indicated that the PCI is not a devotee or combat party, it is only an analysis of what happens to the *Via Italiana* strategy in its two political settings which can suggest what the party *is*.

II. THE CONTEXT: THE TWO ITALIES

"Italy," Joseph LaPalombara writes, "represents two distinct cultures, the relatively dynamic and industrial North and the rela-

---

study will be published in the United States in shorter form under the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund.

[20] Di Rienzo, *A Study in Political Dogmatism* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Notre Dame University, 1963).

[21] These data are reported in Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, *Il Comportamento Elettorale in Italia alla Luce di Alcune Ricerche Condotte Direttamente sugli Elettori* (Bologna, mimeo, n.d.), pp. 150–153.

[22] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 115–116.

[23] See Pietro Merli-Brandini, "La Crisi del Pensiero Comunista," *Conquiste del Lavoro*, 18 (November 14–20, 1965) pp. 9–20.

[24] See Blackmer, *op. cit.*, on the important distinction between the old sectarian left and the new left and on the contrast between left and right within the PCI today.

tively stagnant South."[25] The disparity between the regions is not merely one of degree; it is a structural cleavage, observed by generations of statesmen and intellectuals, extending into the economic, social and political systems and presenting concrete obstacles to political integration.[26] While exhaustive analysis of Italian dualism is impossible in this context, several basic indicators may suggest the breadth of the economic, social and political gap between North and South.[27]

Economically, Italy has long been a "dual economy," with a dual labor market and a dual structure of industry.[28] The North is industrial, the South agricultural: out of fifty-eight northern provinces, thirty-five have more than half of the working population in non-agricultural activities, while in the South only four provinces out of thirty-two have more than 50 per cent of the active population outside agriculture.[29] In the industrial sector, most southern workers (500,000 in 1951) work in the small-scale traditional sector, while only 200,000 are employed in the large-scale modern sector.[30] In agriculture, the stable and productive commercial and family farms of the North contrast sharply with the unstable tenancies and *latifundia* of the South.

Socially, we find a rather mobile highly organized society in the North and a fragmented developing society in the South. Briefly, what the latter term designates is a social structure which has lost the functional coherence of tradition and has not yet achieved a modern organization of social roles. Historically, we can trace the emergence of modern social organization in the North to the typical western processes of commercialization and industrialization; commercialization set up a marketing and credit network while industrialization re-shaped social stratification through the discipline of the factory process.[31]

The South, in contrast, remains a fragmented developing society because commercialization, caused by the influx of northern goods after national unification in 1861, was not accompanied by industrialization; traditional social roles were undermined by commercialization, but in the absence of industrialization, they remained transitional and disorganized. Without industry, the attention of all major social groups focused upon the land, with results that soon became pathological.[32] The middle class, urban, aggressive and entrepreneurial in the North, was unproductive, provincial and land-oriented in the South.[33] The family retains an importance in socialization and economic allocation in the South far greater than its equivalent in the North; in a society in which modern forms of social organization have failed to crystallize, the family is a solidarity unit of almost pathological consistency.[34]

If we search for indicators of the South as a fragmented developing society, we can find them in the atomization of business enterprise and in the network of unstable and transitional roles in agriculture. The average industrial firm in the South employs 2.4 workers, as opposed to 7.5 workers in the North; only 13 per cent of southern firms have joint-stock ownership, as compared to 46 per cent in the North; and twice as many southerners (27.3 per cent) working in industry are owners and directors than in the North (12.8 per cent),[35] suggesting the dominance of the family enterprise over modern forms of business.

---

[25] Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups In Italian Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 37.

[26] The classical sources on the cultural cleavage between North and South are found in Gaetano Salvemini, *Scritti Sulla Questione Meridionale* (Milan: Einaudi, 1955); Francesco Saverio Nitti, *Scritti Sulla Questione Meridionale* (Bari: Laterza, 1958); Giuseppe Fortunato, *Il Mezzogiorno e lo Stato Italiano* (Bari: Laterza, 1911). The most important works on the historical development of the South are collected in Bruno Caizzi (ed.), *Antologia della Questione Meridionale* (Milano: Comunitá, 1955); and Rosario Villari (ed.), *Il Sud nella storia d' Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 1961).

[27] A statistical analysis of economic and social indices has been collected in *Un Secolo di Statistiche Nord e Sud, 1861–1961* (Rome: SVIMEZ, 1961).

[28] Vera Lutz, *Italy: A Study in Economic Development* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Ch. V.

[29] Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Compendio Statistico Italiano, 1958* (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1959), p. 17.

[30] Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[31] David Apter writes, "Industrialization is that aspect of modernization so powerful in its consequences that it alters dysfunctional social institutions and customs by creating new roles and social instruments, based on the use of the machine": *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), p. 68.

[32] See the analysis of southern Italian brigandage by Eric Hobsbawm in *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

[33] Gaetano Salvemini, "La Piccola Borghesia Intelletuale," in Caizzi (ed.), *Antologia della Questione Meridionale*, pp. 383–405.

[34] Edward Banfield and Laura Fasano Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

In agriculture, the situation is still more symptomatic. Until the agrarian reform of 1951, much of the land was operated by small renters, share tenants and day laborers on plots with no farmhouse or equipment. These marginal operating units are not "farms" in any significant sense of the word, nor they are commercial operations. Many peasants shift from one occupational role to another, while others (*figure miste*) hold several occupational roles at once.[36] The fragmentation of contractual ties between owners and peasants prevents the formation of horizontal secondary organization, inhibiting both economic development and political aggregation.

In the political system, the fragmented nature of southern Italian society has critical effects. Politics in the North have long been organized according to typical western patterns, with groups and parties growing out of the broad functional and class groupings of an industrial society. In the South, in contrast, a formal representative system disguised what amounted to a massive system of clienteles. *Clientelismo* grew out of the narrow vertical ties of a fragmented agricultural system. Organized by the liberal middle class of the provinces, which held a strategic role in landholding, it used the fulcrum of local government for patronage, and sent local notables to parliament to make up willing majorities for regional politicians. The ties between leader and follower are highly personal; an American research group found that in seventy-six towns of the South where the vote had shifted greatly,

> . . . the voters were motivated by strictly local and personal issues, that ideology and national issues played little part in determining their voting behavior, and that many shifts were simply the result of *clientelismo*, voters following a personal leader from one party to another.[37]

Structurally, the clientele pattern means that broad functional interests are not readily represented in politics, where personal favors and patronage are dominant. The failures of the system are patent; one reaches the apex of authority not by merging one's demands in a horizontal membership group, but by linking up to a hierarchical chain of personal acquaintance which may begin in the network of neighborly relations and reaches up to the state bureaucracy with little adjustment in structure.[38] The clientele chain soon grows too long for effective political allocation. It is this, and not a conspiracy by the industrialists of the North, which has made the South ineffective in the national political arena; faced by the well-organized interest groups of Milan, Turin and Genoa, southern clienteles are unable to bargain effectively since they can trade only in personal favors. The lack of political integration between the regions is not simply a matter of political culture, but is a *structural* factor; the clientele system is actually congruent with the South's fragmented social structure and resists or modifies the forms and techniques of a modern party system. Even a "monolithic" party like the PCI is profoundly affected by the dualism of the political system in Italy.

III. DUAL POLITY AND DUAL PARTY

Four dimensions are particularly interesting in comparing the PCI in northern and southern Italy: (a) the composition of the membership; (b) the party organization; (c) the leadership; and (d) its ideology.

(a) *Membership*. The membership of the PCI in northern Italy is concentrated in the medium and large-sized cities, while party membership in the South is dispersed in the countryside. Northern membership is consistent as well as concentrated: new members in the North composed less than six per cent of regional membership in 1961. In the South, in contrast, the party suffers from rapid turnover, with new members amounting to 13.9 per cent in 1961, during a period in which it was losing an average of 45,000 members a year.[39]

The sharpest difference in the membership of the PCI in North and South stems directly from the different social composition of the two regions: a working class cadre is strong in the North and weak in the South, while the peasantry is the bulwark of the party in the South (with 42 per cent of the members) and much weaker in the North (30 per cent). A historical factor colors the composition of the PCI membership in the South: the absence of an important labor movement to provide the experience and the cadres for political activity today. In this reversal of historical roles, the Communist Party in southern Italy resembles many marxist parties in non-western nations. In northern Italy, the PCI profits from the long experience of labor organization in the region.[40]

---

[35] SVIMEZ, *Un Secolo di Statistiche*, *op. cit.*, pp. 336–338.

[36] Vera Lutz writes: "The peasant is almost always what is called a mixed figure—small proprietor, tenant, share-cropper, wage earner. In the past, at least, the link between him and that part of the land which he farmed but did not own was in many cases a precarious one": *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[37] Cited in Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[38] Cf. Julian Pitt-Rivers, *People of the Sierra* (Chicago: Phoenix, 1961), p. 154.

[39] *Dati sull'Organizzazione del Partito*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Secondly, Communist Party membership in southern Italy differs radically in its composition from the northern wing of the party in the relative importance of intellectuals and students in its membership. While 25.8 per cent of the PCI's members live in the South, 40 per cent of the intellectuals registered in the party and 60 per cent of its student members are southerners.[41] The importance of intellectuals in the South increases as we move up the hierarchy from ordinary members to active cadres. Figures released in 1954 indicate that over 30 per cent of the members of the party's federal committees in the South were students, technicians, intellectuals or other professionals, as compared to less than 18 per cent in the North.

Turning to youth in general, we find that 34 per cent of the members of the party's Federations of Young Communists of Italy (FGCI) are found in the South, 10 per cent higher than the region's share of total party membership.[42] This factor perhaps reflects the deep frustration of youth in a developing society, where the symbols of affluence have recently become visible but the means of achieving them are not available. Women members of the party, in contrast, are concentrated in the North. Eighteen per cent of the party's female members live in the South as opposed to 82 per cent who live in the North. These figures reflect the traditional role of women in the South and their relative emancipation in the North.[43]

TABLE 1. PCI FEDERAL COMMITTEES PROFESSIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY REGIONS, 1954*

		North	South	Italy
Workers	(N)	1323	402	1725
	(%)	44.9	30.8	40.6
Agricultural workers	(N)	120	92	211
	(%)	4.1	7.1	5.0
Peasants	(N)	245	114	359
	(%)	8.3	8.7	8.5
Artisans	(N)	134	78	212
	(%)	4.5	6.0	5.0
White Collar	(N)	452	143	595
	(%)	15.4	11.0	14.0
Professionals, students and technicians	(N)	506	392	898
	(%)	17.2	30.1	21.1
Housewives	(N)	60	52	112
	(%)	2.1	4.0	2.6
Others	(N)	104	30	134
	(%)	3.5	2.3	3.2
Total	(N)	2943	1303	4264
	(%)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: PCI, *Forza del Attivita del Partito* (Rome, 1954), p. 67.

* More recent figures on the professional composition of federal committees are not available.

Perhaps because of its largely peasant composition, PCI membership in the South is less closely related to electoral success than in the North. Relating the percentage of the population registered in the PCI to the party's share of the provincial vote, we find that membership rises rapidly with electoral success in the North, while it is almost unresponsive to the polls in the South. Party membership ranges from 0.3 per cent of the provincial population in the lowest voting province to 17.4 per cent in the highest province in the North, but from 1.7 per cent in the lowest province to 3.5 per cent in the highest voting province in the South. Moreover, the rise in party members bears an almost geometric relation to the vote in the North when the vote is above 30 per cent, suggesting that the *Via Italiana* in that setting is a successful organizational and electoral strategy. In the South, in contrast, at no point in the electoral curve does membership rise above 4 per cent of the population, even when the vote is as high as 37 per cent.

The paradox of the *Via Italiana* in southern Italy is that the PCI has as its largest membership bloc a group with the poorest organizational potential. Rather than a popular mass party based upon the organized support of the urban proletariat, the PCI has the membership outline of a poor peasant's party in a fragmented developing society, with an intellectual leadership group and a scattering of worker and middle class groups on either side. Not only is its major membership group dispersed and poorly organized; unlike the urban and rural proletariat of the North, it is a group whose social aspirations belong to a rearguard and not a vanguard. The effects of this conservative center of gravity in the PCI membership group in the South can be noted in the inertia of its programs, which still insist upon the need for an agrarian reform at a time when thousands of peasants want only to escape from the land to the cities.

---

[40] While 42 per cent of the membership in the North are members of the working class, 32 per cent of the southern PCI members are workers. In the North, even in the agricultural regions, Emilia, Tuscany and the Marches, 36 per cent of the members are workers, more than the working class portion of the party in any southern region. See PCI, *Dati Sull'Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1964).

[41] Calculated from *ibid.*, pp. 22–27.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 74, pp. 15–17.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–27.

(b) *The Party Structure.* In its network of party sections, cells and factory cells, clear differences within the PCI between North and South are directly linked to the socio-political structure of each region. Seventy per cent of its party sections, 68 per cent of its cells and 92 per cent of its factory cells are found in the North.[44] In the large-scale industries of the major cities and the commercialized agriculture of the central provinces, these units operate with relative regularity and precision. Moreover, a panoply of secondary units—recreational groups, adult classes, and economic organizations—are articulated around the nucleus of the party cell and section. The relevance of these secondary organizations to the economic life of the worker creates the natural basis for the differentiation of program between party and mass organization—one of the bases of the Leninist party.

In the South, party organizations are less numerous and less articulated than in the North, and the differentiation of program between party and mass organization is far less clear. While 30 per cent of the party sections are in the South, only 11.4 per cent of its cells, and less than 8 per cent of its factory cells are found there. The decrease in articulation from level to level means that the PCI organizational pyramid is virtually inverted with respect to that of the North. In many places, there are more sections than cells, and the cells are far too large to permit their political use.[45]

Secondly, the number of secondary and mass organizations surrounding the party cells and sections is far smaller than in the North. In the absence of these groups, the section is often the single manifestation of the party in the southern village. The party member goes there to meet his friends and gossip, to play cards and watch television. Surprisingly, 42 per cent of the PCI sections in this impoverished region have television sets, as opposed to only 16 per cent in the North.[46] It is significant that the only PCI units in which the southern portion of the party carries its organizational weight are the *Circoli* of the Communist Youth Federation: 22.1 per cent of the national total are found in the region. Women's cells, on the other hand, are extremely underrepresented in the South, with 7.1 per cent of the national total. To one party leader, this results not only from the modesty of women in the region, but from resistance from PCI leaders. He writes, "Conceptions which assign to women a subaltern and a marginal role in society are not yet overcome by the PCI."[47]

A third organizational characteristic of the PCI in southern Italy which contrasts sharply with the North is the lack of the strategic differentiation between the programs of the party and the policies of the mass organizations. Launched in the region in an organizational vacuum, the party was compelled to recruit many members spontaneously and to fulfill many of the functions which normally fall to labor and other mass secondary groups. A number of party front groups were formed, but these inevitably drew upon the same cadres, and "very often the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Chambers of Labor and the Cooperatives were nothing but different faces of a single popular movement."[48] In some provinces, the membership of the party exceeds that of the unions and in others the reverse is true. The division seems to depend upon which group arrived first after Fascism. "One of the defects in our organization is that the party today pursues directly many of the activities which should be fulfilled by the secondary mass organizations."[49]

Organizational difficulties are encountered by all militant political parties in their early phases, but the PCI in southern Italy appears to have been permanently affected by these problems. Why this should be so relates to the socio-political milieu of southern Italy. As a party document states: "Experience has shown the great difficulty in organizing the masses of the southern peasants and, above all, of grouping them in organizations by category, because of their indeterminate social character."[50] This is particularly true in the backward areas of the region. As a Sardinian leader writes, "Every social category is fragmented in a guise which is difficult to locate. . . . More than twenty or thirty people in a village who are tied to a clear identity of interests cannot be found."[51]

---

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–63, *passim.*

[45] *Ibid.;* also see Celso Ghino, "Aspetti della Struttura della Organizzazione," *Rinascita,* 7 (March, 1950), p. 163.

[46] *Dati sull'Organizzazione del Partito, op. cit.*, p. 45.

[47] Pietro Valenza, "Alcuni problemi del Rinnovamento del PCI nel Mezzogiorno," *Cronache Meridionali,* 7 (January–February, 1960), p. 7.

[48] P. di Pasquale, "Dalla Politica di Salerno alla Crisi del Frontismo Meridionale," *Rinascita,* 13 (October, 1956), p. 543.

[49] Pietro Secchia, "Relazione," in *VII Congresso Nazionale, Atti e Risoluzioni* (Rome: PCI, 1951), p. 146.

The Communist Party in southern Italy has developed a style of organization distinctly different from its style in northern Italy. A resolution of the Central Committee defines it: "A multiplicity of popular assemblies, of committees for the land and other democratic organizations of an elementary type are necessary to give a primary and simple form of organization to masses of the people who are not socially concentrated and homogeneous."[52] This pattern of organization reached its apogee in the PCI-led movement for the occupation of the *latifundia* in 1950. Yet twenty years after the party began its activity in the South, its organizations still have an amorphous and fluctuating character.

(c) *Leaders and Leadership Roles.* As might be expected when dealing with political leadership in dualistic political settings, the backgrounds and career patterns of Communist leaders in northern and southern Italy differ sharply. Southern Italian Communist leaders are mainly middle- or upper-middle-class individuals with urban backgrounds. In the North, 48 per cent of the party's national level leadership are of lower- or lower-middle-class origin, while only 34 per cent of the southern leaders come from these groups. Eighteen per cent of the northern leaders are of middle-class status, compared to 28 per cent in the South; and 19 per cent of the northern leaders are of upper-middle or upper-class origin, compared to 32 per cent in the South.[53]

TABLE 2. PCI NATIONAL LEADERSHIP
SOCIAL STATUS OF FAMILY, BY REGION

	Lower	Lower Middle	Mid. & Up. Middle	Upper Class	Total
North (203)	18.2%	41.4	26.1	10.8	100.0%
Center (134)	16.8%	37.9	28.5	10.2	100.0%
South (107)	13.1%	25.2	35.5	23.4	100.0%
Islands (66)	7.6%	22.7	42.4	19.7	100.0%

Source: Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, unpublished data collected from PCI parliamentarians and national officers, 1964.

Northern and southern leaders differ in the size of the city of their origin, too. Northern leaders parallel the distribution of the population of the North in the cities of their birth; 15 per cent come from villages up to 5,000 in population, 26 per cent are from towns of 5,000–20,000, 12 per cent are from cities from 20,000–100,000 and 36 per cent are from large cities of more than 100,000 population. Most southern national leaders were born in the large towns and the cities from 20,000–100,000 population (31 per cent in the former and 36 per cent in the latter) with only 11 per cent from the small villages and only 20 per cent from cities over 100,000 in population. This distribution of southern leaders is hardly in keeping with the preponderantly rural membership of the party in the region.

Additional data on the leadership were collected by the author in a series of questionnaires and interviews with party secretaries on the provincial level.[54] Social origins on this level do not differ significantly between leaders in North and South, with lower-middle-class backgrounds predominant in each group. Educationally, however, marked contrasts are apparent; while provincial secretaries in the North are evenly divided between elementary or medium level education and secondary or college backgrounds, almost two-thirds of the southern leaders have graduated from high school or college, and little more than a third ended their education in elementary or high school; indeed, there is a chronic overabundance of intellectuals in the PCI in this backward region.

The geographic (and presumably social) mobility of the leaders differs between North and South, too. Forty-three per cent of the southern provincial leaders grew up in cities other than those of their birth, while 25 per cent of the northern leaders changed residence during the formative period of their youth. The northern leaders are characterized by greater career localism; 38 per cent hold positions in the cities and provinces of their childhood, 47 per cent work in a different city but in the same province, and 15 per cent hold a post outside the province of their childhood. In the South, half as many (19 per cent) work in the city and province of their childhood, 52 per cent hold posts in the same province but in different cities, and twice as many (29 per cent) have positions in entirely different provinces. Related to this factor is the greater breadth of experience of the southern leaders; 40 per cent have held positions in two or more provinces, while only 28 per cent of the northerners have worked in several provinces.

---

[50] Comitato Centrale, PCI, *Documenti*, 1951, p. 197.

[51] Velio Spano, "La Sardegna alla Vigilia delle Elezioni Regionali," *Rinascita*, 6 (March, 1949), p. 103.

[52] Comitato Centrale, PCI, "Risoluzione della Direzione," *Documenti*, 1951, p. 230.

[53] The data which follow on the PCI national elite were graciously provided me by Professor Gianfranco Poggi of the University of Edinburgh and of the Instituto Carlo Cattaneo.

[54] For a more extensive treatment of the data on the PCI provincial elite, see *Peasant Communism*, *op. cit.*, Ch. IX.

The southerner is a relative newcomer to politics. Turning again to the national leadership, we find that 58 per cent from the South are full-time professional politicians, as opposed to 67 per cent from the North. Half as many southern national leaders are the sons of Communist Party members, and very few have siblings, wives and children who are members of the party. On the provincial level once again we find that 53 per cent of the northern leaders entered the party from the Resistance movement, compared to 24 per cent in the South. The largest group of southern provincial leaders were recruited into politics while in college or during professional careers (28 per cent), or from the peasant or labor movement (36 per cent). In the North, in contrast, 11 per cent came from intellectual pursuits and 19 per cent joined the party from the labor movement.

The roles assumed by the leadership differ between North and South. Since fewer paid officials are available in the South, the provincial leaders in that region function more as generalists than in the highly-articulated federations of the North. Interview and questionnaire responses indicate that 45 per cent of the southern federations employ only one to five persons, 40 per cent employ six to ten persons and only 15 per cent employ over ten. In the North, in contrast, only 13 per cent of the federations employ less than five full-time officials, 45 per cent employ six to ten, and 42 per cent employ over ten.

While the southern membership of the party is spread out in the countryside, the leadership tends to cluster in the cities. The most dynamic party workers gravitate to the federations, where they can find greater social prestige and better positions. In fact, party leaders have often noted that the dispersion of party cadres in the villages has slowed up the process of formation of a leadership group, since organizers forced to live in the villages become demoralized and isolated, frequently becoming involved in "clientelistic relationships with local figures."[55] A disproportionate number of the full-time leaders of the PCI in the South are now stationed in the provincial capitals. Party sections in the villages often have a merely formal existence; they form and dissolve according to the issues of the moment and the season of the year—the peasant organizations are only truly militant in seasons when the planting and harvesting have been completed.

The disjunction between city and countryside, between middle class intellectual leaders and peasant members, is attitudinal as well as organizational. Southern leaders tend to view the peasants paternalistically. The failure of a substantial peasant cadre to develop in the party may be linked to such attitudes. As national leaders critical of the southern leadership maintain, "The party must advance further to liberate itself courageously from any elements of clientelism and paternalism which still exist here and there."[56] As one leader complained, "The formation of a new type of cadre of popular extraction is bound to meet or even instigate a certain resistance and danger of distortion from the residues of clientelism in the bosom of the popular movement."[57]

Southern provincial leaders are far more "political"—understanding "political" as public activity-orientation—and less "organizational" than their northern colleagues. There appears to be considerably more flexibility, less ideological closure and more discussion than in the northern federations. Southern leaders, one informant suggested, "have more political sensitivity than leaders in the North."[58] Another informant, a member of the party secretariat said,

> The cadres in the South are more politically sensitive, more flexible, more sensitive to the political nature of their problems. In the South, traditionally, everything is decided politically, for in a disorganized society, it is the relations between individuals which solve problems. In the North, in

---

[55] Pietro Valenza, "Alcuni Problemi del Rinnovamento del PCI nel Mezzogiorno," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[56] PCI, *IX Congresso Nazionale* (Rome: PCI, 1960), Vol. I, p. 231.

[57] Pietro Valenza, "Aspetti del Fanfanismo in Lucania," *Cronache Meridionali*, 5 (December, 1958), p. 865.

[58] Interview F-1, Naples.

contrast, we deal more with concrete classes and opposing groups, and less with contacts on a personal level. In the leaders of the South, therefore, political sensitivity and ideological subtleties are more important.[59]

Yet the greater political capacity of the southern leaders, according to these informants, is damaged by their organizational incapacity. As another informant in the national party organization said,

> The differences between northern and southern leaders are the differences in the characteristics of the regions. The northerner is more of a formalist; the southerner is more versatile but he is less organizationally oriented.[60]

The characteristic described as "political sensitivity" by party informants shades into personalism in relationships with followers and with the opposition. In interviews, provincial leaders in the South stressed such qualities as "prestige," "honesty," and "seriousness" as the factors which recommend them to the admiration of their fellow citizens. In the North, party leaders are more concerned with presenting a united face to the opposition. Southern leaders were far more conscious of the need to establish a network of ties with local elites than northerners, who interpret the Leninist policy of alliances as the affair of the party organizations themselves, pointing to relations with the Vatican rather than interaction with village priests.

In their relations with the rank and file, the southern leaders are personally oriented too. They spend much of their time helping job seekers, writing letters of recommendation for students and trying to resolve the legal disputes of the peasants. A leader writes, "There is a need to overcome the personalism, the tendency to divide into groups around one or another personality. This derives from the type of social organization of the South, and is a reflection of its social dis-aggregation in the files of our party."[61]

Southern leaders perceive their federations as more autonomous with relation to the party national office than do their northern colleagues. Each secretary was asked his opinion on the role a party secretary should play in relation to the national party organization. There were five alternatives presented, representing different degrees of autonomy or central direction. Northern leaders were ranged heavily on the side of central direction (66 per cent), with 17 per cent perceiving their role autonomously and another 17 per cent expressing moderate positions. In the South, in contrast, only 42 per cent were centralists, as many as 42 per cent were autonomists and 16 per cent were moderates.

TABLE 3. PCI FEDERAL SECRETARIES INDIVIDUAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS (N = 80)

		Political	Labor Oriented	Organizational	DK NA	Total
North	(N)	8	4	31	4	47
	(%)	16%	9%	66%	9%	100%
South	(N)	20	3	5	5	33
	(%)	61%	9%	15%	15%	100%
Italy	(N)	28	7	36	9	80
	(%)	35%	9%	45%	11%	100%

Source: *Peasant Communism*, *op. cit.*, Chapter IX.

In order to further explore the perceptions of their roles held by northern and southern leaders, provincial secretaries were asked in questionnaires and personal interviews: "In your work as party secretary, what are the most important things you do, in the order of their importance?" Responses were not contextually coded because of the small number of respondents, but were classified according to their political orientation, their labor orientation and their organizational content. The results are recorded in Table 3.

Naturally, all the responses contained a strong political element, but many incorporated elements which were specifically labor oriented, while many others were organizationally oriented. As the Table shows, two-thirds of the northern respondents perceive their roles predominantly in organizational terms, while almost two-thirds of the southerners include mainly political factors in their role perceptions.

(d) *Ideology*. Unlike French communism, which has been wholly dependent upon imported theory, the PCI was fortunate to possess its own theorist in Antonio Gramsci, whose writings in prison under the Fascists later became an important source for today's leaders.[62]

---

[59] Interview S-1, Rome.

[60] Interview S-4, Rome.

[61] *Cronache Meridionali*, 5 (May, 1958), p. 305.

[62] Gramsci's works are collected in the six-volume series, *Opere di Antonio Gramsci* (Torino: Einaudi, 1955), and selected in Carlo Salinari and Mario Spinella (eds.), *Antonio Gramsci: Antologia degli Scritti* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1963). A recent study of Gramsci's influence on the early period of the party is John M. Cammet, *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of the Italian Communist Party*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

What is most interesting, however, is the extent to which the *Via Italiana al Socialismo* in both North and South was formulated *without* Gramsci's aid, for he died in prison and his writings were not publicly disinterred until 1948.

Gramsci contributed two important ideas to his party's future ideology: the idea of the party as the modern Prince, and the concept of the alliance of northern workers and southern peasants. Both were Leninist in inspiration if not in tone.

Gramsci saw in *The Prince* "a creation of concrete imagination which could work upon a dispersed and disintegrated society to stimulate and organize its general will."[63] The modern equivalent of Machiavelli's Prince is the political party and its sublime role is organizing a new collectivity.

> The modern Prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual; it can only be an organism . . . the political party, which, time and again . . . knows how to form a new type of state.[64]

The party is a creative agent of education and revolution, "a collective intellectual," developing a new class of leaders out of an old and divided society.

A second aspect of Gramsci's thought regarded the backward and "dis-aggregated" nature of southern Italian society and its role in the future revolution. To Gramsci, North and South were not united nationally, but colonially; "The bourgeoisie of the North," he wrote, "has subjected the South of Italy and the Islands to the status of colonies for exploitation."[65] The South is ruled by an agrarian bloc of landed proprietors and intellectuals who are paid off by their northern bosses through parliamentary deals. The peasant is helplessly tied to the agrarian bloc through clientele relations with the landholders. Semi-feudal contractual relations dominate economic life, preventing the peasantry's emergence as a modern social force.

Left to themselves, the peasants of the South will dissolve into a "disorganized mass, a chaotic disorder of exasperated passions." Organized by the proletariat of the North, they are the motor force of the revolution. "The proletariat," Gramsci wrote, "will destroy the southern agrarian bloc in the degree that it succeeds, through its party, in organizing ever larger masses of poor peasants in autonomous and independent organizations."[66]

Several points are significant about this formulation of Gramsci. First, it separates North and South theoretically and admits that special factors condition the organization of the southern peasant. Second, the relationship is bilateral. "The workers of the factory and the poor peasants," he writes, "are the *two energies* of the proletarian revolution."[67] Third, the alliance is revolutionary and socialist, rather than tactical and democratic and there is no doubt about proletarian hegemony. Instead of what he calls the "magic formula" of the division of the *latifundia*, Gramsci proposes a "political alliance between workers of the North and peasants of the South to overthrow the bourgeoisie from the power of the state."[68]

The "organizational weapon" which emerged from these two central ideas—the party as the modern Prince and the alliance of northern workers and southern peasants—would have had a strong potential for revolution in an underdeveloped area like the South. Gramsci wanted the peasants to start an insurrection in the countryside to occupy the army, thereby leaving a clear field for a proletarian revolution in the cities. With allowance made for his unique style and sensitivity to Italian conditions, he is quite close to Lenin's model for a revolutionary party in a backward society. "Spontaneity" is rampant in the "dis-aggregated" southern peasantry, while the party as modern Prince is the embodiment of "consciousness." The parallel to Lenin's model, we may assume, was not lost on Gramsci.

In the North, Gramsci concentrated upon the factory. He wanted to transform society *from within*, as a preparation for the revolution. Gramsci's group in Turin wanted to establish the *Consigli di Fabbrica*, workers' councils which aimed at eventual assumption of the control of production. In 1919, he wrote:

> The socialist state already exists potentially in the institutions of the social life of the exploited working class. To tie these institutions together . . . means creating from then on a true and real workers' democracy.[69]

These ideas, actually of anarcho-syndicalist derivation, were denounced as "reformist experiments" by Gramsci's extremist opposition in the party.

The essence of PCI ideology since 1945 is the cross-fertilization of Gramsci's ideas with Togliatti's *Via Italiana al Socialismo.* And since the latter is essentially reformist in nature—calling for action within the constitutional system through structural reform—the combination ranges from the comic to the bizarre, with a good deal of practical common sense in between.

---

[63] Gramsci, *Note sull Machiavelli* (Torino: Einaudi, 1955), p. 3.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[65] *Antologia degli Scritti*, vol. II, p. 50.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[67] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 52, emphasis in the original.

[68] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 51.

[69] *L'Ordine Nuovo*, Torino: Einaudi, 1955, p. 10.

Gramsci's idea of the party as the modern Prince has, in North and South, lost its Leninist components and is now interpreted almost entirely in terms of Togliatti's emphasis upon national solidarity. Togliatti wrote in 1944:

> The central idea of the political action of Gramsci was the idea of unity: unity of the working class parties in the defense of democratic institutions and the destruction of Fascism; . . . unity of the socialist working masses with the Catholic working masses of the city and countryside; unity of the workers; unity of workers and peasants; unity of workers of the arm with those of the mind. . . .[70]

In the North we find the PCI operating with an increasingly reformist political ideology, with excellent results. For the *Via Italiana* is a strategy for industrialized societies. Emphasis is increasingly placed upon trade union action and structural reform within the capitalist system. Theoreticians have virtually adopted revised views on the evolution of capitalism, and party leaders talk of "insertion" in the processes of neo-capitalism to influence its direction. As a leading labor intellectual writes:

> The CGIL does not try to prevent the modernization of Italian capitalism. Instead of opposing neo-capitalist solutions *a priori*, we each time oppose more advanced and equally realistic and concrete solutions.[71]

In the South, the synthesis of the *Via Italiana* with Gramsci's formulations has been less happy. The party has obliterated his concept of a creative working class impelling a peasant motor force to revolutionary action in a bilateral relationship directed by the party as a modern Prince. Instead, it calls for a pluralistic *system* of alliances between many social groups which *suppresses* the insurrectionary force of the peasants. A partnership-turned-coalition is expanded into "a system with the working class at its head . . . and an alliance with the southern peasants, first, with the petit bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the progressive medium bourgeoisie, isolating the conservative and the large bourgeoisie."[72]

The alliance also loses its revolutionary character. We learn retrospectively that "Gramsci reaffirmed the real unity between workers and peasants in the common battle for the *structural renewal* of the Italian state."[73] There is a theoretical problem in the admixture of Gramsci and Togliatti: the first is revolutionary, the second reformist; taken together they are contradictory.

For example, the party inevitably impels the peasant "motor force" to action which is not revolutionary, for it simultaneously seeks the support of social groups whose interests would be threatened by a peasant insurrection. Moreover, lacking the "organizational weapon" of the Leninist party, PCI initiatives for the peasants do not enlist them in the battle for socialism, but support the peasants' own struggle to become petit bourgeois landowners. Hence, the limited agrarian reform which the party demanded in 1950 has aided the peasants of the South immeasurably, but not the party.

With neither a Leninist organizational weapon nor its revolutionary goals, the PCI in the South falls prey to the "objective conditions" of its political setting in a backward and fragmented society. The whole concept of the party changes from the creative catalytic agent envisaged by Gramsci into an amorphous movement which casts its net through diverse social strata, seeking issues which can unite them. As Togliatti wrote in a key theoretical article:

> Because of the social disorganization of the South, we need an organization of a conspicuously broad, popular nature, more than is necessary in the large industrial centres.[74]

As a result, the PCI in southern Italy shares the personalism, disorganization and ideological weakness of other political parties in that setting. Having applied a strategy well-designed for the industrial North to the backward South, *where the same conditions do not obtain,* the PCI in the South is *neither* an effective Leninist party *nor* a well-organized mass party, but something very different again.

---

[70] *Rinascita,* August 29, 1944.

[71] "Report on the Debate of the Central Committee of the PCI on the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU," *New Left Review,* nos. 13–14 (June, 1962), p. 153. For the re-interpretation of capitalism, see Istituto Gramsci (ed.), *Tendenze nel Capitalismo Moderno* (Rome: Ed. Riuniti), 1962.

[72] Mauro Scoccimaro, "Dottrina Marxista e Politica Comunista," *Rinascita,* May–June, 1945, p. 138.

[73] Franco Ferri, "Questione Meridionale e Unitá Nazionale," *Rinascita,* 9 (January, 1952), p. 10, emphasis added.

[74] Palmiro Togliatti, "L'Azione Democratica e Socialista nel Mezzogiorno," *Cronache Meridionali,* 1 (June, 1954), p. 412.

IV. AN INTERPRETATION

Neither in North nor South does the Italian Communist Party have the attributes of the devotee-combat party described by Duverger and Selznick. This illustrates two things, one that we should have known all along and another that requires a great deal more thought and elaboration. First, the role and structure of marxist parties cannot be derived abstractly as Duverger and Selznick attempt to do. Second, a theory of Marxist parties will only result, in true dialectical fashion, from analysis of the interaction of party strategy and political setting under many different conditions. Turning to this second consideration, we may well ask, "What then are the 'models' with which we may understand the Italian Communist Party in North and South?" In the North, Duverger provides us with an answer: the mass party. In the South, we must turn to the experience of marxist parties in the underdeveloped world.

It is ironic that Communism in northern Italy at mid-twentieth century should vindicate the nineteenth century Western European Social-Democratic tradition. By 1900, the advances made in western society had negated many of the assumptions of Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*. These assumptions had "presupposed a pattern of events which experience had shown to be no longer possible in Europe—*or indeed in any advanced country*."[75] The chauvinistic behavior of the Social-Democratic parties in 1914 and the failure of the revolution to spread to Western Europe in 1917 gave the finishing touch to Western European revolutionary socialism. Since then, every flourishing western socialist party has been a constitutional mass party, recruiting broadly and emphasizing parliamentary and electoral activity instead of the barricades and the *putsch*. The idea of the vanguard party, with which Marx had toyed in 1850 and Blanqui developed more fully, did not appear again until 1905 in Russia.[76]

For just as advancing conditions in Western Europe caused the transformation of European Socialism, "the obverse also applied: where the pre-1848 situation still existed, the fire that had gone out in the West might still burst into flames."[77] Lenin's double-edged contribution was to recognize the connection between political backwardness and revolution, and to develop an organizational weapon and a strategy tailored to these conditions. The Leninist party was the ideal weapon for making the revolution in a backward country, for it bypassed the weak and "spontaneous" proletariat and seduced the disorganized but potentially revolutionary poor peasantry. This is essentially the strategy Gramsci wanted to develop for southern Italy.

Lenin was convinced that the conditions of all backward societies demanded the strategy he had utilized in Russia. He told a group of Asian Communists:

> It is imperative for you to make a success of applying Communist theory and practice under conditions where the peasant is the primary class of the masses, where the task of struggle pending solution lies in the fight against the remnants of mediaevalism, but not in the fight against capitalism. . . .
>
> The solution to the above tasks . . . can . . . be seen in the over-all struggle already started in Russia.[78]

Yet he failed to conclude the obvious corollary: that the strategy used in Russia *would no longer do* in the advanced nations of the West, where capitalism and liberal democracy had already proceeded too far in satisfying the masses.

It is Togliatti's great contribution to have recognized this "bright side" of Leninism and to have responded with the idea of the *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. His statement that "It is impossible to conceive realistically of the advance towards socialism outside the fabric of Italian democratic life, outside of the struggle for the objectives that interest the whole society,"[79] is typical of this attitude.

When we examine the membership, the organization, the leadership and the ideology of the Communist Party in northern Italy, we can only be impressed by its successful adaptation and struck by its essential similarity to the "sociological type" of the mass party presented by Duverger: membership is broad and relatively unselective; loyalty is class-based and weak as compared to the religious loyalty of the devotee party; the cell is replaced in importance by the section, and formal centralization disguises factionalism and ideological rivalry; and party strategy focuses upon parliament, the trade unions and the mass media, in contrast to conspiracy and infiltration.

---

[75] George Lichtheim, *Marxism* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 125, emphasis added.

[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–127.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[78] V. I. Lenin, "Report Before the Second All-Russian Representatives Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Eastern Peoples," *Sochinenya* (Works) (Moscow: 1932), vol. XXIV, pp. 542–551, quoted in Lucian Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 26.

[79] *Rinascita*, August 29, 1944.

The proof of the essential compatability of the PCI's *Via Italiana* with the conditions of an advanced industrial setting is found in its incompatability with the conditions of the backward agricultural South. Here membership is inconsistent and weak; commitment is personal and interest-oriented; neither the cells nor the sections are well articulated; leadership reflects the clientelistic nature of southern politics; and party ideology is dispersive and "catch-all" in nature.

If the PCI in the South cannot be described as either a Leninist party or a mass labor party, what then is its nature? Here we must turn to the experiences of marxist parties in today's developing areas; in the combination of an underdeveloped setting and a non-Leninist strategy, the PCI in southern Italy has emerged as a type very similar to political movements in the new nations. David Apter writes:

> The central characteristics of the movements, whatever their forms, are their spontaneous and populist qualities, the direct relationship between the leadership and the people, the high degree of emotional appeal of their programs, and the simplicity of their aims.[80]

Not only does the PCI in southern Italy reflect many of these characteristics, it also reflects the failure of this type of movement to grapple successfully with many of the needs of the underdeveloped areas. The problem is one which a careful reading of Lenin could have predicted to party leaders: a marxist party in a backward country which lacks a Leninist organization will advance the (not necessarily progressive) goals of the peasant population without advancing the goals of the party. It thus appears as a sophisticated structure of patron-client relations fortified by an ideology that is more populist than marxist and led by intellectuals who are more bourgeois than proletarian.

All this leads us back to the question of the relevance of Duverger and Selznick and other western theorists to the study of marxist movements. The foregoing analysis shows that *neither* in northern nor southern Italy do we find the devotee or combat party. In the first, the combination of a highly developed setting and an open strategy have led to the emergence of the PCI as a mass party. In the second, the same open strategy in a fragmented developing society leads to another sociological type—one closely related to the political movements we now see in the new nations. Had the party in southern Italy been more rigorously Leninist in its strategy, as Gramsci was, we would have seen a third sociological type: the vanguard party, which can overcome the "spontaneity" of a backward society with the "consciousness" of a revolutionary leadership.

Where does this leave the devotee or combat model developed by Duverger and Selznick? It leaves it a poor fourth, a historical mutant in which a strategy designed for underdeveloped societies was mistakenly applied to the West in its high stage of industrialization. That this combination was an unhappy one may be seen in the sorry history of the Communist Party in both Germany and the United States, where an elite of revolutionaries became a sect of devotees persecuted for their beliefs and "outside the system" in a scientific, as well as in a political way. Such a pattern is not inevitable however, as is evident upon examination of marxist parties in places like Italy.

---

[80] *The Politics of Modernization*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

BAR POLITICS, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL INTERESTS*

RICHARD A. WATSON, RONDAL G. DOWNING, AND FREDERICK C. SPIEGEL
University of Missouri

In modern political systems, parties undertake the prime responsibility for nominating public office holders, while interest groups attempt to influence public policy by seeking access to the centers of governmental power.[1] Yet recent developments in the selection of state judges have given a private interest group, the Bar, a role in choosing members of the Bench which, in essence, parallels that of traditional party organizations.[2] A Plan developed by the American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society, first adopted by Missouri in 1940,[3] grants the legal profession a direct, formal role in the selection process;[4] under its provisions, commissions, composed of lawyers, judges and laymen, nominate panels of names from which the governor of the state makes his judicial appointments. As the system works in actual operation,[5] the Bar becomes the key group in the nomination process, since the lawyers and judges on the commissions possess superior knowledge about potential candidates for judgeships, and also outnumber the lay members of these bodies. Beyond this, the Plan restricts the discretion of the governor, who must make the ultimate appointment from among the three nominees.[6] It also protects judges from ordinary political forces once they are in office, because subsequent judicial elections are in reality plebiscites in which appointees run "on their records" with no opponents.[7]

Heralded by one of the leaders of the American Judicature Society as the "greatest single event of this century in the field of judicial administration,"[8] this Plan (referred to as the Nonpartisan Court Plan and the Merit Plan, as well as the Missouri Plan) has become the model of a national movement designed to eliminate the election of state and local judges. Since 1956, voters in four states, Alaska, Iowa, Kansas and Nebraska, have accepted the Plan, and features of it apply to courts in six other states.[9] Moreover, in some areas where the Plan has not been legally adopted, its principles have been put into effect. Governors Scranton of Pennsylvania and Love of Colorado as well as Mayor Wagner of New York City, have voluntarily utilized nominating commissions for their appointments.[10] Meanwhile, the Plan is being debated in bar associations and state legislatures in other states, and has recently been suggested for the selection of federal judges as well.[11]

---

* The material for this article is drawn from a general study, *The Politics of the Bench and the Bar: Judicial Selection Under the Nonpartisan Court Plan,* conducted by the authors with the assistance of grants from The Social Science Research Council and The Research Center of the University of Missouri. The forthcoming, full-length study is to be published by John Wiley and Son.

[1] See V. O. Key, Jr. *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), pp. 18 f.; and Hugh Bone, *American Politics and the Party System,* 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 549. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman suggest that "the development of a modern party system means that the performance of the political recruitment function by other structures, such as interest groups and the media of communication, tend to pass through and be processed by the party system before they emerge as acts of political recruitment": *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 18.

[2] Initially the leaders of the profession sought to minimize the power of party organizations in electing judges through such devices as judicial nominating conventions, nonpartisan judicial ballots and separate judicial elections, and to enhance their own influence by means of referenda in which bar associations evaluated the capabilities of the various judicial candidates and passed on their recommendations to the electorate. When these approaches failed to bring the desired results, the leaders sought to substitute the Bar for the party organizations as the major agency in the recruitment process.

[3] Jack W. Peltason, *The Missouri Plan for the Selection of Judges* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1945), Ch. II, contains an excellent account of the judicial reform movement in the United States and the role of various organizations and individuals in its development.

[4] The role of the Bar in this selection system is to be compared with the one exercised recently in the appointment of federal judges. The ABA Committee on Federal Judiciary has established working relationships with the Senate Judiciary Committee, which possesses the confirmation power, and the Attorney General's Office, which helps to investigate nominees; but the Committee's function is informal and advisory, and whatever influence it exercises is at the sufferance of the Committee and the Attorney General. See Joel B. Grossman, *Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

[5] This conclusion is based upon our general study of the Plan in which we analyze the relative influence the lawyer, judge and lay members of the commissions have exercised on nominations over the years.

[6] This situation is to be contrasted with that in California where the Governor makes initial choices of judges to be appointed to the appellate courts, subject to confirmation by a Commission on Judicial Appointments, composed of members of the Bar.

[7] In the twenty-five year operation of the Plan, only one judge has been voted out of office. This occurred in 1941.

The number of jurisdictions affected by this movement makes it an important issue of current public policy. But beyond this, the Plan raises a key question in democratic theory: to what extent is the role played by the Bar in choosing judges consistent with the tenet that the selection of policy-making officials should not reflect only the desires of a particular private group, but that broader social interests should also be represented in the process?[12]

The answer to this question can only be determined empirically with reference to the actual participation of the Bar in the selection process. This paper examines the nature of that participation in Missouri over the period of the past quarter-century, by analyzing that part of the system's operation on which the interest of the legal profession is most clearly focused, and in which no other groups participate, namely, the elections in which lawyers choose their representatives to the nominating commissions. Since the persons selected in these contests play such an important role in determining who will ultimately be appointed as judges, these elections stimulate interest and activity among lawyers, and also reveal varying perspectives concerning judicial selection held by different segments of the legal community.

As the paper demonstrates, these elections have spawned a party subsystem operating in the legal community similar to a general party system existing within the larger political order. The first four sections of the paper, therefore, analyze Bar politics within the conceptual framework of a general party system, namely, what bar groups constitute the competing "parties," and what are the social and ideological differences between them; how they go about marshalling their resources in the electoral contests and what they conceive to be the "stakes" of such contests. The final section relates this party subsystem to the theoretical question involving the representation of social interests in the selection of policy-making officials.

I. CLEAVAGES WITHIN THE MISSOURI BAR

The Nonpartisan Court Plan has most relevance for the Kansas City and St. Louis areas in Missouri. Lawyers in these communities elect members to the separate commissions which nominate candidates to the circuit courts (those of original, general jurisdiction in Missouri) in Jackson County and St. Louis City;[13] judges in the remaining forty-one "outstate" circuits are chosen by popular election.[14] All attorneys in the state are eligible to vote for members of the Appellate Commission which nominates candidates for the three intermediate courts of appeal in the state, as well as for the supreme court,[15] but since about three-fifths of the state's attorneys practice law in the two largest urban centers, the "city" vote is the most crucial in these contests. Therefore, this paper concentrates on the politics of the Kansas City and St. Louis Bars relating to judicial selection.

---

[8] Address by Glenn R. Winters, Executive Director of the American Judicature Society, before the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City on April 8, 1964, at page 8.

[9] The Plan is utilized to choose judges to courts in Birmingham, Alabama, Dade County, Florida, Denver, Colorado and Tulsa, Oklahoma. In addition, California and Illinois utilize the tenure aspects of the Plan whereby judges run in noncompetitive elections.

[10] *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, 48 (1964), p. 133. Mayor Lindsay has made a pledge to continue the practice in New York City, and to work for the permanent establishment of a nominating commission by constitutional amendment: *ibid.*, 49 (1965), p. 124.

[11] The American Judicature Society published in the August, 1965 issue of its *Journal* (at pp. 47–52) a speech by Royce H. Savage, General Counsel of Gulf Oil Corporation, suggesting that the Plan be extended to the federal courts. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania introduced a bill in the Eighty-Ninth Congress to accomplish this objective.

[12] The rationale for the use of the political party rather than the interest group as the recruiter of personnel in a modern democratic society is that the party "aggregates" interests, that is, it combines, accommodates and takes into account a variety of social interests in the course of the recruitment process: cf. Almond and Coleman, *op cit.*, pp. 38 ff.

[13] Each circuit nominating commission is composed of two lawyers elected by members of the Bar residing in the circuit court jurisdiction, two laymen from the jurisdiction appointed by the Governor and the presiding judge of the Court of Appeals of the area, who serves as *ex officio* chairman.

Prior to the 1930's, there was only one bar association in Kansas City and one in St. Louis,[16] but lawyers in both communities developed schisms in their ranks during the depression period. Accounts indicate that a fight over the enforcement of canons of legal ethics, a matter that has caused difficulties in other metropolitan areas as well,[17] triggered the split. A concerted campaign against "ambulance chasers" and criminal attorneys by certain leaders of the Kansas City and St. Louis Bar Associations, polarized the Bar in both cities. Lined up on one side of the issue were "plaintiffs' lawyers," those representing injured persons in personal injury cases, and on the other, "defendants' lawyers," those having as clients the parties (primarily insurance companies and business concerns) being sued. Included as allies of the former were criminal attorneys; joining the ranks of the latter group were lawyers representing primarily corporations, particularly established economic institutions such as railroads, banks, insurance companies and public utilities, in all kinds of legal matters, not just those involving personal injury cases.[18]

As a result of this cleavage in the Bar, a power struggle took place in the bar associations in both cities, with the plaintiffs' group seeking to gain influence at the expense of the established defendants' attorneys that had traditionally been in control of both organizations. In the case of the Kansas City Bar Association, the plaintiffs' lawyers won the battle by joining the Association in numbers, and once in, winning its leadership positions. This caused the defendants' group to bolt the organization and form a new one called the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City. On the opposite side of the state, the reverse situation occurred. The St. Louis Bar Association "establishment" succeeded in excluding many plaintiffs' lawyers from its membership altogether and maintained firm control over the key offices of the organization. This led the plaintiffs' attorneys there to form another organization, known as the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis. The end result of these developments was the division of the Bar in both communities, with the plaintiffs' lawyers in control of the Kansas City Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis, and the defendants' attorneys in the driver's seat of the St. Louis Bar Association and the newly-formed Lawyers' Association of Kansas City.

This division of the Metropolitan Bar has had direct relevance for judicial selection in Missouri over the years. In the late 1930's, when the elective system was still in effect, the two St. Louis associations conducted separate bar polls which often resulted in the voters' securing conflicting advice from the legal profession concerning qualified candidates for the Bench. When the campaign for the adoption of the Nonpartisan Court Plan was launched, leaders of the defendants' organizations in both cities campaigned for its adoption, while their counterparts in the plaintiffs' groups generally opposed it.[19] Once the Plan was adopted, the rivalry between the Bar and Lawyers' Association in each metropolitan community shifted so as to take place within the framework of the new selection system, with the respective bar groups' backing separate candidates in the lawyer elections, as discussed subsequently in this paper.

---

[14] *The Constitution of the State of Missouri*, 1945, Art. V, Sec. 29 (b), provides for the adoption of the Plan by voters in other judicial circuits, but the Missouri Supreme Court has ruled that this section is not self-executing and requires legislation to make it effective: *State ex rel. Millar v. Toberman*, 360 Mo. 1101, 232 S.W. 2 d 904 (1950). Several attempts to pass such legislation have failed.

[15] The appellate nominating commission includes three lawyers elected by members of the Bar (one from each of the Court of Appeals' jurisdictions into which the state is divided), three laymen from the same jurisdictions appointed by the Governor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who serves as *ex officio* chairman.

[16] The Bar Association of St. Louis was established in 1874. See *The Bench and Bar of Missouri: History of the Bar Associations of St. Louis and Missouri* (St. Louis: The St. Louis Star, 1899), p. 7. The exact date of the formation of the Kansas City Bar Association is undetermined, but Roscoe Pound notes in his study, *The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times* (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1953), p. 315, that it was listed in an official report of the American Bar Association issued in 1887.

[17] Jerome Carlin deals with problems of legal ethics in Chicago in *Lawyers on Their Own* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1962), and in New York City in *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966).

[18] Some lawyers refer to this latter group as "defendants' lawyers," while others prefer to be more precise and call them "corporation attorneys." In any event, all parties agree that they belong with the defendants' group with respect to this division within the Bar.

These historical developments provide some important clues concerning the kinds of cleavages in the legal community which have had an impact on judicial selection in Missouri. They suggest that the plaintiff-defendant dichotomy has been a key factor in the polarization of the metropolitan Bar. With this as a starting point, we extended our current analysis to a broad exploration of the differences between the attorneys in the respective bar associations in the two communities. In doing so, we found that certain concepts developed by students of the sociology of the legal profession relating to "styles" of law practice[20] were very relevant to our study. As social and economic differences between Republicans and Democrats serve to illuminate the nature of our general party system, so similar distinctions between Bar and Lawyers' Association lawyers help explain the nature of the "two party system" that has developed in the metropolitan legal community for electing representatives to the judicial nominating commissions.

We gathered our data for this analysis from two major sources. The first was a series of personal interviews with the attorneys in both communities we thought would have the best insight into the schism in the Bar, namely, officers of the respective Bar and Lawyers' Associations, prominent plaintiffs', defendants', and corporation lawyers and certain essentially "neutral" members of the legal profession whose practices tended to remove them somewhat from the conflict. We supplemented this information with data elicited in a mailed questionnaire to a sample of the Missouri Bar.[21]

The first facet of differences in the bar associations we explored related to specialties of legal practice. Our interviews indicated that the plaintiffs'-defendants' split that led to the establishment of the two associations in both Kansas City and St. Louis is still salient in Bar circles. In fact, it has been exacerbated in recent years by the formation of the National Association of Claimants' and Compensation Attorneys, an organization designed to make personal injury lawyers more effective opponents of attorneys representing employers and insurance companies.[22] The aggressive policies of this national interest group[23] and its affiliate Missouri state chapter, serve to rally the plaintiffs' lawyers (the "NACCA" and "MACCA" men), and alarm the defendants'

---

[19] Peltason, *op. cit.*, Ch. III.

[20] The major studies utilized were Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own, op. cit.;* his *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession* (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, August, 1962, mimeographed); Edgar Smigel, *The Wall Street Lawyer* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); and two articles by Jack Ladinsky, "Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice and Legal Institutions," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), pp. 47–54, and "The Impact of Social Background of Lawyers on Law Practice and the Law," *The Journal of Legal Education*, 16 (1963), pp. 127–144. Richard Wells refers to these studies as relating to "styles" of practice in "The Legal Profession and Politics," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1964), pp. 166–190.

[21] Since the Missouri Bar is integrated, we were able to use the membership of the State Bar Association as our "population." In May of 1964, we mailed a questionnaire to every other member of the Bar (3303 of 6606) and received 1233 replies, a 37 per cent response. This means that almost one-fifth of the lawyers in the state are included in our sample. Moreover, a comparison of the sample with the total population of Missouri lawyers analyzed in *The 1964 Lawyer Statistical Report* (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1965), indicates that it is very representative in such characteristics as geographical location of practice, law school education, and kind of practice arrangement. The age composition of the sample also reflects that of the State Bar with the exception that older lawyers are slightly underrepresented.

[22] The organization was established in Portland, Oregon in 1946 by 11 men, and six years later had a membership of 2,000 lawyers located in every state in the nation. One of the leaders of the group, Samuel B. Horowitz, explains its origins, purposes and activities in "NACCA and Its Objectives," *NACCA Law Journal*, 10 (1953), pp. 17–43. Recently the name of the organization was changed to the American Trial Lawyers' Association.

[23] In addition to the publication of its journal, NACCA has been active in establishing lectureships at law schools, writing articles for law reviews, developing a library on the rights of injured workers, and lobbying before legislative bodies. See Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 25ff.

attorneys,[24] a development which naturally intensifies the rivalries of the two segments of the Kansas City and St. Louis Bars. We also were told that the basic division of the plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers into the respective associations still persists, although a spokesman for the defense attorneys in the St. Louis area volunteered the information that many of their group had joined the Lawyers' Association there in recent years "to keep an anchor on the plaintiffs' boys to prevent them from completely taking over the organization."

We also expanded our analysis beyond the plaintiff-defendant dichotomy to ascertain other differences in practice specialties associated with Bar and Lawyers' Association memberships. We wanted to determine whether the corporation lawyers still ally themselves with the defendants' counsels, as was true with the 1930's, and if criminal law specialists continue to join forces with plaintiffs' attorneys as they did when both groups were targets of the legal ethics campaign in the depression years. We also explored the possibility that other practice specialties that divide the legal profession were relevant, that is, whether lawyers handling domestic relations and labor matters for unions tend to identify with the plaintiffs' attorneys, while probate and trust lawyers find common cause with those on the defendants' side of the Bar schism.

Our source of data to test these matters—as well as others that follow—is the sample survey referred to above. Lawyers were asked to indicate the bar associations they belonged to, and on this basis, the respondents in the Kansas City and St. Louis areas were each divided into two groups, the Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association.[25] Information on practice specialty was elicited by an inquiry requesting each lawyer to select from a list of ten possibilities, the fields (up to three), in which he had earned most of his income or salary since being admitted to practice.[26] Table 1 shows the way in which the specialties are divided between the bar groups in each city.

Table 1 indicates that, generally speaking, the practice specialty divisions are as anticipated. Plaintiffs' lawyers constitute a greater proportion of the memberships of the Kansas City Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis than of their rival associations; the defendants' attorneys tend to be a more important group in the Kansas City Lawyers' Association than in the Bar Association of that city. The latter pattern is not true, however, with respect to the St. Louis Bar organizations, and apparently there is some inclination for defense attorneys to also join the Lawyers' Association there today as was suggested in our interviews. The corporation lawyers identify with the defendants' bar groups, and the attorneys handling domestic relations and criminal matters with the plaintiffs' associations. The remaining specialty divisions explored, namely, probate and trust, and labor, are in the directions expected. That is, lawyers with the former kind of practice tend to side with the defendants' bar groups, and the latter with the plaintiffs', but the differences are not as marked. The survey data also indicate that lawyers representing unions constitute a very small group in the total practice picture.[27]

While an analysis of the Bar along practice specialty lines gives some valuable clues into significant cleavages in the profession, it also has some distinct limitations. As Table 1 indicates, many lawyers do not concentrate all

---

[24] For an article expressing this concern, see Robert P. Hobson, "NACCA—As Viewed by Defense Counsel," *Kentucky State Bar Journal*, 20 (1956), pp. 170–172.

[25] Although there were a considerable number of lawyers in each community who belonged to both the Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association, those with overlapping memberships were similar in characteristics to those belonging to the Lawyers' Association alone. Combining the two groups, therefore, does not distort the analysis, and we did this under the category of Lawyers' Association. Apparently, as our interviews seem to indicate, the decision to join the "rebel" organization (the Lawyers' Association in each city) represents the important associational commitment on the part of a lawyer, and a simultaneous membership in the older, official Bar Association tends to be a matter of tradition and form.

[26] In addition to those discussed in this article, the fields included real property, municipal and administrative law, and negligence and/or compensation, equally for plaintiff and defendant. In developing the list, we were guided by the approach to this same subject in an official State Bar study entitled, *The Missouri Bar—Prentice-Hall Survey: A Motivational Study of Public Attitudes and Law Office Management*, 1963.

[27] A recent article, "The Lawyers of Labor," *Fortune* (March, 1961), p. 213, estimates that some 500 American attorneys serve unions, either as salaried "house counsel," or as lawyers in private practice who are on a retainer fee. *The 1964 Lawyer Statistical Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 26, sets the total number of lawyers in the United States in 1963 as 296,069.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED FIELDS OF LEGAL PRACTICE AMONG MEMBERS OF MAJOR BAR ORGANIZATIONS IN KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS AREAS

Field of Practice	Kansas City Bar Assn.	Lawyers' Assn. of Kansas City	St. Louis Bar Assn.	Lawyers' Assn. of St. Louis
	(N = 137)	(N = 178)	(N = 260)	(N = 157)
Plaintiffs'				
Only field*	14%	2%	5%	14%
One of 2 or 3 fields†	30	8	7	29
Defendants'				
Only field	8	12	10	11
One of 2 or 3	1	11	7	7
Corporate and Business				
Only field	7	18	23	10
One of 2 or 3 fields	27	37	29	21
Domestic Relations				
Only field	0	0	0	0
One of 2 or 3 fields	20	6	7	20
Criminal				
Only field	1	0	0	3
One of 2 or 3 fields	10	1	2	5
Probate and Trust				
Only field	6	8	3	1
One of 2 or 3 fields	21	28	38	34
Labor				
Only field	1	0	0	2
One of 2 or 3 fields	2	2	2	3

* Only field of practice selected by lawyer.

† Field listed by lawyer as one of two, or one of three, major fields of his practice.

their practice in one field. This means that these attorneys cannot be neatly categorized on this basis.[28] Moreover, some of the specialties are broad, and obscure important distinctions between kinds of practices included within them. For example, some attorneys with a corporate and business practice represent huge corporations, while others service partnerships or individual concerns. Likewise, the size of decedents' estates handled by probate lawyers varies greatly. Other important distinctions can be made on the basis of the complexity of the tasks performed for a client: one lawyer may handle small routine matters for a corporation, while others may provide business concerns with complex advice involving a thorough knowledge of taxation and finance.

Perhaps the best index of the kinds of clients a lawyer services, and the complexity of the legal work he handles, is the organizational setting in which he practices law. The arrangements run the gamut from the solo practitioner, who has his own office, or shares an office, and common overhead expenses as well, with other attorneys, to the array of partners and associates of the larger law firms. Lawyers we interviewed often cast the distinction between the members of the Bar and Lawyers' Associations in these terms. Moreover, such differences are highly significant for a social analysis of the Bar, since Carlin found in New York that size of firm was the "single most significant indicator of status" in the legal profession.[29]

Another factor generally related to social status is income. Although the Law ranks as one of the three most lucrative professions in our society,[30] there is a considerable disparity in earnings among lawyers.[31] Moreover, such income differentials have been indentified as an important source of cleavage in the Bar.[32]

---

[28] Our survey data do show, however, that lawyers tend to combine certain practice specialties such as corporate and probate and trust, and plaintiffs' and domestic relations.

[29] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession, op. cit.*, p. 21.

[30] *The Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965* (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1965), p. 230, lists the median income of dentists, lawyers and physicians as over $10,000 a year. No other professional, technical or kindred occupation reaches that level.

We gathered information on organizational setting for the practice of law and income in our sample survey to determine whether differences in these matters were relevant to Bar and Lawyers' Association memberships in both Kansas City and St. Louis. We asked each respondent to select from among nine alternatives, the kind of practice arrangement in which he had spent most of his time since being admitted to practice.[33] The questionnaire also requested information on average yearly net income during the period of the past three years. Replies to these inquires are categorized by bar association in Table 2.

Table 2 indicates the differences in the practice arrangements of members of the rival bar associations in both communities. The disparities are greatest at the opposite ends of the private practice spectrum, that is, between solo attorneys and those in large firms. The former dominate the plaintiffs' associations and the latter (both partners and associates) identify with the defendants' bar groups. The differences in size of firm are most evident when partnerships reach the size of six or more. In fact, the smaller firms, those with two to five partners, are represented fairly equally in the respective bar associations. Lawyers not in private practice, that is, those working for corporations or government agencies, also fail to identify clearly with either bar group, and whatever preferences do exist for the former group, differ between the two cities.

Income differentials are relevant for the Kansas City bar group divisions, although not quite as pronounced as those relating to size of firm. The attorneys with the more lucrative practices tend to be concentrated in the Lawyers' Association. Twice as many of them as Bar Association members earn $20,000 a year or more, and fewer have net incomes below $10,000. However, the same situation does not apply in the St. Louis area. The distribution of incomes below $10,000, $10,000–$20,000, and above $20,000 are almost identical between members of the two associations there. Thus practice arrangement is a more important factor than income for Bar association identification in both metropolitan communities.

We explored two other factors pertaining to social status, partisan affiliation and education, to determine whether they have any relevance for the associational cleavages in the Metropolitan Bar. Some of our interviewees, particularly on the plaintiffs' side of the Bar, saw the differences in the bar groups in partisan terms, and linked Republicanism to what they termed a "silk stocking," that is, a high status, practice. Few persons commented on law school ties in our interviews, but students of the sociology of the legal profession have found this to be an important factor differentiating elements of the Bar.[34] Data on these matters elicited in our questionnaire[35] are categorized by bar group in Table 3.

Table 3 indicates that there are far more Republicans in the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City and the St. Louis Bar Association than there are in the rival bar groups, where Democrats predominate. The fact that half or more of the members of the former organizations identify with the Republican party is

---

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 229, categorizes attorneys' salaries in seven work levels in terms of duties and responsibilities. The average salaries of the seven levels range from $7,248 to $24,288. Maurice Liebenburg in "Income of Lawyers in the Postwar Period," *Survey of Current Business*, 36 (1956), pp. 26 f., finds that in 1954 the median income of lawyers in the United States was $7,833, but one-third received incomes below $5,000 and one-fifth over $15,000.

[32] Carlin in *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 ff., and Ladinsky, in his *Journal of Legal Education* article, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff., analyze income as a factor in the stratification of the Bars of New York City and Detroit respectively. Henderson and Sinclair in their study, *Judicial Selection in Texas: An Exploratory Study* (Houston: Public Affairs Research Center, 1964), Vol. 1, at p. 17, identify the disparity in incomes of lawyers in Texas as a source of cleavage in the urban Bar there.

[33] We elicited similar information on the practice arrangement of each respondent during the past year, but there was almost no variation between the two kinds of data. This accords with the findings of Carlin in *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 ff., and Ladinsky, in his *Journal of Legal Education* article, *op. cit.*, pp. 132 ff., that lawyers' career histories show that they tend to remain in the same general social strata of the Bar in which they begin the practice of law.

[34] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 ff.; Ladinsky, *American Sociological Review*, *op. cit.*, pp. 49 ff.; David Riesman, "Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training, and Colleagueship" in William M. Evan (ed.), *Law and Sociology: Exploratory Essays* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 12 f.

TABLE 2. LAW PRACTICE ARRANGEMENT AND INCOME OF MEMBERS OF MAJOR BAR ORGANIZATIONS IN KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS AREAS

Characteristic	Kansas City Bar Assn.	Lawyers' Assn. of Kansas City	St. Louis Bar Assn.	Lawyers' Assn. of St. Louis
	(N=137)	(N=178)	(N=260)	(N=157)
Arrangement				
Solo Practice	36%	14%	16%	47%
Two-man partnership	14	11	7	12
Partnership 3–5	12	11	14	17
Partnership 6–9	4	9	10	4
Partnership 10–19	1	12	6	1
Partnership 20 or more	0	8	3	0
*Salaried employee-law firm	9	17	20	6
Salaried employee-corp.	12	9	12	7
Salaried employee-govt.	5	2	4	4
Not ascertained	7	7	8	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Income				
Less than $5,000	7%	1%	4%	6%
$5,000–$9,999	22	17	22	20
$10,000–$14,999	26	25	21	22
$15,000–$19,999	24	14	17	15
$20,000–$29,999	14	24	14	21
$30,000–$49,999	5	13	15	12
$50,000 and above	0	3	3	2
Not ascertained	2	3	4	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Generally referred to in Missouri as Associates.

significant in a state as Democratic as Missouri has been in recent years.[36] The data also show that the number of political independents in any of the groups is negligible, indicating that at least in these two metropolitan areas, lawyers are party identifiers.[37]

The education data demonstrate that differences in kinds of law schools attended which lawyers and sociologists have considered important are also very relevant for the Bar divisions. The contrasts are greatest in the Kansas City area where almost one-half of the members of the Lawyers' Association attended law school outside the state, some 24 per cent of them at one of the five prestigious "national" schools of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan and Yale.[38] On the other hand, nearly one

---

[35] In eliciting information on party identification, we patterned our approach after that utilized by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.

[36] A state-wide survey conducted in the Spring of 1965 by the Public Opinion Survey Unit at the University of Missouri showed that 60 per cent of Missourians identify with the Democratic party, compared to 26 per cent who are Republicans. The large urban centers of the state are somewhat more Democratic: in Jackson County, the percentage ratio is 64 to 20, and in the St. Louis area (St. Louis City and St. Louis County combined), it is 62–24.

[37] The 1965 state-wide survey also revealed that about 10 per cent of persons living in the two large urban areas in Missouri, as well as the state as a whole, consider themselves Independents. The Survey Research Center's 1964 study showed an identical figure for the national population. See Hugh Bone, *American Politics and the Party System*, 3rd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 480.

[38] We realize there are no completely satisfactory criteria by which to evaluate law schools. We

TABLE 3. PARTISAN AFFILIATION AND LEGAL EDUCATION OF MEMBERS OF MAJOR BAR ORGANIZATIONS IN KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS AREAS

Characteristics	Kansas City Bar Assn.	Lawyers' Assn. of Kansas City	St. Louis Bar Assn.	Lawyers' Assn. of St. Louis
	(N = 137)	(N = 178)	(N = 260)	(N = 157)
Party Affiliation				
Republican	19%	41%	44%	24%
Independent Republican	6	8	10	8
Democrat	63	41	35	54
Independent Democrat	6	3	7	9
Independents	3	2	2	3
Not ascertained	3	5	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	10
Law School				
Instate				
University of Missouri	29%	24%	9%	4%
Washington University	4	2	41	31
St. Louis University	2	1	21	39
Kansas City	44	19	0	0
Other Instate Schools	0	0	1	12
Outstate				
Prestige Law Schools*	5	24	16	2
Other Outstate Schools	14	24	7	5
Not ascertained	2	6	5	7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Yale.

half of the Bar Association members got their legal education at a distinctly local law school, the University of Kansas City,[39] today an approved law school with a mixed program (that is, both night and day classes),[40] but which until the mid 1930's was a "proprietary" law school not sanctioned by the American Bar Association.[41] In the St. Louis area, the differences are not as great, but more Bar Association members there also go out of state for their legal education, particularly to the prestigious national schools. Also, there are important distinctions between St. Louis lawyers who were educated in local schools. The Bar Association

---

decided on these five on the basis of general reputation. Moreover, it is an objective fact that the latter four law schools, as of 1954 at least, had the largest law libraries in the nation. Albert P. Blaustein and Charles O. Porter, *The American Lawyer*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 206.

[39] Recently this law school, along with the University itself, was absorbed into the University of Missouri system. It is now known as the University of Missouri Law School at Kansas City.

[40] Such law schools are sometimes called "multiple division" law schools and frequently just "night" law schools. In 1963, about 90 per cent of the students enrolled in schools are not approved by the American Bar Association were attending night classes compared to less than 10 per cent in morning classes. See *Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements in the United States* in the *U. S. Review of Legal Education* (Chicago: American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 1963), p. 19.

[41] Proprietary law schools were generally founded as private profit-making institutions, but today many are incorporated not for profit. They have no University affiliation. See Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own*, *op. cit.*, p. 26. The Kansas City School of Law was not approved by the American Bar Association until it became affiliated with the University of Kansas City.

attorneys are more likely to have gone to Washington University, a full-time school, and Lawyers' Association members to St. Louis University, a Catholic school with a mixed program,[42] or to one of the formerly unapproved proprietary night law schools located in the St. Louis area.[43]

Thus our study of the memberships of the rival bar associations in both Kansas City and St. Louis indicates that they generally vary in such factors as practice specialty, income, party affiliation, practice arrangement and legal education, with the latter two matters showing the most pronounced differences. This is significant, since size of firm and kind of law school attended are among the important indicators of social status in the legal profession.[44] Moreover, a separate analysis of the backgrounds of the officers of the four associations over the period of the last twenty-five years[45] shows that the leaders of the rebel bar groups are even more likely to possess distinct status characteristics than the rank-and-file members of their organizations. For example, 39 per cent of the officers of the Kansas City Lawyers' Association attended one of the five prestige law schools as compared to 24 per cent of its general membership. Similarly, 67 per cent of the leaders of the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis have been single practitioners, while only 47 per cent of the members of that group practice law by themselves. The analysis also showed that the officialdoms of the rival bar groups were distinct, since lawyers serve in official positions in only one of the two associations in their community.[46] The way in which these Bar leaders rally the support of their respective members in the election of lawyer members of the nominating commissions is discussed in the next section of the article.

II. CONDUCT OF CONTESTS FOR LAWYER SEATS ON JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS

As with elections generally, the contests for lawyer seats on the judicial nominating commissions in Missouri are shaped by three major factors. The first is the set of legal rules which provides the framework under which the elections are conducted. The second is what Key calls the "standards of campaign etiquette,"[47] that is, what the particular political culture feels is and is not proper in the realm of politics. In this case, of course, the standards are set not by the society at large, but by a special segment of it, namely, the legal profession itself. Finally, there is the nature of the constituency, in this case, the members of the Bar, who collectively form the electorate for these contests. Campaigns aimed at this electorate must necessarily take into account the nature of the various divisions of the profession, just as political leaders analyze the various groupings in the general electorate. These three factors constitute the "givens" of the electoral situation, and thus serve to dictate the nature of the strategies employed in the contests for the lawyer seats on the nominating commissions.

The legal rules for the elections[48] provide that lawyer candidates for both the circuit and appellate commissions be nominated by petition. Since only 20 signatures are necessary,[49] there is the possibility of having several candidates for a position. However, the nature of the Bar rivalries has become so institutionalized, that, at least since the period of the early 1950's, there have been only two candidates in each election, one representing the Bar Association and one the Lawyers' Association, in both Kansas City and St. Louis. Each group has evolved a practice of nominating its candidate in a caucus usually attended by officers of the association and other Bar "actives" outside the formal power structure. Such meetings are not official because, as one interviewee explained, "Lawyers are an independent group and would resent any formal endorsement of either side." Nevertheless, word goes out as to the man who will represent each group in the election, and organizational loyalty is sufficient to prevent other nominations that would serve to split the vote of members of the association. It is particularly important that this eventuality be avoided as it may lead to the opposition group's candidate receiving the necessary majority vote on the first ballot, or force a run-off election[50] with its attendant uncertainties.

---

[42] Carlin includes Catholic and proprietary schools with "mixed" programs in the same category in his analysis of law schools, *ibid.*, p. 25.

[43] Today all the law schools in Missouri are approved by the ABA, but in the depression period a number of unapproved schools operated in St. Louis, including Benton College of Law, City College of Law and Finance and Missouri Institute of Accounting, Law and Law Department.

[44] See footnotes 29 and 34, *supra*. Of course, the two factors are interrelated. The processes of self-selection and firm recruitment result in graduates of prestige law schools joining law firms. See Ladinsky, *American Sociological Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 49; Blaustein and Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 197; Smigel, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 ff.

[45] A yearly publication by Martindale-Hubbel, Inc., contains certain basic data on lawyers in all states. Volume II has the information on Missouri attorneys.

[46] Of the 138 individuals we identified as officers in the two bar groups in Kansas City, only 3 held office in both; a similar number of officers of the two associations in St. Louis contained only 2 individuals who had served as officers in both organizations.

[47] V. O. Key, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 463.

[48] *Constitution of the State of Missouri*, 1945, Art. V., Sec. 29(d) and Supreme Court Rule 10.

[49] In appellate commission contests, at least 10 of the signatures must be those of attorneys residing in a different judicial circuit than the nominee. Supreme Court Rule 10.10.

The selection of a nominee is governed by certain general principles of what might be termed, Bar "availability." As in our general party system, each association starts with certain "hard-core" supporters as outlined in the previous section: one group can count generally on the loyalty of solo practitioners, educated in local law schools, with a plaintiffs' practice or one involving domestic relations or criminal matters; the other draws its followers primarily from the ranks of attorneys from the larger firms, many of whom have been educated at out-of-state prestige law schools, who specialize in corporate or defense work. But because, as discussed in the following section, the system is highly competitive, each group must be concerned with attracting the support of those in the middle of the Bar spectrum, that is, the attorneys who are not committed to either group. The concern with the "vital center" of the profession is revealed in the tendency of three of the four bar associations to draw their candidates particularly from lawyers in the smaller firms.[51]

The closeness of the contests puts a premium on selecting a candidate who not only avoids the negative feature of having an "extremist" kind of practice, but who also possesses positive availability qualities as well. It is particularly important that he be widely-known in the profession. There is the danger that a group's leaders will become myopic and assume that a man well-known in their legal circles will have a wide acquaintanceship in the Bar at large. This is a particular hazard for defendants' organizations, which may fail to take into account that "office" lawyers who seldom appear in court may have only a fairly close-knit group of lawyer friends, and that their contacts with many members of the profession may be nonexistent, or occur only through the highly impersonal medium of a telephone conversation at which clients' affairs are discussed. Some observers of a recent circuit commission contest felt that this was a strategic error which contributed to the defeat of the defendants' candidate in that election.

The groups often select trial attorneys as their candidates because lawyers with this kind of a practice have a wide acquaintanceship in the profession involving face-to-face contact with a number of attorneys. Lawyers also look favorably on their candidacies because they feel that trial attorneys with extensive courtroom experience may be in the best position to evaluate the merits of prospective judges and that, therefore, they should sit on the nominating commissions. At the same time, the best trial attorneys are often those who are the toughest fighters in the courtroom, and there is the risk that if such a person is selected, his candidacy will not be favored by attorneys whom he has not only bested, but more importantly, "worked over" or belittled, in court.[52] Thus a premium is placed on selecting a person who is both a trial attorney and a gentleman.

Other factors affect how well-known an attorney is in the profession. He should have been in the practice long enough to have come in contact with a number of attorneys and, for that reason, young lawyers are generally excluded as candidates, as are attorneys with specialized practices that put them in contact with only a relatively few members of the profession. It is helpful if an attorney has been active in bar association work in which he has been exposed to a wide range of his fellow lawyers. This is particularly important in appellate commission races in which attorneys living outside the two major cities have the franchise. Attorneys active in the Missouri Bar Association are more likely to be known to the "outstate" lawyers, as are attorneys with appellate court practices that put them into courtroom contact with lawyers in all parts of the appellate court jurisdiction.

As availability factors affect the kinds of candidates nominated, so Bar folkways shape the character of the campaign for the commission posts. There is a strong tradition that the position should seek the man: all the candidates we interviewed stressed the fact that others had come and asked them to make the race. Many said they agreed to do so only on the understanding that they themselves would not have to do any campaigning. Part of the reluctance to do so is based on a concern with the time a personal campaign takes from the individual's law practice. But beyond this, there is something repugnant to some lawyers about politicking for a position they feel should be decided upon the basis of legal ability. This is particularly true of persons on the defendants' side of the Bar. Plaintiffs' attorneys are less sensitive about pushing themselves forward, perhaps because they are more used to hustling for legal work than are firm lawyers with more stable clientele.[53]

---

[50] Supreme Court Rule 10.14.

[51] The exception is the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis, which tends to nominate lawyers in solo practice.

[52] Henderson and Sinclair, *op. cit.*, at page 16 note the same courtroom animosities among Texas lawyers.

In the early days of the Plan, some candidates enjoyed such popularity and stature in the profession that no concerted campaign was necessary to ensure their election to the commission. However, the increasing specialization in the law as well as the sheer growth in the number of lawyers practicing tend to circumscribe legal acquaintanceships; this means that it is difficult for any individual to be so widely-known as earlier. The realities of metropolitan Bar politics today require that the candidate's supporters, if not himself, take to the legal "hustings." Typically, this involves solicitation of votes through personal contacts, telephone conversations and, particularly in appellate commission races, communication by letter with fellow members of the Bar. One appellate commission candidate on the defendants' side complained, however, that his opponent in a recent race had almost beaten him by throwing cocktail and beer parties to gain support, and that if he had it to do over again, he himself would wage a vigorous campaign. Thus the aggressive tactics of the plaintiffs' group may be bringing about some important changes in the traditional rules of campaign etiquette.

Since the two sides draw their support from different elements of the profession, their campaign techniques differ. Over the years, the defendants' side has possessed certain electoral advantages. One is that traditionally, more leaders of the Bar have come from this side of the legal constituency. This fact has led the defendants to use "endorsements" as a campaign device. (The word is passed that certain pillars of the Bar are supporting a particular candidate with the idea that this will swing the votes of some of the doubtful lawyers.) Another lies in the concentration of their hard-core support in the large law offices where it can be tapped with a minimum of effort.[54] Senior partners of law firms often act as precinct captains in the campaigns. As one explained, "I'm the Bar Association's representative in our office, and it is my job to line up the support of the other senior as well as junior members of the firm." The ecology of the law offices is also such that the firms themselves are fairly well concentrated geographically in the heart of the central city business district, and this also minimizes campaign "leg-work."

In contrast to this situation, the electoral support of the plaintiffs' groups lies with the isolated single practitioner or small-firm lawyer, which means that precinct captains cannot be called upon to "deliver" the vote. Moreover, the offices are frequently scattered geographically, not only in the downtown area, but also in the outlying neighborhoods where more solo attorneys and small firms are now locating. Thus a special effort is required to marshal their votes through such devices as dividing up buildings by floors among campaign workers, or utilizing telephone campaigns based upon divisions of the Bar directory. The endorsement device is not utilized by the plaintiffs' lawyers because they lack the leaders with the traditional standing in the profession, and also because such a "silk stocking" device runs counter to the "democratic" philosophy of some members of the "little man's" segment of the profession.

Both sides use the campaign technique of lining up the support of "fellow travelers," that is, members of the Bar who are engaged in other pursuits besides the private practice of law, but who are generally sympathetic to their respective causes. Thus the plaintiffs' lawyers contact government attorneys involved in such matters as workmen's compensation, and those on the legal staffs of labor unions as potential allies. The defendants' associations look to lawyers working in claims departments of insurance companies and to house counsel of corporations for support in the elections. As one defense attorney put it, "There are twenty lawyers on the legal staff of Monsanto Chemical who represent potential allies for us." Defense firm clients such as industrial corporations, banks, public utilities, etc., who employ lawyers in non-legal work, are also frequently asked to solicit their support for the defendants' candidate. Lawyers operating on the periphery of the profession are less likely than private practitioners to be interested in Bar activities[55] from which basic loyalties arise, and hence both sides make special efforts to get out their vote in the lawyer elections. The results of these elections over the years, together with the "stakes" or "payoffs" involved in them, are treated in the following sections.

---

[53] Plaintiffs' lawyers' business is generally on a "one shot" basis, that is, individuals who come to see them just once in connection with a personal injury. (See Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own*, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3, for a discussion of methods of getting this business through the use of "brokers" or "middlemen" such as policemen, ambulance drivers, etc.) In contrast, corporate and defendants' attorneys generally do their legal business on a long-term basis, often through "retainer" fees whereby clients pay to have time reserved for their affairs.

[54] For an analysis of the analogous way in which shop size in the printing industry affects the internal politics of the two party system of the International Typographical Union, see Seymour Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, *Union Democracy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), Chs. 8 and 9.

III. OUTCOMES OF CONTESTS FOR LAWYER SEATS

Although normally both groups field candidates for the lawyer-seat elections, on occasion some candidate runs unopposed. This does not appear to result from any prior negotiation between the rival organizations. What seems to be more prevalent is for a group seeking to win the "middle" segment of the Bar to put up a candidate who turns out to be acceptable to the other side. This may occur because the latter group feels it has no real chance of defeating the candidate, and so, to avoid antagonizing him, enters no nominee against him. Or they may feel that he really is neutral in the plaintiffs'-defendants' rivalry and so go along with his candidacy. Moreover, there are some attorneys who, even though they clearly have a plaintiffs' or defendants' practice, acquire a reputation for fair-mindedness and hence are acceptable to the other side. This is most likely to happen if such a lawyer goes out of his way to cultivate friendships and socialize with his courtroom opposition. The "eras of good feeling" in Bar politics are rare, however: we were able to uncover only three unopposed candidacies since the elections began a quarter of a century ago.

The results generally reveal the presence of a competitive situation in both communities. In Kansas City, of the six contested races for the circuit commission, the Lawyers' Association candidate emerged victorious on four occasions and the Bar Association man won twice. In St. Louis the scales tipped slightly in the opposite direction: the Lawyers' Association nominee won six times as compared to five victories for the Bar Association. (Deaths and resignations of commissioners in the latter community have necessitated holding more elections than in Kansas City.) Our investigation of the appellate commission elections indicates, however, that the defendants' groups do somewhat better at this level than for circuit commission races. They have won two of the three clear-cut contests in Kansas City, and three of the four in the St. Louis Court of Appeals district.

The relatively few elections that occur under the Plan make it difficult to assess definite trends, but the plaintiffs' group has been winning more in recent elections. Some attorneys attribute this to NACCA and MAACA, which serve as important organizational ralliers of the plaintiffs' lawyers. These interest groups have thus provided the single practitioners and the small firm lawyers with a leadership and *esprit de corps* they formerly lacked. Moreover, the high professional quality of the activities of these organizations, together with the rise in size of judgments awarded in personal injury cases, have made plaintiffs' work both more respectable and more lucrative than it used to be.[56] All these factors have contributed to strengthening the cause of the plaintiffs' lawyers.

There are also some indications that the legal rules for the elections are working at the present time in favor of the plaintiffs' bar associations. Under these rules, lawyers serving on the commissions, as well as those voting in the elections, must not only practice law in the court's jurisdiction but must also reside there.[57] Thus attorneys living in suburban areas outside Jackson County and St. Louis City are disfranchised as candidates or voters in circuit court elections, and if they live across the state line, they are similarly affected in appellate commission races. All four bar groups are handicapped by these legal provisions, but our survey data show that the defendants' organizations are affected more because a greater proportion of their members live outside the jurisdictions of the circuit court in both metropolitan communities and, in the Kansas City area, beyond the appellate court jurisdiction as well.[58]

---

[55] An analysis of the respondents from both communities who do not belong to either the Bar Association or the Lawyers' Association in their area shows that a considerable number of them are employed by the government or by private corporations.

[56] A number of defendants' lawyers in the Kansas City area recently have begun also to handle some plaintiffs' cases. This development has not yet occurred to any significant extent in St. Louis.

[57] *Constitution of the State of Missouri*, 1945, Art. V, Sec. 29(d) and Supreme Court Rule 10.14.

Despite these developments favoring the plaintiffs' organizations, the defendants continue to do well in races for the appellate commission.[59] The suburbanization process affects them less at that level, particularly in the St. Louis area where few lawyers live outside the state. As previously suggested, attorneys active in Missouri Bar Association activities with outstate reputations and acquaintanceships tend to make strong candidates, and such persons have tended over the years to be more associated with the defendants' than the plaintiffs' bar associations. Moreover, the type of law business of some of the larger firms is such that the courts of appeals and Supreme Court arenas (the judges of whom are nominated by the appellate commission) are far more important to their clients' economic interests than are the circuit courts.[60] Hence they tend to place more emphasis on, and work harder in, elections to the appellate nominating body than those to the circuit one.

IV. STAKES AND CONSEQUENCES

It is this latter consideration which constitutes the "payoff" for the participants in the elections of lawyer members of the commission. The ultimate stakes in these contests are the judges that go on the circuit benches in Kansas City and St. Louis and the appellate courts of the entire state. Both sides seek to influence that decision by insuring that "their" kind of lawyers sit on the commissions that nominate the candidates from whom the governor makes his selection. While some attorneys are interested in judgeships personally,[61] and work to get commission members selected whom they think will favor their candidacies, most are concerned with "policy payoffs," not patronage—that is, they want to get persons on the bench who will be sympathetic, or at least not hostile, to their clients' interests.

As the developer and applier of rules of law, the judge shapes the outcome of litigation. This is particularly true in appellate cases and nonjury cases at the lower court level, but even when there is a jury that "finds the facts," the man on the bench has an important role to play in the law suit. The manner in which he interprets the "rules of the game" under which the trial proceedings are conducted often helps to tip the scales of justice in one direction or the other. For example, the plaintiffs' lawyers seek to have the rules of evidence liberally construed so they can get the maximum evidence introduced into the law suit; defendants' lawyers hope that much of the evidence on which plaintiffs base their cases will be excluded by the courts.

The struggle proceeds throughout the course of the law suit, with important decisions made all along the way that affect the economic interests of the parties to the litigation. After the plaintiff's case is presented, will the judge grant the defendant's motion for a direct verdict in his favor, or will he let the case go to the jury? After the arguments are heard, what kinds of instructions will he give the jury? And after the jury has finally reached a verdict and assessed damages, will the judge let the amount of the judgment stand, or will he reduce it? The discretion he has in decisions of this nature (a trial judge can, of course, be reversed on appeal, but the overwhelming proportion of cases end in the lower court)[62] makes the kind of person he is, and the way he looks at such matters, of vital concern to the litigating parties.

The stakes in the lawyer elections are most important to trial attorneys, particularly plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers—that is, those involved in personal injury litigation—because such cases constitute a great share of the court docket, particularly at the trial court level.[63] However, attorneys who do little or no trial work must necessarily consider the kinds of judges who sit on the bench, since conceivably their clients' affairs may become involved in litigation even if they personally do not handle the case in court. Beyond this, it would appear that the contests for the lawyers' seats on the commission entail other considerations besides the concrete stakes of judgeships. The elections also serve as an outlet for basic rivalries between the social divisions of the Bar previously discussed. The fact that the plaintiffs' and defendants' groups also contest for positions in the integrated state bar association,[64] where the stakes are far less concrete than judgeships, would seem to bear out the supposition that frequently matters of prestige, rather than substance, are involved.[65]

---

[58] Almost one-fifth of the members of the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City reside outside the state according to our survey data.

[59] A recent Kansas City Appellate Commission race, however, was won by the plaintiffs' group.

[60] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, at p. 11, states that firm lawyers in New York City spend more time in appellate courts, while individual practitioners come in contact mainly with lower courts. Our survey data on appearances before circuit and appellate courts in Missouri indicate that the circuit courts are more important to members of the plantiffs' bar associations and the appellate courts to lawyers belonging to the defendants' bar groups.

[61] Our survey data show that about 10 per cent of the attorneys practicing in both Kansas City and St. Louis have let their names come before one of the nominating commissions for consideration as a judge.

[62] The Report of the Judicial Conference of Missouri for the period beginning June 16, 1964 and ending June 15, 1965, indicates that the Supreme Court and three intermediate Courts of Appeal handled 1229 cases, while the lower courts of the state disposed of 88,792 cases.

[63] No exact figures are available for Missouri on

The rivalry between the two bar groups is fed by the ideologies each has developed to support its cause. Many lawyers we interviewed described the nature of the clash as one between "liberals" and "conservatives." (This is interesting since, as a group, lawyers often tend to resist generalizations and what they deem to be stereotyped thinking.) One defense attorney expressed it more precisely as "a battle between property interests and those who want to acquire property interests but have not yet done so." Essentially, then, one side represents the "haves," the other the "have nots." This is particularly true in personal-injury litigation in which the injured party, often a person of modest means, is trying to collect damages from corporations or insurance companies.

In the process of representing their clients, attorneys often are guilty of what Talcott Parsons calls, the "sentimental exaggeration of substantive claims of clients."[66] For example, defense and corporation attorneys are inclined to wax eloquent over the rights of property. One attorney we interviewed pointed out that one of the older members of his firm simply could not conceive of a legitimate plaintiff's claim, that all were simply attempts to get "something for nothing" by blackmailing established institutions into settling claims rather than bearing the cost and inconvenience of litigation. In contrast, the plaintiffs' lawyer thinks of himself as protecting "the working man" or "little guy" against the "vested interests," particularly unscrupulous insurance companies and claims adjusters who try to get injured persons to settle claims out of court at far below their real value. He is more inclined to emphasize "human" rights than those of property. Thus each lawyer sees the legal world through what might be termed "client-colored" glasses.

Many attorneys go further and view with hostility not only opposition litigants but opposing counsel as well. The disparate styles of practice of the two major divisions of the Bar, and the fact that they have so little contact in the profession with each other,[67] leads them to regard each other with what one author calls "mutually derogating images."[68] Plaintiffs' lawyers are inclined to think of defendants' and corporation lawyers as "bluebloods," or as individuals "without a heart" or "cold-blooded with a banker's icy stare," (as one of our interviewees expressed it). They also criticize the defendants' bar organizations as "exclusive clubs run by cliques" which restrict their memberships, in contrast to their own "democratic" groups that accept everyone for membership who applies. Plaintiffs' lawyers are particularly scornful of corporation lawyers as "office" or "banker's attorneys" who "never try a law suit," an interesting twist on the business executive's contempt for anyone who has "never met a payroll."

---

the amount of personal injury cases in the various levels of courts, but many of the trial lawyers we interviewed set the circuit court figure at two-thirds or more. This is generally consistent with studies that show that 60 per cent of the cases in New York and over one-half of those in New Jersey in recent years involved such litigation. See Maurice Rosenberg and Michael I. Sovern, "Delay and Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation," *Columbia Law Review*, 59 (1959), p. 1117.

[64] The Missouri Bar was integrated by court order in 1944. For a general study of the subject, see Dayton McKean, *The Integrated Bar* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963).

[65] It is only recently that the plaintiffs' lawyers have succeeded in having one of their group elected to the Presidency of the Missouri Bar Association. Although the President can conceivably affect the kinds of activities the Association carries on, most of our interviewees felt that this factor was not nearly so important to the plaintiffs' lawyers as the feeling that one of their men had "made it."

[66] "A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession" in Parsons (ed.), *Essays in Sociological Theory* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1954), p. 377.

[67] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, at p. 19, discusses the lack of professional and social contact between the various strata of the New York Bar. The same general situation prevails in the two metropolitan communities in Missouri.

[68] Smigel, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

Defendants' and corporation lawyers are less inclined to condemn their opposition in social-class terms, but many display a kind of patronizing attitude toward those who "have never quite made it in the profession." Moreover, they are openly contemptuous of lawyers who run "divorce mills," and even more, of "ambulance chasers," that is, attorneys who solicit clients through means that run counter to the canons of the profession.[69] Many accuse the plaintiffs' lawyers of exploiting their clients with contingent fee arrangements.[70] Also, there is some tendency for defendants' and corporation lawyers to categorize all attorneys on the basis of the lawyers with whom they have practiced law over the years; this brand of guilt by association means that professional sins of practitioners are often visited on their partners and associates.

All these factors undoubtedly contribute to the great interest which plaintiffs' lawyers take in the lawyer elections. As suggested previously, the concrete stakes of the kinds of judges who go on the court are very important to them in their trial practices. But beyond this, they feel what Carlin calls "the pinch of the status structure"[71] more keenly than other groups in the Bar. Frequently, men of considerable ability and ambition with lucrative practices, they are strongly motivated to compete in electoral contests with those they feel deny them their rightful place in the profession.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Bar politics examined in this article demonstrates that significant cleavages have developed in the Missouri legal community on the matter of choosing judges. In both Kansas City and St. Louis, a practice has evolved whereby rival bar groups nominate candidates and mount campaigns to get their men elected as lawyer members to the circuit and appellate commissions which nominate candidates for the bench. These lawyers' elections have taken on many of the features of a general party system. The bar organizations not only assume the role of parties in the election process, but they also possess characteristics that differentiate them from mere "factions": they are durable and visible; they have not been dependent for their existence upon individual personalities or cliques; and they represent important economic and social divisions in the Bar supported by conflicting ideologies.[72] Moreover, a competitive "two-party" system has developed, since no other group enters candidates, and both the Bar Association and Lawyers' Association have been able to elect their candidates at reasonably frequent intervals over the years.[73]

The development of this two-party system within the legal community means that diverse elements of the Bar are represented in the selection process. The concern of some persons that the Bar is inevitably conservative is disproven by the Missouri experience.[74] The fact that all attorneys, and not just the leaders of the American Bar Association, are involved in the selection process, makes for a more adequate representation of the Bar than is involved in the profession's attempt to influence the choice of federal judges.[75]

---

[69] Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4.28 prohibits the stirring up of litigation directly or through agents. For a discussion of the problem of enforcing compliance with such canons of legal ethics, and the way in which the stratification of the Bar affects attitudes towards them, see Carlin, *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar, op. cit.* and Kenneth Reichstein, "Ambulance Chasing and the Legal Profession," *Social Problems* 13 (1965), pp. 3–17.

[70] Under such arrangements, a lawyer receives a certain percentage (usually one-third in Missouri) of the judgment awarded his client; if none is awarded, he receives no fee.

[71] Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own, op. cit.*, p. 182.

[72] V. O. Key talks of "factionalism" in his *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), and William N. Chambers distinguishes between factions and parties in his *Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 17–33.

[73] For methods of classifying state party systems on the basis of competitiveness see Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, 48 (1954), pp. 477–485; and Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According-REVIEW, 49 (1955), pp. 1120–1128.

[74] De Tocqueville, in his classic study, *Democracy in America*, referred to lawyers and judges as the American "aristocracy" which acted as a check on the democratic element in the society. For a discussion of the reasons underlying the alleged conservatism of lawyers, see Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett, *Courts, Judges and Politics* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 126f.

[75] Grossman's analysis of the composition of the Committee on Federal Judiciary in his study, *op. cit.*, shows that it represents primarily the conservative elements of the profession. For a discussion of the conservative public policy stands of the ABA over the years, see John Schmidhauser,

This inclusion of a broad spectrum of the Bar in the choosing of judges has direct relevance for the theoretical issue raised earlier in this paper, namely, whether the role of the Bar in judicial selection is compatible with the tenet that broad social interests should be represented in the selection of policy-making officials in a democratic society. For one of the key conclusions to be drawn from this study is that lawyers' perspectives on judicial selection are shaped to a great degree by the kinds of clients they serve. Attorneys want judges on the bench who will interpret rules in a particular way because such matters affect their individual law practices. However, generally speaking, what advances an attorney's own personal professional interests, also advances those of persons and organizations he represents.

In other words, in judicial selection, as in the handling of legal affairs generally, attorneys act as surrogates of the social and economic interests they represent. Thus, contests between plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers over matters relating to judicial selection insure that the interests of injured parties of the lower classes, as well as those of wealthy corporations, will be represented in choosing judges.

What is suggested here is that the issue of the role of the Bar in judicial selection has been examined on the wrong basis. The question is not whether the legal profession as a group can serve as unbiased spokesmen for the "public interest"[76] in choosing judges, as its leaders sometimes claim to do; the fact that lawyers are lined up on opposite sides of economic and social issues in our society makes this hope unrealistic. Rather the question is whether lawyers as "client caretakers"[77] adequately represent the various "publics" that utilize the courts, that is, the social and economic interests involved in litigation.

It is our judgment that in Missouri the rival Bar Associations and Lawyers' Associations have acted as effective surrogates of the respective interests they represent. While this study is restricted to one state, there are indications that the cleavages which exist in the Bars of Kansas City and St. Louis are found elsewhere in the United States. Rival bar organizations exist in other metropolitan communities,[78] and the basic ingredients of the Bar politics discussed in this article, namely, the social stratification and internal conflicts of the legal profession, as well as the importance of personal injury litigation in modern society,[79] are present generally in our urban areas. Certainly the national scope of NACCA's activities, and the fact that it has affiliate chapters in every state in the Union, testify to the general nature of the plaintiffs' lawyers' concern with adequately representing their clients.

The findings reported here raise serious questions about the one-sided conception of the legal community which is often found in the literature. Hurst has sketched the lawyer's role in American society through a series of historical stages as the impact of industrialism changed the attorney from a courtroom man representing individuals to a counselor for the corporate world.[80] In the same vein, Adolf Berle has referred to the lawyer as "an intel-

---

The Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities and Procedures (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), Ch. 4.

[76] For a critique of this concept, see Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

[77] Pound uses the phrase, "client-caretaker," at p. 184, *op. cit.*, as does James Willard Hurst in his study, *The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), p. 366.

[78] Pound, *op. cit.*, pp. 281ff., lists Lawyers' Associations or Lawyers' Clubs (in addition to the traditional Bar Association) in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York. (Carlin *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, p. 20, states that membership in the two New York associations is highly correlated with size of firm, with the large firm lawyers tending to join the City Bar Association, and solo and small firm practioners, the County Lawyers' Association. It is possible that other such rival organizations exist, since less than 12 per cent of the local bar associations in the United States returned the questionnaire on which Pound based his study. For example, the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis is not listed, presumably because its officials failed to provide information on the organization.

[79] See footnote 63, *supra*. *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1965, *op. cit.*, at p. 572, estimates that automobile losses paid in 1963 totaled some four-and-one-half billion dollars, or about 60 per cent of the premiums written. One study of the subject in New York City, Marc A. Franklin, Robert H. Chanin and Irving Mark, "Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation," *Columbia Law Review*, 61 (1961), states at pp. 32ff. that in a recent year there were an estimated 193,000 claimants in the City in personal injury litigation, with some payment made in 84 per cent of the cases. When the claimant retains an attorney, the rate of recovery is 90 per cent.

[80] Hurst, *op. cit.*, Chap. 13.

lectual jobber and contractor in business,"[81] and a number of other persons have echoed that sentiment.[82] While none can deny the importance of these facets of legal practice in our corporate world, the development of NACCA and its state affiliates may portend a rise in importance and status of those who represent other economic interests in modern-day society, as a kind of revolution of the legal "proletariat" develops in the profession. Certainly our study demonstrates that such groups are beginning to develop a kind of "countervailing power" in the legal market place.

Of course, much remains to be accomplished in the matter of providing legal services for all elements of our society, particularly persons in the lower classes.[83] However, recent developments, including the Supreme Court's ruling that defendants accused of serious state crimes must be represented by counsel,[84] Congress' appropriation of money for legal services to low-income groups,[85] as well as changes occurring in modes of legal practice,[86] all show considerable promise in assisting "underdog" groups with their legal problems. Such advances should serve to broaden the publics that presently utilize the judicial process, and the concomitant role of the Bar in representing social and economic interests in judicial selection.

---

[81] A. A. Berle, Jr., "Modern Legal Profession," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX (1933), p. 340.

[82] Included are C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 289; Fred Rodell, *Woe Unto You Lawyers* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), pp. 3f.; Karl N. Llewellyn, "The Bar Specializes—With What Results?", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 167 (1933), pp. 177ff.; and Harlan Stone, "The Public Influence of the Bar," *Harvard Law Review*, 48 (1934), pp. 6ff.

[83] One study of the use of lawyers by lower class persons showed that many of them were not aware of their need for legal services, and of those that were, only a small proportion actually went to a lawyer because of a concern with fees. See Earl Koos, *The Family and the Law* (Rochester: National Legal Aid Association, 1949, mimeographed). Personal injury matters, however, are an exception, since contingent fee arrangements mean that a client has everything to gain and nothing to lose by consulting a lawyer. A study in New York City showed that among automobile accident victims, lower class respondents were just as likely to retain a lawyer as higher class respondents. See Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own*, *op. cit.*, p. 154, citing Roger B. Hunting and Gloria S. Neuwirth, *Who Sues in New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

[84] *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The courts are now involved in deciding a line of cases relating to the particular stages of the arrest and detention process for which counsel must be provided, and whether the principle of the case should be applied to criminal misdemeanors as well as felonies. One law professor has suggested that the decision will force more and more lawyers into criminal cases, and this will require that the organized Bar try harder to relate canons of ethics to criminal-law practice. See B. J. George, Jr., "A New Approach to Criminal Law," *Harper's*, 231 (1965), p. 185.

A related development is the passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, which provides for compensated counsel in federal courts for indigent defendants charged with felonies or serious misdemeanors.

[85] The funds are administered by the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The first annual report of the organization, dated August 1966, indicated that over 160 programs proposed by local communities and groups had been funded. Forty-three of the states had programs, as did 37 of the nation's 50 largest cities. Of the remaining 13 cities, nine had applications pending at that time. The agency also reported that over 500 new law offices serving the poor were funded, and over 1000 full-time attorneys and countless volunteer lawyers enlisted in the War on Poverty.

[86] Including the increased usage of lawyer referral services, legal clinics and group legal service plans, as well as improvements in legal aid programs. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., "The President's Annual Message: The State of the Legal Profession," *American Bar Association Journal*, 51 (1965), pp. 823ff.

TOWARD A COMMUNICATIONS THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A CAUSAL MODEL

DONALD J. MCCRONE AND CHARLES F. CNUDDE*
University of Wisconsin and University of California, Irvine

The construction of an empirical theory of democratic political development is dependent on the formulation of causal propositions which are generalizations of the developmental process. To date, several essential steps in the process of constructing such a theory have been taken. First, concept formation and clarification by students of political development has led to an emphasis upon political democracy as one of the dependent variables for the field.[1] Second, the gathering and publication of quantitative indicators of social, economic, cultural, and political phenomena provide a firm basis for subsequent empirical inquiry.[2] Finally, correlational analysis has identified numerous variables which are closely associated with the development of democratic political institutions.[3]

The next major task is the formulation and testing of empirical models of democratic political development which provide a basis for inferring causal relationships by distinguishing between spurious correlations and indirect and direct effects.[4] The accomplishment of this task would enable us to derive explanatory propositions concerning the process of democratic political development.

The purpose of this essay is to suggest the combined utility of two similar theory-building techniques in the accomplishment of this task and to take a modest step in the direction of constructing an empirical model of democratic political development.

I. CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Seymour Martin Lipset explicitly adopts democratic political development as his dependent variable. He defines political democracy as:

> a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problems of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest to choose among alternative contenders for political office.[5]

For Lipset, this definition of democracy implies three key specific conditions: first, one set of political leaders who occupy official governing positions; second, one or more sets of competing leaders who do not occupy governing positions, but who act as a loyal opposition; third, widespread acceptance of a "political formula" which specifies the legitimate political institutions for the society (political parties, free press, etc.) and legitimizes democratic political competition.[6] European and English-speaking nations are classified as stable democracies or unstable democracies and dictatorships on the basis of whether they fulfilled these specific conditions in the period since World War I. Lipset also adds the condition that there be an absence of Communist or Fascist parties (i.e., political movements opposed to the democratic "political formula") garnering more than twenty percent of the vote in the last twenty-five years.[7]

Lipset's measurement of political democracy unfortunately has severe limitations. His "all-or-nothing" requirement transforms political democracy from a continuous variable into an attribute. Theoretically, democracy may be most usefully conceived of as a continuum. A political system is not democratic or non-democratic—democracy is not present or absent—rather a political system is more or less democratic. Moreover, even if democracy were best conceived to be an attribute, the problem of selecting nonarbitrary cutpoints would still present severe problems.[8] Finally, a dichotomous dependent variable places strains on the power of the statistical techniques that may be applied.

---

* This article is the second of a series on which we are alternating the order of authors' names to indicate that the studies are in every way joint enterprises.

[1] For an interesting discussion of this material as well as important findings on factors which relate to democracy, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, 53 (1959), pp. 69–105.

[2] Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

[3] Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development," in Nelson Polsby, *et al.* (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 569–582.

[4] For an example of this type of model testing in political science, see Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, LX (1966), pp. 66–72.

[5] Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74. Latin American political systems are classified somewhat differently, but still dichotomously.

Philips Cutright, on the other hand, attempts to define political development in terms which do not rely explicitly on liberal democratic standards.

> The degree of political development of a nation can be defined by the degree of complexity and specialization of its national political institutions.[9]

Nevertheless, a careful examination of Cutright's political development scoring procedure indicates a reliance on the same standards utilized by Lipset. In fact, Cutright's measurement procedure is an excellent operationalization of Lipset's concept of political democracy. Points are assigned to a political system on the basis of one set of officials in office, one or more sets of political leaders out of office, and reliance on political parties and free elections as the legitimate political institutions for the society.[10] The virtue of the Cutright measure is that it transforms Lipset's democratic attribute into a continuous variable, thereby avoiding the problems cited above. Pending further refinements in this field, democratic political development may best be conceptualized in Lipset's terms and measured by Cutright's procedures.[11]

Both Lipset and Cutright have established correlations between socio-economic factors and democratic political development. Lipset finds that indices of *wealth* (per capita income, thousands of persons per doctor, and persons per motor vehicle), *communication* (telephones, radios, and newspaper copies per thousand persons), *industrialization* (percentages of males in agriculture and per capita energy consumed), *education* (percentage literate, and primary, post-primary, and higher education enrollment per thousand persons), and *urbanization* (percent in cities over 20,000, 100,000, and in metropolitan areas) are all strongly related to political democracy.[12]

Cutright, using product-moment correlation analysis, identifies indices of *communication* (summed T scores of newspaper readers, newsprint consumption, volume of domestic mail, and number of telephones per capita), *urbanization* (T score of the proportion of the population in cities over 100,000), *education* (combined T scores of literacy and number of students per 100,000 in institutions of higher education), and *agriculture* (T score of the proportion of the economically active labor force employed in agriculture) as being closely associated with political development.[13]

Regardless of the imaginativeness and utility of these studies, they do not constitute theoretical formulations of the process of democratic political development. They remain studies of the correlates of democratic political development.

II. A COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Communications development suggests itself as a variable around which a theory of the process of democratic political development might be constructed for several reasons.[14]

---

[8] For the pitfalls involved in choosing cutpoints, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

[9] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 571.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 574. Scores may vary from 0 to 66 based on a total of three for each of twenty-two years (1940–1961).

[11] Of course political scientists' interest in democracy includes more than the existence and maintenance of democratic institutions. Two lines of further refinements have relied upon system-level democratic "behaviors" to make additional distinctions among political systems with democratic institutions. One of these developments deals with Dahl's concept of polyarchy, the other with political equality. While extremely meaningful, these concepts require much ingenuity to operationalize, especially on a cross-national level. For the concept of polyarchy see Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 84. For operational measures of the concept see Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy" (forthcoming), and Haywood R. Alker, Jr., "Causal Inference and Political Analysis" (forthcoming). For an operational measure of political equality within the United States, see Charles F. Cnudde, "Consensus, 'Rules of the Game' and Democratic Politics: The Case of Race Politics in the South" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 1966).

[12] Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–77. He relies on means and ranges to establish the relationships.

[13] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

[14] For theoretical contributions which indicate the central role of communications systems in more general types of political development, see Lucian W. Pye, (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

First, both normative and empirical theory point to communications as a prerequisite to a successfully operating political democracy. Normative thinking gives communications networks the role of providing an informed citizenry, while more empirical scholarship sees communications as integrative, producing the social cohesion necessary to prevent disintegration in the face of democratic policy conflict.[15] Second, Cutright finds that communications development is by far the strongest socio-economic correlate of political development.[16] Third, the most ambitious attempt at a theoretical formulation of the process of democratic political development views communications development as the final prerequisite for a successfully functioning democratic political system.[17]

Daniel Lerner theorizes that the process of democratic political development (which he defines as the "crowning institution of the participant society") is the consequence of a developmental sequence beginning with urbanization.

> The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases—literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies.[18]

Lerner's thesis is not satisfactorily confirmed by his data, but his conceptualization of political development as a developmental sequence provides a basis for a causal formulation of the process of democratic political development.

Figure 1 represents our initial causal model based on the conception of democratic political development as a developmental sequence.



FIG. 1. Initial conception of democratic political development as a developmental sequence. (U—Urbanization, E—Education, C—Communications, D—Democratic political development.)

This four-variable causal model is, of course, only one of a whole family of logically alternative models utilizing the same four variables. A means for testing the adequacy of this particular causal model and for eliminating alternative models is clearly needed.

III. TESTING THE MODEL

Two interrelated theory-building techniques are applied in this study in an effort to eliminate logical alternative models and to provide a basis for inferring the adequacy of the postulated model of democratic political development. First, Simon-Blalock causal model analysis is utilized because it enables us

> to make causal *inferences* concerning the adequacy of causal models, at least in the sense that we can proceed by eliminating inadequate models that make predictions that are not consistent with the data.[19]

Prediction equations based on the correlation coefficients between variables are computed for each alternative model. Models that make prediction equations inconsistent with the actual relationships between the variables in the system are rejected.[20]

---

[15] Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," in Phillip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 46–74. For the relationship between communication and civic cooperation at the individual level in nations which vary in the degree to which democracy is successfully institutionalized, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 378–381.

[16] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

[17] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[19] Blalock, *op. cit.*, p. 62. Also see Herbert A. Simon, "Spurious Correlations: A Causal Interpretation," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (1954), pp. 467–479.

[20] Blalock, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–94.

Second, path coefficients are computed for the causal model that is inferred by use of the Simon-Blalock technique. In causal analysis, we are primarily concerned with changes in the dependent variable(s) which are produced by changes in the independent variable(s). The correlation coefficients used in the Simon-Blalock prediction equations only measure the goodness of fit around the regression line. Path coefficients which may be viewed as being analogous to beta weight(s), are used because they measure changes in the dependent variable produced by standardized changes in the independent variable.[21]

The data to be utilized in this study consist of Cutright's previously published intercorrelations computed from four aggregate indicators for seventy-six nations. The four variables are urbanization, education, communication, and political development.[22]

Prior to the analysis of alternative causal models, several fundamental assumptions on which this analysis is based must be explicitly set forth. First, political development is assumed to be the dependent variable and urbanization is conceived not to be dependent on any other variable in the system. Second, relationships between the variables in the system are assumed to be additive and linear. Third, other causes of each of the four variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the other variables in the system. And fourth, it is necessary to assume uni-directional causation.

Unfortunately, assumptions of this nature are usually left implicit. Yet whenever correlational analysis is attempted with the assumption of which are independent and dependent variables these other assumptions logically follow. The techniques to be applied in this paper merely make the assumptions more explicit. However, this state of affairs should not obscure the basic similarity between making causal inferences from a variety of techniques, whether they be correlation coefficients, regression coefficients, path coefficients, or the Simon-Blalock technique.[23]



FIG. 2. Seven logically possible causal paths between the four variables, including correlation coefficients.

Perhaps the least satisfying of these assumptions is that of uni-directional causation. While several respectable hypotheses involving reciprocal effects could be constructed, they would considerably complicate the analysis. We will therefore tentatively exclude such possibilities here. In a subsequent analysis we will attempt to evaluate these possible reciprocal relationships with a technique devised by one of the authors.[24]

Figure 2 shows the seven logically possible causal relationships between the four variables in the model under the assumptions as set forth above.

IV. ALTERNATIVE CAUSAL MODELS

Restricting our attention to the first half of the democratic political development model (the relationships between U, E, and C), Figure 3 notes three logically alternative causal relationships. Model Ia predicts that the relationship between E and C is spurious due to the causal effects of U on both variables. If Model Ia were to fit the data, both educational and communications development would be inferred to be the common consequence of the rise of urbanization with no causal link between education and communication. Model Ib, on the other hand, predicts that the developmental sequence from U to C to E interprets the relationship between U and E. If the prediction equations for Model Ib were correct, urbanization would be seen as producing the spread of communications which would, in turn, produce widespread growth in literacy and education levels. The spread of mass media would be inferred to be a prerequisite to the spread of mass education, rather than the reverse. Model Ic, based on our original model, predicts that the causal links proceed from U to E to C and ac-

---

[21] Sewall Wright, "Correlation and Causation," *Journal of Agricultural Research*, 20 (1921), pp. 557–585.

[22] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

[23] Social scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the similarities in the logic of these techniques. Boudon, for example, subsumes them all under a more general formulation which he calls "dependence analysis": Raymond Boudon, "A Method of Linear Causal Analysis: Dependence Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), pp. 365–374.

[24] See Charles F. Cnudde, "Legislative Behavior and Citizen Characteristics: Problems in Theory and Method," (a paper delivered at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, Ill., April 29, 1966).



Model Ia. No direct causal link between E and C.

Model Ib. Developmental sequence from U to C to E.



Model Ic. Developmental sequence from U to E to C.

FIG. 3. Alternative causal models—First half.

count for the original relationship between U and C. The success of Model Ic in predicting the actual relationships between these three variables would confirm the notion that urbanization is the prerequisite to the widespread growth of literacy and education. The consequent educational development would then provide the mass public necessary for the growth of the mass media of communication.

The prediction equations for Ia, Ib, and Ic in Table I show the Simon-Blalock test of each of these alternative models. Clearly, the excellence of the fit between the predicted and actual correlations for Model Ic, as opposed to the results for Ia and Ib, provides a basis for eliminating the latter two alternatives and inferring that the direction of causation is indeed from urbanization to education to communication.

Turning our attention to the second half of the democratic political development model (the relationships between E, C, and D), Figure 4 indicates that only two logically alternative causal models can be posited. This is due to the fact that we have already inferred the direction of causation between E and C from Model Ic. Model IIa predicts that the relationship between C and D is spurious due to common causation by E. If this model were to fit the data, education, not communication, would be confirmed as the final prerequisite to a successfully functioning political democracy. Model IIb posits a developmental sequence from E to C to D as interpreting the original correlation between E and D. If this model is confirmed, communications development will be seen to be the final link in the chain of causation. The spread of mass education creates an informed public that supports the growth of a system of mass communication which penetrates and integrates the society thereby laying the basis for democratic political competition.

Table 2 shows the prediction equations for Models IIa and IIb. These prediction equations confirm the inference that the relationship between education and democratic political development is an indirect one through communications.

One final link, the direct original relation-

TABLE 1. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR MODELS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT—FIRST HALF

Predictions		Degree of Fit	
Models	Predicted	Actual	Difference
Ia. rUErUC =rEC	(.75) (.71) =.53	.85	.32
Ib. rUCrCE =rUE	(.71) (.85) =.60	.75	.15
Ic. rUErEC =rUC	(.75) (.85) =.64	.71	.07

TABLE 2. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR MODELS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT—SECOND HALF

Predictions		Degree of Fit	
Models	Predicted	Actual	Difference
IIa. rECrED =rCD	(.85) (.62) =.53	.80	.27
IIb. rECrCD =rED	(.85) (.80) =.68	.62	.06



Model IIa. No direct causal link between C and D.

Model IIb. Developmental sequence from E to C to D.

FIG. 4. Alternative causal models—Second half.

ship between U and D, remains to be tested. A final logically possible model would postulate that the developmental sequence from U to E to C to D accounts for the entire relationship between U and D. If Model III were to be confirmed, the inference would be that there is no direct relationship between U and D. Figure 5 and Table 3 illustrate and test this possible alternative respectively. The relatively poor fit (over .10 difference) indicates that Model III can be rejected and the direct link between U and D should be maintained.

Before settling on the final system of causal relationships indicated by use of the Simon-Blalock technique, let us briefly evaluate the direct effects of each of the remaining paths through the computation of path coefficients. The correlation coefficients utilized in the Simon-Blalock analysis, it should be recalled, only measure the degree of association between variables. We found above, for example, that the association between U and D is maintained even when the effect of the path from U to E to C to D was taken into account. Correlation coefficients, however, do not measure the amount of change in the dependent variable which is associated with changes in the independent variable. Our primary concern at this stage is with the measurement of changes in the dependent variable produced by changes in the independent variable path coefficients, therefore, are utilized because they measure the amount of *change* in the dependent variable produced by *standardized changes* in the independent variable.



FIG. 5. Model III—Developmental Sequence from U to E to C to D.



FIG. 6. A causal model of democratic political development including path coefficients.

Figure 6 shows two paths from U to D remain in associational terms. First, there is the developmental sequence from U to D with three links—U to E, E to C, and C to D. Second, there is the direct link between U and D. Path coefficients for each of these links in the causal model of democratic political development are computed in Table 4.

An examination of the path coefficients

TABLE 3. PREDICTION EQUATION AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR A MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT—FINAL LINK

	Predictions		Degree of Fit	
	Model	Predicted	Actual	Difference
III.	rUErECrCD = rUD	(.75)(.85)(.80) = .51	.64	.13

TABLE 4. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS AND PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR THE CASUAL MODEL IN FIGURE 6

Path	Equation	Path Coefficient
a	$bUE+rUE=0$	.75
b	$bEC+rEC=0$	.85
c	$bCD+rCD=0$	.80
d	$bUD+(bCD \times rUC)+rUD=0$	.07

placed on each link in Figure 6 indicates that the overwhelmingly important causal links in the process of democratic political development are contained in the developmental sequence from U to E to C to D. The direct effect of urbanization on democratic political development (as indicated by the use of a broken line) is negligible.

The remarkable correspondence between this empirically derived causal model of democratic political development and the original causal model postulated in Figure 1 is clear.

V. CONCLUSION

This causal model, because it represents the beginnings of a parsimonious theory of, rather than mere correlates of, the process of democratic political development enables us to derive a series of empirical propositions concerning this crucial process.

1. Democratic political development occurs when mass communications permeates society.

   Education affects democratic political development by contributing to the growth of mass communications, therefore:

2. Mass communications occurs when literacy and educational levels rise in society.

   Urbanization affects democratic political development primarily by increasing educational levels, which then increase mass communications, therefore:

3. Education and literacy development occur in urbanizing societies.

This causal model, then, is a series of interrelated causal propositions which link urbanization through a developmental sequence to democratic political development.

Since the causal relationships specified in the model are not perfect, the model and the propositions derived therefrom are probabilistic in nature. The r^2 between U and E (.56), E and C (.72), and C and D (.64) leave a significant proportion of the variance unexplained. For this reason, deviant cases (in terms of the model) can be found. Basically, there are two kinds of deviant cases. First, there are those cases where the nation is "overdeveloped" in one of the variables included in the model. For example, Cutright discusses nations with a relatively low level of communications development which are defined as being relatively highly developed politically.[25] In this case, the democratic political system does not have sufficient communications development to maintain the regime. In terms of our model, this nation is likely to experience severe difficulty in maintaining democratic political competition and may even collapse. The dangers of attempting to impose a democratic regime on socio-economically underdeveloped nations in the post-World War II world are indicated by this type of analysis.

Stepping further back in the chain of causation, we may also find nations which are experiencing communications revolutions, but without prior developments in urbanization and education. In this case, disruption of the regime may occur because the citizenry has not been prepared for the sudden exposure and communications development may bring social disintegration, rather than social cohesion. The examination of such deviant cases may give us insight into other factors that produce changes in these four variables and bring such disruptions. Moreover, we may also ascertain the explanatory power of the model by examining the reliability of predictions about disruption based on these discontinuities.

The second type of deviant case is the nation that has fulfilled the requirements for development, in terms of the model, yet fails to maintain a democratic regime. Germany, for example, would seem to have fulfilled the prerequisites for a democratic regime long before the present Federal Republic. Nevertheless, Germany has experienced severe difficulty in establishing and maintaining a democratic regime in the twentieth century. Apparently, the developmental sequence can be disrupted by influences outside the model. Cutright, for example, examines the impact of foreign invasion and war on political development. He finds that such events seem to intervene to upset the normal sequence of events.[26] The examination of this type of deviant case and of time series data may subject our propositions to further tests. For example, the effect of urban growth over time may be quite different from that of variations in urbanization at one point in time. In general, additional research should shed light on other variables that might be included in a more complete model of the process of political development.[27]

---

[25] Cutright, *op. cit.*, pp. 577–581.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 580.

A major virtue of this form of causal model analysis is its capacity to elaborate and extend the model by the inclusion of new variables. This type of elaboration may take two forms. First, when variables outside the system are identified and hypothesized to be causal variables in the process of democratic political development, they can be explicitly introduced into the model. The introduction and testing of such variables provides a test of both the causal nature of the specified variable and the adequacy of the existing model. As additional causal variables are identified and included, the model of democratic political development will begin to match the complexity of the phenomenon it seeks to explain.

A second form of elaboration is the introduction and testing of new dependent variables. In this manner, we can gauge the effects of democratic political development. By the introduction of measures of welfare, education, and military expenditures into the model, we can measure the effects of both democratic political systems and the causal factors in development on public policy. More specifically, answers might be obtained to these questions: what is the independent effect of democratic politics on welfare expenditures? What are the effects of education on welfare expenditures? Are the effects of education interpreted through political development? Answers to questions such as these require the testing of several alternative models including welfare expenditures as a new variable.

In a previous study, on an unrelated substantive matter, the authors have expressed the belief that

> in regard to the subject of theory building in political science, the cumulative nature of empirical model building needs to be stressed. By explicit articulation of the model of constituency influence and emphasis on establishing empirical relationships, the Miller-Stokes study provides a basis for further development. The application of new techniques and the possible inclusion of new variables is thereby facilitated.[28]

We can only hope that this particular causal model of the process of democratic political development may also facilitate the elaboration and testing of models of development by the application of new techniques and the inclusion of new variables. In this manner, a cumulative body of development theory may arise.

---

[27] Clearly, there is no incompatibility between Cutright's technique of using the prediction equation based on the regression line and this type of causal analysis. In fact, Cutright's technique applied at each stage of the developmental process would effectively isolate the deviant cases at each stage. His present research on historical trends in political development should also shed light on the adequacy of this causal model. See *ibid.*, pp. 577–581 for a discussion of Cutright's techniques and research.

[28] Cnudde and McCrone, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN
The Johns Hopkins University

I. INTRODUCTION

The general conclusions of the study will be stated at the outset in the broadest terms to aid the reader in his evaluation of the argument as it is unfolded in more detail.

The Soviet leaders expected to make great advances in the underdeveloped world as it decolonized. They hoped that the Communists would lead the nationalist rebellions and convert them into Communist states. Only in the North of Indochina has the Communist party been able to do so; the South is still in contest. High hopes in Indonesia, Algeria, and the Congo have come to naught. The successful seizure of power in Cuba has taken place in an unanticipated manner.

In this case, a non-Communist revolution converted itself into a Communist one. Before Castro's assumption of power in Cuba, the Soviet Union viewed Latin America in general, and the Caribbean in particular, as an area where American power severely limited Communist opportunities. The overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 seemed to prove the point. But for a time after the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cubans believed, and seemed to have convinced the Soviets, that the Cuban revolution could be exported. But the failure of several attempts to do so, and the outcome of the missile crisis in the fall of 1962, caused first the Soviets and somewhat later the Cubans to revise their hopes for new Communist states in Latin America in the near or foreseeable future. Now several years after the windfall of Castro's conversion, Soviet attention is increasingly centered on the costs to be borne. First, although Castro will probably remain a Communist, he will continue to be as defiant as he can afford to be. Second, Castro has cost the Soviet Union a great deal of money[1] and, although these contributions have been reduced, the end is not yet in sight. Third, the appearance in Latin America of regimes seemingly on the road to communism has been shown to provoke United States intervention. Such intervention is less costly to the Soviet Union when the loss of a Communist state is not at issue than after the Soviets have made large commitments, or after a Communist regime has been established. For this reason, and because the Soviets do not foresee the victory of traditional Communist parties in Latin America and have all sorts of reservations about parties headed by "Johnny-come-lately" Communists like Castro, they prefer a long transition from coalition governments to communism, and indeed favor an extended period of national democracy in which many social elements participate. As long as the situation is one which might be called "creeping revolution," the Soviet Union's commitment, economic and military, can be kept within the bounds of what the Soviets are willing to invest. But once a country labels itself Communist, the Soviet options are greatly restricted. Hence the Soviet Union's preference for a gradual transition in Latin American countries to such rapid communization as in the case of Cuba.[2] But the Soviets are not free to follow their preferences if they want to maintain influence, let alone control, over revolutionary parties. In Central America, particularly in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Peru, there are partisan movements, most of which are run by indigenous, non-Communist revolutionaries who are willing to take greater risks and resort more readily to violence than do the traditional

---

[1] No authoritative figure is known to me, but a million dollars per day has often been mentioned.

[2] The following is an expression of Soviet preferences in the form of a prediction: "Some developing countries have already begun their noncapitalist development. It would be more accurate to say of those who have followed this path consistently that they occupy a 'special place,' not in the capitalist world system, but rather in the socialist world system. This means that the appearance and establishment of world socialism can no longer be represented only by the unity of countries where socialism has already been completely victorious and where the political form is the dictatorship of the proletariat or the government of the whole people which has developed from that form. The world socialist system can also include not completely socialist or semi-socialist links. The passage of the developing countries from the world capitalist to the world socialist system is possible not only in the form of a comparatively rapid action, such as occurred in Cuba in 1959–1960, but also in the form of a prolonged process stretching over many years." S. Tiul'panov, "Osnovnye problemy politekonomii razvivaiushchikhsia stran" (The Basic Problems of the Political Economy of the Developing Countries), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* No. 9, 1965, p. 72.

Communist parties. The Cubans and the Chinese are potential sponsors of these movements and thus a threat to Soviet influence. To preserve its influence, the Soviet Union has to grant these movements greater autonomy, and this in turn creates conflicts with the traditional Communist parties in Latin America, which stand to suffer as a result of Communist support of violence in any one country.

It is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to have revolutions in Latin America when and how they want them. Much more likely, in any future case, the Soviet Union will be confronted with a revolutionary situation where it will have to either support or reject the incipient Communist revolution. Soviet doctrine, which is to be examined in the next pages, does not enable us to predict which choice Soviet leaders will make, but it can furnish a better notion of the intellectual atmosphere in which Soviet policymakers move.

II. SOVIET DOCTRINE ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Soviet scholars writing on the underdeveloped world recognize that its political problems represent a special category and that Communist revolutions in these areas will differ from earlier Communist revolutions elsewhere. Few go as far as did a young French Communist writing in a Cuban weekly, who said, in effect, that the history of the Communist revolutions of the past was a poor guide to the future. "The true value of the Cuban revolution is perhaps more forcefully perceived within the revolution itself: it dispenses with the revolutionary models of the Soviet Union, China, and *even Cuba*. . . ."[3] If one reviews American and even Soviet accounts of the revolution in Russia itself, and of the creation of Communist states in Eastern Europe and China, it becomes obvious that all the peering into the entrails of a political situation to see if the pattern of Moscow 1917, Peking 1947, Prague 1948, or Havana 1959 is being repeated has been wasted effort. Some such realization seems to inform Soviet analyses of the underdeveloped world, as we shall presently see.

Not only is any future seizure of power likely to follow different rules, but the model of the development of the Soviet Union has little relevance for underdeveloped countries.[4] For years before and after the Second World War, the experience of the modernization of a backward part of the Soviet Union, Soviet Central Asia, was compared to the situation in colonial countries. By almost any definition, Soviet Central Asia was an underdeveloped country. In almost fifty years of Soviet rule the situation has changed radically. But how was this achieved? Enormous amounts of Soviet capital and trained personnel (a special form of capital) have been invested in this area over a period of fifty years. The equalization of living standards between the backward and the more advanced areas of the Soviet Union was one consequence of planning on an all-Union scale. But who is going to provide the capital for the four hundred millions of India? For the six or seven hundred millions of China?

Such questions throw into sharp relief the dilemma that foreign economic development poses for the Soviet Union (and indeed for the United States). It is becoming increasingly evident that the present situation in almost all the underdeveloped countries makes both the Soviet and the American model only marginally relevant.

Marxian analysts can neither expect the underdeveloped countries to undertake industrialization on the model of capitalist development, nor can they expect them to follow the example of the Soviet Union. The latter, paradoxically, has followed Marx's model of capitalist industrialization more closely than any other country. Capital was accumulated almost exclusively on the basis of forced savings, for the Soviet leaders made an early decision to go it alone and refused to permit foreign capital to be invested in their state. Although some leaders of the underdeveloped world believed that their only course was to follow the Soviet example, political realities in their own countries have ruled this out. It is possible to force present generations to sacrifice themselves for the future, but only if the state is run by ruthless leaders who are convinced that immutable laws of economics exist and that they alone understand them. Thus far, only Communist regimes have met these criteria.

---

[3] Emphasis in original. Regis Debray, "America Latina: Algunos problemas de estrategia revolucionaria" (Some Problems of Latin American Revolutionary Strategy), *Bohemia*, Havana, Nos. 57 and 58, November 19 and 26, 1965. The article also appeared in *Politica*, Mexico City, November 15, 1965, Supplement, p. 7.

[4] Tiagunenko, V. L., *Problemy sovremennykh natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii* (Problems of Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions) Moscow, 1966, pp. 175–178. After stating that Soviet Central Asia is a model for underdeveloped states, the author gives an excellent exposition of all the factors which have made it a unique case rather than a model.

If regimes of this kind should continue to appear, they would present a peculiar problem to the Soviet Union because of the political and economic demands they would make on it. Even had it desired to do so, the Soviet Union obviously would have been incapable of helping China on the same scale that it did its own Central Asian republics. Therefore, successful Communist revolutions in poor and overpopulated countries hereafter will not be able to emulate the Soviet experience without aid from the Soviet Union of a magnitude far beyond that nation's resources. Thus a new problem has emerged, the problem of "premature communism."

The Soviet Union has contributed to the Cuban economy, but reluctantly and without any genuine choice in the matter. Yet Cuba is smaller and has a much better articulated infrastructure than many other underdeveloped countries. There is a limit to the potential number of new Communist states which could expect economic support from the established Communist powers, and "premature" Communist regimes that could not count on Soviet economic support might well founder. In a sense, the Soviet Union has been forced into the very position for which it criticized the Mensheviks in 1917. It prefers that capital be accumulated before the socialist revolution so that the new Communist states will have a better chance of success and not make embarrassing demands upon the Soviet Union. Naturally, the Soviet formulation is not so blunt but the meaning is clear.[5] As we go on to examine Soviet doctrine on the economic and political development of underdeveloped countries, the basis for so radical a shift in Soviet preferences will emerge.

Soviet economists argue that improving labor productivity is a better way to accumulate capital than concentrating on large capital installations with scant reference to productivity.[6] Therefore, some underdeveloped countries are advised against following the Soviet example of developing large steel mills and all the paraphernalia of heavy industry, but are urged instead to develop whatever pays best and use the profits from that to capitalize. Thus, Che Guevara, who created a mystique of sacrifice and was willing to industrialize Cuba without regard to whether it was economically expedient, was overruled by the Soviets, who would have had to foot much of the bill. The Cubans were advised to industrialize by starting with what they could do most profitably, which was to grow sugar.

The Soviets have also stressed the need for agricultural reforms, particularly for Latin America, as a way to increase the size of the internal market. Their argument, familiar enough in Western economic writings, is that large segments of the peasant populations of the world produce so inefficiently that they can do little more than feed themselves and are unable to buy any of the products of industry, thereby putting a ceiling on the expansion of domestic manufactures. To expand the internal market, therefore, agricultural reforms (not argicultural revolutions, it should be noted) are advocated. Given such reforms, the peasants will have some surplus; they will enter the market; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will expand; and economic progress will have begun.[7]

Soviet economists advise underdeveloped

---

[5] Krasin, Iu. A., and V. F. Li, "O zakonomernostiakh nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiia osvobodivshikhsia stran" (Rules Governing the Noncapitalist Development of the Liberated Countries) *Voprosy filosofii* (8) 1964, pp. 29–40. On pp. 30–31 the authors say: "The noncapitalist stage of development, which is the specific form of the metamorphosis of the democratic revolution into the socialist, creates the social and economic base for the subsequent progress of the country without the participation of private capitalist elements. . . . "; Ul'ianovski, R., "Sotsializm i natsionalnoosvo-boditel'naia bor'ba" (Socialism and the national liberation struggle), *Pravda*, April 15, 1966, warns that in addition consumer demands must be met during this stage or else the non-capitalist path is discredited, as happened in Ghana.

[6] For a summary of the Soviet literature, see my "Soviet Doctrine on Developing Countries: Some Divergent Views" in Kurt London (ed.), *New Nations in a Divided World* (New York, 1963), pp. 80–84.

[7] Eliutin, Iu., "Latinskaia Amerika: Krizis pomeshchichei oligarkhii" (Latin America: The Crisis of the Landholding Oligarchy), *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (2), 1963, pp. 52–61. See pp. 56–57 for a version of this formulation; also see Kuznetsov, V. O., *Agrarnye reformy v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh i stranakh vysokorazvitogo kapitalizma* (Agrarian Reforms in the Developing Countries and the Highly Developed Capitalist Countries), Moscow, 1965, p. 155; and Danilevich, M. V., "Agrarnye otnosheniia i bor'ba za agrarnuiu reformu v stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki" (Agrarian Relations and the Struggle for Agrarian Reform in the Latin American Countries), in A. M. Rumiantsev, *Agrarnyi vopros i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* (Agrarian Question and the National Liberation Movement) (Moscow, 1963), pp. 432–458.

countries to get their capital from both the Soviet Union and the United States. They say, in so many words, that the Soviet Union has neither the capital nor the skills to help the entire underdeveloped world, and that these countries therefore must have recourse to Western capital.[8]

Soviet writers profess to see an important political difference between countries that are on the path to socialism and those that are not. Since many of the leaders of the underdeveloped world reject the capitalist system and tend to take out much of their frustration on the capitalist world, Soviet writers expect that in the transition period many of these countries will be adjuncts to the Soviet diplomatic system rather than the capitalist. If countries espouse the doctrine of socialism, say the Soviet writers, even if it is not socialism in the Soviet sense, this represents an important predisposition for socialism and against capitalism. If medium-term gains from a policy can be anticipated, it is not necessary to make a strong case for the long-term gains.

A crucial factor in this new type of socialist revolution is the concept of what the Soviet writers call intermediate, or interstitial, strata and what Western scholars would call the technocratic elite: a service class composed of people with skills rather than property. Its members may belong to the military, the bureaucracy, or the professional classes. According to Soviet theory, in a country developed on a state-capitalist rather than a private-capitalist basis this new class grouping will have a vested interest in pushing toward a state-managed system rather than a traditional, capitalist state. As the political power of private capital will be small, the "new class" will meet little opposition as it moves toward socialism. When the prince becomes a Christian, the people follow; when the managers become Communists, so does the state. These intermediate groups, then, are unwittingly preparing a socialist revolution.

In practice, the foregoing is used to justify the Soviet support of transitional regimes by a modest program of loans and grants, as the Soviet Union can argue that history will help bring the new countries into the socialist camp. As might be expected, the Chinese have mocked the theory that nonsocialists will make socialist revolutions despite themselves.[9] Soviet concentration on intermediate rather than ultimate goals (a counterrevolutionary tendency, in Chinese terms) is not the result of ideological reassessment alone but the consequence of successive defeats. Except in Cuba, Soviet intervention in the underdeveloped world has brought very little but headaches. Recent events in Algeria and Indonesia demonstrated how precarious even the most touted "national democracies" can be.

III. SOVIET DOCTRINE ON LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Before World War II, Moscow had little success in Latin America and great difficulty in controlling Communist parties. In the immediate postwar period, this pattern continued; Soviet leaders believed the influence of the United States to be controlling, and the ease with which the Guatemala of Arbenz, a government friendly to the Soviet Union, was overthrown in 1954 confirmed their conviction. The Communist phrase that described this state of affairs was "geographic fatalism." For this reason the breakneck speed of the radicalization of Cuba after January 1, 1959, startled Soviet observers. Theodore Draper's *Castroism: Theory and Practice* demonstrates conclusively that neither the Soviet Union nor the Cuban Communists viewed Castro as an ally until very late in the game, when the Communist Party of Cuba established liaison with him and assisted him in his victory, very much as a last-minute junior partner. Even after Castro entered Havana, the Soviets and the Cuban Communists regarded him as another petit-bourgeois leader, more promising than most, but still a man who might make his peace with the United States and continue the social structure essentially unchanged.[10] However, as 1959 wore on and Castro became more radical in his internal policies, and as his relations with the United States worsened, the Soviets began to believe that here indeed was a new political phenomenon: a genuine social revolution in Latin America, seemingly tolerated by the United States. Moscow now supported him, first verbally and then economically, and even gave very carefully qualified assurances of military aid. When Castro seized upon these vague Soviet formulas and tried to make them more specific, Khrushchev replied that his promise of missile support had been only figurative. But Castro was inexorable in his pursuit of the reluctant Soviets and insisted that he had always been a Marxist-Leninist—one of many untruths. Castro's becoming a Communist meant two things. First, it would now be harder for the Soviet Union to evade helping him both politically and economically; and second, it put the Communist Party of Cuba under his discipline. Castro did not hesitate to alter the Communist Party of Cuba to his own needs and to establish his dominance by eliminating many of the old Communist Party members from positions of power.

---

[8] According to one Soviet scholar who has written on the subject for many years, "The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America cannot, naturally, count on the socialist states' being in a position to provide all their requirements for capital, equipment, and technical assistance. A significant portion of their requirements has to be satisfied through the agency of the imperialist states." V. Tiagunenko, "Aktual'nye voprosy nekapitalisticheskogo puti razvitiia" (Current Problems of the Non-capitalist Path of Development); *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 11, November 1964, p. 17. See also the same author in an article entitled "The Future of the Liberated States" in the more official *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1965, p. 113, and Iu. Potemkin and V. Sandakov, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: nekotorye aspekty problemy nakopleniia" (The Developing Countries: Some Aspects of the Problem of Accumulation); *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 4, 1965, p. 43, for a similar statement with particular reference to Latin America, and most recently Ferenc Varnai, "Whither the Third World?" *Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, March 16, 1966.

[9] The Chinese have singled out for particular ridicule the following Soviet formulation of this idea: "The leading role of the proletariat on a world scale finds expression in part in the circumstance that under the influence of its ideology the transition to socialist transformations in some countries can take place even without the direct leadership of the working class and—at least in the initial stage—under the leadership of the progressive forces which gradually go over to the position of scientific socialism," B. N. Ponomarev (ed.), *Mezhdunarodnoe revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie rabochego klassa* (The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class) (Moscow, 1964), p. 325. The very same statement appears in the revised 1965 edition. The 1964 edition was printed in 50,000 copies, the 1965 edition in 25,000 copies.

Here, then, was yet another kind of Communist revolution. It began as an essentially middle-class revolution (with only a rudimentary, but much-advertised, rural base) against a tottering dictatorship. The middle-class revolutionary, who had studied the lessons of Guatemala and Cuba very carefully, came to power with the conviction that the United States would not let him go very far. Castro wanted to be the Bolivar of the Caribbean. If he were to be only a more liberal Batista, he could not realize such a dream. In the assessment of the Latin American Left, the Guatemalan revolution had failed because it had left the army intact and had not really enlisted the peasants' support. It was the exigencies of holding power, not doctrinal conviction, that drove Castro leftward. By expropriating the large landowners, by moving rapidly to appropriate foreign property, and by forming a new army, Castro systematically did all the things that Arbenz had not done.[11] In addition, he forced a reluctant Soviet Union to become his ally.

Once Castro had made these important changes in the political structure of his country, it needed more than a trumpet to blow down the walls of that Jericho. A small action from outside could not have the catalytic effects in Cuba that it had in Guatemala. This was the lesson of the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961.

The Soviets were confronted with an unexpected victory and an unusual new Communist. Castro at first tried to export his revolution, but had little success. As the prospects for further Castroite revolutions in the Caribbean went glimmering,[12] the Soviets had to take on the costs of fortifying the existing enterprise and to see if they could get more than political advantage from it. The cost in money was high, and money was hardly in abundant supply in the Soviet Union. Another and far from negligible cost was the complication of relations with Latin American Communist parties, which will be considered later.

---

[10] "On 13 February [1959] the position of Prime Minister of the revolutionary government was taken over by Fidel Castro, leader of the rebel army. This meant that 'the principal role in the government went over into the hands of the petty radical bourgeoisie'," Konstantin M. Obyden, *Kuba v bor'be za svobodu i nezavisimost'* (Cuba in the Struggle for Freedom and Independence), Moscow, 1959, in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (hereinafter cited as JPRS): 3563. 18 July 1960, p. 6.

[11] See Luigi Roberto Einaudi, *Marxism in Latin America: From Aprismo to Fidelismo* (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1966), especially pp. 160–250 for a convincing account of Castro's analysis of the Guatemalan experiences.

[12] Before the missile crisis, expectations were very high. "Latin America today is rapidly being converted into one of the most revolutionary regions of our planet" was the concluding phrase of an important article. See K. Tarasov, "Gavanskaia deklaratsiia-prizyv k bor'be protiv imperializma" (The Havana Declaration is a Summons to the Struggle Against Imperalism), *Kommunist,* No. 4, 1962, p. 89. See also Milos Vesely, "Latin America on the Move," *Nova Mysl,* July 1962, No. 7, Prague, in JPRS 15606, No. 254, p. 1.

Some time in the spring or early summer of 1962, the Soviets began planning to put medium- and intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. The frustration of that scheme was a great defeat for the Soviet Union and Castro. After the missile crisis, both the Soviet Union and Cuba had to lower their sights. To be sure, communism in Cuba was a considerable accomplishment, even if the most optimistic hopes had not been realized. But Cuba had cost, and continued to cost, a great deal of money, and the very existence of a Communist Cuba had provoked an American response which reduced the likelihood of new Cubas. It was clear even before the Dominican crisis that a new Castroite revolution would not be tolerated by the United States. However, even if this judgment had been mistaken and such a revolution might have succeeded, could the Soviet Union have afforded it? Brazil in 1964 offers a good hypothetical case. The Soviets, unlike most American political analysts, believed that the chief purpose of Goulart's approaches to the Communist Party and to the Soviet Union was to enable him to extract better terms from the United States.[13] But even if they hoped that Goulart might follow the Castroite path and change his political color once he had consolidated power in Brazil, they could not have viewed such an eventuality with any enthusiasm. Cuba is a country of about seven million people; Brazil has a population of over seventy-seven million. Obviously, the Soviet Union could not support Brazil economically on anything like the scale on which it was supporting Cuba. A Communist regime under Goulart would pose very serious problems for the Soviet Union while it existed, and its viability was uncertain. Perhaps in this case, as in many others, the wish was father to the analysis, leading the Soviets to believe that Goulart could not come to power.

Whether their diffidence is cause or effect, Soviet writers on Latin America are hardly sanguine about the prospects for revolution on that continent. The starting point of their analysis is that, by comparison with other underdeveloped areas, Latin America has a better-developed middle class, which opposes the assumption of power by the proletariat or by modernizing revolutionaries like Castro. Given the connection of this middle class with American imperialism and the immediate benefits that it derives from the relationship, so the Soviet theory goes, members of this group can be relied on to suppress Communist revolutions in Latin America. But some sections of the middle class suffer more from America's dominance than they gain from being its agent. From the Soviet point of view, the growth of this sector of the middle class is to be encouraged, and a precondition for doing so is the expansion of the internal market. In time, then, the *comprador* (middleman between foreign imperialism and native business) is expected to yield political power to the national, and nationalistic, bourgeoisie. For the latter to flourish, the internal market must grow, and to this end there must be land reforms (*not* an agrarian revolution). As the nationalistic, patriotic components of the bourgeoisie in Latin American countries become preponderant, Soviet writers expect that they will break with the United States, the first step being the confiscation of American property.[14] This process will take much longer in Latin America than in Africa, say the Soviet analysts, precisely because the *comprador* class is so strong in Latin America. Although in Africa the economy as a whole is less developed, the prospects for the transition to socialism are better because a concomitant of backwardness is a weak middle class.

At best, the Soviet prediction for Latin American communism is not wildly optimistic. Also, there remains the question of why Latin American radical nationalists, once having shaken loose from the United States, should turn to socialism rather than to new types of government which do not fit present categories tidily. Of course, if the Soviets insist on calling whatever system emerges a variety of communism, they are assured of victories; conversely, if we do the same, we are assured of defeats. But on the basis of any reasonably objective definition of communism, one must agree with the Soviets' pessimism about their opportunities in Latin America, especially when one recognizes that the Soviet Union is not prepared to grant large-scale economic assistance to the development of these new, presumably anti-American, governments. The dominant and unvarying theme of all Soviet analysts is that Castroism will not be the model.[15] Why, they never say. One could imagine another situation in which a non-Communist leader, once having taken power, finds it opportune to turn Communist. It appears, however, that this alternative is never discussed in Soviet literature, as much, one suspects, because the Soviets find it unpalatable as because the United States is not expected to permit such a development.

---

[13] The Communist Party of Brazil took the position, revised after his overthrow, that "Goulart came to power as a result of a compromise between the national bourgeoisie and the forces of reaction." See Manuel de Souza, "Communism in Brazil in 1965," *Est & Ouest*, No. 357, Paris, pp. 16–18 February 1966, in JPRS 35051, No. 823, p. 137.

[14] K. S. Tarasov, *Soiuz radi grabezha* (The Alliance for Looting), Moscow, 1965, a pamphlet, pp. 27–28; I. Sheremetyev, "Latin America's Social and Economic Problems," *International Affairs*, Moscow, 2, 1965, pp. 43–48; Victor Perlo, "U.S. Monopolies and Latin America," *International Affairs*, Moscow, 5, 1965; A. Shulgovsky, "Political Trends in Latin America," *International Affairs*, Moscow, 11, 1965, pp. 43–49.

IV. THE SOVIET POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Actual Soviet policy toward Latin American states and their Communist parties conform generally to the theoretical analysis just summarized, but, naturally, with many modifications to meet local situations. The variations are most obvious in the differentiated policies toward Latin American Communist parties. One of the consequences of the Sino-Soviet competition has been that the Soviet Union is holding Communist parties on increasingly loose strings in order to be able to hold them at all. But it has not been possible to satisfy one party, or group of parties, without dissatisfying another. Thus far, Cuba has presented the most awkward case. The Cuban revolution cannot be popular with such long-established Communist parties as those in Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, whose leaders have held their offices for years, in some cases more than a quarter of a century, and do not relish the prospect of being displaced, humiliated, and expelled from the Party by a Communist of such recent vintage as Castro. For them, Castroist infiltration in their respective countries is not only subversive of their authority within the Communist party, but it furnishes a pretext for hostile state authorities to declare the party illegal. Since they share the Soviet view that the best course is to rely on growing nationalism to further the movement toward communism, they want to retain the legality of their position so as to be able to exert maximum influence on the radical nationalists. The old Communist leadership does not want to frighten the nationalists into making their peace with the United States and spurning the cooperation so eagerly offered by the Communists. Thus far, although the Soviet Union has had problems in balancing the interests of Castro against those of the traditional Latin American Communist parties, it has succeeded on the whole.

A major adjustment in this complex relationship seems to have taken place in a secret meeting in Havana in the latter part of 1964. Following Togliatti's recommendation to convene regional meetings of Communist parties,[16] the Soviets had called the meeting in Havana, which presumably was to be attended by all the Communist parties of Latin America but which excluded the pro-Chinese splinters. In agreeing to such a meeting, Castro went a long way toward estranging the Chinese. The communiqué of the conference, published in Moscow in January, 1965, gave some indication of what the compromise between the Soviet Union, Castro, and the other parties must have involved. The critical issue was the employment of violence at that time in Latin America. On this issue Moscow's position had been changing. Two articles in consecutive issues of *Kommunist* in the summer of 1964 signaled the change.[17]

---

[15] "The unity of the Latin American Revolution does not exclude but on the contrary presupposes various national processes, a wealth of tactics, dissimilar tempos of development, various levels of the sharpness of the class struggle, and an endless gamut of political struggle in each country, region, or group of countries." Rodney Arismendi, "Latinskaia Amerika vykhodit na avanstsenu" (Latin America Comes to the Front of the Stage), *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1961, p. 73; and A. M. Rumyantsev of the authoritative *World Marxist Review* said: "It is clear that the position with regard to the national bourgeoisie is not the same in Cuba, as, let us say, in Colombia. The revolutionary movement in Latin America, as in all other continents, develop unevenly." "Building a United Anti-Imperialist Front," *World Marxist Review*, VI (1), January 1963, p. 83; and in the context of a discussion of the example of Cuba, the old Communist leader, Corvalan, said: "Any tendency towards a mechanical copying of one or another revolutionary process by regarding it as a universal pattern is, at best, subjectivism." "The Peaceful Way—A Form of Revolution," *World Marxist Review* VI (12), December 1963, pp. 8, 9.

[16] "Pamiatnaia zapiska Palmiro Togliatti," *Pravda*, September 10, 1964.

[17] M. Kudachkin and N. Mostovets, "Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike" (The Movement of National Liberation in Latin America), *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1964, pp. 121–

In their dispute with the Chinese the Soviets had never taken the position that a peaceful parliamentary transition was the only path to Communist revolution. They always insisted that both the violent and the nonviolent paths were possible and that the choice in any given case depended on the circumstances, but Communist parties that did not consider the armed struggle suitable for their countries were cited as examples.

The first *Kommunist* article follows the pattern just described. The second article repeats the generalization that the choice of means must depend on the local situation, but then specifically approves armed struggle and guerrilla activity in some Latin American countries and peaceful means in others. The two articles are, of course, logically consistent, but an important policy shift has been signaled.[18]

At an undisclosed date at the end of 1964, the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist parties of Latin America met in Havana and adopted a resolution which reflected the policy change which the CPSU had initiated in the summer or, more likely, had accepted at Castro's urging. The resolution called for "support in an active form to those who at present are subjected to severe repression, such as the Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan, and Haitian fighters." It took the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet conflict and called for the unity of each Communist party.[19] Since none of the Chinese splinters among the Latin American Communist parties had been invited to the meeting, it was obvious that unity within each of the Latin American parties was to be interpreted as applying to parties which followed the Soviet lead. In addition, Castro, after his initial reluctance, agreed to come to the Moscow Party meeting scheduled for March, 1965, which was directed against the Chinese.

What seems to have happened at Havana is that the Soviet Union on the one hand secured the support of Cuba and other Latin American parties against the Chinese, but on the other hand made support of its position on China easier for those parties by making explicit that there were several Soviet lines in Latin America. The Havana communiqué called for a further meeting, or meetings, of groups of Latin American Communist parties, implying that they should either concert their activities or agree to pursue different policies in different areas. Unity of the Latin American parties was restored by the explicit endorsement of diversity of policy.

At first sight, the Soviet Union's encouragement and support of guerrilla movements in Latin America, whether grudging or spontaneous, seems to contradict its estimate of the prospects for revolution in Latin America. But if the Soviet Union is to maintain its influence over Latin American parties (control being no longer in question), it must be responsive to their needs. When guerrillas are active in Latin American countries, the Communist parties find themselves in a quandary. (Castro's guerrilla movement from 1957 to 1959 is a good example of this.) The guerrilla leaders often are not Communists. Sometimes only a minority of them are Communists; in no case in the past have they all been Communists. Typically, the guerrillas operate in the countryside and are thus relatively elusive; only in exceptional cases will they be active in the cities, as they were for a while in Venezuela. The established Communist parties often are opposed to guerrilla activity because they are convinced

---

130; A. Sivolobov, "Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike" (The Peasant Movement in Latin America), *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1964, pp. 100–107.

[18] The first article said (p. 127): "A study of the programs of the Communist parties of Latin America shows that the form of struggle has not been absolutized by the Communists and that they change according to the situation in one or another country.

"Latin American Communists consistently support the implementation of the line indicated in the programmatic documents of the international Communist movement and reject the position of the Chinese leaders who are trying to impose on all the parties the strategy and tactics which they worked out in the specific conditions of their country [viz., armed revolution and civil war]." The article then went on to cite statements from the Chilean and Salvadorean Communist parties, both of which are opposed to violence in their own countries at present. The second of the two articles said in its last paragraph (p. 107): "An analysis of recent events established that in countries where dictators are in power, dictators who are the henchmen of foreign monopolies, the development of the struggle on a broad front, including armed struggle, and the creation of partisan detachments in some areas, is a completely justified course." Then follows a warning that this does not apply to liberal reformist regimes.

[19] "Communicado: Conferencia de los Partidos Communistas de América Latina" (Communiqué: A Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America), *Revolución*, Havana, January 19, 1965.

that it will fail and that their support of any movements which they do not control may uselessly jeopardize whatever legal rights they have. However, in weighing their own opposition, they have to take into account the danger of losing the support of young militants who admire those who are fighting. Most typically, the relations between the Communist parties and the guerrillas are very strained. In one unusual case, Castro denounced the Sosa movement in Guatemala as a political mistake.[20] But more commonly, Communist parties will furnish limited support to the guerrillas and some personnel, in an effort to ensure some control over them and to avoid the onus of being against those who are "fighting with weapons in their hands." The police often arrest and harry the Communists, a circumstance which impels them to try to get the guerrillas to desist. As one can imagine, such alliances are fearsomely complicated, constantly shifting, and almost always embittered. Generalizations are of course perilous, but apparently the Cubans have remained more optimistic about the prospects of guerrilla movements than the Russians, and the relations between the Russians and the Cubans seem to include agreement on particular cases, concessions by one to the other, as well as agreements which one or both seek to subvert—the marks of a normal alliance, in other words. The Cubans are showing signs of greater discrimination in their support of guerrilla movements, and the Soviets still seem to be chasing the guerrilla movements leftward without being able to overcome the contempt of the guerrilla leaders for the old-line Communists.

Such a situation, while hardly ideal for the Soviets' point of view, is tolerable as long as their thesis that the guerrillas really have no chance of seizing power proves correct. If, however, in some small country where relatively few people participate in political life, a modest guerrilla force were to seize power, the Soviet Union would have to make the hard choice between supporting and scuttling a guerrilla group in power which it had previously been helping. Either choice would entail unpleasant consequences for the Soviet Union. If it supported the guerrillas' seizure of power with more than vague statements of support, it would lose heavily in prestige if the United States intervened successfully; a policy of inaction, on the other hand, would furnish ammunition to those guerrilla elements who have contended that the Soviet Union does not want them to succeed. Perhaps the Soviets are willing to risk having to make such a choice because they are convinced that the likelihood of the event is very small and that the objective of preserving their influence over the Communist movement in the face of the Chinese challenge is worth such a risk.

Although Soviet attention to guerrillas has increased, in most of the populous countries of Latin America the Soviet Union has adopted a vigorous united front policy, and it is doing so also in other parts of the world. In Europe, alliances with left and moderate parties have been projected. Even *rapprochement* with the Catholics has been advocated in the pages of the *World Marxist Review*. The policy of the united front is essentially a policy of broad alliances for limited ends. Given the Soviet Union's low estimate of the likelihood, or perhaps desirability, of Communist revolution at the present stage, its emphasis throughout the world is on alliances with other parties.

In Latin America the goal is clear: the isolation of the United States and an end to its influence in Latin America. In pursuit of this goal, the large Communist parties all over Latin America have been instructed to give conditional support to nationalist reformist movements. For instance, the Communist party of Chile in coalition with the Socialists, after losing the last election to the Christian Democrat Frei, has now moved to a position in support of Frei. At the last congress of the Communist Party of Chile it seemed as if the party would have supported Frei even more vigorously if its socialist allies had permitted it. In the Soviet analysis, Frei is pursuing a triangular policy in trying to balance off the United States by making arrangements with Europe, and in this endeavor the Communists wish him well. The Soviets are aware that Latin American politicians will try to use Europeans, including the East Europeans, as a way of getting better terms in their bargaining with the United States. The Soviet Union, for one, is quite willing to be used in this way, and the political color of the regime with which it is so dealing makes little difference. Thus, the Soviets were prepared to go along with Goulart, and are now willing to arrange trade agreements with his successor, Castello Branco.[21] This policy has the virtue of being extremely cheap, and almost automatically assured of success because its objectives are so modest. The Soviets understand as well as others that the most powerful political force in Latin America today is radical nationalism, which is naturally antiforeign. As a foreigner who is far away, with very little "presence" in Latin America, the Soviet Union is not the target of Latin American radical nationalism. The favorite target is the United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union, simply by continuing to talk generally about national liberation movements, and by encouraging native Communist parties, wherever it has influence over them, to cooperate with nationalist movements, is swimming with the tide. This is not a policy that promises the transition of the Latin American states to communism in the near or approximate future, but it has the virtue of avoiding embarrassing complications for the Soviet Union.

---

[20] Havana Domestic Radio, January 16, 1966.

[21] V. Kobysh, "Uspekhov tebe, Braziliia" (We Wish You Success, Brazil), *Izvestiia*, September 7, 1965, congratulates Brazil on the day of her national holiday and says that countries with different social systems can cooperate to mutual advantage.

The same issues were reexamined at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January, 1966, where the main actors—the Chinese, the Russians, the pro-Soviet Communist parties, and representatives of the guerrilla groups that are in uneasy alliance with Communist parties—were able to confront each other in the flesh. Information on the proceedings of the conference is still incomplete, and the statement of its results that follows may have to be revised in its details, and perhaps even in its essentials, when the full data are available.

The Chinese in attacking Castro pushed him closer to the Soviet Union, although he is still not in agreement with the latter on all issues. Apparently, the central issue between Cuba and China has been the treatment of the guerrilla movement. The Cubans have rethought the problems of the guerrilla movements in Latin America, and the aforementioned article by Regis Debray, published in Havana on the eve of the conference, is primary evidence of their rethinking. Debray makes the general point that no models for revolution really exist, but that each revolution in the past has found its own strategy and tactics in action. Many attempts at an exact imitation of the Cuban revolution in Latin America have failed, says Debray, because they were unsuited to local conditions, but also, more generally, because the very precedent of the Cuban revolution has made its repetition difficult if not unlikely. The opponents of Communist revolution in Latin America are now alert to the possibility that a non-Communist guerrilla movement may become Communist after taking power. As one Colombian guerrilla leader told Debray, "Herbert Matthews will not interview me nor will a Betancourt send me arms." Debray does not present a formula for successful revolutions growing out of guerrilla movements in Latin America; the main burden of his argument is that the formula will emerge from the struggle. "Engage the enemy and then play it by ear" is his prescription. But he foresees that battles may be lost, and he does not specify how many enemies should be engaged. One may conclude from Debray's article that the Cubans are less sanguine than they once were about the possibility of revolution but that they still favor assistance in selected cases.

The drama of the conference itself and the pressure on Castro determined the form in which Castro conveyed this new line. Sino-Cuban relations reached their lowest point when China refused to continue to barter rice for sugar. This refusal would appear to have been a mistake, because Castro's estrangement from China has sharply reduced his bargaining power with the Russians, now that he can no longer play the Russians off against the Chinese. Castro is properly very sensitive about the charge that he is a Soviet puppet, and frequently talks and acts in a way calculated to demonstrate his independence. A journalist who had talked with Castro for several hours after the Havana conference then quoted an unnamed high Cuban official as saying: "It is the USSR which has attached itself to the Cuban line."[22]

On the guerrilla movement the Cubans demonstrated their difference with the Soviets in two cases, and their agreement in another. Their varying positions most probably reflect the Cubans' appraisal of the situation, but they also serve to demonstrate Cuban independence. Let us first examine the instances of disagreement with other Communist parties (including, presumably, the Soviets). Cuba was in charge of the invitations to the Tricontinental Conference. She invited, as members of the Peruvian and Venezuelan delegations, persons who were critical both of the Communists in their respective countries and of the Soviet Union. In a recent article, the Peruvian delegate, who came under the assumed name Roberto Garciá Urrutia, is quoted as frankly admitting that the Peruvian guerrillas do not enjoy wide support and have suffered reverses. But if the guerrilla movement continues, he maintains, conditions for wider support will be created because, as the movement grows, American intervention will follow, and the guerrilla struggle will then become identified with the patriotic struggle of the whole Peruvian people.

---

[22] Carlos Nuñez, "Y ahora, en que campo está Cuba?" (And Which Camp is Cuba in Now?), *Marcha*, Montevideo, February 18, 1966.

The Americans, because they fear that the Peruvian middle class will aid the guerrillas, support the conciliatory reformism of the ruling party. And the writer adds: "Certain leftist parties [read, the Communists] . . . have the illusion that in making an agreement with the bourgeoisie which permits them to publish four or five periodicals—which only the militants read anyhow—they have discharged their revolutionary duty. In reality this is an attitude of collaboration with imperialism. . . ."[23]

By inviting Garciá to the Tricontinental Conference, Castro was clearly intervening in the affairs of the Communist party of Peru and departing from the practices of fraternal and friendly conferences among the Latin American Communist parties. The Soviets were forced either to swallow this defiance or try to change Castro's mind.

In Guatemala, on the other hand, Castro took the opposite course. For a long time he favored the MR-13 wing of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement led by Sosa, a non-Communist who typically is more strongly committed to extensive guerrilla warfare than is the Guatemalan Communist party. In a speech right after the Havana conference, Castro switched the Cuban position and attacked Sosa possibly because he disapproved of this policy but more likely because he was resentful of his connection with the Trotskyites. Latin American Trotskyites have criticized Castro very sharply, and apparently effectively, for the change of policy which they connect with the disappearance of Che Guevara.[24]

The Trotskyites interpret Che Guevara's eclipse as meaning that Castro has ceased to be a genuine revolutionary. He failed to offer vigorous opposition to the American landing in Santo Domingo, they say; perhaps he murdered Guevara; he is really opposed to guerrilla movements in Latin America; he has withdrawn arms from the militia because he is afraid that the "Guevara group" might use them to overthrow him. Nothing could be better calculated to infuriate Castro than to be accused of having the same relationship to the guerrilla movements of Latin America that the Cuban Communist party had to his movement. Only time will tell whether the uneasy Cuban-Soviet agreement on policy toward insurrection can be maintained at the present level or whether it will deteriorate.

In the above pages, Soviet foreign policy objectives in Latin America have been described as more limited and realistic today than in the period before the missile crisis. Soviet Latin American policy is of a piece with the changes in Soviet policy the world over. The Soviet Union has lowered its sights and now aims for more modest but more realistic goals. The question in Latin America as in the rest of the world is whether this is a temporary, a medium-range, or a long-range trend. Given a Soviet military inferiority that is now recognized as likely to continue, and given the Soviet Union's preoccupation with an unsatisfactory domestic political situation and with the Chinese problem, one would expect this tendency to be of longer rather than shorter duration. But these projections are always uncertain because, in the Soviet-American confrontation, events unexpected by either side, sometimes undesired by either side, often push matters into new directions.

It is on this note of caution and ambivalence that this paper ends. Although the Russians may prefer and expect to pursue limited objectives in Latin America, unexpected events could force them to take sides in an unanticipated crisis.

---

[23] Marta D. Solis, "Peru, la guerrilla es su signo," (Guerrilla Warfare is Peru's Motto), *Siempre*, Mexico City, February 2, 1966.

[24] E.g., see S. Posadas, "The Expulsion of Guevara from Cuba is a Blow to the Development of the Cuban Socialist Revolution," *Voz Proletaria*, Buenos Aires, October 27, 1965, JPRS 33,204, No. 785, pp. 116–139.

AN END TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?*

Ronald Inglehart
University of Michigan

"European Integration has slowed down since the mid-50's, and has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957–58."[1] This is Karl Deutsch's first major conclusion in a recent summary report of findings from a study which he and a number of colleagues have been executing over the past few years.[2] The study appears to be one of the most ambitious and interesting political research projects undertaken in recent years; its findings should be widely useful. In reaching this conclusion, Deutsch's interpretation is not merely that integration has stopped in the relatively narrow realm of formal government decisions; on the contrary, he contends that the process has come to a halt in the "European political environment" as a whole.

Deutsch bases his case on an analysis of trade flows and other transactions, content analysis of the elite press, public opinion surveys and elite interviews. An examination of much the same data, in connection with a study of political socialization in Western Europe, has led me to a radically different conclusion. Far from finding a stagnation of integrative processes since 1958, I would argue that, in some respects, European integration may have moved into full gear only *since* 1958. In this article I will first present some new evidence concerning attitudes among the younger generation in The Netherlands, France, West Germany and Great Britain; I will then review Deutsch's findings in this context.

I. ATTITUDES AMONG WESTERN EUROPEAN YOUTH

I hypothesize that important changes in political socialization may have been taking place in recent years, as a result of the postwar European movement, the increases in trade, exchange of persons, and the erection of European institutions. If this is the case, we might expect to find differences between adults and youth in their orientations toward European integration. To test this hypothesis, I made a secondary analysis of two cross-national studies of adult attitudes, made in 1962 and 1963. I will compare these data with material which I collected in 1964 and 1965 through surveys of the school populations of France, The Netherlands, West Germany and England.[3] My sampling technique consisted of selecting several schools in each country which were considered representative of the important social and economic groups, on consultation with educational authorities in the respective countries. Self-administered questionnaires were given to all members of specific classes in these schools, under the supervision of a teacher.[4] The questionnaires incorporated

---

* I wish to thank Samuel Barnes, M. Kent Jennings, Warren Miller and David Segal for their valuable criticisms of an earlier draft of this article. I am also grateful to Karl Deutsch for generously giving access to research reports from his study. The interpretations reached here are, of course, my own.

[1] "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment," this Review, 60 (1966), p. 355. Deutsch's collaborators are listed in a footnote on p. 354. The same footnote indicates that fuller versions of the findings will be published in two forthcoming books.

[2] Deutsch does not seem to be alone in taking this general view. Sen. Frank Church suggests that "European sentiment may have shifted toward a different arrangement, that what might have been achieved in the vision of such men as Jean Monnet when Europe lay prostrate after the war may no longer represent a practical possibility," see "U.S. Policy and the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, 45 (1966), p. 52.

[3] The data collection was supported by a Fulbright grant, with additional aid from the Dutch Ministry of Education. The analysis has been supported by a National Science Foundation Cooperative Fellowship.

[4] Total numbers of questionnaires obtained are as follows: France: 700; The Netherlands: 3,100; West Germany: 700; England: 500. Each social type is not included in proportion to its occurance in the overall population. In order to correct for this fact, I will base my comparisons on samples which are weighted to compensate for the relative shortage of working-class students. I weighted our SES groups according to the proportions of manual to non-manual occupations indicated in the adult surveys (approx. 2:1). My estimates, therefore, can only be regarded as a spot check on the overall distribution of attitudes. I resorted to this approach because funds did not permit obtaining a probability sample, and no alternative data were available. In a more extensive analysis, I examine other factors which seem to influence support for European integration, and attempt to control for them also. See Ronald Inglehart, *The Socializa-*

a number of items from the two adult surveys just mentioned. The data indicate that a gap does exist between adults and youth in relative degree of "Europeanness."

In response to the question, "To what extent are you in favor of, or opposed to, the efforts being made to unify Europe?" adults compared with youth (ages 13–19) as follows:

TABLE 1. OVERALL PERCENTAGE "STRONGLY FOR" OR "FOR" EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Adults—				
1962	87%	72%	81%	(65%)[5]
Youth				
1964–65	95	93	95	72

Among youth of the three European Community countries, this is about as near to a unanimous verdict as one is likely to come in survey research. The response is overwhelmingly favorable to European unification by a majority which swamps all differences of social class, sex, religion, etc. Among adults in these three countries, a substantial degree of hesitation exists, especially in France; it virtually vanishes among the younger generation. English youth is far from unanimity, but does give a fairly solid majority in support.

The foregoing question merely indicates support or opposition to European "unification" as a general idea. What happens when we pin our respondents down to specific measures? A series of questions was asked concerning concrete proposals for European integration. We find that the favorable percentage declines in every case; a strong majority gives lip service, at least, to the general idea of "unification" but is less emphatically in favor of given specific proposals. A factor analysis of our secondary school data revealed that a number of these responses clustered together, evidently indicating a "Europeanness" dimension. Using the four highest-loading items which are common to both surveys, let us compare the responses of youth with those of adults in 1963:

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR PROPOSALS: ADULTS V. YOUTH

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
1. "Abolish Tariffs?"				
Adults	79%	72%	71%	70%
Youth	87	83	89	74
2. "Free Movement of Labor and Businesses?"				
Adults	76	57	64	52
Youth	64	65	75	65
3. "Common Foreign Policy"				
Adults	67	50	60	41
Youth	80	71	74	56
4. "Use 'Our' Taxes to Aid Poorer European Countries?"				
Adults	70	43	52	63
Youth	82	68	72	57

TABLE 3. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR MEASURES

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Adults	73%	56%	62%	57%
Youth	78	72	78	63
Difference	+5	+16	+16	+6
Normalized Difference[6]	19	36	42	14

The Netherlands (in which the adult population already displayed a relatively high level of support for European integration) shows a relatively small age group difference; but over the four measures, our samples of French and German youth show pronounced increases in Europeanness relative to the adults in those countries. English youth lag behind here, as in our other comparison, although there is an indication of some increase in Europeanness relative to the adult population of Britain.[7] Strik-

---

tion of "Europeans" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967).

[5] In the three most recent surveys in which this question was asked of British adults (1955, 56, and 57) the percentage favorable ranged from 64% to 66%.

[6] Normalized according to the Effectiveness Index described by Carl I. Hovland *et. al.* "A Baseline for Measurement of Percentage Change" in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe, 1955), pp. 77–82.

[7] Does this imply that youth is more cosmopolitan than adults as a general rule? Not necessarily. The example of the Hitler youth might be cited as an indication that the reverse relation-

ing as these generational differences are, they become even more interesting when we break down the adult responses according to age group:

TABLE 4. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR MEASURES, BY AGE GROUP

Age Groups	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
55 and over	70%	47%	52%	49%
40–50	73	58	63	57
30–39	71	59	64	61
21–29	72	58	67	60
16–19 (youth sample)	77	72	78	63

In the Netherlands, the most notable feature of this pattern is its stability among different age groups. Dutch youth are more European than the oldest adult group (55 and over), but the difference is one of only 7 percentage points: an average of 77% "For" among the teenagers, as compared with 70% among the oldest group. The gap between the "55 and over" Germans and the teen-age Germans is much larger: fully 26 percentage points separate the two groups, building from a base of 52%. This seems to confirm other findings of striking differences among age groups reported for that country. One hears less talk of a "generations conflict" in France, yet in regard to the European issue, my data indicate that among the French there is almost as great a change from middle-agers to teen-agers as in the case of Germany: an increase of 25 percentage points in over-all support of the four European integration measures. The increase from oldest to youngest age group in England is intermediate: 14 percentage points.

While the average levels of support for these concrete proposals are considerably below the landslide approval of European "unification," we might tentatively draw the conclusion that the youngest generation in each of these countries is significantly more favorable to European integration than the group 55 and over—the age group which now holds most top-level positions of political power in these countries. Two relative discontinuities are particularly interesting in the age-group pattern: first, we notice that in France, Germany and Britain, the "over 55" group is markedly less European than the group immediately bordering it: there is a sharp drop of 8 to 11 percentage points. On the other hand, we find no sizeable gap between the oldest *Dutch* group and the next younger group, in regard to Europeanness. Indeed, the "over 55" group in that country is within 2 points of the "21–29" group. This contrast between Dutch stability and the rather sharp changes in the age group patterns of her neighbors cannot readily be interpreted in terms of a life cycle explanation and it leads us to a very interesting alternative interpretation.

The age group which was 55 and older in 1963 was at least 10 years old at the end of World War I. These individuals were exposed to the period of intense nationalism which preceded that war, and to the powerful fears and suspicions the war aroused during a relative impressionable stage of life. Alone among these four countries, Holland did not participate in World War I—nor was she deeply involved in the preceding great-power rivalries. If one's concept of nationality tends to be established early in life,[8] then the sharp decline in Europeanness which we find among this age group in each country *except* the Netherlands might be attributed to a residue from experiences in childhood and youth. It seems plausible that the effect of a major war on one's feelings of trust and kinship with the "enemy" people (e.g., the French toward the Germans) is strongly negative.

The "over 55" group in France, Germany and Britain had a powerful dose of the influences of World War I in its early years: the corresponding group in Holland was much less affected by them. And the next younger group (this time in all four countries) also shows less of the effect which we might attribute to that period: the median year of birth for this group is 1916. The oldest members of the younger group would have had some exposure to World War I (and their Europeanness would be lessened accordingly); but to a large extent this group was too young to be directly aware of

---

ship is also possible. My interpretation is simply that, because of the specific influences present in their early socialization, this *particular* crop of youth has been oriented in a more European and less nationalistic direction than preceding age cohorts.

[8] See, for example, Jean Piaget, "Le developpement chez l'enfant de l'idée de patrie et de relations avec l'étranger," *Bulletin Internationale de Science Sociale*, UNESCO, 1961, pp. 3, 605, 621. Piaget concludes that the concept of nationality is fully developed by age 14. Cf. Robert Hess, Judith Torney and David Jackson, *The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government, Part I* (Chicago, 1965), p. 380; and Gustav Jahoda, "Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality" *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, June, 1963.

World War I, and had reached adulthood before the outbreak of World War II. Karl Deutsch reports a phenomenon which seems to fit in with this interpretation. Drawing on data from a series of elite interviews in France, he reports:

> Typically, age accounts for less than 5 per cent of the variance in the answers found. Within these limits, the "middle elites"—those in their fifties and hence the generation of the 1930's and World War II—tend to differ from both their elders and juniors, who in turn often resemble each other. This middle elite group is somewhat more nationalistic and more closely identified with the de Gaulle regime. The junior elite—those under 50—are more internationalistic, more in favor of alliances, and still more opposed to an independent foreign policy for France.[9]

While Deutsch refers to the relatively nationalistic group as "the generation of the 30's and World War II," they might also be described as "the generation of World War I": in their fifties in 1964 (the time of the interviews), the Great War was probably felt as *the* important event of their childhood. They were 4 to 14 years old at the War's end. The next younger group was unaware of the war, while most of the older group had already passed through their most important years of political socialization by that time.

Moving down the age group tables, we notice little further increase in Europeanness among the adult population. This would be surprising if we were to work on the assumption that younger people are naturally more open to new ideas (a favorite assumption of intuitive life-cycle interpretations). Again we would attribute this peculiarity to the psychological residue of a major event—in this case, World War II. The median year of birth of the youngest adult group is 1938: by 1945, its members were 3 to 11 years old, and had experienced Blitz, Occupation, and devastation during the most impressionable years of life. The "European" atmosphere of the post-war years should *also* have made a relatively great impact on this youngest adult group—but apparently not enough to make them significantly more European than the older adult groups.

Except for the oldest group, none of the age groups discussed so far is a "pure" category from the standpoint of historical experiences. To some extent they overlap, containing individuals who were socialized during periods which we would consider optimal (from the standpoint of developing Europeanness) as well as individuals who were exposed to powerful negative influences during the years of childhood and early youth. The youngest group of all (those in the 16–19 year old category) do constitute a "pure" group in this sense. All of these individuals were born in 1945 or later; they have gained their first political perceptions in a world where European organization seems natural and right, and nationalism seems archaic and dangerous. It is among this youngest group that we find (as we did with the oldest group) a relatively great discontinuity from the level of Europeanness of the adjacent group. This discontinuity is most marked in France and Germany; it exists also in The Netherlands; but it is very slight in England. The latter finding may be highly significant. I conclude that at least two elements are necessary for the establishment of a strong sense of Europeanness:

1. The absence of divisive memories (but this is not enough in itself).
2. A sense of positive participation in substantial common activities. Britain has not participated in the institutions of the European Community. Youth in the other three countries, however, have grown up with some awareness of a common endeavor, and this may explain, at least in part, their greater degree of backing for European integration measures.

II. AGE, COHORT AND HISTORICAL PERIOD

Projecting from the foregoing data, we might anticipate that the current generation of youth in these countries will manifest a relatively "European" outlook when they become adults, because this accords with conditions obtaining at that point in time when their basic political orientations were instilled. At this point, let me introduce an hypothesis which will make more explicit the relationship which I believe exists between certain distinctive aspects of the attitudes of a given age cohort and the period in which the group received its early socialization. The central element in this hypothesis is something which we might call "structural inertia" in concept formation. Taking this view, we would regard the socialization process as one in which perceptions become ordered into increasingly complex conceptual structures. Only a few of the infant's earliest perceptions—those related to basic needs—will give rise to subjectively important symbols. Most other stimuli will be disregarded as "noise." Subsequent perceptions which are regularly associated with these symbols may take on a derivative importance; these will tend to become relatively permanent, to the extent that a relatively large number of perceptions are associated together around a given basic symbol. To change a central part of the system would require a disassembly and reintegration of the whole structure. Accordingly, adult learning has been contrasted with infant learning as the "recombination of a smaller number of larger subassemblies of memories or habits. . . ."[10] When one has reached adulthood, only a very important event, making a deep and continuing impact on the individual's life, would justify the cost of such a conceptual reorganization.

---

[9] Deutsch, "Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 358.

My expectation on the basis of this hypothesis, is that the full impact of the post-war European movement has not yet manifested itself among the adult population. I would anticipate a time lag between certain types of major political outputs and the resulting feedback into the political system, because of the gap in time between the early political socialization of individuals,[11] and the point at which they become politically relevant. We might diagram the basis of this time lag as follows:



FIG. 1. Time lag and attitude development.

A major event (war, or the establishment of new political institutions let us say) occurs at time X—during the adult years of generation "1," bringing about a relatively superficial attitudinal change in that generation. It has occurred during the late childhood of generation "2" and influences the basic political orientation of that age group. Its political feedback, however, may not be felt until time Y, when that generation "surfaces" into political relevance. (This point is arbitrarily indicated as age 21.) Such a time-lag effect would only be expected to operate in connection with relatively early-established and persisting aspects of political socialization. Provisionally, I interpret these data on development of a sense of European political identity according to this model.[12]

---

[10] D. O. Hebb, cited in Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1963), p. 166.

[11] That is, the socialization which takes place in childhood and youth.

[12] The concept also seems useful for interpreting political activity in other areas—notably Red China. Peking's recent mobilization of teen-agers to enforce conformity on the part of their elders may be linked with differences in the early political socialization of youth as contrasted with the adults. Fragmentary as our evidence is, there seem to be indications of a wide cleavage between the older and the youngest generations in the population at large, regarding their degree of commitment to the Maoist vision for Chinese society. It is probably noteworthy that the current teenage group has received its basic political socialization entirely since 1949, the year of Communist victory on the Mainland. This regime has given intense attention to the indoctrination of a new set of societal values. Apparently, the program of thought reform has not achieved the desired degree of communist piety through reorientation of

It is, of course, impossible to predict with certainty what attitudes a given age group will express in a decade or two. My interpretation would be far more convincing if I were able to support it with longitudinal data based on national probability samples made at *several* different points in time. This is a goal for further research. On the basis of the evidence we have examined, however, we might infer tentatively that the younger generation has a stronger *tendency* to support the concept of a federal Europe than do older age groups in these countries. The Europeanness of the youth samples presumably represents a basic orientation, rather than a re-orientation in conformity with current experience.

III. DECAY OR STABILITY IN AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES?

We find age group differences, then, as predicted by our model. But will these differences persist? From the perspective of the exceptionally stable American political community (which has experienced a relatively slowly changing political consensus for about a century) one may be tempted to assume that these age-group differences will decay—that by the time the current European youth are as old as today's adults, they will hold the same attitudes. To be sure, a life cycle interpretation may provide a valid explanation for many or most of the age group differences which have been found in survey research, especially among societies which are not undergoing rapid social change. On the other hand, it is clear that this is not true in *all* cases, even in Western societies.[13]

The relative importance of decay in age group differences probably varies according to at least three sets of circumstances: (1) The type of attitude involved. Preferences in popular music, for example, may be very largely governed by life cycle factors; political party preference, or matters of even more fundamental self-identification may be much less so. (2) The age at which the given orientation is established. According to our concept of structural inertia, those attitudes which are earliest established should be hardest to change. Orientation toward the political community seems to be established relatively early in life. (3) The causes of the given set of age group differences: are they attributable to different reactions to the same environmental conditions at different points in the life cycle, or are they due to different conditions of early socialization? If the latter, we might expect decay to be relatively unimportant, particularly if the changed conditions persist.

If Europeanness were a matter of teen-age rebellion, for example, we might be justified in assuming that it would diminish with increasing maturity. Our interviews gave little indication that Europeanness was regarded by youth as a form of rebellion.[14] On the contrary, it seemed

---

adults in the general population. Its efforts have only now begun to reach fruition in the production of a highly-committed age cohort, capable of being used as guardians over less firmly Maoist groups. A parallel to the European phenomenon also seems to exist in the American context; it could be interpreted as due to a differential impact of this country's post-war internationalism on different age cohorts. A nation-wide survey of high school seniors and their parents in 1965 produced evidence of a possible intergenerational shift in the direction of more cosmopolitan political attitudes. Ranking the relative salience which four levels of government had for them (international, national, state and local), fully 65% of the students rated international politics in first or second place; only 42% of the parents did so. See M. Kent Jennings, *Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government* (paper presented to the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, April 1966).

[13] There are indications that an age-specific pattern in American political party preferences may be linked to the differential impact which the Great Depression had on different age groups. These differences apparently have not decayed. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), pp. 153–156.

[14] The relative Europeanness of the youth in our samples probably springs from naiveté or adolescent rebellion to only a very limited degree. The fact that they have a relatively pessimistic (and perhaps realistic) view of how long it will take for Europe to become "unified"—and the fact that they have a level of knowledge which compares favorably with that of adults—tends to make an explanation in terms of naiveté somewhat untenable. Our interviews indicated, moreover, that rebellion is not an important theme in connection with European integration. Despite the widespread prevalence of a stereotype of youthful rebellion, the available evidence suggests that it is important only in exceptional individual cases, as far as political views are concerned. See M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *Family Structure and the Transmission of Political Values* (paper presented at the 1966 annual meeting of the American Political Science

to be generally regarded as an enlightened and highly respectable orientation. Analysis by social status reinforces this impression; far from being a deviant position, "Europeanness" is likely to be found among those of higher status and those who are most integrated into the community. My interpretation links the age group differences which seem to exist regarding Europeanness with the following differences in the conditions of early socialization:

a. Absence of a major intra-European war from the younger individuals' experience.
b. A marked increase in intra-European transactions, with a possible reduction in the psychological distance between the groups concerned.
c. Development of European institutions which perform important functions and are widely regarded as beneficial.

All these factors have distinguished the early socialization of European youth from that of the older generations. Moreover, they continue to operate; we might well argue that their impact is likely to *increase* rather than disappear as the current crop of youth grows older. These do not appear to be transient stimuli, felt only at a certain stage of life, but persisting factors. Although they probably reach their greatest degree of effectiveness in orienting (presumably malleable) children, they may also have some effect in resocializing adults in the same direction. The fact that adult age cohorts appear to have become somewhat more European during their mature years suggests that one might reverse the question about decay, and ask "How much *more* European are these younger people likely to become by the time they are 30 or 40 years old?" By their very nature, our data can not give a conclusive answer to this question (or its reverse). It would be rash, however, to flatly assume that a decay in Europeanness will take place.

IV. STABILITY OF ATTITUDES OVER TIME

At this point one might reasonably ask if it is plausible that individuals respond to survey questions such as these because of events in their childhood and youth: just how stable are these attitudes? To deal with this point, let us review the manner in which public support for European integration has varied over a decade's time. During that period, the question about "making efforts toward uniting Europe" has been aksed repeatedly in three of the countries included in our survey. The following percentages of adult samples responded that they were "for" these efforts:[15]

TABLE 4. PERCENT OF ADULTS "FOR" EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE

	Sept. '52	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Oct. '56	June '57	Feb. '62
W. Ger.	70%	82%	73%	69%	79%	82%	79%	81%
Britain	58	78	67	66	65	—	64	—
France	60	63	49	45	53	67	55	72

As we see, support for European integration fluctuates from year to year, even from month to month. Are we justified in attributing variations in Europeanness among different age groups to the effect of events which took place as much as 50 years ago? Despite the manifest fluctuation, there is a certain underlying stability. Although varying proportions of the population favored "efforts toward unifying Europe" at varying times, in every case the German adults gave the highest level of favorable response among these countries; and in five of the six cases where comparative data are available, the British adults ranked second.[16]

Association, New York City, Sept. 6–10). Cf. Eleanor Maccoby *et. al.*, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1954), pp. 23–29.

[15] 1952–57 figures from USIA surveys cited in Donald Puchala, *Western European Attitudes on International Problems*, 1952–61 (New Haven, 1964), p. 9; 1962 figures from European Communities Information Service survey cited in *Sondages*, #1, 1963, p. 8.

[16] Prior to the establishment of the EEC, British adults were consistently more favorable to European unification than were the French (see Table 4). Participation in a common (and successful) endeavor seems to have brought the French adults about even with British adults in Europeanness, while a reversal of the earlier relationship seems clearly reflected in the outlook of

The levels of support for European unity rise and fall simultaneously in the three countries—perhaps in response to important events in the international environment.

There is also a degree of consistency in response patterns when we break them down according to social categories within these countries. In nearly every case, the upper socio-economic groups give a stronger favorable response than do the lower groups.[17] Moreover the adherents of certain political parties have consistently been more favorable to uniting Europe than those of other parties. Although the overall level of support rises and falls, the same social groups (and, I infer, the same individuals) tend to be relatively strong or relatively weak in support for European unification. Certain major events come to mind as plausible causes of this rise and fall: I will make a few conjectures about them.

The first two polls in the above series were made in 1952 and 1954—immediately after the Korean War, formation of the E.C.S.C. and during the efforts to form a European Defense Community. There was, probably, a sense of common danger, and a feeling that European unification was moving ahead successfully. Optimism about the imminence of European unification seems to be associated with expressions of support for European unification.[18] The collapse of the E.D.C. project (and perhaps a diminishing sense of military danger) had the converse effect—leading to a decline in pro-European sentiment in 1955 and early 1956.[19] Subsequent rises in the level of sentiment supporting European unification might be associated with the impact of the Hungarian revolt and the Suez invasion in late 1956; and with a generally optimistic climate created by the establishment and rapid implementation of the Common Market, by 1962.

The question about "efforts toward unifying Europe" was not asked in the 1963 cross-national survey of adults, but there are strong indications that de Gaulle's veto of British admission to the Common Market dispelled the mood of high expectations, bringing a period of relative pessimism which perhaps persists today. One piece of evidence consists in the fact that there was a sharp drop in levels of support for the four key European integration proposals discussed earlier in this paper. Average levels of support for the four measures declined as follows:

TABLE 5. LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION PROPOSALS, 1962–1963

	(Feb.) 1962	(Feb.) 1963
The Netherlands	78.5%	73.0%
West Germany	68.2	61.8
France	58.8	54.4
Great Britain (data not available)		

Between January, 1961 and December, 1965, the percentage of Germans who "expect some day to see the countries of Europe united to constitute a United States of Europe" dropped from 36% to 29%. This decline in optimism was especially marked among people over 45 years of age.[20] Moreover, despite the proverbial

---

youth in the two countries. States of public opinion apparently can be outputs as well as inputs in relation to government decisions.

[17] The patterns of age group responses cannot readily be compared due to the variety of categories used from survey to survey, and because of the excessive breadth of the categories.

[18] In the factor analysis of responses from youth in the four countries, an item tapping the student's estimate of the length of time which will elapse before Europe is "united" had consistent (although only moderately high) loadings on the "Europeanness" factor; the direction of the relationship was always such as to indicate that an optimistic time estimate was linked with support for integrative measures.

[19] There is an apparent flaw in this timetable: the defeat of E.D.C. in the French legislature came *before* the October, 1954 survey. However, at that time it was widely believed that the London Conference establishing the Western European Union would produce an even greater measure of European unification than would have emerged from the E.D.C. (a union which would, moreover, include Britain). An IFOP survey in October, 1954 found that 52% of the Frenchmen surveyed thought that the London Conference was a move toward European unification, as against 17% who thought it was a simple military alliance. A plurality of the former group felt that W.E.U. would go farther in this direction than E.D.C. These expectations were, of course, false; they seem to have produced a short-lived bubble of optimism about European unification. See IFOP surveys cited by Jean Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion" in D. Lerner and R. Aron, *France Defeats E.D.C.* (New York: 1957), p. 101.

[20] *Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung* (Verlag fur Demoskopie, Allensbach, 1957); and *Informationsdienst*, Institut für Demoskopie, January, 1966, cited in Jacques-René Rabier *L'Opinion Publique et l'Europe* (Brussels, 1966), p. 19.

optimism of youth, the young people in our samples are much less likely to view European unification as something which will be attained in the near future than were adults in the 1962 samples. In response to the question "Do you believe that Europe will become unified? . . . If YES, in how long a period of time?" the following responses were obtained:

TABLE 6. EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

	NETHERLANDS		FRANCE		GERMANY	
	"Never" or "over 20 yrs."	Within 15 yrs.	Over 20 yrs.	Within 15 yrs.	Over 20 yrs.	Within 15 yrs.
Adults (1962)	57%	43	51	49	42	58
Young (1964–65)	82	18	83	17	78	22

The adults were about evenly split (in 1962) between those who saw European unification as something quite close at hand, and those who felt it would come only in the remote future or never. About four-fifths of the youth in all three countries saw it as something relatively remote (and the stalemate which existed in European politics at the time of their responses made their position seem fairly realistic). We believe that this factor probably acted to deflate the level of support for European integration expressed by the younger people in 1964–65. Nevertheless, despite an apparent realization that European unification had bogged down, the youth in our samples gave a relatively strong measure of support for "European" proposals. This shows up even when we compare their responses in 1964–65 with the adult responses from 1962.[21] Basing our comparison on the same four key proposals described earlier in this paper, average levels of support were as follows:

TABLE 7. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR MEASURES

	Netherlands	France	Germany
Adults—1963	78%	59%	68%
Youth 1964–65	77	72	78

In this comparison, the youth in our Dutch sample are actually slightly less European than the adults; I attribute this to a reaction to the veto of British admission (and other lesser events) which intervened between the times when the two surveys were taken. In the other two comparisons, the younger generation is substantially more European than the adult age groups, despite the fact that the outlook in 1964 was decidedly less auspicious than it had been in 1962.

V. RELATIVE STABILITY OF ATTITUDE AMONG DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS: THE IMPACT OF THE DE GAULLE VETO

The existence of data from two cross-national surveys of attitudes toward European integration, made within a year of each other but giving responses both before and after the veto of British admission to the Common Market, gives us an opportunity to check the relative stability of support for "Europe" among different groups in the adult population of Western Europe. And some intriguing patterns emerge when we compare responses to nine questions which were asked in both the 1962 and 1963 international surveys.

Over the six EEC countries there is a net decline of slightly more than 6% from 1962 to 1963 in the average level of support for the nine European integration proposals. For the most part, this does not reflect a movement into opposition, but a shift from being "for" to "no answer." The percentage giving no answer increased an average of about 8 points from the first survey to the next, so that the percentage "against" actually *declined* slightly.

---

[21] Let me emphasize, however, that in my opinion the comparison with the 1963 adult data is definitely the more appropriate intergenerational comparison. Unfortunately, a different set of age-categories was used in coding this adult data, from those which were used with the 1963 adult data; we cannot make direct comparisons between adult groups. These age categories, of course, have a different relationship to periods of socialization than did the previous data.

The increase in the proportion not answering, from 1962 to 1963, seems to be an emotional response to a discouraging event; it can scarcely be attributed to a decline in knowledge or public interest. On the contrary, during the year intervening between the two surveys, the negotiations for British entry brought forth very extensive coverage of the European integration question by the mass media, and almost certainly increased public interest in the topic. Viewed in this context, the rather large increase in the percentage not answering (which would normally seem paradoxical) makes sense: apparently a number of new converts had been made to the European cause during the course of the negotiations. They were recruited largely from among the previously uninformed—and were the least stable adherents.

The veto of British admission on January 14, 1963, suddenly made the outlook for the cause seem bleak. Reacting to this, many of those who had been "for" Europe were apparently jolted off the bandwagon (especially the newer converts, I hypothesize). They were discouraged, but they did not go so far as to register an opinion *against* European integration, however. Instead, they abstained from answering. This is reflected in the substantial and consistent increase in "no answer" responses in each country. By abstaining, these individuals avoided the psychic pain of acknowledging that they were "for" what appeared to be a losing cause.

In which countries was the shock most keenly felt? Expressed as a percentage of those originally "for" each measure, the average decline for the respective nations was: Germany, 15.0%; Belgium, 13.6%; The Netherlands, 10.4%; France, 6.2%; and Italy, 5.1%. In the 1962 survey, the most European country was The Netherlands, followed closely by Belgium and Germany, with France and Italy lagging behind. To an extent, the most European countries suffered the greatest decline from one survey to the next (which I will refer to as "fall-out").

We might explain this phenomenon as follows: a large share of the population of any nation is more or less apolitical; the consensus favorable to a given measure in such a country will therefore contain a higher proportion of fair-weather friends, who have been only faintly interested in the measure, but indicate that they favor it because it is perceived as widely accepted. If 90% of the population of a country expresses itself as favorable to a given proposition, we may be sure that a good share of them—perhaps 20% or 30% of those favorable—have only the vaguest attachment to the measure.

In this connection, we may note that the French level of support was already relatively low in 1962, apparently fairly near a level where only persons with some genuine conviction would express themselves as favorable to a given proposal for integration. France was thus less vulnerable to a decline in support, as a result of a discouraging event, because sufficient opposition was being voiced within the political culture so that apoliticals were less sure which was the "proper" response.[22]

But when we look at the data more closely, we find that the relative attrition is not simply due to having had a comparatively large proportion of the population giving nominal support; some persisting element of a nation's political culture seems to be equally important. For we find a relative stability in The Netherlands (the most European country in 1962) as compared with Germany. In 1963, the latter country had dropped sharply, to a level below France although still ahead of Italy.[23] By contrast, Holland was still clearly in the lead after the veto. While she did experience considerable decline, it was substantially less than that in Germany. I hypothesized that "fall-out" is caused chiefly by defection of the band-wagon riders; but this group may contain two types of individuals: those whose commitment to a given position is relatively superficial because they are weakly involved politically; and those whose commitment is unstable because they are expressing agreement with a popular or fashionable trend without its being in harmony with the outlook instilled in their primary political socialization.

---

[22] It may also be speculated that the French were relatively less discouraged by the de Gaulle veto because it was, in a sense "their" veto; it was the French who were keeping the British out, and who could, perhaps, reverse themselves. To the Germans and Dutch, on the other hand, there may have been a greater sense of helplessness. A measure they strongly favored had been defeated by a man over whom they had no political control.

[23] The Italian case is somewhat special. This country had a considerably lower level of political information than did any of the other EEC countries. A rather large "non-mobilized" segment of the Italian population had never pronounced itself as favorable to these measures in the first place, and hence did not fall away from supporting them in the face of the veto. Germany continues to rank ahead of France on the most important European measures in 1963, however (i.e., those loading highest on the Europeanness factor). We eliminate Luxemburg from this analysis because of the small sample size for that country.

Our previous analysis has pointed to The Netherlands as an example of stable internationalism, over the three generations for which we have data. Internationalism has deeper historical roots there than among her neighbors.[24] Non-participation in World War I may be an additional factor which would help to maintain a relatively even pattern among the Dutch adult age groups. This may explain the relatively small degree of "fall-out" in The Netherlands, despite the fact that disappointment there must have been especially sharp in reaction to de Gaulle's veto: Holland was the country which was most keenly in favor of British admission, among the Six.[25]

The relative importance of "fall-out" is greater in Germany. Apparently the German consensus favoring Europe was a particularly vulnerable one, containing a relatively large proportion of persons who were expressing internationalistic views which were not in harmony with their primary attitudes.

To check the validity of this interpretation, let us examine the responses of different age
ity of Dutch adults polled immediately after the
groups within these countries, and the degree to which they shifted from 1962 to 1963. This age group analysis so far has suggested that the adults who received their primary political socialization in the interwar period, and the youth socialized after World War II, are relatively strongly European. According to my interpretation, it is these age groups which have underlying concepts of nationality which are most nearly akin to the currently-expressed Europeanism. I would predict, therefore, that these age groups should show the least "fall-out."[26]

Let me point out that a normal expectation would be that the older group would show less "fall-out" from one year to the next: (1) they would be expected to have a relatively inflexible mentality; (2) they have held their opinions longer, and should be relatively "immunized" to change.[27] My prediction, however, is to the contrary: I hypothesize that the older group has a more nationalistic basic concept of political identity, and that these individuals are consequently more vulnerable to change as the result of a blow to a band-wagon mentality.

A comparison of relative rates of "fall-out" indicates that there is very little difference between the older and the younger groups in The Netherlands—once again reflecting her history of a relative internationalism over the past three generations. Since both groups had about the same inner orientation, Dutchmen of 40 and over suffered just about the same degree of set-back as did the younger Dutch adults. On the other hand, the older Frenchmen and Germans suffered a substantially greater degree of "fall-out" than did their younger compatriots. This suggests that they experienced a greater degree of dissonance between expressed and inner orientation than did the younger group.

Note that the younger German group is more stable in its Europeanism than the younger Dutch group: evidently nationalism in Germany exists mainly among those aged forty and over.[28]

This analysis suggests that the younger adults (particularly in France and Germany) have a more stable commitment to European

---

[24] She has, for example, favored a free-trade policy ever since the end of the Napoleonic Wars; her interest in international law dates back to Grotius, and was recognized (and perhaps strengthened) by the location of the World Court in The Hague.

[25] This was true of public opinion, as well as of official Dutch policy. Indeed, an absolute major-veto said they would prefer a Common Market with Britain but without France, if it were necessary to choose. See *Sondages*, #1, 1963, p. 108.

[26] I select this 28% of respondents from this age group at random, since there is no finer age-identification available. To the extent that the predicted age-group differences hold true within this 15-year age group, this method will result in underestimating the age group contrasts—for I will be including a certain number of cases which dilute the differences between the younger and older halves. This is a fairly close approximation to recoding according to consistent (and more usable) age groups—and despite its imperfection, a fairly striking set of age group contrasts does result.

[27] See *The American Voter, op. cit.*, pp. 161ff.

[28] This holds true of the younger French group as well; as indicated in the foregoing pages, the situation in that country is not quite comparable with the Dutch and German cases in relation to the veto of British admission.

TABLE 7. "FALL-OUT" FROM 1962 TO 1963 BY AGE GROUP, FOUR KEY MEASURES

	Netherlands		France		Germany	
	20–39	40+	20–39	40+	20–30	40+
Abolish Tariff:	−10%	−14%	−5	−15	− 5	−11
Free Movement Labor, Bus.	+ 8	—	+9	− 1	− 2	− 8
Common Foreign Pol.	−13	− 5	−8	−11	−13	−11
Aid European Countries	−10	− 7	+8	− 1	+ 2	− 1
Average Points of "Fall-Out"	− 6.3	− 6.5	+1	− 7	− 4.5	− 7.8

integration than do the older adults. Despite the fact that (under favorable conditions) both groups may express approximately the same level of support for "European" proposals, there appear to be fewer bandwagon-riders among the younger group. I attribute this phenomenon to differences in the early socialization of the different age categories.

VI. THE EVIDENCE OF OTHER INDICATORS

Let us return now to the question posed at the start: has European integration *in general* come to an end? If not, why is it that two analyses (Karl Deutsch's and mine) have come to such opposite conclusions?

Deutsch, of course, does not draw upon political socialization data in concluding that European integration has levelled off or come to a halt; not having this material available may have led him to underestimate the degree to which the integrative process has continued. But the difference in results cannot be attributed to this alone. My own analysis relies partly on an assertion that the overall European political environment is currently favorable to formation of a European outlook, and that it has grown more, not less so since 1958.

In making his argument, Deutsch draws on some imaginative and sophisticated analysis; it is worth reviewing in detail. He bases much of his case on an examination of "structural integration." He states: "An analysis of trade data going back as far as 1890 suggests that in the 1957–58 period Europe reached the highest level of structural integration it ever had," Deutsch argues, in effect, that although the total amount of trade among the members of the European Community has increased since 1958, this fact must be discounted because the rate of increase has been no greater than the general rise of trade and productivity. His interpretation might be debated on a variety of grounds. In the period 1958–62, total trade among the countries of the European Community increased by 73%.[29] At the same time, these countries experienced their most impressive four years of economic growth in modern history[30]—a growth which may have been stimulated in part by the extraordinary increase in Community trade. Are we to discount the importance of the trade increase because of the simultaneous occurrence of economic growth? This line of reasoning by itself would lead us to conclude, for example, that the United States was less than half as "integrated" with Western Europe in 1957 as it was in 1929—at the height of isolationism.[31] America's foreign trade increased substantially during the intervening period but GNP increased even faster.

In regard to the economic sphere, Deutsch's argument is useful, though not compelling.[32]

---

[29] E.E.C. Statistical Office, *Foreign Trade Monthly Statistics*, No. 4, Brussels, 1962, p. 9. This was a considerably higher rate of increase than obtained in the four years preceding 1958, See *Econimische Statistiche Bericht*, Rotterdam, Jan. 16, 1964.

[30] O.E.C.D. *General Statistics 1958–62* (Paris, 1963).

[31] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the U.S.* (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 550, 552.

[32] As presently constructed, the "index of relative acceptability" of foreign trade may reflect a general tendency for foreign trade to decline in proportion to GNP, as nations become highly industrialized. A primitive extractive economy, selling a few plantation crops or raw materials abroad and importing nearly all manufactured items, will be relatively dependent on foreign trade; a large and advanced industrial economy may be less so. As indicated by the American record, isolationism can accompany the early stage, and internationalism the latter stage. This is not accidental: America's high degree of involvement in world affairs at the present time is not weakened by her high domestic productivity—on the contrary, to a large extent, it is made possible by it.

When he shifts the analogy to other spheres, however, his conclusions become dubious, particularly where the psychological dimension of the transaction is crucial. Deutsch states, "The absolute increases after 1958 in trade, travel, postal correspondence and the exchange of students are accountable for from the effects of prosperity and the general increase in the levels of these activities. There have been no increases in integration in regard to all these transactions beyond what one would expect from mere random probability and the increase in prosperity in the countries concerned."[33]

Does the fact that these changes have been accompanied by rising prosperity mean that "integration" has not been taking place?[34] I would argue that the chief significance of these trends lies not in the extent to which they have produced "structural integration" in the sense in which Deutsch defines it, but in the degree to which they reshape the political aspirations of the major groups in the society. For example, are we to regard an increase in the number of students being educated abroad as offset by the fact that there has been an increase in higher education within these countries? On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that both tendencies are contributing to the process of European integration. Virtually every opinion survey from which data are available indicates that a relatively high level of education is associated with a stronger degree of support for European unification.[35] Assume that we were able to demonstrate that increases in the exchange of students and in higher education generally *both* encourage the development of a sense of European citizenship; assume also that these increases in educational activities can be attributed entirely to rising prosperity. We would then have demonstrated the (unsurprising) point that prosperity encourages political integration; we would not have shown that integration is not taking place.

Similarly, let us assume that travel in other EEC countries makes an individual more favorable to European integration; is this effect nullified by travel in other places? The absolute increase in exchange of tourists among EEC countries since 1958 has been very sizable; the influx of EEC tourists in 1963 compares with that in 1958 as follows: Italy, 176%; France, 348%; Germany 139%; Belgium-Luxemburg, 138%; The Netherlands, 146%.[36] There are indications that this trend is strongly favorable to the process of European integration.[37] In 1963, over six million German tourists visited Italy (equal to the *total* influx of tourists into the U.S. from all nations that year), a figure which represents one out of every nine Germans. At the same time, there were about three million visitors from France, a million from The Netherlands, two-thirds of a million from Belgium. To be sure, the rate of increase has levelled off in recent years. But this may be because the process is reaching a saturation point. Overall, in 1963, and again in 1964, about one out of every twelve citizens from her EEC partner countries visited Italy. This is comparable to the proportion of Americans who visit Florida in a given year.[38]

It is also true that rates of travel to countries outside the European Community have increased markedly since 1958; presumably this should act to encourage integration with those countries as well. But there is no reason to assume that an increase in "Europeanness" can come about only through a relative exclusiveness vis-a-vis the outside world. Conceivably, the two might increase concomitantly. In fact, as we shall see presently, this seems to be the case.

Deutsch's distinction between structural integration and probabilistic integration is useful; but he tends to overstress the former at the expense of the latter. Furthermore, he seems to overlook the possible existence of a threshold effect. Deutsch would, no doubt, agree that the E.E.C. area has already reached a relatively high level of structural integration (his data indicate that, in general, a 70–80% level has been attained). It is quite conceivable that this is a high enough level for political integration to take place, even if further increases in these exchanges do not rise above random probability rates. Deutsch would further probably agree that the development of a sense of community is central to the process of integration.[39] Material on "structural integration" provides a relatively indirect indication as to whether this process is taking place. Nevertheless, although Deutsch himself uncovers a more direct kind of evidence of such crucial changes in orientation, he tends to underplay its importance.

---

[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 355.

[34] Political "integration" has been defined as the attainment within a territory of a "sense of community"—a belief that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of "peaceful change"; and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. Karl Deutsch *et. al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, 1957, p. 5.

[35] See, for example, Gallup International, *L'Opinion Publique et l'Europe des Six* (Paris, 1962), pp. 29–32.

[36] Calculated from OECD, *Tourism in Member Countries, 1965* (Paris, 1965); and OECD, *Tourism in Europe, 1959* (Paris, 1959).

[37] See *Sondages* (1963), #1, p. 38; cf. Inglehart, *op. cit.*, Ch. 8.

[38] About one in fourteen out-of-state Americans visited Florida in 1961. See Florida Council on Economic Development, *Statistical Abstract of Florida* (Tallahassee, 1962), p. 90.

Let me cite some of these cases: he finds that "Friendly feelings in French mass opinion about Germany, and in German mass opinion about France, increased substantially to roughly one-half of the Germans and Frenchmen polled in 1963–4. Feelings of mutual trust increased much less, to about one-fifth of the respondents in each country."[40] He also finds an increase in agreement on accepting European unity between the two countries since 1958; and that elites in the two countries agree on most major issues—and furthermore, seem to be converging over time. Deutsch states that, "Factor analysis of many French and German opinion poll results between 1954 and 1962 indicated a marked increase in the similarity of image between the two countries . . . In particular, there was a marked increase in the importance of an image of a United Europe in both French and German opinion. Most of this increase occurred between 1957 and 1962." He then notes that "In regard to accepting European unity, at least in general terms, Frenchmen and Germans agreed to a greater extent in 1962 than they had done in earlier years."[41]

Deutsch tends to discount this primarily on the basis of three points: first, the people of the two countries trust the U.S. more than each other; and Britain trusts both of them more than they do each other. Here again we encounter in its most explicit form an assumption which also seems to underlie Deutsch's reasoning about "structural integration." It might be legitimate to discount indicators of increased European integration on the ground that these interactions have also risen with regard to the outside world; this could be justified if, and only if, European integration and Atlantic integration (and international integration in general) take place in different psychological directions, one tending to develop at the expense of the other. If "Europeanness" were a traditional form of nationalism, this assumption might be justified. But, in fact, the available evidence indicates that this is not the case: they seem to lie on a common psychological dimension. As an individual is converted to a European (or Atlantic) point of view, he tends to become more favorable to other forms of internationalism as well. An openness to Atlantic unity and toward rapprochement with Eastern Europe has characterized the Monnet Europeans for a number of years;[42] this orientation also seems to characterize the pro-Europeans among the general population. My survey of youth in Western Europe found the following correlations between relatively strong support for European federation and for U.S. association with the E.E.C.:[43]

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Q =	+.38	+.70	+.58	+.51

The tendency for partisans of European federation to favor world government was generally weaker, but consistently positive:

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Q =	+.42	+.38	+.49	+.29

If this is true, the relevant question is whether two given countries are in fact coming to trust each other and agree with each other to a greater extent as time passes. The existence of relatively high levels of trust for the U.S. is certainly interesting but it does not diminish the significance of the increasing levels of trust and agreement on European unification between France and Germany.

Deutsch's second reason for discounting the foregoing evidence is that elites in France and Germany show different levels of support for NATO and arms control proposals. But the process of integration implies a continuing convergence—not necessarily that the integrating partners have reached the same absolute level at a given time.

The third point which Deutsch cites centers on the decline of interest in NATO and in arms control proposals—by governments, in the press, and among the general public. In view of the decline of a sense of threat of Russian invasion, this change in attitude is perfectly comprehensible: the problem is less interesting because it seems less important. In the early

---

[39] See his definition, footnote 34.

[40] Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 357.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[42] See, for example, Declaration of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, June, 1962.

[43] See Ronald Inglehart, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3. I use Yule's Q as a measure of association. Figures are for middle class youth only.

1950's, European "unification" was largely manifested in NATO, a military response to a military threat. Today it connotes economic and social integration to a much greater extent, as exemplified by the European Community. Deutsch's elite interview data indicate that at present support for European integration is not dependent on a sense of military threat.[44] Nevertheless, he uses evidence of declining interest in military matters to support his contention that European integration has come to a stop. One might hazard the guess that Deutsch's conclusion may have been unduly influenced by the study of top-level decision-making. It is at precisely this level that European integrative activity has been most effectively blocked since 1958 (but even here one cannot overlook such important bits of progress as the agreement to unify the three European Community executive bodies, and the agreement on a common agricultural policy). In broader spheres of European society, I would argue, the process of integration has been going on.

At least a limited amount of reorientation in favor of "Europe" seems to have taken place among the adult population since 1958. But perhaps more important are the changes which seem to characterize the outlook of the generation which has been undergoing formation since the end of World War II, and especially since the creation of the European communities. There are indications that their Europeanness is more stable than that of older age cohorts, and it seems to persist even under rather adverse conditions. I would argue that this is true because, for them, a European outlook is not a superficial reorientation, but reflects their earliest political perceptions. Before the end of the 1970's, a majority of the voting population in the Common Market countries will consist of people who entered primary school after World War II. It is not inconceivable that the entry into political relevance of new elements will tend to further change the political environment in important ways.

All of the foregoing calls into question the projections which have been made concerning the likelihood of further progress toward erecting the institutional framework for a United States of Europe. At this level, I agree, there has been relatively little progress in the last several years. But there are, after all, certain blocking factors which currently act to prevent much change in this sphere—the most important being the attitude of the present French government.[45] It is dubious whether de Gaulle will remain in power much beyond 1970. Deutsch's evidence indicates that French elites on the whole are a good deal more favorable to European integration than is de Gaulle himself;[46] it therefore seems quite conceivable that with the passing of the General from supreme power, they may be considerably more responsive to the pressures for European political unification than he himself has been.

---

[44] See Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 361.

[45] Leon Lindberg goes so far as to argue that de Gaulle's boycott of the EEC in 1965–66 does not even represent an attempt to halt the process of integration; it is, rather, a struggle over the form and content of decision-making procedures among actors who accept the European Community system. He presents persuasive evidence that the Common Market has developed such powerful support among economic elite groups that it is now irreversible—and recognized as such by de Gaulle. If Lindberg is correct, this is a highly significant development—and one which, necessarily, must have taken place since 1958. See Leon Lindberg, "Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System," *International Organization*, 30 (1966), pp. 233–266.

[46] A plurality of them favor *supranational* European integration (Deutsch, "Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 358); 72% of French leaders agree that the military security of their country rests upon the deterrent force of the U.S. and "the idea of a national deterrent is unpopular among the elites in France, where it is official government policy." (*Ibid.*, p. 363.) Finally, "a large majority of French leaders (63%) agree that Britain ought to be included in an integrated Europe." (*Ibid.*, p. 360.)

ACADEMIC IDEOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF ADJUDICATION*

GLENDON SCHUBERT
University of Hawaii

This paper proposes a theory about the differences in perspective that political scientists bring to bear upon their teaching, research, and writing. It also suggests a method which can be used to study such differences. The particular empirical example discussed relates to only one of the subfields of political science, but this report may encourage parallel investigations into the structure of professional academic values in other component areas of the discipline. Such a result would not merely confirm or refute the applicability of the theory as a generalization about political science; it also would enhance our present meager and unsystematized understanding of the extent to which our professional knowledge is affected by our quasi-professional (personal) biases. The development of such understanding evidently ought to be assigned a high priority in any normative schedule of goals relating to the social ecology of scientific inquiry.

The phenomenon of analyst value predisposition is by no means peculiar to social science, and most certainly it is not idiosyncratic among political scientists. Psychologist Silvan S. Tomkins recently has called attention to the universality of the problem of academic ideology in all scientific work:

> At the growing edge of the frontier of all sciences there necessarily is a maximum of uncertainty, and what is lacking in evidence is filled by passion and faith, and hatred and scorn for the disbelievers. Science will never be free of ideology, though yesterday's ideology is today's fact or fiction.[1]

This proposition's particular pertinence for political scientists has been pointed out by a law professor, in the context of his evaluation of the legal implications of some recent behavioral research in adjudication theory. Although Arthur S. Miller was writing for an audience of lawyers, the shoe fits us political scientists just as well—and in view of the quotation's personal allusion to me, there can be no doubt of my own implication:

> [I]t is a great fault of behavioral scientists (and lawyers), [to] believe that statements may be made about such very human activities as the official settlement of disputes in adjudication without the intrusion of the biases or prejudices of the observer or commentator. . . . In *Judicial Behavior*, Professor Schubert . . . [says] nothing at all about the mental attitudes and backgrounds of commentators upon the judicial process. Are we to understand that the selection of facts, the organization of data, the construction of theories, and the presentation of conclusions are all value-free? As I have said previously, "the idea that personal values inevitably accompany—and color—research in human affairs (including law) is widely accepted by leading social scientists of the era. In like manner, a 'disinterested legal science' . . . is nonsense. It is unattainable. What this requires, accordingly is avowedly 'facing the valuations' which are present in all commentary" on the judiciary. Another part of the environment in which courts operate is the scholarly community. Those who write about courts and law should "face their valuations" in order to give us as scientific an explication as possible.[2]

The present article might well be viewed as an attempt to remedy the deficiency denoted by Miller. Such a rationale is so pat that perhaps I should let it go at that, but the genesis of my inquiry into academic bias was in fact earlier and in response to other stimuli.

I. THE HYPOTHESIS

From its beginnings following the Civil War until about a dozen years or so ago, the study of public law in American universities was closely linked with law school instruction and research; and the orientation which guided the approach to the acquisition of knowledge about and understanding of the subject, by political science and by law professors alike, was legalistic.[3] Out of the Court-packing episode of 1937 came more than a reform of the Supreme Court, however; the same set of events led also to some modest reforms in theory and method, as well as in the content, of professional discourse about the judiciary. The substantive change, which emphasized the political involvement of courts and the political effects of judicial decisions, came first and soon became the new orthodoxy among most political scientists. The reform in theory and method began with Pritchett's early work,[4] but it was not until a decade ago that several other persons began to follow the trail that he had blazed.[5] After it had become clear that more than a passing fancy was involved, the various departures from traditional public law pedagogy began to attract rebuttal, and for a while it doubtless seemed to most observers (including participant-observers) that the significant difference in points of view lay between the defenders of the "leading case" approach in public law (and their allies who use the great books approach to political philosophy), and the rest of the political science profession.[6] Such a simplistic rationalization of the conflict seemed adequate to account for the critique that emanated from spokesmen whose point of view readily could be identified with parochial defense of the research modus operandi (or lack thereof) of the humanities,[7] or with the inculcation of virtue and the promulgation of justice,[8] or with the retention of Oldspeak as a tactic for helping to embalm preferred aspects of the historical images of selected judicial personalities.[9] But the rationale failed utterly to account for the position assumed by persons whose professed orientation is passionately political, and who purport to see no important difference between the workways and standpoints toward data collection of groups of their colleagues who perceive *each other* as defenders of the *ancien régime* (on the one hand) and as harbingers of a Brave New World of Juridical Robots (on the other hand).[10]

---

* I wish to thank Charles B. Poland, a doctoral candidate in political science at Michigan State University, for his assistance in preparing the data for computer analysis, and in related statistical tasks; and I wish especially to thank the twenty-six political scientists, all of whom are identified in the paper, for their participation in the research described: this is a report of what is in a most real sense our common labor, and I am deeply indebted therefore to these colleagues in the field, whose cooperation made it possible.

[1] "Affect and the Psychology of Knowledge," at p. 73 in Silvan S. Tomkins and Carroll E. Izard (eds.), *Affect, Cognition, and Personality* (New York: Springer, 1965). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 75, 97.

[2] "On the Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral Sciences," *Texas Law Review*, 43 (1965), p. 1098.

In an initial attempt to canvass the principal objections that had been raised against behavioral research in legal institutions and processes, I suggested that it might be more useful to conceptualize the academic chorus (or at least those who are performing the adjudication oratorio) as a trio of groups,[11] in lieu of the behavioralist-versus-antibehavioral duet which prior discussion seems to have taken for granted. But if there are three standpoints, how do they relate to each other? The simplest hypothesis, which ought perhaps to be preferred on grounds of parsimony, assumes as a model a linear ideological continuum (ranging from behavioralists through judicial processors to public lawyers). This hypothesis requires, however, not only that students of the judicial process consider themselves to be equivalently distinguished from the other two types, but also that the public lawyers and behavioralists each feel greater affinity for the judicial processors than for each other. The available evidence, consisting of the expression of professional opinion (in books, articles, papers, conversation, panel discussions, and correspondence) seemed to me to support the proposition that most persons in each type consider themselves to be about equally different from persons whom they would identify with either of the other two types. This interpretation suggested the alternative hypothesis that the relationship among the three types is better represented by an equilateral triangle (or the circle on whose perimenter the three points of such a triangle lie) than by a straight line.

---

[3] See Schubert, "The Future of Public Law," *George Washington Law Review*, 34 (1966), pp. 593–614.

[4] C. Herman Pritchett, "Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941," this REVIEW, 35 (1941), pp. 890–898; and *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947* (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

[5] Joseph Tanenhaus, "The Uses and Limitations of Social Science Methods in Analyzing Judicial Behavior," (a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1956; mimeographed); Fred Kort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the Right to Counsel Cases," this REVIEW, 51 (1957), pp. 1–12; Schubert, "The Study of Judicial Decison-Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), pp. 1007–1025; and "From Public Law to Judicial Behavior," in Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 1–3.

[6] A recent survey of the profession reports that when asked to evaluate the significance of research contributions in seven fields of the discipline, political scientists ranked public law (sixth) and political philosophy (seventh) as "least significant." See Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline* (New York: Atherton, 1964), pp. 56, 58.

[7] John P. Roche, "Political Science and Science Fiction," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), pp. 1026–1028.

[8] Walter Berns, "Law and Behavioral Science," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 28 (1963), pp. 185–212.

[9] Wallace Mendelson, "The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Critique," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 595–603.

[10] Martin Shapiro, *Law and Politics in the Supreme Court* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), chapter 1; Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, "The Role of the Judiciary in American State Politics," in Schubert (ed.), *op. cit.* ftn. 5, *supra*, at pp. 245–246; and cf. Theodore L. Becker, "On Science, Political Science, and Law," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 7:4 (December, 1963), p. 12.

[11] *Judicial Policy-Making* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1965), pp. 158–165.

The typology, and the hypothesis of a circular ordering of types, provided me with a frame of reference which could be used to guide a more intensive inquiry into some of the more recent criticisms of psychometric research in judicial decision-making, while at the same time supplying an explanation for the affective overtones which typically accompanied the perceptual and cognitive misunderstandings that underlay much of the critique.[12] But the proof of the pudding is in the eating; and anyone who has enough confidence in his theoretical constructions to be willing to publish them ought also to be eager to have them put to the empirical test.[13]



FIG. 1. Academic ideologies toward adjudication.

Figure 1 summarizes the set of relationships, among the three ideologies, which was hypothesized.[14] The figure shows the traditional ideology to be centered in the humanities (History—Law—Philosophy) with a focus upon *law*. The conventional ideology centers upon the social sciences (Economics—Political Science—Sociology) and focuses its investigations upon *courts*. The behavioral ideology is centered in the behavioral sciences (Psychology—Biology—Anthropology) and upon the study of *judges*. The three ideological positions divide the perimeter into three segments which designate the overlapping concerns of the major standpoints; thus, the traditional approach merges into the conventional in the *judicial process* segment; the conventional changes into the behavioral in the *political jurisprudence* segment; and the behavioral in turn leads back into the traditional approach in the *jurimetrics* portion of the continuum. The relationship among all three approaches is portrayed as a continuous one, in which an infinite variety of discrete positions can be denoted, indicating particular proportions of emphasis as between any *two* of the ideological standpoints. The figure is completely determinate, it assumes (and indeed suggests) closure, and it precludes the portrayal of ideological syndromes consisting of combinations (in varying proportions) of all three standpoints; but it does afford a theoretical explanation for the tendency, for judicial politics enthusiasts, to view *all* decision-making analysis (whether on logical or psychological grounds) as apolitical.[15] The specification of a circular sequence of ordering for the nine academic disciplines denoted in the figure is intended to be suggestive only, and it is not assumed that such a manifestly oversimplified and overly rigid rank ordering corresponds, except as a very rough approximation, to empirical reality; but at the same time, the ordering suggests the central tendencies that tend to define the core content, in terms of academic fields, of the major standpoints, and this definition of the modes in relation to the disciplines may have heuristic value.

---

[12] See my "Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (1967), pp. 3–40.

[13] In this instance, the design for the empirical research reported herein was roughed out the day after an oral presentation was made expounding the hypothesis: "Academic Ideologies, Judicial Attitudes, and Social Change," (a paper read at the 37th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, November, 1965; mimeographed), especially pp. 1–8 and Figure 1.

[14] Figure 1 here is reproduced from Figure 1 of the article cited in ftn. 12, *supra*, and except for the minor modification of changing Economics from third to first in the sequence of Social Sciences is the same as Figure 1 in the paper. For further discussion of the a priori theory of academic ideologies in relation to Figure 1, with examples of writings which exemplify the three standpoints, see that article.

[15] As Harry Stumpf has remarked, "there are a good many scholars who . . . cry out for a political approach to constitutional law while at the same time denouncing most or all behavioral techniques." See his "The Study of Public Law: A Plea for Consistency," (n.d.; mimeographed), p. 6 ftn. 7.

II. THE RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Theory

If anyone (including oneself) were to take seriously the hypothesis implicit in Figure 1, then the obvious next step would be to attempt to test with empirical data the propositions that:

1. Political scientists with a primary interest in the study of adjudication are divided among three distinct groups;
2. Each group consists of persons who identify with one of the three corresponding ideological positions (traditional, conventional, or behavioral, as defined above); and
3. The three groups are equidistant in psychological space (*i.e.*, their position in two-dimensional space defines an equilateral triangle).

A possible way of obtaining empirical data relevant to the above propositions would be to ask some of the political scientists who work in the field of the judiciary where *they* think others are in relation to themselves, and where they would locate themselves in Figure 1.

The answers to the first question might be converted into data in such a form that it would be possible to intercorrelate the responses of the various individuals in the sample; and if this were done, it occurred to me that I might very well be able, in analyzing the correlation matrix, to take advantage of the theory and methods with which I recently had worked in carrying out a study of *judicial* ideology.[16] If one had any confidence in the interpretation that had been based upon the application of these theories and methods to data collected from official sources in libraries, then one ought to be willing to put them to the test of a design that would involve experimental research, survey-type "field" data, and a bevy of dynamic, "live" respondents who would be in a position to comment critically upon the interpretation made of their replies. Most human sources of data for such reasons as lack of status, ignorance, and inaccessibility to the relevant communication channels, have no chance to correct the mistakes that researchers have made using the data supplied by those sources; and most researchers thereby lose the advantage of exposing their findings to meaningful feedback from their subjects.

The answers to the second question would then make it possible to make a three-way correlational check upon the degree of consistency among several different measures of the cognitive structure attributed to the sociopsychological field of the attitudes of these professionals toward their academic work. First, there would be the researcher's own conception of where the others are, in relation to themselves and to himself. (He would need to generate this information for purposes of drawing the sample of respondents in any event.) Second, there would be the consensual conception of the ideological position of each individual in the sample, in the opinion of the *others*, as derived from the answers to the first question. Finally, there would be the self-conception of each individual of his own position, which the answers to the second question would provide. It would then be possible to examine the relationship among the a priori hypothesis of the researcher, the others' consensual conception of egos, and the egos' individual conceptions about themselves.

B. Procedures

1. The Raw Data. Thirty-two persons were chosen, on the basis of criteria to be discussed below, for a mail survey. Each of these persons was sent the letter and the questionnaire which are reproduced as appendices to this article, together with a copy of Figure 1. The letters were individually typed, although their content make it perfectly clear that they were part of a mailing *en masse*; and the questionnaires were mimeographed. Together the letter and the questionnaire purported to explain to the respondents the objectives of the investigation and the information sought by the two questions; to assure respondents that the raw data for the first question would be kept secret; and to promise them an opportunity to comment critically upon a draft report of the research before the latter was submitted for publication.

Question 1 of the questionnaire asked each respondent to rank all of the other persons listed on the basis of his own perception of how closely they agreed with him in their approach to the field in which, as it was presumed, they had some common interests. The arbitrary assumption was made that each person was in closest agreement with his own point of view.

---

[16] Schubert, *The Judicial Mind* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965).

It is recognized that for some types of inquiries and for some types of respondents, the findings would be hopelessly biased by such an assumption. In regard to this particular population of respondents, and the topic under investigation, the assumption of non-schizophrenia seems justified. If cognitive structure in the field of public law-judicial process-judicial behavior (or in any other subfield of political science, for that matter) is so weak that professors have no consistent point of view with which they identify, at least during some reasonably limited span of time, then our whole enterprise as teachers of political science is a kind of madness; and no amount of rational investigation is going to be able to make any sense out of it. So the respondent was asked to rank himself first; the person whom he thought was in closest agreement with him as second; and so on until the individual (among those sampled) with whom his disagreement was maximal was ranked as thirty-second. If the list contained persons with whom the respondent felt that he was insufficiently well-informed to make a decision, the directions specified that ranks of zero were to be assigned to such persons. No particular model of space was specified, nor needed to be specified, as a criterion for respondents in answering the first question. Each could hypothesize a space of any dimensionality and structure that suited him; all that was required of him was that he establish a decision function which would permit him to discriminate degrees of proximity to his own position in the space.

Question 2, to the contrary, specified a circle, upon whose perimeter positions were to be denoted using a clock metric, as a guide to answers. Figure 1 was suggested as one possible hypothesis about the ideological relationships that might be subsumed by a circular model, and respondents were directed to orient themselves in relation to the three major standpoints (at two, six, and ten o'clock, respectively) denoted by Figure 1. It was explicitly pointed out, however, that the positions—and therefore, of course, the sequence—of academic disciplines, as shown in Figure 1, were intended only to suggest one possible theory of the underlying gross associations of the three standpoints; and it was stated that respondents should not choose their own positions because of either their agreement (or disagreement) with the relative positions of the academic fields in the paradigm. The raw data consisted, therefore, of the two types of responses made, and marked on the questionnaires which were returned by the respondents. For the first question, the raw data consisted of the sets of rankings of all or part of the list of names specified by the question. For the second question, the raw data consisted, in each case, of the respondent's specification of a number, ranging from zero to twelve, which would locate a position for him on a circular continuum.

2. Coding. Coding was necessary for several purposes: to assure the promised secrecy of the raw data; to correct technical mistakes in the responses; and to transpose the replies to machine-readable cards. The first objective was accomplished by having only the author handle the questionnaire returns, to each of which was assigned a code number which identified the respondent (but only to the author) in subsequent manipulations of the data for the first question. An example of the kind of technical mistake that had to be corrected would be the omission of a rank from those assigned, or the failure to adjust for ties by omitting a corresponding number of intervening ranks between the tied rank and the next to follow in sequence. (Inspection of the returns suggested that a few of the respondents were not very experienced in the use of ordinal measurement; but all managed to indicate their decisions with sufficient clarity to preclude the necessity for eliminating any set of rankings on grounds of ambiguity.)

3. Measures. In order to calculate the correlation between each pair of rankings, the coded data were input for computer anaylsis, using both rho and tau rank correlation programs.[17] These coefficients are not directly comparable numerically because at any given level of association, the value of rho will be greater. Either coefficient measures, for any two respondents, the degree of similarity or of difference in their answers to the first question. The theoretical range for both tau and rho is from plus one (indicating perfect agreement) to minus one (indicating perfect disagreement); but the effect of requiring each respondent to rank himself as first was to place an empirical limit upon the positive range. Since this limit is well above +.99 for both coefficients, however, it was concluded that such a trivial difference could have no practical effect upon either the analysis or the resulting interpretation of the data. Either coefficient also can be used to measure the degrees of association among the

---

[17] John Morris, *Technical Report No. 40* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Computer Institute for Social Science Research, 1966). See also Maurice G. Kendall, *Rank Correlation Methods* (London: Charles Griffin, 1955, rev. ed.); Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 202–223.

hypothesized, the consensual, and the autogenous conceptions of the sequential ranking of the respondents on a circular continuum.

4. Factor Analysis. Some inferences could be based directly upon visual inspection of the correlation matrices. But one major objective of the research would be to isolate and to identify the principal dimensions which, while accounting for a major proportion of the variance, would define a space in which points representing the respondents could be located in a psychologically meaningful configuration. This objective implied the use of a statistical procedure for multivariate analysis, such as factor analysis. I decided to use an available computer program for principal axes analysis, and to call for both quartimax and varimax rotation[18] of (successively) the first two through the first ten factors.

C. Data

1. The Sample. The criteria for choosing the sample were visibility, accessibility, and balance. Visibility meant that the persons selected must be sufficiently well known generally *and to each other* that the probability of significant non-response due to ignorance would be low. I assumed that persons would know each other primarily, but not exclusively, through their writing; and it would by no means be adequate that persons merely "know who others are" by their names and general reputation. What would be required would be familiarity with other persons' ideas in some depth, and in particular concerning their beliefs about how—in relation to theory, method, and kind of data—it is best to study the subject (adjudication).

Accessibility required that the persons selected know the author personally, so that it could be assumed that they would at least read his letter circulating the survey instrument, and the probability that they would reply would be maximized. Balance required that there be approximately an equal number of persons chosen to represent each of the three hypothesized points of view; and further, that the persons selected be dispersed throughout all segments of the postulated circular continuum.

It might have been possible to restate at least the first of these criteria in a form that would have permitted objective and quantified selection procedures, but I decided to proceed instead upon the basis of what was presumed to be my adequate personal knowledge, resulting from recent bibliographical activities which had required me to survey (and resurvey) the research literature in the field.[19] What was sought, after all, was not a random or probability sample, but instead a highly biased (in terms of those statistical concepts) sample which would consist of almost the entire universe of the elite leadership for one subfield of an academic discipline. The design included a check upon the author's bias, however: the extent to which his judgment about the persons selected corresponded with the group's responses. If many persons with poor visibility were included in the sample, the rate of non-response would be high. If persons were not accessible, they would not bother to respond at all. If the author's judgment concerning the subgroup (*i.e.*, ideological) identification of persons deviated from either the consensual understanding or their own autogenous judgments, then the correlations between his ranking of the sample (Fig. 2) and theirs would be low or even negative.

The advice of colleagues was sought concerning an initial proposed sample of thirty, and as a result one younger person was deleted (for presumed failure to meet the visibility criterion) and three others were added (of whom two turned out to be non-respondents, presumably because of poor accessibility). The revised and final sample of 32 persons is listed in Appendix B. Table 1 shows that it was assumed that the sample would include approximately equal numbers of persons of each major point of view; and the outer circle of Figure 2 shows that it was further assumed that these persons were spread throughout the continuum. The observed distribution of persons among the three types, based upon the responses to the

---

[18] The purpose of quartimax rotation is to simplify the variables (respondents), by making the extreme loadings tend toward unity or zero on every factor; the purpose of varimax rotation is to simplify the factors (the columns of the factor matrix) by making all loadings tend toward unity or zero on each factor. Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960), pp. 294–308; Rudolph J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University, forthcoming 1967), chapter 13.4.2.1–2.

[19] "Bibliography" in *Judicial Decision-Making, op. cit.*, ftn. 5, *supra*, pp. 257–265; "Bibliographical Essay: Behavioral Research in Public Law," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 433–445; *Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); "Judicial Behavior," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, rev. ed., forthcoming, 1966–67); "Judicial Process and Behavior" in James A. Robinson (ed.), *Political Science Annual: An International Review*, Vol. 3 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, forthcoming, 1968).

TABLE 1. EXPECTED AND OBSERVED BALANCE AMONG IDEOLOGICAL TYPES, IN THE SAMPLE

	Observed[b]					
Expected[a]	Behavioral	Conventional	Traditional	Idiosyncratic	Non-response	Totals
Behavioral	7	2			1	10
Conventional		7		1	2	10
Traditional		2	7	1	2	12
Totals	7	11	7	2	5	32

[a] See the outer sequence, Fig. 2.

[b] See Fig. 3.


Schmidhauser
Murphy
Vines
CONVENTIONAL
BEHAVIORAL
TRADITIONAL
Pritchett
Shapiro
Peltason
Tanenhaus
Vines
Peltason
McCloskey
Vose
Abraham
Murphy
Grossman
Chase
Shapiro
Pritchett
Schmidhauser
Becker
Nagel
Danelski
Schubert
Ulmer
Spaeth
Tanenhaus
Danelski
[Lasswell]
Schubert
Ulmer
Vose
[Horn]
[Jacob]
Rosenblum
Krislov
Kort
Spaeth
Krislov
Roche
Tresolini
Mendelson
Berns
Rosenblum
Bartholomew
Chase
Grossman
Scigliano
[Westin]
Becker
Nagel
Kort
McCloskey
Roche
Mendelson
Tresolini
[Fellman]
Abraham
Bartholomew
Berns
INNER = Self perceptions (Q. 2 responses)
OUTER — The sampling assumption

FIG. 2. Hypothesized and autogenous ideological positions.

first question and the correlation and factor analyses that we shall presently discuss, indicates that the sample was somewhat biased in favor of the conventional point of view, primarily because two of the persons whom I had assumed to be behavioral in their orientation, and two others whom I had assumed to be traditional, were consensually deemed to be conventional.

It was assumed that although there would be considerable qualitative variation in visibility, any instances of exceptionally low visibility could be handled by "purifying" the sample and deleting relatively "unknown" persons, at least as items, in the generation of the correlation matrix. Accessibility seemed likely in all except three or four instances, although it was recognized that a few persons might be blocked by their own emotional reactions from responding to the intended query, as a consequence of previous professional interaction which had entailed affective side-effects for them; but it was assumed that almost all persons in such an elite group of professionals would distinguish between their private and their public attitudes toward the project, at least to the extent that their evaluation of its merits would induce them to respond.

2. The Survey. The only person in the sample who refused to acknowledge either the initial letter or subsequent correspondence was also the one person whom the author never had met personally; he was one of those added to the sample on the advice of colleagues. The mailing went out to all persons in the sample on November 22, 1965; and positive responses to Question 1 were received from 25 of the 32 during the ten day period November 29 - December 8. Three of the seven who had not responded to the first question, by the latter date, had replied declining to do so; subsequent endeavors to follow up with a second mailing evoked responses from two of the four persons who did not reply to the initial mailing. There were, therefore, a total of 27 replies to the first question. All except three of the persons who answered the first question replied also to the second question; and there were no persons who replied to the second but not to the first. An attempt was made to follow up with the three persons who had answered the first question but declined to answer the second, by directing their attention to that part of the instructions which emphasized that response to the question did not require one to accept the location of academic disciplines that is suggested in Figure 1; and as a result, two of them did answer the question. The 26 responses to Question 2 are reported in Figure 2. The rate of response was 84% for Question 1, and 81% for Question 2.

In addition to the five persons who refused to give any response to the first question, the instructions anticipated that there would be partial non-response in the form of omitted rankings, for those persons to whom respondents assigned ranks of zero. Actually, there was much less partial non-response than had been expected. Almost half of the total of 48 omitted rankings (out of a possible total of 27×32 = 864) were due to a single respondent, who ranked only the half-dozen persons with whom he was in closest agreement and the other half-dozen persons with whom he was in least agreement. By thus reporting only the tails of his distribution, he provided a useable reply; his deletion of a score of other persons in the sample was a reflection, no doubt, of the less intense affect, or the less adequate information, that he entertained with regard to them. Five of the respondents were responsible for an additional 25 of the omitted ranks; three respondents omitted one each; and the remaining seventeen persons all were able to rank the entire sample. It is noteworthy that 79% of the omitted rankings were attributable to four of the seven persons whom we shall, shortly, discuss as affiliates of the traditional viewpoint; the seven behavioralists, on the other hand, made no omissions. One possible inference is that there is a consistent differential in the quality of information input by these two groups of persons: behavioralists seem to think that they are familiar with all of the literature produced in the field, but at least several of the traditionalists appear to be unaware of at least part of the behavioral and conventional research; the pattern of zero ranks, for one traditionalist, is B:4, C:4, T:0; and for another, it is B:3, C:4, T:0[20]. (As one distinguished affiliate of the traditional standpoint remarked at a panel meeting of the American Political Science Association just a decade ago, the then editor of this REVIEW had asked him to read a manuscript which was about courts and judges but was "full of numbers"; so the eminent reader proceeded to advise the editor, as he jovially remarked to the panel audience, to "send the paper off to some mathematics journal.")

3. Other Feedback. Two-thirds of the persons who answered the questions also volunteered comments, ranging from a sentence or two to long letters, in which they discussed their responses and their opinions concerning the utility and probable findings of the survey.[21] Many were skeptical concerning the possibility that anything meaningful would emerge from the study, and often these persons explained in some detail the difficulty that they had experienced in replying to the questions. Typically they pointed out that they perceived themselves to be very complicated persons, with multivariate systems of academic values which could not possibly be projected onto some crude one- or two-dimensional space without gross distortion of their feelings. In replying to these comments, the author attempted to point out that there was no specified dimensionality for response to Question 1; and that the problem, with regard to Question 2, was to find the space with the minimal dimensionality adequate to account for most of the common variance among the respondents. To the extent that they were as idiosyncratic (*i.e.*, unarticulated with the prevailing academic cultural norms) as many believed themselves to be, the question of the dimensionality of the space was irrelevant, since their idiosyncracies could not, by definition, be measured in any common frame of reference. In any event, their answers should make it possible to test the validity of their objections: gross distortion in the enfolding of many n-dimensional spaces into the hypothesized circle ought to produce a randomized pattern of autogenous positions for the respondents upon that circle, thus facilitating the rejection of the hypothesis that Question 2 was designed to test. It was also explained that the space selected for Figure 1 was two-dimensional because the effect of attempting to portray or otherwise suggest a space of higher dimensionality would almost certainly be to increase non-response to the second question even more than the widespread feeling of vexation at its seeming oversimplification. The two-dimensional model corresponded, of course, to the relevant dimensionality of the physical apparatus (*i.e.*, a piece of xerox paper) that was employed for purposes of presentation; and more importantly, many of the persons in the sample might be assumed, on the basis of their previously published remarks, to entertain little empathy for the extension of a psychological/statistical model to its Euclidian limits of dimensionality (*viz.*, three), let alone going beyond that into conceptions of

---

[20] Walter Murphy suggests as an alternative inference "that behavior[al]ists are acquainted with the work of traditionalists more than vice versa because so many of the behavior[al]ists were trained in a traditional fashion by traditionalists; but few [if any] traditionalists have been trained by behavioralists"; personal communication to the author, May 4, 1966.

[21] In addition, a draft of this report was circulated among some seventy persons, including the 25 respondents who had indicated their wish to see a copy (by inserting a check in the query at the close of the questionnaire form, Appendix B). Twelve of the respondents replied in writing, some more than once and some in considerable detail. Three other respondents conveyed their views to the author orally in direct conversation, as also did several of the persons who had commented in writing on the draft. So the views of 60% of the respondents were taken into consideration, in revising for publication the draft report. Only one person suggested that it would be better to suppress the report of this research.

space that could be perceived only through mathematical intuition. Even if the sample had been limited to persons who would have understood a question keyed to an explicit model of multidimensional space, the explanation of how to operationalize and to execute a decisional function for such a more complicated space would have required a covering letter of considerably more than two pages. Again the greater demands that such a question would have made upon a set of (in)voluntary respondents almost certainly would have entailed significant reduction in the level of response.

Several persons pointed out, in volunteered comments when they returned the survey instrument, that they had found Question 1 to be difficult but Question 2 even more so. This is readily understandable. What the first question requires is some procedure for partitioning the universe of items (persons in the sample) into sets which will be, in turn, successively further subdivided into subsets and subsubsets; it is further necessary that the subsets scale, both internally and in relation to each other, along a linear continuum. Few respondents, doubtless, were able to sit down and ask themselves: "Now, who is closest?" and then, "Who comes next?" and so on, through a list of over thirty names, with a resulting sequence that would represent a very reliable decision for them. Some persons attempted to do this, however, as evidenced by a few answer sheets which were returned with many crossings-out and changes in the initial ranking that was contrived. Doubtless it was naive of me, but I guess I had assumed that responding to Question 1 would not be too difficult, basing my assumption on my own (and my colleagues' apparent) ease in making decisions for departmental elections over the course of the past decade, using a preferential ballot to rank a group of about thirty members. After the survey materials had been put in the mail, however, and I faced the task of explicating my own response to the first question, I better appreciated the extent to which I had become accustomed to relying upon a host of clues and information in depth that were available for the face-to-face group to a much greater extent than for the synthetic one.[22] Moreover, the task of ranking persons in order to attempt to assure or to preclude their selection to serve the group in some representative capacity (e.g., as members of a committee) is not the same as the task of evaluating all members of the group in relation to a single selected and highly abstruse criterion. So I fell back upon the "equally noticed difference" (or equal-appearing intervals) method[23] to guide my own responses. This involved sorting all thirty-two names (including my own) into three groups (+ [like me], 0 [yes and no], − [different from me]) and then, by the same procedure, dividing each group into three subcategories. This placed each person in a subcategory of three or four persons; the subcategories already were scaled; and the few persons within each subcategory could then be ranked on the basis of man-to-man discriminations.

The first question presumed no structure in particular for a respondent's own psychological space, but the second question clearly demanded that he accept, as the basis for making a response, at least three assumptions of mine. Many of the respondents went out of their way to record in their volunteered comments their disagreement with these assumptions, which were that: (1) persons active in the field today can be classified into one of three positions, or into a combination of any two, but not of all three, of them; (2) the three positions are related to each other in a scalar order; and (3) the scale is a circular (determinate, psychologically closed) continuum rather than a linear (indeterminate, psychologically open) one. It should be clear by now that I did not necessarily "believe in" all three of these assumptions; but I did consider it essential to make them in order to construct the frame of reference within which to ask the question. Evidently some common space would have to be hypothesized if the respondents' self-perceptions were to be denoted and measured in relation to a metric that would permit commensuration. No doubt this question was easy for me, not only because the assumptions were mine but also because I was aware of the limited purposes that they were designed to subserve; it would be much more difficult for other respondents to say, in effect, "this is where I am," particularly if they felt that they were being asked to specify their location in some strange place that they had never visited and did not recognize. But it is doubtful, also, that the differences between traditionalists and behavioralists, and between both of them and certain other persons who rejected either affiliation, was really all that novel a conception for very many of these thirty-odd persons. The sample, it bears repeating, was of what one would have to presume to be the most (not the least) aware members of this field of the profession.

---

[22] Cf. Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, *A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making* (New York: Wiley, 1964), chapter 2.

[23] Cf. Louis L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1929).

4. The Data Matrix. The raw data cannot, because of my explicit prior commitment to the respondents, be divulged; but they certainly can be described. They were coded in the form of two-digit numbers in the cells of a 27 ×32 rectangular matrix. Each respondent initially was assigned a two-digit identifying number (from the sequence 01–32); this set of numbers identified the columns of the matrix, and the respondents in their role as *items* to be ranked by others. Those twenty-seven persons who answered the first question also were assigned two-digit identifying numbers (from the sequence 01–27); and this second set of numbers identified the rows of the matrix, and the respondents in their role as *rankers* of the items (other persons). The cell entries in any row include a continuous sequence of numbers ranging from 01 to as many persons as the ranker ranked: all cells in that row contain either a number from that sequence or the entry 00 (signifying that this item was omitted by this ranker). All (and only) entries for self-ranking (the cell identified by a person's columnar number as an item, and by his (other) row number as a ranker, are unity (01). The only constraints upon the total of entries for any column, of course, are that each includes only one entry of unity, and that other numbers be 00 or else range from 02–32—and either 00 or any particular number within that range may appear several times or not at all.

Either the tau, or the rho, matrix is calculated by comparing the sequences of rankings for any two *rows* of the raw data matrix. In making comparisons between rankers with rankings of different lengths, it is necessary to delete from either sequence any items that are not included in both, and to renumber either or both sequences of rankings accordingly. The rank correlation coefficient (rho or tau) measures the differences, between two sets of rankings, of items common to both. Consequently, the empirical correlations are based upon discrete data pools of differing sizes, depending upon non-response; but this entailed no serious problem for the subsequent analyses of the correlation matrices, because of the generally very high proportion of complete or almost complete response. To the slight extent that non-response did affect a few of the correlations, this shows up in the testing of their statistical significance, as discussed below. The computer program that was used to calculate the rank correlations evaluated their significance, and it also accommodated non-response (*i.e.*, to the differing lengths of row sequences).

III. THE SOCIOMETRIC RANKINGS

A. The Correlation Matrices

Table 2 reports the correlation matrix, with rho coefficients below and with tau coefficients above the major diagonal (the self correlations of unity). It is evident that the rho and tau matrices are equivalent, in the sense that although the values of rho are larger (in both directions), the same patterns of relationships are explicit in both matrices. Either matrix denotes three groups of respondents. The first group includes eight persons, ranging from Kort through Krislov, among whom the correlations are all positive, at a minimal level of .33 for tau (with all intercorrelations significant at less than .005) and of .39 for rho (which is significant at .014; otherwise all are below the .002 significance level). A second group of seven persons, at the opposite end of the major diagonal, ranges from Roche through Mendelson. All correlations among persons in this second group are positive, at a tau minimum of .13 and a rho minimum of .31, and all are significant at less than .07 except for two correlations involving the three individuals who accounted for almost three-fourths of the total non-response, so the reduced rankings available for comparison readily explain the lack of statistical significance in the low positive correlations for these two pairs.

The 56 intercorrelations between the eight members of the first group and the seven members of the second group all are negative at a minimal level of .15 (for tau, with $p = .142$; and .20 for rho, with $p = .168$) for Krislov/Roche. Five other pairs (all involving one of the three persons, with high non-response, in the second group) also have marginal significance values (.050 to .075 for tau, and .050 to .090 for rho); the remaining fifty correlations all are significant at less than .05, for both coefficients.

The average correlation among the eight persons in the first group is +.53; among the seven persons in the second group it is +.45; and the average correlation, between persons in the first group and persons in the second, is −.40. It seems reasonable to infer that there are two distinct and cohesive groups. Each group consists of persons who are in very substantial agreement with each other, and in very substantial disagreement with persons in the other group.

A third group, adjacent to the Kort-Krislov group, extends from Vines through Chase. All

TABLE 2. THE RANK CORRELATION MATRICES

Kort	Nagel	Tanenhaus	Danelski	Ulmer	Schubert	Spaeth	Krislov	Vines	Grossman	Becker	Peltason	Shapiro	Pritchett	Murphy	Chase	Schmidhauser	Rosenblum	Vose	Scigliano	Roche	McCloskey	Bartholomew	Tresolini	Abraham	Berns	Mendelson	
	46	54	56	59	51	41	44	35	32	25	32	25	30	27	21	26	12	*02*	*06*	*37*	*43*	*29*	*33*	*50*	*62*	*67*	Kort
65		62	57	46	48	33	47	47	54	59	37	34	20	26	16	31	13	*03*	*06*	*28*	*55*	*32*	*49*	*51*	*50*	*40*	Nagel
70	81		71	58	58	47	58	44	49	36	36	31	37	35	15	27	07	06	00	*21*	*41*	*22*	*49*	*54*	*44*	*58*	Tanenhaus
75	78	87		67	65	57	58	46	42	36	40	35	33	30	16	21	09	04	*08*	*32*	*37*	*25*	*44*	*53*	*53*	*80*	Danelski
79	67	77	85		59	57	45	42	27	24	33	34	37	31	07	18	*02*	*10*	*05*	*26*	*36*	*53*	*43*	*36*	*51*	*58*	Ulmer
70	67	76	84	79		51	47	38	36	38	30	34	46	25	23	12	18	04	05	*21*	*31*	*32*	*38*	*40*	*39*	*52*	Schubert
57	39	58	76	72	71		33	30	26	07	30	30	35	31	11	11	*05*	15	*07*	*21*	*28*	*34*	*31*	*38*	*35*	*48*	Spaeth
61	68	77	75	66	64	49		53	44	46	58	36	43	46	29	25	25	24	*05*	*15*	*25*	*28*	*32*	*36*	*39*	*33*	Krislov
51	64	60	62	60	54	47	70		42	45	62	43	22	22	27	29	18	13	03	*25*	*29*	*36*	*39*	*36*	*36*	*31*	Vines
49	74	69	59	42	52	36	59	59		52	51	49	49	31	41	25	21	14	*03*	*02*	*17*	*25*	*31*	*31*	*42*	*39*	Grossman
39	80	52	51	32	53	12	60	61	67		40	23	21	29	30	09	29	08	13	*18*	*22*	*32*	*43*	*38*	*29*	*18*	Becker
46	59	53	57	50	44	49	76	80	70	57		53	28	46	32	26	31	22	*13*	*06*	*12*	*34*	*27*	*29*	*37*	*30*	Peltason
37	48	45	48	46	47	42	51	61	68	34	73		31	39	35	20	28	12	*14*	03	07	*23*	*12*	*24*	*30*	*27*	Shapiro
41	27	52	46	52	63	51	59	36	37	32	42	45		36	29	06	19	22	14	22	08	*16*	*09*	*17*	*12*	*24*	Pritchett
37	37	44	44	39	39	44	65	49	43	46	62	54	48		30	12	31	35	*02*	05	09	*32*	*01*	*13*	*18*	*15*	Murphy
31	21	21	19	09	34	16	38	39	54	42	46	51	42	44		20	42	31	14	12	17	*08*	11	10	*16*	21	Chase
36	44	38	30	26	16	15	35	45	39	20	40	27	07	16	27		12	06	*03*	*17*	*13*	*05*	*15*	*15*	*41*	*03*	Schmidhauser
17	24	10	13	*02*	24	*05*	37	26	33	48	39	42	26	44	63	18		34	*07*	12	11	*03*	10	13	*07*	09	Rosenblum
05	*08*	04	05	*18*	02	16	37	18	20	16	31	17	30	49	48	12	49		12	03	18	*06*	18	24	11	30	Vose
08	*09*	*00*	*11*	*08*	08	*13*	*07*	05	*04*	23	*16*	*20*	21	*07*	21	*04*	*12*	15		04	06	*19*	*06*	*01*	22	24	Scigliano
45	*44*	*28*	*41*	*39*	*28*	*32*	*20*	*33*	*14*	*28*	*11*	*05*	32	04	15	*27*	19	07	04		58	13	32	37	43	64	Roche
55	*59*	*54*	*55*	*53*	*43*	*36*	*36*	*44*	*29*	*32*	*20*	07	14	08	23	*20*	14	28	12	75		28	55	54	41	68	McCloskey
40	*40*	*29*	*34*	*50*	*45*	*45*	*36*	*48*	*33*	*40*	*46*	*31*	*28*	*16*	*05*	*07*	*01*	*08*	*25*	31	40		41	39	22	17	Bartholomew
48	*70*	*68*	*62*	*57*	*53*	*39*	*50*	*56*	*44*	*55*	*42*	*21*	*15*	*07*	15	*21*	13	26	*10*	48	77	55		69	27	58	Tresolini
67	*71*	*73*	*74*	*73*	*61*	*49*	*54*	*57*	*46*	*46*	*47*	*36*	*26*	*19*	12	*23*	17	34	*01*	55	70	49	87		42	64	Abraham
79	*71*	*61*	*69*	*67*	*51*	*46*	*53*	*54*	*60*	*44*	*56*	*41*	*15*	*24*	*20*	*56*	*11*	15	27	46	59	36	42	62		67	Berns
83	*77*	*79*	*87*	*77*	*72*	*70*	*57*	*55*	*64*	*40*	*49*	*40*	*38*	*18*	35	*07*	20	38	24	81	83	42	75	84	83		Mendelson

NOTE: The numbers above the major diagonal are tau coefficients; those below are rho. All numbers are two-place decimals; the self-correlations, which have been omitted above, all are 1.00. The italicized correlations are negative.

eight of these persons are positively intercorrelated (at a minimal level of .21 on tau, and .32 on rho) and with very few exceptions (three for tau, and two for rho, which have probability values between .04 and .06), all are significant at less than .03. The intercorrelations of this group with persons in the Nagel-Krislov group all are positive, but somewhat lower than that group's correlations among its own members; and the intercorrelations of this third group with the Roche-Mendelson group are mostly negative (of the 56 correlations, 45 of the tau, and 46 of the rho, are negative) but again at a lower level than the negative intercorrelations between the first two groups. These findings suggest that there is a third group which falls in between the first two, but which is more closely aligned with the first than with the second.

The three groups, which together account for 23 persons, leave only four individuals who are not clearly aligned with any of the groups. Schmidhauser is positively correlated with everyone in the two groups to his left, and negatively correlated with members of the Roche-Mendelson group; but many of his correlations are weaker, in both directions, than those of persons in the Vines-Chase group: Schmidhauser has one tau correlation of −.41, another of +.31, and nine in the plus twenties, but his other fifteen correlations all are less than ±.20—which means that his common variance with most persons is less than five percent ($\pm.20^2=.04$). The correlations for Rosenblum and for Vose are no higher, and they tend to agree—but not very enthusiastically—with everybody else; of the fifty-one correlations for them both, only nine are negative, and the highest of their negative correlations is −.10. Unlike Schmidhauser, who seems to lean toward the two groups to his left, the remaining individual, Scigliano, appears to lean toward the group to his right. His highest correlations are +.24 and +.22, with Mendelson and Berns respectively—who are at the right wing of the correlation matrix. Scigliano's correlations with the Kort-Krislov group all are within the ±.08 range, and six are negative; with the Vines-Chase group, the range is ±.14, and half are negative; while with the Roche-Mendelson group, the range is ±.24, and a majority are positive.

In the light of the hypothesis associated with the sampling assumption (Fig. 2, outer perimeter), it seems reasonable to note the general correspondence between the composition of these three groups, and the ideological typology which was hypothesized. Although we shall make a more precise test of the relationship in Part IV of this article, it will be convenient henceforth to refer to the Kort-Krislov group as "behavioral," the Vines-Chase group as "conventional," and the Roche-Mendelson group as "traditional." On the basis of only these correlation data, we should have to conclude that the remaining four individuals are not clearly identified with any of the ideologies for which the three groups stand.

B. Factor Analysis

Initially, a principal axis analysis was made of both matrices. The eigenvalues drop very rapidly after the second: for the rho matrix, the first axis is 12.27 and the second 4.21, the next five range between 1.83 and 1.04, and all factors beyond the seventh have eigenvalues of less than 1.00. Similarly, for the tau matrix, the first axis is 9.18, the second 3.41, the next five range between 1.64 and 1.00, and all factors beyond the seventh have eigenvalues of less than 1.00. It is clear that interpretation ought to be confined to the first two factors.

The research design called for successive output, for both matrices and for both quartimax and varimax rotations, of the first two, then the first three, and so on through the first ten factors. Two-dimensional plots were made of the first four factors, for both rotations based upon both matrices. These plots confirmed that the rotations limited to the first two factors provide the most information with the greatest parsimony. The only notable difference between the rho and the tau plots is that the vectors are longer in the rho configuration (because the correlations are larger). It makes no difference which is chosen; we shall select tau and focus attention upon the two-dimensional rotations shown in Figure 3, the coordinates for which are reported in Table 3.

The varimax rotation is the one which provides the reference axes for the configuration in Figure 3. It is evident that three clusters are discriminated by these two dimensions: a behavioral group consisting of Ulmer, Kort, Danelski, Nagel, Tanenhaus, Spaeth, and Schubert; a conventional group, consisting of Vines, Krislov, Becker, Grossman, Peltason, Shapiro, Pritchett, Murphy, Chase, Rosenblum, and Vose; and a traditional group composed of Roche, McCloskey, Mendelson, Tresolini, Abraham, Berns, and Bartholomew.[24] The first dimension scales these groups in the

---

[24] These groups agree with the clusters apparent in the correlation matrix, except that this factorial configuration shows Krislov to be conventional rather than behavioral, and it also shows two of the four isolates from the correlation clusters (Rosenblum and Vose) to be conventionally oriented.



FIG. 3. Ideological positions in factor space.

sequence B, C, T; the second dimension, in the sequence of C, B, T. All three groups are discriminated without intransitivity on both dimensions. The most cohesive (*i.e.*, tightly clustered) group is the behavioral, next is the conventional, and the least cohesive is the traditional. In other words, the seven behavioralists appear most similar in their point of view, and the seven traditionalists share a distinctive but a much more diversified academic ideology.

Two individuals do not lie in any of the three clusters. Their independent positions imply that their views tend to be idiosyncratic, in the sense that whatever is represented by the two ideological dimensions which are common factors for 25 of the 27 respondents, these two individuals tend to conceptualize their respective approaches to the subject in other terms. In a statistical sense, this finding is expressed by their communalities, the sums of the squares of their correlations with the two factorial dimensions, which are much lower for the two isolates than for the other respondents. Scigliano's communality is .01, and Schmidhauser's is .13, while the average communality for the twenty-five affiliates of the three groups is .50 (with Mendelson's .85 maximal).

Both the varimax and the quartimax rotations represent orthogonal repositioning of the principal axes, and it is easy to suggest in Figure 3 how the configuration appears in relation to the quartimax rotation. The perimeter points labelled "*QI*" and "*QII*" identify the termini of the quartimax axes. Axis *QI* separates the configuration as follows: the seven persons whose points are in the traditional cluster, plus Scigliano, all have negative correlations (*i.e.*, are to the left of *QII*) on *QI*, while all others have positive correlations. Thus, the quartimax rotation suggests the best *one*-dimensional array of the ideological differences, along the first quartimax axis, with the traditional ideology distinguished from the conventional and behavioral views entertained by the other persons in the sample; and the 8-to-19 split implies at least a rough index of the relative importance of the traditional approach, in relation to the rest of the field, at the present time. The point configuration remains invariant, of course; it is only the frame of reference (the set of orthogonal axes) that is rotated. Therefore, the apparent gap between the traditional and the conventional groups does does not change under any rotation, although it is the quartimax rotation which directs attention to the fact that the conventional group is closer to the behavioral than to the traditional one.

The proportion of the total variance that is accounted for, by the first and second axes, is .466; for varimax, it is .263 (I) plus .203 (II),

TABLE 3. FACTOR LOADINGS

Variable	Varimax		Quartimax		Smallest Space		
	I	II*	I	II*	I*	II	III
Abraham	−78	−10	−70	38	−82	20	−36
Bartholomew	−37	−27	−46	00	−47	35	−66
Becker	32	51	55	22	34	24	33
Berns	−64	−27	−68	15	−81	−11	−53
Chase	−19	69	25	67	−13	19	17
Danelski	71	43	83	−07	52	−16	10
Grossman	32	61	62	31	36	14	21
Kort	65	33	72	−11	56	−09	−05
Krislov	39	66	70	30	35	−11	19
McCloskey	−77	15	−53	57	−74	04	−28
Mendelson	−92	−05	−77	50	−84	10	−33
Murphy	04	67	42	52	01	−19	26
Nagel	62	42	75	−02	55	06	15
Peltason	26	69	61	41	25	−02	32
Pritchett	10	57	42	40	11	−37	−02
Roche	−63	17	−41	51	−68	−14	−30
Rosenblum	−22	58	17	60	−21	27	28
Schmidhauser	20	29	33	12	34	45	−18
Schubert	55	46	71	05	46	−23	06
Scigliano	−10	04	−05	09			
Shapiro	16	64	50	42	14	−11	36
Spaeth	50	33	61	−02	41	−41	−01
Tanenhaus	64	45	78	−01	52	−08	09
Tresolini	−72	−06	−62	37	−75	26	−38
Ulmer	68	33	74	−13	55	−25	03
Vines	41	56	66	21	40	−02	31
Vose	−32	51	04	60	−43	−01	27

NOTE: All numbers are two-place decimals.
* Means the factor has been reflected. All factors except Smallest Space II have been rotated.

while for quartimax it is .340 (*Q*I) and .126 (*Q*II). These data confirm the suggestion above that the first axis on the quartimax rotation (viz., the third data column of Table 3), which accounts for 34% of the total variance, provides the best one-dimensional solution of the correlation matrix. (For the rho matrix, the first two factors account for 61% of the total variance, and of this 45% is attributable to the first quartimax factor.) The rho quartimax two-factor rotation, incidentally, is *identical* with the first two principal axes; and for tau it is virtually so—none of the corresponding correlations of any of the respondents on either of the first two axes differ, as between the principal axes and the quartimax factors, by as much as |.015|. The extension of the analysis to include the third and fourth factors did not prove particularly fruitful: the total variance accounted for was increased only by .11 (.14 for rho), and the effect of adding the additional factors was of course to add quite weak factors for quartimax (neither the third nor the fourth factors added as much as 7% additional variance, for either rho or tau).

C. Interpretation

The interpretation of any factorial data involves reliance upon some extrinsic criterion which can be related to the variables in such a way as to provide a basis for defining the substantive content of the factors. In other words, what the factor analysis does is to denote the important patterns of relationships among the variables; the task of interpretation then becomes, on the basis of what are otherwise the known characteristics of the variables, to identify the factors. In the case of our present data, there is one factor which is by far the most important in explaining the observable relationship among the variables. As Figure 3 shows, this is the first factor, which separates over 90% of the variables into three clusters. The observed clusters conform so closely to the predicted clusters that we cannot, on the basis of this evidence, reject the working hypothesis, which assumed that the persons in the sample represent three distinctive standpoints.

If the first factor distinguishes between the behavioral and the traditional approaches to the study of adjudication, with a third (conventional) group arrayed between the other two because of its relatively much more moderate correlations with the factor, what does such a dimension stand for? I submit that this factor is one of method, which relates to *how* one studies his subject. Behavioralists advocate a scientific approach with the goal of developing systematic theory out of research that has been carefully designed in advance, that operationalizes the relationships among variables, that employs an articulate methodology, and that relies upon quantification and (so far as possible) statistical measurement. Traditionalists reject all of these goals, in favor of a more subjective, speculative, and literary approach which, in their opinion, avoids the many undesirable byproducts that the behavioral approach necessarily entails. This dimension, therefore, posits a continuum with modern "political science" at one extreme, and "political philosophy" at the other. In its most pristine terms, the conflict is that between physics and metaphysics. In the context of the development of the rest of the discipline of political science during the past half century, this is a factor of academic liberalism and conservatism.[25] In terms of the present study, the behavioral group is liberal, and the traditional group conservative, in its academic ideology.

The second factor is one upon which all of the members of the conventional group are strongly loaded. The behavioral group is moderately correlated, in the same direction as the more extreme conventionalists, but the traditionalists are only weakly correlated with the second factor. In the light of the conventionalists' insistence upon the importance of observing and describing political action—the facts of the judicial process in the context of the larger political process—it seems reasonable to identify the second factor as one of theory which is concerned with *what* is to be studied. The conventionalists are empiricists who seek to build a theory of the judicial process out of observations—preferably made in the field or laboratory—of the politics of the judiciary. The negative pole of the second factor represents a rational approach to the study of law. Although our sample includes no persons who can be described as adhering strongly to the ideology of legal rationalism, the behavioral group is less enthusiastically political in its orientation than are the conventionalists, and the traditional group is least so.

We now are in a position to ascribe ideological content to the four quadrants of the space described by Figure 3. Designating them in the usual manner,[26] the first quadrant, which evidently can appropriately be described as the behavioral quadrant, is scientific empiricism, emphasizing the scientific study of political action; and a majority of the conventional group also fall in this quadrant. The second quadrant, the literary study of political action, is much less densely populated than the first, but includes minorities from both the conventional and traditional groups, plus (weakly) Scigliano. The third quadrant, the literary study of non-political action—or, as we can put it in relation to this particular field, the speculative study of legal norms—is where most of the traditional group falls. The fourth quadrant would, of course, be the scientific study of legal norms; but it is unpopulated in our sample. To summarize: in terms of the typology of academic ideologies that I have attributed to the factorial space of Figure 3, the behavioral group are scientific empiricists; the conventional group are political empiricists; and the traditional group are non-scientific rationalists.

One final aspect of that space warrants consideration. Our hypothesis (Figure 1) requires that we observe a configuration of points that lie, at least roughly, in the pattern of a circle. It is manifest, in Figure 3, that this is not the case; what we do observe is a *semicircle*, extending from Kort and Ulmer on the extreme right through Nagel, Schubert, Vines, Grossman, Shapiro, Murphy, Rosenblum, Vose, Roche, and Tresolini, to Berns at a position diametrically opposed to that of Kort and

---

[25] The author is indebted to David Danelski for having pointed out that the first factor also appears to discriminate among the respondents on the basis of age: *all* persons with negative loadings on *VI* (*i.e.*, to the left of the middle of Figure 3) are (when this is written, in May, 1966) over 40 years of age, and the average age of these eleven persons is 46.4 years; while half of the remaining persons (*i.e.*, those with positive loadings on *VI*, to the right of the middle of Figure 3) are under 40, and the average age of these sixteen persons is 39.4 years: personal communication to the author, April 24, 1966.

[26] I+/II+=1st; I−/II+=2nd; I−/II−=3rd; I+/II−=4th.

Ulmer. Figure 3 suggests the positioning of another axis, whose termini on the perimeter of the space are identified by the symbol: PS/L. This axis, whose position was determined by the method of visual (or "graphical") rotation, discriminates almost the entire configuration—everyone except Bartholomew—from the empty space that otherwise lies below the axis. Above this axis, the configuration of our sample arches in a semicircle, with the points representing persons located at least roughly (it would appear) in the sequence that had been hypothesized for them by Figure 2 (the outer perimeter).

We are now in a position to infer why our hypothesis of a circular configuration turned out to be only half-right. The position depicted in Figure 1 at six o'clock is for the academic discipline of law. We included no law professors in the sample; and Figure 3 suggests that there is an important difference between even those political scientists who have been designated as traditional in their approach, and the law professors. Evidently, the spacing of the academic disciplines is different than Figure 1—in the absence of empirical data—presumed. Political scientists are more closely allied in their ideological range than was assumed; and conversely, the legal approach preempts a much larger segment of the total relevant ideological continuum than was expected. In order to have obtained a circular configuration, it would have been necessary to have included in the sample some law professors—preferably, a dozen or two, so as to maximize confidence in the discriminating power of the factorial analysis—so as to be able to populate the fourth quadrant. Then we might find representation for the rationalist academic ideology, advocacy for the scientific study of legal norms, and allies for those relatively few political scientists who specialize in the speculative study of legal norms. Unfortunately, however, we would have encountered immediate technical problems, which would have precluded the extension of the present study to a broader sample that included a goodly representation of law professors. Neither the sampling criterion of visibility nor that of accessibility could have been satisfied, if a dozen law professors had been added to our sample. Probably something could be done to alleviate, or to correct for, the accessibility problem; but the difficulty in regard to visibility appears to be almost insuperable. Political scientists and law professors simply do not read enough of each other's work for a mixed sample to be able to avoid producing overwhelming quantities of either non-response or uninformed response. Given the differences that continue to obtain in the respective socialization experiences of members of the two professions at both the graduate and post-professional-degree levels, it is understandable that the motivation of most political scientists to read the typical writings of law professors should be low, and vice-versa. Perhaps, however, an independent replicative study, but using a sample consisting only of law professors, would produce the missing semi-circle; and then the two halves might be fitted together.

D. Smallest Space Analysis

In order to provide an additional perspective of the sociometric relationships implicit in the correlation matrix, I shall report also the results of a Guttman-Lingoes "Smallest Space" (a non-metric factor) analysis.[27] This approach might be deemed particularly suitable for our data, since it calculates a set of Euclidean coordinates for points so that the distances among them correspond to the rank order differences among the coefficients in the correlation matrix, which in turn are functions of the intersubjective rankings (of the members of the group) of each other. The two-dimensional solution was computed, but it is not reported here because it is almost identical with the first two factors of the three-dimensional solution, which is much more interesting.

In Table 3, the output values for dimension coordinates have been converted to the usual metric for factorial space (*viz.*, ranging from +1.00 to −1.00), and the first and third factors have been rotated orthogonally 27.5° clockwise with the second factor remaining unrotated and orthogonal to them both. Figure 4 shows the two-dimensional factor plots for

---

[27] J. C. Lingoes, Kevin Kay, and Susan Spear, *Technical Report No. 29* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Computer Institute for Social Science Research, 1965). I am indebted to David J. Peterson, then a graduate student at Michigan State University, for assistance in the use of the program to analyze the rho matrix (with Scigliano omitted because of his exceptionally low communality, as evidenced by the principal axis factor analysis). See also: James C. Lingoes, "An IBM-7090 Program for Guttman-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis—IV" (Computer Program Abstract), *Behavioral Science*, 11 (1966), p. 407; and two articles by Louis Guttman that have been announced as forthcoming in *Psychometrika*, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Euclidean Space for a Configuration of Points," and "Smallest Space Analysis with Unknown Communalities."



FIG. 4. Ideological positions in small space.

SI/*SIII* and *SII*/*SIII*. The first and third factor plane shows almost exactly the same configuration as does Figure 3, the only exception worth noting being Pritchett's appearance as an isolate. Just as do the first and second varimax axes, both the first and third small space dimensions discriminate absolutely among the three clusters; and the rotation of the latter two was made so as to bring the dimensions into alignment with the axes.[28] Hence the psychological content of *SI* must be the same as *VI*, and *SIII* the same as *VII*. What the smallest space analysis adds to the picture is the second dimension, *SII*, on which most of the traditional group are positive, the conventional group are divided about equally, and most of the behavioral group are negative, although there is (as Figure 4b shows) considerable overlapping among groups, unlike the differentiation provided by the other two dimensions. Examination of which members of each group are most positive, and which are most negative, suggests that this is a factor of positivism versus nomism—that is, of a primary concern for the study of what are conceptualized to be facts, as distinguished from a primary concern with values. Such a distinction is quite independent of what may be deemed to be the appropriate substantive content of either facts or values. Thus, we might expect to find some persons preoccupied with political facts and others with legal facts; some with political values and others with legal values. And cross-cutting all of these categories is the question of methodology, since either type of fact or value can be studied scientifically, and it can also be studied belletristically.

SI reveals the latter orientation; and the plane of *SII*/*SIII* (Figure 4b) indicates both the predisposition and the relative intensity of persons in our sample, toward the dimensions of empiricism/rationalism and of positivism/nomism. Starting in the first quadrant, the persons who emphasize the factual study of judicial politics are Becker, Rosenblum, Chase, and Grossman. The empiricists, who are more concerned with politics than whether it relates to facts or values, are Shapiro, Peltason, Vines, and Vose. Political values is the focus of Murphy, Krislov, Danelski, and Tanenhaus.

---

[28] A counterclockwise rotation of 60° produces the same result as the quartimax rotation of the principal axes: that is, the traditional cluster then is negative on the first dimension, and everyone else is positive.

Spaeth, Pritchett, Ulmer, and Schubert are interested in values, irrespective of whether they relate to political or legal variables. A shift to a concern for legal values characterizes Roche and Kort, while Berns and McCloskey are rationalists whose primary concern is with law. Bartholomew, Tresolini, Abraham, and Mendelson are more concerned with legal facts; and the only positivist, interested in facts whether they be legal or political—although leaning toward the former—is Schmidhauser. The validity of this interpretation can, of course, readily be checked against the content of the writing of these persons, which in most instances is prolific.

IV. THREE VIEWPOINTS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

Figure 3 also can be used to provide a consensual ranking of "others" by "egos." We have noted that the configuration of points lies in a rough semicircle. The semicircle is "rough" because the vectors, which project (from the origin of the space) the points representing the variables, are of differing length; they vary in length precisely according to the communality differences among the variables. Thus, it is apparent from Figure 3 that if Schmidhauser's vector were extended to double its present length, he would then clearly be a member of the conventional group. Similarly, if Scigliano's vector were quadrupled in length, he would then be in the traditional group. But we can extend all vectors to unit length, in which event all points will be arrayed in sequence along the semicircular perimeter of the factorial space above the PS/L axis. We can then use that sequence of points as a ranking of the variables, assigning the first rank to Ulmer, the second to Kort, and so on until we reach Berns, who will be twenty-sixth, and Bartholomew, twenty-seventh. By so doing, we shall have used the responses to Question 1 in order to provide a consensual ranking of the respondents along a circular continuum which we already have construed to be the empirical equivalent of the continuum depicted in Figure 1. This ranking can then be compared with the rankings which can be inferred from Figure 2, which shows the postulated boundary between the "traditional" and "behavioral" segments to be at about 4:30 o'clock. We can measure both the inner and the outer circles of Figure 2, proceeding in a counter-clockwise direction, just as we did in the case of Figure 3. Evidently, we should begin each ranking with the person who appears in the "behavioral" position that is closest to the boundary between the behavioral and the traditional segments. For the inner ring of self-preceptions, Krislov is in the first rank, and Kort is in the second; while for the outer ring of the sampling assumption (the hypothesis to be tested), Kort, Nagel, and Becker all are tied for the initial (and therefore, for the second) rank. The three rankings are reported in Table 4.

The non-respondents are classified (in brackets) along with the respondent members of the sample, in the outer ring of Figure 2, since the non-respondents of course were included in the sampling assumption. It is equally evident that we cannot include the non-respondents in the

TABLE 4. A PRIORI, GROUP, AND SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF RANKINGS ON THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUUM

Variable	Hypothesized[a]	Consensual[b]	Autogenous[c]
Abraham	24	25	19.5
Bartholomew	26.5	27	25
Becker	2	10	8
Berns	26.5	26	22.5
Chase	19	17	11
Danelski	6.5	3	6
Fellman	T	T*	NR
Grossman	19	12	11
Horn	C	T*	NR
Jacob	C	C*	NR
Kort	2	2	2
Krislov	16	11	1
Lasswell	B	B*	NR
McCloskey	21.5	22	16.5
Mendelson	24	24	22.5
Murphy	10	16	14
Nagel	2	5	7
Peltason	13	13	16.5
Pritchett	13	15	11
Roche	21.5	21	22.5
Rosenblum	16	18	26
Schmidhauser	11	9	11
Schubert	6.5	7	4
Scigliano	19	20	NR
Shapiro	13	14	11
Spaeth	4	4	4
Tanenhaus	6.5	6	16.5
Tresolini	24	23	22.5
Ulmer	6.5	1	4
Vines	9	8	16.5
Vose	16	19	19.5
Westin	T	T*	NR

[a] See Fig. 2 (the sampling assumption).
[b] See Fig. 3 (Q. 1 responses).
[c] See Fig. 2 (Q. 2 responses).
* See Table VIII.
NR = No response.

autogenous ranking, since they did not supply us with their self-perceptions. It is possible, however, to make a nominal consensual classification of the non-respondents, by a procedure that will be explained in the next part of this article; so the non-respondents are classified, in the first two rankings of Table 4, by ideological type rather than by rank.

Inspection of the table suggests that the different rankings are at least roughly similar. In considering the rows—the set of three ranks for each of the twenty-seven respondents—the range of rank differences is four or less for a majority, and the average range is less than five. There are only two really big discrepancies, and both of these involve self-perceptions—those of Krislov and Tanenhaus—which deviate markedly from both the sampling hypothesis and the consensual perception. Reference to Figures 2 and 3 shows that Krislov appears to consider himself to be much more behavioral[29]—while Tanenhaus, conversely, considers himself to be much *less* behavioral—than others seem to think. Examination of the inner ring of Figure 2 shows that except for Tanenhaus, the behavioralists are about where they are hypothesized to "belong"; but the conventionalists are bunched together in the narrow segment spanning 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock, and all of the traditionalists except Bartholomew are similarly escalated towards what was hypothesized to be the conventional segment. Of course, this does not indicate that the self-perceptions are inaccurate, but rather it refutes the a priori assumption of equal spacing along the continuum. The bunching of the conventionalists up close to the behavioralists, the gap between the conventionalists and the bulk of the traditionalists, and the latter's selfplacement near the boundary between the "traditional" and the "conventional" segments, all of these are precisely in accord with the configuration of points in Figure 3. Hence we should conclude that, in general, it appears that the perceptions of selves by selves, and of selves by others, are in very good agreement.

We can, of course, confirm these intuitive judgments by subjecting the three rankings to the more rigorous statistical test of correlating the pairs of rankings; and the results of this test are reported in Table 5. The rho coefficient of .92, for the correlation between the hypothesized and the consensual ranking, is exceptionally high; and we should have to conclude, on the basis of this evidence, that the a priori assumptions about the ideological content and structure among political scientists working in this field tend to be strongly supported.[30] The rho coefficient of .78, for the correlation between the autogenous and consensual rankings, is high enough to tend to confirm our subjective judgment that the respondents' perceptions of their own ideological positions are in close accord with the perceptions about them that their co-workers in the same field entertain. Incidentally, the feeling of many of the respondents, as articulated in their comments to the author, that their attempts to comply with the author's request, by "forcing" themselves to commit themselves to a single point in two-dimensional space when they felt their positions to be much more complicated than that, should be somewhat assuaged, perhaps, by the results reported above. It seems clear, now at least, that their replies make a lot more—and more consistent—sense than they thought

TABLE 5. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG HYPOTHESIZED, CONSENSUAL, AND AUTOGENOUS RANKINGS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUUM

tau \ rho	Hypothesized	Consensual	Autogenous
Hypothesized		.92	.74
Consensual	.80		.78
Autogenous	.57	.65	

---

[29] Subsequent to the writing of this sentence, Samuel Krislov has reported that "my self-perception is not so out of line as might appear. . . . I did not then and, alas, still do not, quite understand the clock metric and what I was trying to indicate was that I was at the middle or the right wing of the behavioral group expecting such stalwarts as yourself to be at '5:30' or so,": personal communication to the author, April 7, 1966.

[30] We can make an equivalent extension to unit length of the vectors in Figure 4a and then observe their rank order. The rho correlations for the small space ranking are .97 with the consensual ranking derived from Figure 3, and .88 with the hypothesized ranking of Figure 2. (Pritchett, Scigliano, and Schmidhauser were deleted from the rankings for these computations, because of their low communalities in either or both of the factor spaces from which the rankings were derived.)

possible. Of course, persons more familiar with psychometric theory would have anticipated the likelihood of such an outcome. The problem is strictly analogous with the one we faced, in interpreting the factorial output, in choosing whether to employ one, two, three, or four or more factors as a frame of reference. We could have settled for a four-factor, rather than a two-factor, solution of the correlation matrix. This would certainly have afforded a richer, more complicated, and more difficult-to-conceptualize space; and if the payoff, in terms of the quality as well as the quantity of information thereby provided, had justified recourse to a four-dimensional interpretation, then this is what we should have preferred. We found, however, that in fact the dimensions beyond the third were so relatively weak that we passed the point of diminishing returns just as soon as we added a fourth factor. We could also, of course, have settled for the first factor alone, because the first varimax factor did offer a linear solution that arrayed the three groups in sequence. Evidently, however, that would have been oversimplification, because we then would have been foreclosed from studying the second respect, in relation to *what kind* of data should be studied, by which these three groups differ; and we also would have been unable, of course, to say much about the validity of the assumptions about ideological structure that are explicit in Figure 1. This is why, in correspondence with respondents, I attempted to suggest that the question of the dimensionality of the relevant space is an empirical rather than a theoretical question; and that although it might be helpful to formulate a hypothesis about the number of dimensions—as was, in fact, done—that hypothesis should be subjected to the test of the empirical data collected—as we have done.

The third correlation in Table 5, between the inner and the outer ring of Figure 2, is also high enough to support the intuitive judgment that they are in fairly close agreement. Finally, it should be noted that in Table 4 the consensual ranking should be considered to be the norm from which both the hypothesized and the autogenous rankings deviate in varying degrees.

V. CONCORDANCE AND IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY

A. Concordance

The raw data matrix can supply evidence bearing upon another and quite different type of question relating to the responses to Question 1. Given a set of rankings, we might wish to know how consistent are the judgments expressed by the persons making the rankings. Ordinarily, with psychological data, persons are asked to rank some extrinsic objects, and our expectation is that, if their perceptions and judgment are similar, then their rankings ought to be in close agreement. Hence, W, the coefficient of concordance, which ranges between .00 and 1.00, usually is interpreted so that a high score signifies high agreement among the subjects, and a low score poor agreement. With sociometric data, however, the situation is very different. When each subject is evaluating the position of others in relation to himself, the criterion is a shifting rather than a presumably fixed one. If we were to array a dozen persons along the perimeter of a circle, or along a line, and to ask each to rank the others in terms of his perception of their physical proximity to himself, we should anticipate a set of rankings in a very different pattern. If everybody were spaced equally in a circle, and each exercised perfectly consistent perception and judgment, then the sums of the ranks for each column of the data matrix ought to be equal to each other; and the value of a coefficient of concordance, calculated from such data, ought to be .00. Consequently, with our data matrix, we should interpret a low value of W to mean high concordance—that is, that there is very considerable consistency among the persons in our sample, and in their conceptions of their ideological relationship to each other and to the non-respondents in the sample. A high value of W, to the contrary, could only mean that a considerable number of the persons in the sample all thought that they perceived the others, not only in the same way, but also *from the same base position*—that is, both their conceptions of others, and their self-perceptions, would have to be identical, or at least very similar. In effect, we could anticipate a high W coefficient only if there were a *single* ideological standpoint, which practically all of the respondents shared. We know that, impirically, neither of these conditions obtains; and the coefficient of concordance substantiates our judgment.

The available computer program for W[31] does not accommodate to, and could not readily be adjusted to, the missing data occasioned by the double zero entries in the raw data matrix. In order to get around this difficulty, the following procedure was adopted in order to calculate a value for W. Ranks were substituted for the correlation coefficients in each row of the corre-

---

[31] Morris, *op. cit.*, ftn. 17, *supra*.

TABLE 6. AVERAGE RANKINGS

Rank	Subject	Ranking
1	Danelski	9.24
2	Murphy	10.00
3	Schmidhauser	10.65
4	Grossman	10.92
5	Pritchett	11.34
6	Peltason	11.50
7	Schubert	12.14
8	Krislov	13.15
9	Tanenhaus	13.24
10	Jacob	13.36
11	Vose	13.68
12	Vines	14.34
13	Shapiro	15.24
14	Rosenblum	15.52
15	Westin	15.55
16	Lasswell	15.60
17	Abraham	15.69
18	Ulmer	15.69
19	Nagel	16.34
20	Chase	16.41
21	Spaeth	17.08
22	McCloskey	17.37
23	Scigliano	17.58
24	Becker	18.20
25	Horn	18.64
26	Fellman	19.55
27	Kort	19.61
28	Tresolini	21.00
29	Mendelson	21.11
30	Roche	21.73
31	Bartholomew	23.08
32	Berns	24.52

TABLE 7. RANKINGS ACCORDING TO IDEOLOGICAL TYPES

Types*	Rankings	
	1–16	17–32
Conventional	9	2
Behavioral	3	4
Traditional	0	7

* See Fig. 3.

lation matrix—it would not matter whether the rho or the tau matrix were used for this purpose. This provided a complete set of rankings, with no missing data, for a new 27×27 matrix. It seems intuitively reasonable to assume that, if the ranks of the raw data express a respondent's judgment of how close another person is to him, then the correlation coefficient for the two persons can be viewed as an expression of their conjoint perception of this relationship. This assumes that a person will feel closest to the person with whom he is most highly (and positively, of course) correlated; and this is, indeed, precisely the assumption that underlies the point configuration of the factor analysis. The value of W calculated by the computer, for the data matrix described above, was .13. It was possible, of course, also to calculate, by hand, the value of W for the complete 32-column raw data matrix; this was done, and the coefficient obtained was .17. Although both of the observed values are low, they doubtless reflect the substantial homogeneity of viewpoint among the behavioralist cluster and among several subclusters of the conventional group.

B. Classifying the Non-respondents

Although five persons in the sample did not reply to either question, it was inherent in the research design that these persons nevertheless would remain a part of the project, at least in the status of items whom the respondents ranked along with themselves and each other. As in the calculation of W, we shall use the means of the columns of the raw data matrix, for purposes of the present analysis. These average rankings, for each column, are reported in Table 6, which ranks all persons in the sample accordingly from lowest to highest. If one analyzes the upper and lower halves of this ranking, in relation to ideological groupings, then we can observe the relationship shown in Table 7. Persons in the conventional group are "in the middle" (as in Figure 3), and therefore tend to seem closer to persons in both of the other two groups than do the latter to each other. The traditional group, as it appears in Figure 3, is the most isolated, as evidenced by the fact that all seven of its members had average rankings (as items, it will be recalled) in the bottom half of the sample.

TABLE 8. AVERAGE RANKINGS OF NON-RESPONDENTS, BY IDEOLOGICAL TYPES

Types*	Non-respondents				
	Lasswell	Jacob	Horn	Westin	Fellman
Behavioral	10.9	17.7	21.8	23.4	27.4
Conventional	17.2	9.2	20.0	18.3	24.9
Traditional	20.7	19.5	12.0	5.3	4.9

* See Fig. 3.

Another approach to these data is to consider the rankings, *of* each of the non-respondents and *by* each of the respondents, by ideological groups. As before, we are precluded from reporting the raw data, but we can report the averages, after describing more precisely how they were derived. A new data matrix was established, with five columns (one for each of the non-respondents.) The twenty-five respondents who fit the types then were listed in column to designate the rows of the matrix. The respondents were grouped exactly as they appear in Figure 3: first the seven behavioralists, and an extra row in which to accumulate totals and averages for them; then, similarly, the eleven conventionalists; and then the seven traditionalists. The cell entries were the ranks assigned, in their responses to Question 1, by each respondent to each non-respondent. Thus, there were a total of 125 cells, grouped into fifteen subcolumns. There were only five double zero entries in the entire matrix, which suggests that the visibility of these five non-respondents was excellent, albeit their accessibility was poor. These five omitted ranks occasioned no problem for the analysis, which is based upon the average rankings for each of the fifteen subcolumns (*i.e.*, for each non-respondent by each ideological group). The resulting data are reported in Table 8.

The pattern of consistency seems very high; the only intransitivity in the Table is the slight difference by which Horn's average ranking, by the conventional group, exceeds Westin's. The table shows clearly that Fellman is ranked lowest (*i.e.*, perceived as being most exemplary of the type) by the traditionalists, followed by Westin and Horn. Jacob, on the other hand, is clearly preferred by the conventional group, and Lasswell is clearly preferred by the behavioralists. Indeed, it goes further: Fellman, Westin, and Horn are ranked least by the traditionalists, next by the conventionalists, and highest by (indicating they are perceived as being furthest away from) the behavioralists. This is just what we should expect, on the basis of Figure 3. Similarly, Jacob is ranked least by the conventionalists, next by the behavioralists, and highest by the traditionalists; and Lasswell is preferred most by the behavioralists, next by the conventionalists, and least by the traditionalists. All these findings are in perfect accord with the scale of preferences that we ought to expect from these three groups, for these five persons, assuming that Fellman, Westin, and Horn are consensually perceived *by all three groups* to be traditionalists, that Jacob is consensually perceived to be a conventionalist, and that Lasswell is consensually perceived to be a behavioralist. It does appear to be so; and my sampling assumption, which classified Horn with the conventional group, must be considered to have been erroneous.

VI. SUMMARY

The purpose of this investigation was to collect and analyze empirical evidence which would make it possible to test my a priori hypothesis about the structure and content of the approaches of different persons in the field of public law-judicial process-judicial behavior, to the study of their subject. The hypothesis is that there are three distinctive ideological standpoints, and that these ideological positions are commonly recognized, to the extent that a sample of persons chosen from the field would correspond to these standpoints.

The major findings are that there are three such ideological groupings: the traditional, the conventional, and the behavioral. Most persons in the sample identified with the latter two groups, which are much closer to each other than to the traditional group. Factor analysis suggested that the three groups are arrayed, in scalar order, upon two dimensions. The first is a major factor of academic liberalism and conservatism, which is concerned with *how* to do research, the scientific versus the philosophical approach. The second factor is empiricism versus rationalism, and it relates to *what* to study, the empirical field data of political action versus legal norms. The interpretation made of the position of the groups, in relation to these two factors, is that the traditional group consists of academic conservatives, who strongly favor the philosophical approach but who take no particular position on the second dimension. The conventional group consists of empiricists who strongly favor political analysis of judicial acts but are much more diverse and moderate in regard to methodology, and who therefore assume a more neutral position on the first dimension. The behavioral group strongly supports a scientific approach with systematic theory and explicitly quantitative methods, and favors, but is less strongly committed than is the conventional group to, the analysis of data based upon field observations. The sample did not include persons who strongly favored the rationalist position of legal norm study, and it was inferred that it would have been necessary to have included law school professors in the sample in order to have been likely to have obtained representation, in the study, for that point of view.

The analysis also showed that there is a close correspondence between persons' self-perceptions, and their perceptions of the ideological positions of others working in the field—and this irrespective of whether the others are persons with whom the persons making the evaluation are in close agreement or in substantial disagreement about the proper approach to the augmentation of knowledge in the field. The close correspondence between the relationships that were hypothesized, and those that are observed on the basis of these field data, lead to the conclusion that there is a considerable degree of consensual understanding of the standpoints common to the field today; and that, in substantive terms, the conventional academic ideology is the modal one, the behavioral ideology is the most cohesive, and the traditional ideology is the least cohesive and most isolated.

So far as is known, there is no precedent for this study, and therefore no body of related knowledge to which comparisons might be made. It is tantalizing to speculate whether similar ideological groupings of persons—not necessarily, of course, in the same proportions as are suggested by this single sampling of this single field—would be observed in related subfields of political science. It would certainly be of interest if the three basic ideological types hold for the political science profession in general, and indeed, conceivably, for other of the social sciences as well. Further scientific research may make it possible either to confirm or to refute such conjectures, and should in either event help us to comprehend better how (and how much) our academic ideologies bias our professional inquiries.

APPENDIX A

November 22, 1965

Dear ——————————:

I am writing to you in the hope that you will be willing to aid me in making an exploratory study of academic ideologies toward the study of judicial decision-making. An enclosure to this letter lists the other persons to whom I am writing at this time. I selected this group because of my assumption that (1) all of these persons know each other; (2) they represent collectively a variety of orientations toward adjudication; and (3) they all are sufficiently interested in contemporary pedagogical and research trends, in relation to adjudication processes, to want to participate.

The first enclosure (Fig. 1) suggests one possible hypothesis about the latent structure which underlies our disparate attitudinal similarities and differences. Although it is crude and doubtless much over-simplified, this model might be used as a basis for attempting to scale a set of respondents, or selections from among their writings. By making the present empirical investigation, I propose to substitute, for my own intuitions about our conjoint relationships in regard to the question of academic ideology, your own replies to the enclosed two questions.

The first question asks you to rank *yourself* as number 1 (indicating that you are in closest agreement with your own point of view), and to rank as last (*i.e.*, #32, if you rank all) the person whose approach is most different from your own. The others on the list should be ranked from 2–31, depending upon your perception of how closely the view of each toward the subject of adjudication processes is similar or dissimilar to your own. It will be much more helpful if you are able to rank everybody; if you feel that the list includes a person (or persons) whom you simply do not know, assign him (or them) the rank of #0.

The second question asks you to specify your own relative position on the perimeter of the circle depicted in Fig. 1. Using a clock metric, please specify as closely as you can a point that approximates "where you are." The sequence of academic disciplines which is apparent in the space between the two circles is intended only to be *suggestive* of the content of the three approaches, and *not* to specify directly positions on the perimeter. Therefore, you should orient yourself in relation to the three major approaches: the traditional at 6:00 o'clock, the conventional at 10:00 o'clock, and the behavioral at 2:00 o'clock. The hour hand of the imaginary clock is capable of denoting position to the nearest minute as well as marking the hours, and therefore you should feel free to make your designation either roughly (to the nearest hour) or more precisely as a point between two hour-loci.

It is possible that the replies to the first question could be used in a manner that might prove to be embarrassing to some individuals. There is no way of assuring that respondents will remain anonymous to the analyst, for the structure of the answers provides a quick identification. However, I will not publish nor otherwise reveal to any other person the individual responses to the first question; and the sample size is sufficiently small that I can code these raw data myself. We happen to have a recently debugged tau program for our computer, so I shall use it to calculate a matrix of rank correlation coefficients, which will measure the extent to which each pair of respondents agree in their evaluation of the psychological distance separating them from each other and from the other persons in the sample. *Only these correlation* *coefficients* and measures based upon them (and explicitly *not* the individual sets of rankings) will be used and reported in the published analysis.

The replies to the second question will, of course, be reported; and I plan to compare the findings with those which result from the analysis of the first question. This will make it possible to compare self-perceptions with others' perceptions. Conclusions based thereon should contribute to a much better common understanding of whatever degree of cognitive structure may obtain in our orientations towards the substantive professional field in which we labor. It will then be possible to base our future discourse upon more valid and reliable knowledge than the idiosyncratic and unsystematized intuitions of individuals (including my own present intuitions).

With luck, I hope to be able to complete the analysis and write the research report early next winter, and then after revision (see below) to submit the ms. for possible publication in the *Law and Society Bulletin,* the new journal of the Law and Society Association, which is perhaps a particularly appropriate forum. At the bottom of the second enclosure you will note a place which you should check if you would like to have me send you a copy of the draft paper, thereby providing you with an opportunity to comment critically upon, and suggest revision in, the ms. before I do submit it for publication.

I have tried to include in the sample persons representing a variety of different points of view. It is of course my hope that everyone replies to both questions, so that the sample available for analysis does not become biased by either the over-representation or the under-representation of persons who represent any of the major perspectives which characterize our field today.

Please use the stamped and addressed envelope that is enclosed for your reply. Now that you have read the letter, only a few more minutes will be required to answer the two questions.

With my sincere appreciation,

Glendon Schubert

APPENDIX B

PLEASE RETURN THIS SHEET IN THE ENCLOSED REPLY ENVELOPE

QUESTION #1. Rank the following individuals from 1 to 32. Place the number "1" after your own name, the number "2" after the name of the person whose point of view (concerning how to study law, courts, and judges) is most similar to your own, and so on with the person whose viewpoint is most different from yours ranked last.

Abraham ____
Bartholomew ____
Becker ____
Berns ____
Chase ____
Danelski ____
Fellman ____
Grossman ____
Jacob ____
Horn ____
Kort ____
Krislov ____
Lasswell ____
McCloskey ____
Mendelson ____
Murphy ____
Nagel ____
Peltason ____
Pritchett ____
Roche ____
Rosenblum ____
Schmidhauser ____
Schubert ____
Scigliano ____
Shapiro ____
Spaeth ____
Tanenhaus ____
Tresolini ____
Ulmer ____
Vines ____
Vose ____
Westin ____

QUESTION #2. Your own position on the perimeter of Figure 1 is best approximated by a point at about ____:____ o'clock.

Check here __ if you would like to receive a copy of the draft of the report.

CAUSAL INFERENCES, CLOSED POPULATIONS, AND MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION*

HUBERT M. BLALOCK
University of North Carolina

Two of the most important traditions of quantitative research in sociology and social psychology are those of survey research and laboratory or field experiments. In the former, the explicit objective is usually that of generalizing to some specific population, whereas in the latter it is more often that of stating relationships among variables. These two objectives are not thought to be incompatible in any fundamental sense, but nevertheless we lack a clear understanding of their interrelationship.

One of the most frequent objections to laboratory experiments turns on the question of generalizability, or what Campbell and Stanley refer to as "external validity."[1] In essence, this question seems to reduce to at least two related problems: (1) that of representativeness or typicality, and (2) the possibility of interaction effects that vary with experimental conditions. In the first case, the concern would seem to be with central tendency and dispersion of single variables, that is, whether the means and standard deviations of variables in the experimental situation are sufficiently close to those of some larger population. The second involves the question of possible disturbing influences introduced into the experimental setting that produce nonadditive effects when combined with either the experimental variable or the premeasurement.[2] These same variables may of course be operative in larger populations. But presumably they take on different numerical values, with the result that one would infer different relationships between major independent and dependent variables in the two kinds of research settings.

As a sociologist who is only superficially acquainted with trends and developments in quantitative behavioral political science, it is my impression that, with the exception of simulation studies, the overwhelming emphasis has been on stating generalizations appropriate to specific populations rather than stating general laws of political behavior. Consistent with this has been the frequent use of correlation coefficients as measures of degree of relationship, as contrasted with the use of unstandardized regression coefficients as measures of the *nature* and form of relationships appropriate for general structural equations representing causal laws. One reason for this emphasis on particular populations is perhaps that the kinds of populations dealt with by political scientists are often of more inherent descriptive or practical importance than many of the (usually smaller) populations sampled by sociologists. I shall return to this question in discussing the Miller-Stokes study of constituency influence.

The question of whether or not one is generalizing only to specific populations or attempting to state scientific laws has created considerable confusion in the sociological literature, and I hope that political scientists will be in a position to benefit from this confusion so as to by-pass controversies such as those concerning whether or not one should make tests of statistical significance when data for the entire population are available. The purpose of the present paper is to bring this general issue into sharper focus. In doing so, I shall take a position with which many political scientists will undoubtedly disagree.

Rather than taking as the ultimate objective the goal of generalizing to specific populations, I would maintain that it is preferable to attempt to state general laws that interrelate variables in terms of hypothetical "if-then" statements. These could be of the form, "If X changes by one unit under conditions A, B, and C, then Y should change by b_{yx} units." In effect, then, I would consider generalizations to populations as means rather then ends. But given the limitations imposed by most data collection techniques, it is often necessary to carry out studies on specific populations at a single point in time, or at most several points in time. If so, then what must one assume about these populations? Since no real populations will be completely isolated or "closed," what

---

* I am indebted to the National Science Foundation for support of this research.

[1] See especially Donald T. Campbell and Julien S. Stanley, "Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research on Teaching," in N. L. Gage (ed.), *Handbook of Research on Teaching* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), pp. 171–246. See also Leslie Kish, "Some Statistical Problems in Research Design," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (1959), pp. 328–338.

[2] For a systematic discussion of the handling of various interaction effects in experimental designs see John A. Ross and Perry Smith, "Experimental Designs of the Single-Stimulus, All-or-Nothing Type," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), pp. 68–80.

kinds of assumptions concerning less than completely closed populations can realistically be made? And what bearing does this have on choice of measures of association? Let me first consider the question of the closure of populations.

CLOSED POPULATIONS AND CLOSED THEORETICAL SYSTEMS

A completely closed theoretical system would be one in which no variables have been omitted, and which (if mathematically formulated) would imply perfect mathematical functions with no stochastic or error terms. Obviously, such completely closed systems are impossible to find in the social sciences. Furthermore, our approximations to this ideal are not even close. The error terms one finds empirically are usually too large to be considered negligible. Therefore one is faced with the necessity of making assumptions about these errors and why they occur. Such assumptions will become quite complex whenever one is dealing with theoretical systems involving reciprocal causation, time lags, interaction terms, and the like.

Let us therefore confine our attention to simple recursive equations of the form:

$$X_1 = e_1$$

$$X_2 = b_{21}X_1 + e_2$$

$$X_3 = b_{31}X_1 + b_{32}X_2 + e_3$$

$$X_4 = b_{41}X_1 + b_{42}X_2 + b_{43}X_3 + e_4$$

One can show in this case that unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients can be obtained by assuming that the error terms in each equation are uncorrelated with each other and also with all of the *independent* variables that appear in their respective equations.[3] Thus e_2 is assumed uncorrelated with X_1 and also the remaining error terms e_i. Similarly, e_3 is unrelated to X_1 and X_2, and so forth.

What do these assumptions mean in terms of the behavior of outside variables not explicitly contained in the model? In brief, if one assumes that outside variables have a direct effect on *only one* of the explicit variables, then the assumptions can be met. Notice that an implicit variable might have an *indirect* effect on some variable through one of the remaining X_i without violating the assumptions. But if an implicit factor *directly* affects two or more explicit variables, then it will ordinarily be correlated with one of the independent variables in its equation, and the assumptions will not be met. If this is the case, least squares estimates will be biased, and one's inferences will be incorrect. Such a variable should be explicitly included in the system. At some point one must stop and make the simplifying assumption that all remaining implicit factors operate (in a major way) on only one explicit variable.

Analogously, a completely closed population is one which is subject to no outside influences including immigration or emigration. A completely closed theoretical system that implied a stable equilibrium could be tested in such a closed population by collecting data at a single point in time, provided it was assumed that stability had actually been reached.[4] But given that such completely closed populations can never be found empirically, the major problem seems to be that of specifying a satisfactory analogue to the imperfectly closed theoretical system that allows for error terms in the equations.

It seems to me that in order to state and test theoretical generalizations based on population data, one must assume that the lack of closure of the population does not violate the above assumptions regarding error terms.[5] That is, disturbances that systematically affect one variable should not affect the others in a major way. For example, migration factors that directly affect X_2 should not also affect X_1, nor should they affect X_3 or X_4 except through the operation of X_2. This means that migration processes (or other disturbances emanating from outside populations) should not affect *relationships* among the variables, though they may very well affect measures of central tendency or dispersion for *single* variables.

For example, individuals obviously migrate for economic reasons. Certain cities will have higher income or occupational levels than others, or may be more homogeneous economically than others. Individuals will of course also migrate for other reasons as well—to join relatives, or for cultural or recreational purposes. In many instances, however, it will be plausible to assume that these additional reasons are "idiosyncratic" and that, when aggregated, do not systematically distort relationships among variables. If, however, large numbers of persons move for *combinations* of reasons, then one's inferences regarding relationships among variables may very well be misleading. For example, suppose that high-income liberals move into communities containing large numbers of low-income conservatives (e.g., rural college communities). A study relating income to conservatism could lead to erroneous conclusions if based solely on this community.

---

[3] See Herman Wold and Lars Jureen, *Demand Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), Ch. 2.

[4] There will of course be numerous dynamic models all of which predict the same stability conditions. Ideally, theories should be formulated in dynamic terms in such a way that time enters in in an essential way (as in difference equations). The approach of "comparative statics" can then be used to study equilibrium conditions. For a very readable discussion of this question see William J. Baumol, *Economic Dynamics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959). See also Paul A. Samuelson, *The Foundations of Economic Analysis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); and Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), Chs. 6–8.

[5] Of course somewhat less restrictive assumptions concerning the error terms might be used. Whatever set of assumptions are used, however, it would seem necessary to assume that the population is "closed" in the sense of meeting these assumptions.

I assume that many objections to "atypical" populations are based on this kind of concern about selective migration. Detroit is certainly not typical of metropolitan centers with respect to income distribution. Whether or not it is considered objectionable, from the standpoint of generalizations to other populations, however, would seem to depend on whether or not Detroit is peculiar with respect to combinations of characteristics of interest to the investigator. Ideally one should define the boundaries of his population in such a way that such selective migration (by several variables) is reduced to a minimum. Thus he might prefer to use an entire metropolitan area, rather than the central city, arguing that although migration *within* the metropolitan area may be selective, this will not be the case *between* such larger units. Had he used central cities, he might have found this assumption much less plausible. For example, high-income Negroes might be more likely to remain within the city, as might also be true for certain extremely high-status families (e.g., the "Proper Bostonians").

AN EXAMPLE: CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE

Before proceeding with a rather general discussion of standardized and unstandardized coefficients, I should like to introduce as a concrete example the study of constituency influence in Congress by Miller and Stokes.[6] The authors give correlational data based on a sample of 116 congressional districts and then interpret these data in terms of a causal model as indicated in Figure 1. The direction of influence between the representative's attitudes and his *perceptions* of the constituency's attitudes is left unspecified, though the authors discuss the implications of the two limiting models in which the one or the other of the two arrows is erased. Cnudde and McCrone suggest some possible revisions of this model, based on the magnitudes of the coefficients.[7] In particular, they suggest that the data are compatible with a model in which (1) the arrow from constituency's attitude to representative's attitude is erased, and (2) it is assumed that the representative's perception affects his own attitudes, rather than vice versa. There is no need, here, to concern ourselves with this particular substantive issue.


Representative's Attitudes
Constituency's Attitudes
Roll-Call Behavior
Representative's Perceptions of Constituency's Attitudes

FIG. 1.

The basic problem with which Miller and Stokes deal is that of measuring the relative importance of the two major paths from constituency's attitude to roll-call behavior. In the case of civil rights they conclude that the path via the representative's perceptions is more important than that via the representative's own attitudes. The measures they display in the paper are correlation coefficients, but they also make use of path coefficients (which will be discussed below). The conclusion reached is that in the case of civil rights roll-call behavior, and the least favorable assumptions regarding the importance of the representative's perceptions, the path via perceptions accounts for more than twice as much of the variance as does the path involving the representatives' own attitudes.

This is an excellent example of a study in which there is inherent interest in generalizing to a single population, since there is only one U. S. House of Representatives. Once inferences have been made from the sample of 116 districts to this total population, one might then take the position that there is no point in attempting to formulate more general "laws" of constituency influence. But there are a number of respects in which the data are not completely general. First, only a sample of political issues could be studied. Second, the study is obviously time-bound, and it might be desirable to compare results (for these same issues) over a period of time in order to ascertain whether or not the basic processes have remained unaltered. Third, one might wish to compare these results with those of legislative bodies in other countries. Had the Miller-Stokes data pertained to legislative behavior within a single state, then one would obviously be interested in comparing results across states. For example, one might determine whether the coefficients for Southern and Northern states were similar with respect to civil rights issues. If different with respect to civil rights, they might be similar with respect to other issue areas. These types of problems require one to formulate propositions more abstractly than in terms of specific populations and periods of time.

---

[6] Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 45–56.

[7] Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), pp. 66–72.

The question of the possible lack of closure of a population may not be as relevant for this type of substantive problem as would be the case in voting behavior studies. Legislative bodies are closed at least in the sense that, with minor exceptions, persons are elected for specified periods of time and do not migrate into and out of such "populations." In developing measures of constituency attitudes, one likewise need not be too concerned about lack of closure since presumably representatives are concerned about the makeup of *present* constituencies, and ordinarily assume that the distribution of attitudes will not be modified in any major way by migration. Each constituency, however, will be influenced by neighboring districts, and it will undoubtedly be necessary to make simplifying assumptions about how this influence process affects the closure of these smaller units.

With this example in mind, let us return to the question of one's choice of appropriate measures. I shall then comment briefly on why I believe that unstandardized measures would be more suitable for certain purposes for which the Miller-Stokes type of data might be used.

STANDARDIZED VERSUS UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

The method of "path coefficients" or "dependence coefficients" has been recommended as an important methodological tool for measuring the relative contributions to associations between pairs of variables in multivariate analyses. Raymond Boudon implies that sociologists may have failed to use such coefficients because of a certain confusion over the meaning of regression coefficients in simultaneous equations, and also because of the identification problems that may arise.[8] It is important, however, to be well aware of the major differences between standardized measures, such as correlation and path coefficients, and unstandardized regression coefficients. The former seem most appropriate for describing relationships in particular populations; the latter for comparing populations or stating general laws.[9]

It is instructive to examine the relationship between correlation and regression coefficients by conceiving of the numerical value of a correlation coefficient as a dependent variable, being a function of (1) the causal law connecting two (or more) variables, and (2) the relative amounts of variation that happen to exist in any particular population or that may be induced in experimental manipulations. Making the assumptions necessary for least squares, we may write

$$r_{xy} = b_{yx}\left(\frac{s_x}{s_y}\right)$$

Let us assume that the sample size is sufficiently large that we can ignore sampling error. Similar expressions can be written in the case of three or more variables; for example:

$$r_{xy\cdot w} = b_{yx\cdot w}\left(\frac{s_x}{s_y}\,\frac{\sqrt{1 - r^2_{xw}}}{\sqrt{1 - r^2_{yw}}}\right)$$

I shall confine the discussion to the simple two-variable case, as the extension is straightforward.

The coefficient b_{yx} (or $b_{yx\cdot w}$) represents the change in Y produced by a unit change in X and is appropriate for use in a general statement of a causal law.[10] Such a law is expressed in the hypothetical "if-then" form. There is no assertion that X has changed, or will change, by a given amount. But in order to apply or test such a law one must deal with specific populations or manipulations in particular experiments. The factor s_x/s_y, or its extensions in the multivariate case, involves *actual* variations in X and Y. Assuming that there are no measurement errors in either variable, we would presume that variation in X (e.g., constituency attitudes) is produced by factors not explicitly considered, and that variation in Y is jointly affected by X plus additional factors left out of the theoretical system. Least squares procedures will give unbiased estimates of the true regression coefficients in causal laws only if certain assumptions are met concerning the effect of variables left out.[11] Ordinarily, however, one is in no theoretical position to specify a priori the *amount* of actual variation produced by omitted factors in real populations. In the case of populations that are not completely closed, the existence of migration makes such assumptions even less plausible.

---

[8] Raymond Boudon, "A Method of Linear Causal Analysis: Dependence Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), pp. 365–374. See also Sewall Wright, "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts?," *Biometrics*, 16 (1960), pp. 189–202; and Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (1966), pp. 1–16.

[9] This position is basically similar to that taken by John W. Tukey in "Causation, Regression, and Path Analysis," in Oscar Kempthorne *et. al.* (eds.), *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1954), Chap. 3.

[10] The numerical value of b_{yx} is of course also affected by one's choice of units of measurement. Unlike the expression s_x/s_y, however, these units

Thus the amount of variation in X relative to variation in Y produced by factors not considered may be taken as "accidental" from the point of view of one's theory. Of course one may take X as itself being determined by other variables, in which case variation in X may also be partly explained. But we are here considering X as "exogenous," and it is of course necessary to have some such exogenous variables in one's theoretical system. These are the "givens" that the theorist makes no effort to explain. In terms of the coefficients, he cannot account for the numerical values of the variance in exogenous variables. In this sense they are taken as accidental, and are unique to each population even where the same causal laws are operative on all populations.

Let me illustrate with a simple example. Suppose one finds stronger correlations between constituency's and representative's attitudes in the North than is true in the South. It is quite conceivable that the same laws are operative, giving the same values of b_{yx} in each region. Yet there may be more variation in constituency's attitudes in the North, and if extraneous factors operated to the same extent in both regions this would account for the larger correlation. Fortunately, the amount of variation in X can be measured and the regions compared in this respect. But uncontrolled and unknown disturbing influences cannot, and one would have no way of determining whether or not these also varied more in the North than in the South. It would therefore be more meaningful to compare the slope estimates than the respective correlations.

The same basic issues concerning standardization arise in the case of more complex causal models. As Miller and Stokes have noted, the method of path coefficients provides a simple and useful way of representing a total correlation between any two variables as a function of the causal paths that connect them. Consider, for example, the following model:



Letting p_{ij} represent the path coefficient from X_j to X_i, we can write down expressions for each of the r_{ij}. For example:

$$r_{23} = p_{21}p_{31}$$

and

$$r_{14} = p_{21}p_{42} + p_{31}p_{43}$$

These expressions can either be derived algebraically, as indicated in Boudon's paper, or they can be obtained directly by following certain rules or "algorithms" for tracing paths. The latter method has more intuitive appeal, and is easier to apply in simple models, but may lead one astray in more complex situations. The general rule is that one can trace paths by proceeding backward and then forward, or forward only, but it is not legitimate to move forward and *then* backward. Thus in the case of the paths between X_2 and X_3, one finds a path through X_1 (going back against the direction of

---

of measurement are interrelated by purely a priori or definitional operations (e.g., 100 pennies = one dollar). It is true, as McGinnis notes, that one can transform r_{xy} into b_{yx} by multiplying by a simple scalar quantity. It does not follow, however, that correlation and regression coefficients are essentially interchangeable as McGinnis implies. For this scalar quantity s_y/s_x is a function of standard deviations peculiar to each population. A reader who is given only the correlation coefficient is therefore likely to be misled in interpreting results of comparative studies. For a further discussion of this point see H. M. Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), Ch. 4. See also Robert McGinnis, "Review of *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research*," *Social Forces*, 44 (1966), pp. 584–586.

[11] In particular, one must assume that the error terms in each equation have zero means and are uncorrelated with each other and with any of the independent variables that appear in their respective equations.

the arrow, and then forward), but *not* through their common effect X_4 (which would require going forward and then back).

One can then attribute a certain proportion of the total correlation to each component path, thereby obtaining a measure of the relative contribution of each variable to this correlation. But why take the *correlation* between two variables as something to be explained? According to my previous argument, this should be a function of variation in exogenous variables peculiar to particular populations. Breaking up a correlation coefficient into component parts would seem to require that these parts, themselves, be peculiar to the population. This is in fact the case, as can be seen from the definition of a path coefficient.

A path coefficient p_{ij} is defined as the ratio of two quantities. The standard deviation in the dependent variable X_i is in the denominator. The numerator is essentially an adjusted standard deviation, being the standard deviation in X_i that would result if X_j retained the same amount of variation, but if all other causes of X_i (direct and indirect) remained constant. In symbols:

$$p_{ij} = \frac{s_{i:j}}{s_i}$$

where $s_{i:j}$ represents the standard deviation in X_i that can be attributed to X_j, with the other variables held constant. It is possible, therefore, that a path coefficient can take on a value greater than unity, though this is not likely in most realistic examples.

Notice that this definition of path coefficients, from which the simple algebraic relationships with correlations can be derived, involves a combination of the hypothetical and the real. On the one hand, the *actual* variations in both X_j and X_i are accepted as givens. On the other, we are asked to imagine what would happen if the remaining variables were held constant. This mixture of real and hypothetical poses some interesting questions. How, for example, would one retain the same variation in X_3, while holding constant X_1 which is one of its causes? To do so would require one to manipulate some *other* cause of X_3 not included in the model. It is of course possible to imagine experiments in which this could be accomplished. The real question, it seems, is: "Why combine these hypothetical manipulations with the actual variations peculiar to a given population?" Put another way, if one were interested in controlling some of the variables, why would he insist that the independent variable under study retain the same amount of variation? This might make sense if the so-called independent variables were not themselves causally interrelated, but the rationale seems to be less clearcut in more complex situations.[12]

Unstandardized regression coefficients provide direct answers to the kind of hypothetical question that I believe to be more appropriate. For example, one could ask what would be the expected change in X_4 produced by a unit change in X_1, given that X_1 affects both X_2 and X_3, and assuming that outside factors produce only random variation. Suppose, for example, that a unit change in X_1 will increase X_2 by three units, and decrease X_3 by four units. Suppose also that unit increases in X_2 and X_3 will increase X_4 by two and four units respectively. Then an increase of one unit in X_1 should increase Z_4 by $3(2) = 6$ units via X_2 and change X_4 by $(-4)(4) = -16$ units via X_3. The total expected change would then be ten units in the negative direction.

Notice that nothing is being said here about actual changes in a given population. The population data are used to *estimate* the regression coefficients, but the formulation is purely hypothetical. I have used a simple numerical example for illustrative purposes, but the general procedure is quite straightforward *provided* one assumes one-way causation and no feedback, plus the usual least squares assumptions regarding error terms. Turner and Stevens provide both an algebraic procedure and an algorithm for tracing paths similar to that given by Wright for the standardized path coefficients.[13]

Returning to the Miller-Stokes data, the reason why the path via the representative's perception was found to explain more than twice as much of the variance as the other major path was that the correlation between constituency's attitude and perception was .63, whereas that between constituency's and representative's attitudes was only .39. The correlations between the two intervening variables and roll-call behavior were almost identical (being .82 and .77 respectively). Let us rule out the possibility of sampling error and assume that these correlations adequately describe the magnitudes of the relationships for this particular population, at this given time (1958), for civil rights issues.

---

[12] If interest is in generalizing to a population, it might make more sense to use a measure that does not involve any hypothetical manipulations. One may of course break down $R^2_{4.124}$ into the components r^2_{14}, $r^2_{24.1}$ $(1-r^2_{14})$, and $r^2_{34.12}(1-R^2_{4.12})$. Since x_1, x_2, and x_3 are intercorrelated, these components cannot be directly associated with these variables. However, the exogenous causes of the X_i are assumed orthogonal in the case of simple least squares, and therefore one may—if he wishes—link the above components of $R^2_{4.123}$ with the respective error terms, given these assumptions about the causal ordering of x_1, x_2, and x_3. This of course raises the question of why one would want to associate components with exogenous variables that have not been included in the theoretical system.

[13] Malcolm E. Turner and Charles D. Stevens, "The Regression Analysis of Causal Paths," *Biometrics*, 15 (1959), pp. 236–258.

Suppose, now, that additional data were available for other populations, time periods, or issues. To be specific, suppose one wished to compare the Miller-Stokes results with those for several different periods of time, posing the question as to whether or not basic changes in influence processes were occurring. As noted above, it is entirely possible that the basic laws, as measured by slopes, would remain unchanged whereas the relative magnitudes of the correlations could be altered. In the case of constituency attitudes, which are the starting points for both paths, an increase in the variance would be expected to increase *both* correlations with the two intervening variables. But it is quite possible that outside or exogenous factors affecting the representative's attitudes might produce a smaller variance in subsequent periods, though they might continue to create essentially random disturbances. If so, the correlation between constituency's attitude and representative's attitude would increase, perhaps to a level comparable to that between constituency's attitude and representative's perception. With reduced variation in representative's attitude, the correlation between this variable and roll-call behavior might also decrease, again with no basic changes in the slope coefficients.

The general point, of course, is that both the simpler correlation coefficients and more complex path coefficients are functions of the nature of the underlying processes *and* the relative magnitudes of disturbance terms. As long as one is dealing with a single set of data—as is true with respect to the Miller-Stokes example—the use of path coefficients will not be misleading. When one is interested in making comparisons, however, he should become sensitized to the differences between the two types of measures.

CONCLUSIONS

I suspect that one reason why both standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients have not found favor with sociologists and political scientists is a general reluctance to work with interval-scale assumptions and an understandable resistance to committing oneself to specific causal models. I would hope that we will begin to move more and more in these directions. In doing so, however, we must keep clearly in mind the distinction between working with causal laws and unstandardized coefficients, and attempting to measure relative importance of variables in specific populations. We must recognize that relative importance cannot be evaluated in the abstract: the contribution of each factor to the total variation in a dependent variable is a function of how much the various independent variables happen to vary in that given population. Since I am arguing against the advisability of generalizing to populations, at least as an ultimate objective, I must also argue that we would not be interested in these standardized measures except for descriptive or practical purposes.

Tukey has taken essentially the same position and has recommended working with unstandardized coefficients.[14] Wright has pointed out that, like the ordinary correlation coefficients, standardized path coefficients have much simpler properties than the unstandardized measures.[15] I would agree with Tukey, however, who suggests that the price of simplicity may be too high. It would seem preferable to make use of unstandardized coefficients that have some chance of being invariant from one population to the next, rather than measures that have admittedly simpler descriptive properties.

---

[14] Tukey, *op. cit.*

[15] Wright, *op. cit.*

POLITICIANS' BELIEFS ABOUT VOTERS*

JOHN W. KINGDON
University of Michigan

The pattern of communications between representatives and constituents has become a matter of central concern to many students of legislative behavior. As Lewis A. Dexter points out, the statement that a Congressman "represents" his district is only shorthand for the fact that the Congressman "represents his image of the district or of his constituents." This image is established, according to Dexter, by the communications between representative and constituents: "what he hears from the district as he interprets it."[1] Miller and Stokes explore directly Congressmen's images of their constituents' opinions.[2] The representative's image of his district is significant because it may constitute part of the explanation for various important types of behavior, such as his roll call voting, the stands he takes on issues of public policy, and the formulation of his campaign strategies.

A portion of a representative's image of his district is composed of his beliefs about voters, his explicit or implicit theory of voting behavior. Because his position is contingent upon the approval of a majority of voters in an election, he is likely to consider at least to some degree the effect that various of his decisions might have on election outcomes. In making such judgments, the representative probably makes some assumptions, conscious or not, about the manner in which voters make their choices. If he believes, for example, that voters pay close attention to his actions, he probably feels more constrained by his district's likely opinions than if he does not hold that belief.[3] Thus his beliefs about voters may be an important part of his image of his district, which in turn affects his important decisions on roll-

---

* I am indebted to many for helpful comments, among them Ralph Huitt, Austin Ranney, Leon Epstein, Philip Converse, Donald Stokes, Warren Miller, and Jack Walker.

[1] Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Representative and his District," *Human Organization*, 16 (1957), pp. 2–13.

[2] Part of this research is reported in Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 45–56.

[3] Fortunately, data are available which can be easily adapted to indicate the importance of these beliefs about voters. In 1958, the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan collected data designed to explore the subject of the relations between Congressmen and their constituents. In each of 116 congressional districts, the incumbent Congressman, his general election opponent, and a sample of voters were interviewed. Some of the findings, methodological considerations, and procedures have already been reported in Miller and Stokes, *op. cit.*

A secondary analysis of these data suggests that Congressmen who believe that their constituents are interested in and informed about issues of governmental policy are more likely to reflect constituency attitudes in their voting in Congress than those who believe that their constituents are less politically aware. When one separates Congressmen into two groups, those who perceive a relatively high degree of voter interest in issues and those who perceive relatively low voter interest, according to their answers to the question, "How many people would you say there are in your district who are really interested and who keep up-to-date on issues like those we've talked about?", the Pearsonian product-moment correlation between constituency attitudes on social welfare policies and the Congressmen's roll call votes on these policies is .32 for those with a low estimate of voter interest in issues and .60 for those with a high estimate of voter interest. If one considers only the majority element in the constituency rather than the whole constituency, the correlation between the majority element's attitude and roll call vote for those with a low estimate of voter interest is .57; for those with a high estimate of voter interest, .87.

The same picture emerges when Congressmen are again divided into two groups on the question, "How much do you think the people of your district know about your stands on issues like those we've talked about?" The correlation between the whole constituency's attitude and roll calls on social welfare measures for those with a low estimate of voter knowledge of incumbent's stands is .34; for those with a high estimate, .59. The correlations between the majority element in the constituency and roll call for those with a low estimate is .56; for those with a high estimate, .94. Even though the figures may somewhat overestimate the strength of the relationships, due to the effect of a correction introduced for the small samples of constituents, comparison of Congressmen with high estimates of voter awareness with calls policy stands, campaigns, and the like. This paper, part of a larger study, investigates politicians' beliefs about voters, their theories of voting behavior.

Politicians' beliefs about voters have been considered important for another reason: they may account for the campaign strategies which candidates adopt and perhaps for the success of these strategies in winning votes. Ranney and Kendall maintain that politicians base their campaigns on "reflective analysis of past experience, i.e. theory," their theory of how to win votes.[4] After each election, there is much commentary which suggests that the successful candidate in the election had a theory of voting behavior different from that held by the loser. The unsuccessful candidate, the argument runs, lost because he made several crucial mistakes, many of them involving his judgments about voters. We are told, for example, that Adlai Stevenson apparently overestimated the degree to which voters were interested in the issues he was discussing. Again, the study of the 1964 election by Converse, Clausen, and Miller states that Barry Goldwater's campaign "assumed an electorate with near-total ideological comprehension and sensitivity," that his actions were based on "a sort of chronic miscalculation of electoral reality."[5] A comparison of winners' and losers' beliefs about voters, therefore, might prove fruitful in terms of explaining campaign strategy and even some election outcomes.

This paper first considers the differences between the beliefs of winning and losing candidates for public elective office. The concluding sections then outline alternative explanations for the results and suggest several theoretical implications of the findings.

METHOD

In this study, a portion of which is reported in this paper, structured interviews were conducted with a sample of successful and unsuccessful Wisconsin candidates in the 1964 election[6] for offices ranging from U.S. Senator and Governor to the lower house of the state legislature.

The sample. Districts in Wisconsin, rather than individual candidates, were sampled, and the winning and losing candidate in each chosen district was included in the sample. A census was taken of the candidates for U.S. Senator, U.S. Congressman, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, and State Attorney General. The other half of the sample was composed of candidates for the state legislature (Senate and Assembly) drawn on a probability basis at the ratio of one to eight in order to equal the number of candidates for the "higher-level" offices mentioned above. This sub-sample of state legislative districts was stratified by area of the state, which approximates a stratification by population density, since the South-east part of Wisconsin is more densely populated than the rest of the state.

TABLE 1. THE COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

	Districts	Individuals
U. S. Senator	2	4
U. S. Congressman	10	20
State-wide offices	5	10
State Senate	4	8
State Assembly	12	24
Totals	33	66

A summary statement of the sample appears in Table 1. The total of 66 possible candidates was eventually reduced by four. Two of the Assembly candidates had no opponents, and two of the state-wide candidates refused to grant an interview, which resulted in a 97% rate of return. In order to test and revise the interview schedule before it was used in the production interviewing of the 62 candidates in the sample, eight pretest respondents were also interviewed.

The interview. A structured interview was used in this research, with the same questions asked of each respondent in the same order. The most significant advantage of this technique is that it enables the researcher to compare one respondent with another with some degree of assurance that their responses were elicited by the same stimulus. The cost of such

---

those with low estimates still decidedly suggests that a politician's theory of voting behavior does influence his decisions on matters of public policy to an important degree.

I am indebted to Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, the directors of the project, for the use of these data.

[4] Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956) pp. 340–344.

[5] Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), pp. 332 and 335.

[6] In two districts with terms longer than two years, the 1962 candidates were chosen.

a method in terms of inability to explore interesting tangents and the like was recognized and deliberately paid, in order to obtain comparable and complete answers to all the questions of interest.

Respondents were interviewed during the months of March and April of 1965, about five months after the election. This period of time allowed the candidates to reflect a bit on the election, while not being so distant from the event that recall would be drastically impaired. The timing of the interviews, however, renders statements about the pre-election beliefs of the respondents tenuous, as will be evident below. Most respondents were extremely generous with their time, and the mean length of interview was one hour.

FINDINGS

The questions asked the respondents were formulated with survey research studies' conclusions about voting behavior in mind. These studies have discovered that a relatively small proportion of voters are highly interested in and informed about politics, so respondents were asked to indicate how politically interested and informed they thought voters are.[7] The voting studies have also identified a number of variables which influence voters' choices, including relatively static ones which are stable over time, like party identification, and relatively dynamic ones which change from election to election, like the voters' attitudes toward the candidates and the issues of a particular election.[8] Questions concerning these variables were structured according to the analysis in *The Voter Decides*, where the authors identify three variables which heavily influence voters' choices: party identification, issue partisanship, and candidate orientation. Respondents were therefore asked to assess the importance of party, issues, and candidates.

Politicians in the sample were first asked to rate and rank the importance of the three variables which influence voters' decisions. Table 2 gives the rating made by winners and losers on each of the three. Both winners and losers downgrade issues and upgrade personal characteristics to some extent. But the unsuccessful candidates heavily emphasize the importance of party label, while decidedly downgrading the importance of issues of the election as determinants of voters' choices. Winners, on the other hand, while splitting roughly equally on party label and issues, tend to believe that their own personal characteristics are very important influences on voters' behavior. To characterize what may be their patterns of thought, the winners tend to believe more than the losers

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF WINNERS AND LOSERS ON THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO PARTY, ISSUES, AND CANDIDATES[a]

Importance	Party		Issues		Candidates	
	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
All or very important	44%	80%	42%	27%	84%	63%
Of some, little, or no importance	56	20	58	73	16	37
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	32	30	31	30	32	30

[a] Respondents were handed a response card with party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation stated in layman's English at the top of the card: "Party label, issues of the election, personal characteristics of the candidates." The following evaluational categories were at the bottom of the card: "All important, very important, of some importance, of little importance, not important." Respondents were then asked the following question: "Consider the three factors at the top of this card. Would you tell me how important each of these is in determining the choice of the voters? You can use the categories at the bottom of the card."

---

[7] The exact phrasing of questions appears in footnotes to the tables.

[8] For the survey studies on these points, see Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); and Angus Campbell and Donald E. Stokes, "Partisan Attitudes and the Presidential Vote," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

that the voters in their district decided how to cast their ballots not by blind party voting, but according to the issues of the election and the man who was seeking the office. They tend more than the losers to congratulate the electorate for deciding on the "right" bases because, after all, the electorate made the right choice. Relative to the winners, on the other hand, the unsuccessful candidates blame the electorate for their loss by emphasizing the importance of the party label, and by downgrading the importance of issues and the candidates. They deprecate the electorate's decision because, after all, it was not the wise decision.

The same conclusion emerges from the respondents' ranking of the three factors. Each respondent was asked to rank party label, issues of the election, and personal characteristics of the candidates in order of importance in determining the ways voters cast their ballots. Table 3 shows how many winners and losers ranked each of the three factors as first in importance and how many ranked each of them as least important. Again, winners tend to place great emphasis on their own personal characteristics as determinants of voters' decisions and to assign party label a relatively low place. By comparison, losers tend to upgrade party label and downgrade the personal characteristics of the candidates. While both groups tend to place little emphasis on issues, the winners tend more than the losers to congratulate the electorate for "voting for the man," while the losers tend more than the winners to blame the electorate for "blindly voting for party labels."

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF WINNERS AND LOSERS ON THE RANK WHICH THEY ASSIGN TO PARTY LABEL, ISSUES AND CANDIDATES' CHARACTERISTICS[a]

Variable	Most Important		Least Important	
	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
Party Label	21%	59%	47%	17%
Election Issues	17	7	50	55
Characteristics of the Candidates	62	35	3	28
	100%	101%[b]	100%	100%
N	29	29	30	29

[a] The response card outlined in the footnote to Table 2 was again used. The question: "If you were to rank the three factors, which would you say is most important in determining the choice voters will make? Which is second?"

[b] Rounding error.

A breakdown of the successful candidates indicates that the congratulation effect shown in the figures on the importance of party and issues in Table 2 and the "least important" ranking in Table 3 is actually due to the beliefs of the marginal winners, those who won by under 55 per cent of the two-party vote. While "safe" winners tend to stress the importance of party label and downgrade the importance of issues in approximately the same proportions as both marginal and decisive losers, two-thirds of the marginal winners think that issues are all or very important and that party label ranks last in importance, while 80 per cent of them rate party label as of some, little, or no importance. But regardless of the decisiveness of the win or loss, both types of winners still tend to rate the personal characteristics of the candidates as more important than losers do (Table 2), and also tend to rank personal characteristics of the candidates as the most important of the three variables while losers rank party label as the most important (Table 3). These differences between marginal and decisive winners are especially accentuated in the case of successful candidates for the state legislature.

It seems evident that marginal winners in some instances are making judgments not about the motivations of voters in general, but rather about the sorts of variables which are thought to influence votes at the margin where they are of crucial importance. Because their districts tend to be evenly balanced between the parties, issues are thought to be of great importance and party identification of less importance because it has less effect on "swing" votes in the middle. The safe winners, on the other hand, probably because their districts obviously favor one party or the other, emphasize the importance of party label.

Respondents were also asked how interested in their campaigns and how informed about the issues of the election they thought voters were. The results of the comparisons between successful and unsuccessful candidates[9] appear in Table 4. The cross-tabulation on information is clearly another case of the congratulation-rationalization effect. Losers are inclined very strongly to believe that voters are not informed about the issues of the election, while winners tend to believe that voters are much better informed. A full quarter of the winners even think that voters are very well informed about the issues, most of these being safe winners. Differences between successful and unsuccessful candidates are especially pronounced at the state-wide and federal levels, as opposed to the state legislative level.

---

[9] The decisiveness of the win or loss has no substantial impact on these results, except where noted.

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF WINNERS' AND LOSERS' BELIEFS ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH VOTERS ARE POLITICALLY INTERESTED AND INFORMED[a]

Degree	Interested		Informed	
	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
Very	32%	43%	26%	3%
Some	42	20	42	27
Not	26	37	32	70
	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	31	30	31	30

[a] The question: "Generally speaking, would you say that voters in your district are interested in your campaign, or not?" If the respondent said they were interested, "Would you say they're *very* interested?" About information: "Do you think that voters in your district are informed about the way the candidates stand on the issues of the election, or not?" If informed, "Are they *very* well informed?"

The picture in the case of voters' interest in the campaign is less clear. Winners tend to believe that voters are somewhat interested in their campaigns and losers tend to believe that voters are either not interested or very interested. Most of those losers who believe that voters are very interested in their campaigns have never held any public elective office. This finding may be due to the tendency on the part of some inexperienced unsuccessful candidates particularly for the state legislature to believe that they did accomplish at least one thing: they got people interested, and at least feel the satisfaction of having aroused the electorate.

It is interesting to observe the congratulation-rationalization effect *within* the same politicians as well as between winners and losers, making the effect intra-individual as well as inter-individual. Respondents were asked to summarize the major factors which led to their wins and defeats over the years. As Table 5 shows, respondents attributed their wins to factors under their own control: their hard work, personal service to constituents, matters of campaign strategy, building a reputation, and publicizing themselves and becoming known thereby. Respondents attributed their losses, on the other hand, to factors beyond their control: the party makeup of the district, the familiar name or other unbeatable characteristics of their opponent, national and state trends, lack of money, or other uncontrollable circumstances. It was a comparatively rare respondent who would attribute his wins to his good political name, for instance, or to the predominance of his party in his district, and respondents rarely attributed their defeats to their laziness, their failure to service constituents, their mistakes in campaign strategy, and the like.

TABLE 5. RESPONDENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT THE MAJOR FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR WINS AND DEFEATS[a]

Factors	Wins	Defeats
Factors beyond R's control	25%	91%
Factors within R's control	75	9
	100%	100%
N	40[b]	44[b]

[a] The question: "Could you summarize the major factors that have contributed to your wins and defeats over the years?"

[b] The total number is lower than the sample size of 62 because many respondents either had never won or had never lost.

It is possible that the type of office sought by the candidate might be relevant—that those who ran for the state legislature might have different beliefs about voters from those who ran for state-wide or federal offices. Respondents were therefore divided into two groups: those who had run for the state legislature and those who had run for higher-level offices, including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Governor, and the other state-wide elective offices.

Type of office sought has no substantial effect on the basic congratulation-rationalization effect reported above. Winners differ from losers in the manner described at both the higher level and the state legislative level. But when the winners at the higher level are compared to the winners at the state legislative level and the losers at the two levels are also compared, some differences between the two levels emerge. In general, party label is believed to be more important and issues less important at the state legislative level than at the higher level.[10] Winners at the higher level also believe that voters are more politically interested and informed than do winners at the legislative level.[11] But the congratulation-rationalization effect is still noticeable at both levels.

---

[10] The proportion of state legislative winners saying that party label is all or very important is 56%; the same proportion of higher-level winners is 31%. The proportions of winners saying that issues are all or very important are: legislative—33%; higher level—50%.

EXPLANATIONS

The research reported here has discovered that winning and losing candidates have divergent beliefs about the behavior of voters, the winners believing that voters are more informed, more issue- and candidate-oriented and less party-oriented than the losers do. In some cases, these differences between winners and losers are especially pronounced in competitive districts.

The findings have been explained in terms of a "congratulation-rationalization effect." To state this explanation more fully here, I have maintained that winners develop complimentary beliefs about voters and losers develop rationalizations for their losses simply by virtue of the outcome of the election. Winners, the argument runs, believe the voters did a good job of choosing. Voters in their view are well informed about politics and vote according to the issues and the candidates, rather than blindly following their party affiliation. Losers, on the other hand, rationalize their defeat by saying that voters are ill-informed and vote according to party label rather than the issues or the men who are running for office. Both winners and losers, in other words, rearrange their cognitions about voters to take account of the outcome of the election, winners congratulating the voters and losers rationalizing their defeat. This might be expected to occur to some extent even before election day, since some candidates probably anticipate the outcome. This congratulation-rationalization effect can be conceived as a mechanism for reducing the cognitive dissonance between beliefs about voters and election outcome.[12]

Alternative explanations for the findings are available. The belief that voters are interested in and informed about politics and vote on the basis of the issues of the election, for example, is probably a socially acceptable belief in the American culture. Incumbent office-holders, therefore, may feel somewhat obliged to hold the "correct" beliefs, while the losers, because they may not confront the prospect of facing the voters in subsequent elections, may not feel similarly bound. This explanation does not simply dismiss the findings as the incumbents' conscious distortions of their beliefs for the benefit of the interviewer. This sort of conscious deception seems unlikely, since the respondents were assured of their anonymity and the questions were not particularly sensitive. This alternative explanation instead maintains that unsuccessful candidates have in a sense been rejected by their society, and therefore no longer feel obliged to give the socially acceptable response.

Another alternative may be labelled the "incumbency" explanation. Incumbent office-holders, after all, live in a highly politicized world. They regularly deal with those who are highly involved in at least some aspects of government, they may think of themselves as the center of attention to an extent, and they simply extend these experiences with elite citizens to the voters at large. Because everyone with whom they come into contact is involved in the affairs of government, in other words, they may come to assume that this is also the natural state of affairs with voters.

Another possible result of incumbency might be a tendency to concentrate on determinants of voting behavior which can be manipulated by the politician. Marginal winners in this study may have rated the dynamic variables of issue and candidate as particularly important not because they believe these factors influence voters more than party identification does, but because issues and condidates change from election to election and hence are capable of being manipulated by the politician more than are stable party loyalties. In their districts, furthermore, because party loyalties tend to balance one another, marginal winners may believe that party is "not important" in the sense that it cannot account for shifts from election to election, which are of vital interest to them. So another explanation for some of the findings may be that these marginal winners, far from being "unrealistic" in some absolute sense, instead choose the "reality" which is most relevant to their election and re-election. Marginal losers, on the other hand, now freed from such a concern and perhaps personally threatened by the possibility that they lost because their issue positions or personal characteristics were unacceptable to the majority of the electorate, rationalize their defeat by concentrating on party label. There may be more rationalization than congratulation.

---

[11] Of the state legislative winners, 13% say that voters are very interested in their campaigns, while 50% of the higher-level winners say so. The proportion of state legislative winners saying that voters are very well informed is 13%; of higher-level winners, 38%.

[12] For the general theory upon which this statement is based, see Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957).

In sum, there are alternative explanations for the findings, and this study cannot adequately determine which of these explanations or combinations of explanations accounts for the results. Whatever the explanation, however, the crucial question of the political consequences of these findings still remains. The next section considers some of these consequences.

IMPLICATIONS

Politicians' theories of voting behavior investigated here have political implications on which we may speculate in the hope that they will be tested in future research. This final section states some hypotheses which, while not established here, may be of interest to political scientists and suggest some of the agenda for future investigation.

Election success. One explanation for some election outcomes, set forth at the beginning of this paper, is that the winning candidate based his campaign on a more accurate perception of voting behavior than the loser did. This proposition cannot be adequately tested in this paper, since pre-election interviews, which were not taken in this research, would be necessary.

Considering only the post-election interview data presented here, it would be difficult to maintain that winners have more accurate beliefs about voting behavior than losers do, once election day is past. Survey research studies of voting behavior have discovered, generally speaking, that a rather small proportion of the electorate is highly interested in and informed about politics, even in Presidential elections.[13] This minimal voter awareness and involvement seems doubly true of Congressional elections, where the voters' images of the candidates and their knowledge of the election issues are considerably weaker.[14] Both Presidential and Congressional compaigns are probably more salient than contests for the state legislature.[15] Against this backdrop of evidence about the actual degree of voter interest and information, it seems clear that at least after the election, successful candidates tend to overestimate the degree to which voters are interested in politics, informed about governmental matters, and conscious of election issues.

The relative perceived importance of party, issues, and candidates is more difficult to consider. In this case, it appears that winners and losers are both selecting a version of "reality" which is consonant with their post-election situation. Winners tend to emphasize the dynamic, manipulable variables which affect votes at the margin, while losers tend to emphasize party label. Both of these responses could conceivably be considered "realistic," depending on the frame of reference evoked by the analyst. Especially in view of the data on the respondents' beliefs about the degree of political interest and information in the electorate, however, it would still be difficult to maintain that after the election, the winners have *more* accurate beliefs about voters than the losers do.

The pre-election beliefs of these respondents are probably considerably different from the post-election beliefs which are reported in this paper. One might perhaps expect that the potential winners' and losers' beliefs about voters would be similar, with the congratulation and especially the rationalization occurring after election day. Or one might expect that the potential winners would have a higher estimate of voter political involvement than the potential losers because both are anticipating the outcome to some extent, even though the differences between them would be greater after election day. The hypothesis of greater perceptual accuracy on the part of the winners, however, would require that the pre-election potential winners would have a lower estimate of voter interest, information, and issue and candidate awareness than candidates who subsequently become losers. There seems to be little reason to expect such a pre-election configuration, precisely the reverse of the post-election case. So while the data presented here are not measurements of the candidates' pre-election beliefs, they nevertheless suggest that it is difficult to account for election success in terms of the winning candidate's more accurate perception of voting behavior.

This does not imply that successful candidates conduct less effective campaigns than unsuccessful candidates do, that winners succeed in spite of their campaigns rather than because of them. Such a conclusion would assume that campaigns are oriented toward voters, an assumption which may not hold in fact. It could be, indeed, that political campaigning is carried on according to considerations relatively far removed from voters: the requirements of the media, the timing of the campaign, the actions of one's opponent, the demands of non-mass, elite elements such as party activists, campaign contributors, and interest group leaders, and like considerations.

---

[13] Campbell, *et. al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*

[14] Miller and Stokes, *op. cit.*

[15] See Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 29.

A successful candidate may base his campaign largely on such non-voter variables and still conduct a campaign which is effective in winning votes. We might speculate, however, that whatever campaign strategies may account for election success, these strategies do not appear to be based on beliefs about voters which correspond to the conclusions about voter awareness and involvement drawn from survey research studies of voting behavior.

State-National Differences. We have discovered that candidates for the state legislature tend to believe that voters are less interested in their races, less informed about the issues, and more party-oriented than the candidates for state-wide offices or the U.S. Congress do. This felt isolation from voters on the part of state legislative candidates may have several important political consequences. First, if state legislators believe that voters in their districts are highly party-oriented, this may influence the high degree of party cohesion found in many state legislatures.[16] Election success in such cases might be thought to be a function of standing with the party, but U.S. Congressmen might not feel similarly bound by their party.

It has also been maintained that interest group activity on the state level is quite different from that on the national level. Several of Milbrath's respondents, for example, think that lobbying is "cleaner" in Washington than in their state capitols.[17] Perhaps one restraint on interest group activity is voter involvement in politics as perceived by legislators. According to Huitt, for example, one of Senator Proxmire's beliefs about politics is that a "strong hold on the electorate, which can control him only in the most general sense, enables him to resist any group (including his staunch supporters) which might seek to exercise specific influence."[18] This paper has presented data suggesting a difference between state legislators and U.S. Congressmen in the degree to which they think that voters are involved in their campaigns, and this difference might be part of an explanation for the differences in interest group activity.

It appears, then, that politicians' theories of voting behavior may be related to the whole style of politics found in different political systems. More research is needed which systematically compares similar phenomena at state and national levels, so these remarks must be considered highly tentative.

Communications. Let us return to the broad problem of communication between representative and constituents with which this paper began. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter state that even in the case of relations with his constituents, who have the powerful sanction of re-election at their disposal, "the congressman is quite free," within the limits of "what is morally or sociologically conceivable."[19] The research reported here, including the data in footnote 3 above, suggests that the representative's freedom may vary according to his theory of voting behavior, that the representative who believes that voters pay attention to election issues probably is less free of his constituents than one who does not.

To elaborate a bit, the rearrangement of a politician's cognitions by virtue of the fact that he has won an election may have important implications for his behavior while in office. The incumbent is more likely than if he lost to believe that voters are watching him, that they are better informed, and that they make their choices according to his own characteristics and even according to the issues of the election. Because of these results of electoral victory, the incumbent may be easier to influence than if there were no congratulation-rationalization effect. He might pay greater attention to his constituency than otherwise, because he believes that his constituents are paying greater attention to him than he might think if he had lost.

Constituency influence on an officer-holder need not depend on the reception of direct cues from the district. The politician acts not only according to the cues such as mail which reach him directly from his constituents, but also according to his conception of their reaction to various alternatives he might choose. This notion that incumbents anticipate the reactions of people who are important to them, particularly the electorate in the case of elective officials, is common to a number of writers in political science, and has been set forth by Friedrich as the "rule of anticipated reactions."[20] The congratulation-rationalization effect described in this study probably heightens the importance of these anticipated reactions. By virtue of his electoral victory, an office-holder and especially a marginal winner believes that the eyes of the public are on him, that voters cast their ballots according to his actions and characteristics, and that they are comparatively well informed about the issues of an election. If the incumbent thinks the electorate is watching him, whether they are or not in fact, he will attempt to anticipate their reactions to his decisions. The congratulation-rationalization effect, in short, may increase the influence which a constituency has on an office-holder.

---

[16] Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[17] Lester W. Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), pp. 301–304.

[18] Ralph K. Huitt, "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," this REVIEW, 55 (1961), p. 568.

[19] Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 423.

[20] Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), p. 49. Other writers have also used essentially the same concept. These include V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1961) p. 263, "latency of public opinion"; David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 34, "potential groups"; and Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 132.

SOME COMMENTS ON RUSSETT'S "DISCOVERING VOTING GROUPS IN THE UNITED NATIONS"

JOHN E. MUELLER
University of Rochester

Factor analysis, a statistical technique of growing popularity in political science, has recently found application in the June, 1966 issue of this REVIEW in an attempt to identify U.N. voting blocs. The hand is that of Professor Bruce M. Russett, the author of a number of outstanding contributions toward the systematic and quantitative study of international relations. The following paragraphs are designed to be cautionary in nature, not destructive, and endeavor to suggest: 1) that factor analysis has questionable value as a tool for the study of complex phenomena; 2) that even if acceptable as a tool, it has peculiar faults when applied to U.N. bloc voting; and 3) that even if acceptable as a tool for the study of bloc voting in the U.N., an application somewhat different from the one chosen by Professor Russett might have been more profitable. In the process it will be argued that the procedures of the sort profferred by Professor Arend Lijphart for determining U.N. voting blocs are preferable.[1]

1. If appealing in its seeming promise to make order of disorder and sense of nonsense, factor analysis proves to be exasperating in practice. For while it is true, that, as Professor Russett has noted elsewhere, "the method is completely *objective*"[2] in the sense that the decision as to which variables are to "load" on which factors is made entirely by the impartial machinery, the criteria which the machinery applies in arriving at this decision are manipulated by the operator—and depending on these criteria, the outcome can vary widely. Thus factor analysis can generate not one, but a number—in fact an infinite number—of solutions to the same problem. In choosing among these solutions the one most likely to represent truth (if that is what one is interested in), the analyst is commonly urged to select the solution which makes the most "sense"—in other words to embrace the objective solution which is most subjectively appealing. Therefore, one can get out of factor analysis almost whatever one wants to get. For example, in an argument a few years ago over such central psychological concerns as agreement response set, anal expression, social desirability, and (of course) the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, two teams of psychologists factor analyzed the same sort of data, selected different solutions, and came to precisely opposite conclusions.[3]

Claims that factor analysis is an "economical" procedure (e.g., Russett, p. 328) therefore should best be cautiously weighed. For the process of sorting through several exasperatingly different factor matrices is a tedious and frustrating process and at the same time one which is likely to be less conclusive than a form of cluster analysis of the sort Lijphart advocates.

Of course it is possible to assign a single set of criteria, based on grounds of mathematical and statistical elegance and parsimony, and to seize upon the first factor solution that pops out of the machinery as the most likely approximation to truth. This ploy, widely adopted by political scientists including, apparently, Professor Russett, has the advantage of reducing the paper work. The profound arbitrariness of this approach however must be duly appreciated.

The problems of interpreting the factor solution even after one has been decided upon have often been noted. Professor Russett for example brings forth a U.N. voting alignment dubbed "Brazzaville Africans" in which Haiti and Bolivia are important members and Israel is a fellow traveler. In another equally valid factor solution these nations might well appear allied with an entirely different group of associates and contribute therefore to a strikingly different interpretation of the data.

Faced with dilemmas of this sort Lijphart's approach, which keeps the investigator much closer to the data, seems far less elusive and far more interpretable: one is confronted simply by a set of descriptive statistics giving the degree of cohesiveness of a series of inductively-located voting blocs.

Professor Russett's claim then that factor analysis is a technique which is "given to a means of presentation which is readily *inter-*

---

[1] "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 902–917.

[2] *Trends in World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 68. Emphasis in the original.

[3] Arthur Couch and Kenneth Keniston, "Agreeing Response Set and Social Desirability," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 62 (1961), pp. 175–179; and Allen L. Edwards and Jerald N. Walker, "Social Desirability and Agreement Response Set," *ibid.*, 62 (1961), pp. 180–183.

pretable" and which "reliably *identifies all the groupings*" (p. 328) is surely overly sanguine.

2. If one shrugs aside these objections on the grounds perhaps that the gain in mathematical elegance is worth the cost in decisiveness of result (after all, no method is completely free from arbitrariness), there are still certain special problems which attend the application of factor analysis to bloc voting patterns in the United Nations.

First, because the voting choices of two nations correlate reasonably well with a particular factor, it does not follow that the voting preferences of the two countries correlate well *with each other*. In fact the correlation between two voting units which have loadings of .50 on a single factor could be anywhere between 0.00 and +1.00. Professor Russett finds that Madagascar, Togo, and Liberia all load .62 on the "Brazzaville African" factor. Using some data that is at hand I find that at the same session, on plenary session votes at least (Professor Russett also includes committee votes in his analysis), Madagascar correlates .84 with Liberia but only .35 with Togo. Or, to order the problem in reverse, I find that Algeria and Burundi correlate .85 on plenary votes—they vote in complete agreement 90 per cent of the time; yet Algeria is disclosed to be an enthusiastic member of the "Afro-Asian" bloc while Burundi is not. Since the definition of a voting bloc insists that all members of the group agree with all other members at a specifically designated level, factor analysis would appear to be faulty as a selection device.

To sort out those pairs within a factor "bloc" which correlate well with each other from those which do not, the analyst must deal with the mammoth correlation matrix, something factor analysis was specifically adopted to avoid—but which Lijphart's method embraces from the beginning.

A second special problem in applying factor analysis to U.N. voting arises from the use of the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient as a measure of agreement. Because abstention is a meaningful voting option in the United Nations (unlike the U.S. Congress), the voting relationship between each pair of states can be represented in a 3×3 table of the sort exemplified in Tables 1–3. Lijphart's proposed index of agreement (IA) is based on the idea that any entries on the principal diagonal of the table represent cases of agreement between the states—they agree either in affirming the resolution, in opposing it, or in adopting a middle position by abstaining. Entries in the upper right and lower left cells are treated as instances of utter disagreement—in each case one state favors while the other opposes. (Entries in the four non-diagonal cells are regarded as cases of half-agreement.)

TABLE 1

		State A		
		Yes	Abst	No
State B	Yes	10		
	Abst		80	
	No			10

r = 1.00

IA = 100%

TABLE 2

		State A		
		Yes	Abst	No
State B	Yes			10
	Abst		80	
	No	10		

r = −1.00

IA = 80%

TABLE 3

		State A		
		Yes	Abst	No
State B	Yes	5		5
	Abst		80	
	No	5		5

r = 0.00

IA = 90%

However, the Pearson coefficient when applied to the Tables does *not* treat the middle cell in a consistent manner. To make the point with a somewhat extreme example, consider Tables 1, 2, and 3. In each case 80 per cent of the time the states agree to cast joint abstentions. Nevertheless, depending on the distributions of the remaining twenty votes, the value for the Pearson r varies wildly: the entries in the middle cell are treated in Table 1 as cases of utter agreement, in Table 2 as cases of utter disagreement, and in Table 3 as cases neither of agreement nor of disagreement. At the same time Lijphart's index remains relatively unperturbed.

To be sure all summary measures will at times distort and muddle information. One might question whether the Lijphart index is justified in treating entries in the middle cell as instances of as strong agreement as those in the two corner cells of the principal diagonal. But the flaws of the Pearson coefficient in application to the 3×3 table seem far greater.

3. One of the numerous mysterious decisions one must muddle through in applying factor analysis (assuming one is not dissuaded by the arguments above from using it at all), is whether to demand that the final factors be correlated or uncorrelated with one another, that is, whether to demand an oblique or an orthogonal solution. When in doubt it is probably safest to do both, although of course this leads to yet more factor matrices to ponder over and choose among.

Professor Russett has apparently chosen to ask for and adhere to a single orthogonal solution. There are good reasons to believe that this is not a wise choice. While in some applications of factor analysis it may be argued from the nature of things that factor solutions only make sense if the factors are uncorrelated, in the analysis of voting blocs such reasoning seems distinctly invalid. In searching for blocs, the analyst expects to be able to pick out a number of clusters of like-minded voters and he expects each cluster to possess a certain unity and meaning, but he does *not* demand that each bloc be utterly unrelated to all of the others. Indeed most analyses of U.N. voting find hierarchies of blocs, some quite closely linked to each other, some only remotely associated. Indications that this is the case can be seen in Professor Russett's data. He finds that there are a number of states, mostly Latin American, which load on his first factor above the level arbitrarily chosen to be significant, .50, while at the same time they load rather well on the second factor. From this it is argued that these states have "similar voting patterns" and comprise a "separate group" distinct from those states which only load on either factor one or factor two. But the arguments of the previous section are especially relevant here, for while these states do seem to be distinctive in that they load (at relatively low levels) on two factors, it cannot be argued from the data presented that they have high correlations among themselves and thus are a separate group. What the data *do* suggest is that some (or perhaps all) of these nations will line up rather neatly on a factor which is somewhere in between the first two factors determined by the orthogonal solution. Thus, if one wishes to use factor analysis to ferret out blocs in United Nations voting, it would seem on both intuitive and empirical grounds that an oblique solution is more likely than an orthogonal one to prove satisfying.

Other problems arise from the use of the Pearson r and its well-known tendency to do peculiar things when the marginals are extreme. In many sessions of the U.N. it is simply the case that the vast majority of votes taken are strongly affirmative and thus there are a fair number of states which have extremely affirmative voting patterns—of the African states in 1963, for example, ten did not vote negatively on a single measure in plenary session. It would seem wise to eliminate such cases from consideration or at least to watch carefully over them (or else adopt another method for roll call analysis). Professor Russett does eliminate all unanimous or near-unanimous *votes* from consideration, but in a bloc analysis the important distorting component will be "unanimous" or near-"unanimous" *voters*.

It is doubtful that the actual impact of these comments, even if the whole array were applied in series, would radically alter some of the bloc patterns uncovered by Professor Russett: Poland and Czechoslovakia for example will doubtless always emerge in the same bloc. On some of the more subtle levels of investigation however, where the most interesting and non-obvious distinctions lie, the application of factor analytic procedures does appear to have caused distortions which might well alter the interpretation of bloc voting in the United Nations significantly.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For Professor Russett's comments on Professor Mueller's criticisms, see *Communications to the Editor*, pp. 149–150.)

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

Recent letters of protest against articles in the Review move me to come to the defense of the Editor, albeit on grounds which have not occurred to the critics—C. W. Harrington, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and others.

The complaints have to do with computers, with the irrelevance of evidence to conclusions, and with failure to communicate. They are echoed in Barbara Tuchman's plea (NYT, January 1, 1967) to the American Historical Association: "Let us beware of the plight of our colleagues, the behavioral scientists, who by the use of a proliferating jargon have painted themselves into a corner—or isolation ward—of unintelligibility. They know what they mean but no one else does. Psychologists and sociologists are the farthest gone in the disease and probably incurable." Mrs. Tuchman should read the APSR.

Quite so. The articles in question are meaningless, even to mathematicians. Among so many candidates for honors in the September and December issues, distinctions are invidious. But typical is "Transaction Flows in the International System." Here, after 18 pages of neologisms, nonsense terms (e.g., "decomposition of coincidentally salient linkages"), and impressive equations, graphs, and charts, a *startling conclusion* is reached. *In* English translation: States have closer relations with some States than with other States. Q.E.D.

Criticism of the Editor misses the point which, to coin a phrase, came to me as a blinding flash of the obvious. Let the Editor not deny the point, lest we be faced with another "credibility gap." His purpose, unacknowledged but honorable and necessary, is to present a *reductio ad absurdem* of the new faddists of "behavioralism" and "empiricism." When the medium is the message, there is no message. Congratulations are in order. May the task so well begun continue until the absurdity is complete. It may then again become possible to resume research and writing in Political Science.

Frederick L. Schuman

Williams College

(Editor's note: My horror of opening another "credibility gap" is exceeded only by my obligation to disclaim the editorial subtlety Professor Schuman so generously imputes. It must be confessed that we publish what we publish because my referees and I think the articles make significant contributions—even if couched in language unfamiliar to some. As for the latter:

Men ever had, and ever will have, leave
To coin new words well suited to the
age.
Words are like leaves, some wither ev'ry
year
And ev'ry year a younger race succeeds.
Horace, *Ars Poetica*)

To the Editor:

It is useful to be reminded of the limitations of factor analysis and that one must never mechanically report computer output as an immutable substantive finding. But in this instance the conclusion is derived not from a rigorous evaluation, but merely from numerical examples that are inappropriate and often purely hypothetical.

Certainly one should not conclude that because two variables have the same loading on *one* factor they are very highly correlated with each other. That is why I reproduced the entire factor matrix for all *six* major factors. While Madagascar and Togo indeed both load .62 on Factor 2, they load .39 and .09 respectively on Factor 1, and .05 and .49 respectively on Factor 3. Thus by looking at factors other than the one with the highest loading, it is possible to discriminate differing variables *without* having to go back to the mammoth correlation matrix.

When making a methodological comparison of two indices it is necessary to examine the same data in each case. Professor Mueller cites only plenary votes, whereas my analysis employed both plenary and committee roll-calls. Although Algeria and Burundi do vote in complete agreement on about 90 per cent of the 24 *plenary* roll calls, they differ on fully one-third of the 42 *committee* ballots. Hence it is not surprising that in the factor analysis their loadings differ.

His rejection of the product-moment correlation coefficient (r) depends upon an essentially irrelevant numerical example. The dramatic differences between the Pearson r and the Lijphart index of agreement in Tables 1–3 rely on what he himself calls an extreme case; namely on having the great bulk (*80 per cent* in the example) of the votes concentrated in the *middle*, or abstain, category. In real UN voting data the distortion is very much less; absences and abstentions together were well *under 30 per cent* of my total. Later he talks about the distortion caused by countries which nearly always cast *affirmative* votes. Even this would be much less damaging than the kind of thing in his numerical example, and in fact there are in the data of my article *no* countries which vote affirmatively as much as 85 per cent of the time—absences and abstentions are more common in committee than in plenary session, as are initiatives which fail of majority support. Finally, there is some literature on the essential toughness and resistance of factor analytic procedures to whatever distortion in the *correlation matrix* is produced by the Pearson r. Mueller's point, however, is technically correct and warns us all that it is essential to know what one's data look like before deciding what statistical manipulations will or will not be tolerable. One should be especially careful with a collection composed exclusively of plenary roll-calls.

The caution against accepting any one analytic solution as completely satisfactory before seeing others, including various oblique rotations, is perhaps the best-grounded. To discuss the matter experientially rather than hypothetically, I did also perform some oblique rotations, but they did not change the basic pattern nor affect the grouping decisions in more than a half dozen of the most marginal countries, and were not reported in the article. This has usually been my experience, yet I agree that before staking too much on the conclusions it is still wise to try not just oblique rotations, but actually quite different grouping or clustering techniques. The longer study from which the article was drawn, my *International Regions and the International System* (in press) considers this problem at some length.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT
Yale University

TO THE EDITOR:

The rigor and seeming logic of the theory of the budgetary process presented by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (this REVIEW, September, 1966) will likely attract widespread attention. At first glance the theory appears to provide a clear conceptual notion of the budgetary process and to lay the basis for cumulative knowledge. Carefully judged against the criteria for a successful scientific theory, however, the theory of the budgetary process is a failure.

Three sets of criteria are normally satisfied by a "good" theory: (1) *internal criteria* (is the theory internally consistent? somewhat plausible on its face? interesting? etc.); (2) *external criteria* (does the theory in some sense "fit" reality?); and (3) *promise* (does the theory open up interesting new research possibilities?). I take it as self-evident, in this period of paradigm confusion in the social sciences, that proposed conceptual innovations have to be taken seriously and assessed seriously, and I therefore shall examine the proposed budgetary theory in terms of these criteria.

1. The theory fails to survive even the initial requirements of theoretical promise. Its dynamics are sadly deficient. There are only "outputs" with no adequate explanation of how the outputs are produced. The dynamics of the theory rest exclusively, following Lindblom's incrementalism, on the factor of the human being's limited cognitive capacities. The theory posits that decision-makers will move in a gradual step-by-step process away from a specific problem rather than trying to "solve" the problem in its complex totality. Now it may be conceded that rules-of-thumb or decision rules are inevitable when decision-makers face a complex problem. But it does not follow from this that the rules-of-thumb will necessarily be of an incremental nature. That assumption follows only if one considers the factor of limited cognitive capacities in a vacuum. If the process is placed in a relevant political context, it becomes apparent that the decision-makers may adopt a decision rule which embraces the possibility of distinctly non-incremental activity (e.g., satisfy the intense grievances of a vocal group whatever the cost in short-run policy consistency). Incrementalism should be expected as the norm only in the society free from conflict—in short, in a society which has no politics.

The theory, moreover, aims at a range of behavior which is essentially static. The "base" points from which incrementalism proceeds are not accounted for in the theory: they are somehow supplied by exogenous forces, rather as an irritating distraction, so that the authors can get down to the business at hand of modeling the incremental process. What results, then, are separate slices of static reality unconnected by any explanatory scheme for showing how we get from one stage to the other. In fact, the type of behavior which *is* explained approaches triviality, and the type of behavior not considered within the framework of the model is mainly what the student of politics wants to know. It is surprising that, at a time when other social science disciplines have shed a static functionalism and when questions of political development have attracted increasing interest within political science, so static a theory should be trumpeted as an important conceptual innovation.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the theory amounts to little more than an elaborate tautology. The authors' summary of the advantages of the theory (p. 545) makes it clear that there are no advantages aside from accepting the definitional framework of the theory and being able to talk in those terms. One only knows where he is "within this larger scheme" if he accepts the scheme. One only knows what is a "normal" or "deviant" case if he accepts the theory as the only legitimate way to look at the data. The applicability, fruitfulness, and relevance of the theory are precisely the points at issue. It is inadmissible to accept the theory on a priori grounds, and then to go on to argue that the theory is sound because, among other things, it enables one to distinguish "normal" from "deviant" cases—these concepts are built into the definition of the theory. Indeed, the theory is structured so as not to allow for disconfirming results.

2. The "test" of the theory is basically misconceived for the reason just mentioned. A built-in perceptual bias, resulting from the way the theory has jumbled around the political universe to exclude the interesting phenomena and to define as "data" only uninteresting phenomena, has led the authors to favor bureaus or subagencies with relatively low-intensity involvement in the political process. One does not know for sure until more complete data are published, but a logical guess is that the data come disproportionately from bureaus like the Battle Monuments Commission or Bureau of Indian Affairs. Even if one sets aside this basic objection, numerous difficulties still exist with the empirical test. The authors exclude the defense agencies. Why? Since defense expenditures constitute the biggest part of the budget, it seems at least odd that no effort was made to gather such data. The main reason why the authors skirted the defense area so completely probably stems from the fact that this is a realm of experience totally unfathomable within the theoretical blinders of incrementalism. In defense, under the impact of an accelerating technology, programs evolve, dissolve, and change direction with bewildering rapidity. There are few stable base points to provide a convenient frame of reference for the theory. One can sympathize with the desire to avoid a domain that is so refractory to simple modeling, but the impact of science and technology cannot really be ignored. (This is perhaps why they have also excluded NASA—another non-incremental program—from the data.) Excluding defense, moreover, means that the whole subject of rational management aids (program budgeting, cost effectiveness, systems analysis) is avoided. The authors at least have to consider the possibility that new aids to calculation will give decision-makers greater ability to make comprehensive budget choices.

Furthermore, the authors are equivocal on the issue of how close the "fit" with the data must be in order to constitute support for or verification of the hypothesis. They use unsatisfactory phrases like the data support the hypothesis up to a random error of "reasonable" magnitude, or "little" of the variance is left statistically unexplained. The processes of deciding acceptable standards of verification have to be visible and precise. The authors, on occasion, are simply careless. It is observed, for example, that (p. 539) "the data are not deflated for changes in the price level during the early years." If one is not dealing in constant dollars, the results may show nothing but trends in prices. The authors do not elaborate, and it is unclear whether the data *were* deflated for price changes in later years (and only the early years ignored), or whether no effort at all was made to develop a measure of constant dollars.

Last, the whole idea of treating annual appropriations as independent events is suspect. Often appropriations in succeeding years merely implement the policy objectives of earlier, more fundamental decisions made at critical turning points. Thus abstracting each year's budget decisions from the larger program context and using them as "proof" of the number of instances which support the theory amounts to stacking the cards in their own favor. In the end, it is not even clear that the authors have found a good fit with their own data. The existence of fifty-five apparently disconfirming instances (p. 540) should be a very serious matter for anyone wishing to find "laws" of the budgetary process.

3. The theory's promise is dim because it points the way only toward an ever more baroque embellishment of an essentially trivial theme. It can only explain short-term policy outcomes of programs insulated from significant conflict, and further work can only lead to a more detailed burrowing into the minutiae of a scheme that is of little interest in the first place. In contrast, if the Davis-Dempster-Wildavsky theory becomes accepted as a paradigm to guide further research, certain other bodies of literature that are theoretically incompatible will have to be displaced. And while not much can be gained by acceptance of the theory, a great deal would inevitably be lost. The whole body of literature on Presidential leadership will be sacrificed, becoming of

merely antiquarian interest and giving way to a "dummy variable" term allowing for different degrees of intensity of Presidential interest in proposed appropriations. Interesting experiments in rational aids to management will be brushed aside as irrelevant to the policy outcomes of the budgetary process. Studies of the strategies employed by agencies to build public support, to form stable coalitions with congressional allies, or to aggrandize their influence within the executive branch will appear worth doing only insofar as they illustrate the detailed workings of incrementalism. There will be no way to tie the new research to the growing literature on political development or to build any bridges to the comparative government literature on highly-unstable, low-consensus political systems. Indeed, even within the framework of American politics, there would be no way to get a grip on any but the most uninteresting political phenomena.

I regretfully conclude that Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky have not presented an acceptable theory of the budgetary process. As it now stands, the theory is apolitical—a curious state of affairs for one of the co-authors who started out to analyze the "politics of the budgetary process."

BRUCE L. R. SMITH

Columbia University

TO THE EDITOR:

We sympathize with Bruce L. R. Smith's desire to save the profession from a theoretical disaster and we appreciate the extraordinary importance he ascribes to our work. But we think that his remarks are insufficiently critical. The usual task of criticism is to expose the major fallacies of the work under consideration. A logical error is discovered. Incorrect inferences from the data are revealed. The statistical methodology is demonstrated to be invalid. Basic assumptions are shown to be inappropriate. Smith's remarks bear on none of these matters.

Consider Smith's three criteria for a good theory. First, the *internal criteria,* or the logical consistency and plausibility of our theory, are not questioned. Second, the *external criteria,* or the "fits" between the theory and empirical data, are not seriously examined, since no contradicting empirical evidence is offered. Third, the *promise* of the theory is not a question that can be resolved by polemics, but must await the results of future research.

Smith says that "A Theory of the Budgetary Process" is apolitical. Our theory, however, does not lead away from the discovery of points of political change but toward them. We did not propose to end empirical work but to begin it. A hypothesis we tested was that organizational behavior in the federal budgetary process is essentially random. If this were true, it would be impossible to develop any theory; change could not be studied because it could not be distinguished from other phenomena. Instead, we demonstrated that the budgetary process follows certain probabilistic laws that stand up well against other hypotheses. Then, when behavior was observed to change, we were able to determine "shift points" as a focus for future research. One aspect of the fruitfulness of any theory is to be able to lead to such new questions. Far from being upset by knowledge of a small percentage of deviant cases, we looked upon this (in the context of a stochastic model) as an invaluable opportunity to search for variables to extend our theory. Since both deviant cases and shift points clustered around years of change in the Presidency and Congress, this strongly suggested the advisability of reformulating our equations to include a variable on party control of these institutions. In this way we expect to account better for known change. Our theory is not static but dynamic; it shows the budgetary process to be stable over periods of time but not for all time. Whether or not budgetary decisions (during the period studied) were incremental can only be established by empirical evidence and not by assumption. Our study explicitly demonstrates the dependence of current appropriations on past events, supports incrementalism for short-term description, but centers attention on the points of political change. The theory does not imply, therefore, that it is irrelevant whether agencies build public support or aggrandize their influence within the executive branch. Rather, it provides a framework within which these important strategic relationships may be studied.

What can be said about the buckshot commentary on our procedures? We had informed readers in the original article that the statistical methodology and the empirical results were reported in much greater detail in *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making.** Whether only agencies like the Battle Monument Commission were considered is evident for all to determine (especially a critic) in this paper. If we had known enough to choose 56 agencies that would fit our equations on an *a priori* basis, we would hardly have had to conduct any research. Appropriations are made in dollars, not in deflated dollars, so that dollars are appropriate units of analysis for behavioral models. We would have been happy to include NASA if we could conjure up a time series of moderate length for an agency that has been in existence for only a few years. In order to test our models on a new set of data, we are currently analyzing agencies in the remainder of the non-defense sector for which adequate time series are available. For reasons of cost and time and inability to ascertain precisely what is included in defense appropriations, we are not studying that sector. But we are certain other researchers will rise to the challenge.

---

* "On the Process of Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriation, Gordon Tullock (ed.), *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making* (Charlottesville, Va.: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia, 1966), pp. 63–132.

It is doubtful that our theory will (and it certainly should not) deter efforts to improve the economic rationality of the budgetary process. We are surely given too much credit (and other scholars too little) when Smith suggests that acceptance of our work might literally put an end to interesting theorizing in political science. Naturally, we do believe that our research will lead to better knowledge of budgeting as a political process. We plan to convince other scholars not by exhortation but by performance.

OTTO DAVIS
M. A. H. DEMPSTER
AARON WILDAVSKY

TO THE EDITOR:

I am a bit perturbed by John Porter East's comments (this REVIEW, December, 1966, pp. 1004–1005) on my review of his book because, although he notes accurately my many favorable remarks, he apparently fails to grasp some other points. East recognizes (p. 89) that Childs produced a "mechanistic model." Why then does he insist on infelicitously referring to a "machine model," since that phrase has a very distinct meaning to Childs and students of city politics?

An objective reader would find in my review not opposition to scientific comparison of theory and behavior but praise for Professor East's contribution in this regard. I said that Childs and his supporters (among whom East includes me without foundation) would not care, because their theory was intended to persuade people to adopt council-manager governments, not to explain how things work. Childs' success is part of the facts and my analysis of the distribution of his system was relevant.

In his letter, East appears the complete empiricist. In his book, the empiricism could have been expanded by inquiry into why some communities adopted Childs' form while others did not. Professor East is a more thorough behavioralist in his correspondence than in his research.

JAY S. GOODMAN

Wheaton College

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Editor's Announcement: Discontinuation of Bibliographies 155

Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Bertram M. Gross 156

Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Harry Eckstein 158

Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington. David Fellman 160

Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. James C. Davies 161

Brecht, Aus Naechster Naehe—Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927. Carl J. Friedrich 163

Young, The Washington Community 1800–1828. Nelson W. Polsby 164

Jacob and Vines, Politics in the American States, A Comparative Analysis. Duane Lockard 165

Fliess, Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity. Bruce M. Russett 166

Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China. John W. Lewis .. 167

BOOK NOTES

Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology 169

American Government and Politics 182

Comparative Government and Politics 194

International Politics, Law, and Organization 213

EDITOR'S ANNOUNCEMENT: DISCONTINUATION OF BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Beginning with this issue, the REVIEW will no longer publish the bibliographies of selected articles and documents formerly included in the Book Reviews and Notes section. The Managing Editor's Annual Report for 1965–66 mentioned this possibility, and the decision announced here has been made after consultation with both the Editorial Board and Executive Committee.

The principal reasons for discontinuing the bibliographies are as follows. In recent years the growth in the profession's numbers, range of interests, and research competence and support has greatly increased the pressures on the REVIEW's space, while rising printing costs have made it substantially more expensive to produce. Consequently, we have had to limit the number of articles published in each issue to keep within our budgetary limits. Yet we are now receiving about 50 percent more article manuscripts than two years ago; and even though less than one in five are accepted for publication, our space limitations have piled up a substantial and growing backlog: at the present writing all issues are filled through that of March, 1968, and I estimate that within eighteen months the article space will be claimed for two years ahead. Moreover, the number of books appropriate for review is increasing rapidly, and the Book Review Editor informs me that he too is accumulating a substantial and growing backlog.

Accordingly, we have decided to eliminate some service features so as to permit the publication of more articles, book reviews, and book notes per issue within our cost limits. We do so because we agree with the great majority of the respondents to our questionnaire of autumn, 1965, that articles and book reviews are professionally more significant and useful than the service departments, helpful though the latter have been.

We believe, moreover, that the technological revolution now taking place in cataloguing, indexing, and annotating offers high promise of more comprehensive and useful bibliographical services than we can now provide in the REVIEW. Following are brief descriptions of the principal services available now or in the near future.*

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE BIBLIOGRAPHIES

1. *International Bibliography of Political Science*, 1953– (Paris: UNESCO, 1954– ; issued annually). This classified bibliography lists books, pamphlets, and pertinent government documents as well as indexing over 1800 periodicals in most major languages. Between four and five thousand entries are included each year. There are both author and subject indexes. Comparable bibliographies are published by UNESCO for Economics, Historical Sciences, and Sociology, all containing a number of items of interest to political scientists.

2. *Public Affairs Information Service* (New York: Public Affairs Information Service 1915– ; issued weekly from September through July and fortnightly in August, cumulated annually). PAIS lists by subject books, pamphlets, and articles in over 1000 English language periodicals in the fields of sociology, economics, and political science.

3. *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, formerly the International Index (New York: Wilson, 1916– ; issued quarterly and cumulated periodically). Indexes select English language periodicals published in the United States and abroad. Most of the major American political and social science journals are indexed here but a few are covered only in the companion *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*.

COLLECTIONS OF ABSTRACTS

1. *International Political Science Abstracts* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951– ; issued quarterly). This abstracting review contains between 1400 and 1500 abstracts, each year taken from over a hundred periodicals published in all major countries and in most languages. Abstracts are arranged by author under broad subjects. Each issue contains a subject index and a list of the periodicals abstracted, and there is an annually cumulated subject index.

2. *The ABS Guide to Recent Publications in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Sage Publications, Inc., 1965– ; monthly and annual supplements). Lists abstracts of over 6500 books, government reports, pamphlets, and periodical articles, arranged alphabetically. It

---

* This list was prepared with the assistance of Professor Jack A. Clarke, Assistant Director of the University of Wisconsin Library School, to whom I wish to express my thanks.

is kept up to date by *New Studies*, published monthly from September through June under the direction of *The American Behavioral Scientist.*

3. *The Universal Reference System* (New York: Universal Reference System, P. O. Box 262, Cooper Station, New York, N. Y. 10003). A computerized documentation and information retrieval system designed by Professor Alfred de Grazia. It covers books, articles, and documents, annotated and indexed in depth (an average of 16 cross-references per document). Ten volumes will be cumulatively published on a two-year rotation cycle in these fields: International Affairs; Legislative Processes, Representation and Decision-making; Bibliography of Bibliographies in Political Science; Administrative Management: Public and Private Bureaucracy; Current Events and Problems of Modern Society; Public Opinion, Mass Behavior and Political Psychology; Law, Jurisprudence, and Judicial Process; Economic Regulation, Business, and Government; Public Policy and the Management of Science; and Comparative Government and Cultures. The first volume of 3040 documents was published in 1965, and an updated version with various format improvements will be published in May, 1967. The second volume will be published in June, 1967, and the remaining volumes by the end of this year. Semiannual supplements are planned for June and December, carrying document listings as late as a month before issue.

4. *The ACLS Constituent Society Journal Project.* The American Council of Learned Societies, in conjunction with New York University's Institute for Computer Research in the Humanities, is establishing a Bibliographical Data Processing Center. One of its first projects is to compile author-prepared abstracts from leading journals in the social sciences and humanities (including the *American Anthropologist, American Economic Review, American Historical Review,* AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, *American Sociological Review, Daedalus, Journal of Legal Education, Philosophical Review,* and *Speculum*). The data will be processed to produce both an annual index of constituent society journals and specialized indices for interdisciplinary concerns.

5. *Bulletin Analytique de Documentation Politique, Economique, et Social Contemporaine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946– ; issued bimonthly). Under the auspices of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, this is a classified index to cover 1300 French and foreign journals dealing with social and political questions. Contains descriptive annotations on articles treating political affairs.

* * *

These are the principal bibliographical aids presently available, and many, especially the collections of abstracts, provide more comprehensive and useful services than the REVIEW can with its selected bibliographies. Most bibliographers are convinced that the next decade will see major improvements in the coverage, utility, and lower costs of these services and the development of new ones. Insofar as the American Political Science Association can and should provide bibliographical and other services to its members, it should surely use the best technology it can; and the officers and National Office are presently exploring the question of what the Association might do to provide these services more efficiently and economically. It is my hope that the valuable contributions made in the past by the REVIEW's overworked and underpaid bibliographers will be matched and exceeded by services made possible by the new technology.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Systems Analysis of Political Life. BY DAVID EASTON. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1965. Pp. xvi, 507. $8.95.)

A major step in recent political theory was the publication in 1953 of David Easton's *The Political System.* Unquestionably the best political science work of the year (and, indeed, too original to qualify for formal awards at a time when "system" and "systems analysis" had not yet become fad words), this book provided a tightly argued clarion call on behalf of a new conceptual framework that would both (1) "specify the varieties of data involved in the analysis of any political relations" and (2) provide "categories for examining the moral premises out of which the theory itself emerged" (p. 319).

It also became the basis of the author's long-range work plan. His *Framework for Political Analysis* (1965) went beyond exhortation by sketching in the bare bones skeleton of a "systems" framework for the analysis of political life. The present book, the third in a series that hopefully will be much more than the author's announced tetralogy, begins to put flesh on the bones.

The first of these three books helped political scientists in many countries appreciate the difference between genuine theory and the textual exegesis or disorderly moralizing that have so often been passed on to students as "political theory." The detailed concepts in *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* will help illuminate inquiry into *any* of the traditional fields of specialization: from legislative to judicial or administrative behavior, from comparative government to international relations, from constitutional law to parties and elections. They have already been—and will increasingly be—of great value to careful fact gatherers, narrow gauge theorists and broader gauge theorists. The book has already become, in my judgment, "must reading" for any serious students or investigators of political action—no matter what their disciplinary base. A scholar's ability to use Easton's ideas on the input of demands and support, on outputs, and on feedback (together with an awareness of their limitations) will probably become an "acid test" differentiating between those engaged on the frontiers of creative political research and theory and the "obsolescents" (including many chronologically younger men) who shrink from the personal re-tooling required for the absorption of new concepts.

Moreover, the Eastonian system concepts represent a technologically-advanced take-off into historically higher levels of conceptual sophistication and theoretical discourse. Easton goes far beyond the simpler models found in physical, chemical, machine and biological systems. He is not led astray by "scientoid" ideas of a system as something that must necessarily be expressed in mathematical symbols or become the basis of computerized data processing. Distinguishing carefully between *outputs* and their consequences (which he calls *outcomes*), he helps unravel one of the knots that the Rand Corporation econometricians tied into the Federal government's new budgeting system (PPBS) by clumsily equating information on outputs with information on benefits or outcomes (David Novick, *Program Budgeting,* 1965, p. xii).

In the give-and-take of academic discourse, any presumably comprehensive treatise provides a built-in weakness for its readers and a built-in line of defense for its author. The weakness is that its grand sweep will stimulate attentive readers to think of new ideas, improve some old ones and then ungratefully use both to charge the author with sins of omission. The defense—particularly with someone who has publicly announced a serialized version—is "Wait for the next volume—or the one after that. . . . " For this reviewer, such a defense is highly plausible—particularly since Easton's theoretical output over the past dozen years has been an invaluable input in converting me from a "primitive Bentleyian" (and politico-bureaucratic activist) into a "primitive social systems analyst." Accordingly, I shall briefly identify four areas in which much greater progress is needed if a systems analysis of political life is to be made more fruitful.

First of all, it is essential to provide a conceptual framework for dealing directly with the changing structure of a system as well as its activities (or "performance" or "functioning"). Reacting against static oversimplifications dealing only with structure, Easton has gone to the other extreme of postponing direct concern with structural elements. As a result, his entire approach to structure is over-static, ignoring the possibility that both structure and performance may be viewed as aspects of social process. (Gross, *The State of the Nation,* in Bauer, ed. *Social Indicators,* 1966). Through the back door, he brings various aspects of structure into the joints and crannies of his model. While suggesting certain structural components of a political system as a whole (the political community, the regime and the authorities), he has not yet provided the analytical concepts needed to analyze the concrete subsystems of a system.

Second, it is essential to deal with many other dimensions of performance beyond a system's mere persistence. We need concepts that allow us to answer—and, indeed, ask in very specific terms—the question: "How does a system perform in producing various kinds, quantities and qualities of output that may meet the needs (or satisfy the interests) of such-and-such kinds of people and groups?" We must be able to distinguish between those aspects of a system that remain more stable and those that change more rapidly. We must be sophisticated enough to recognize that often a system may persist—as the American political system has done—only by major changes in many fundamental aspects. The Easton model would need some drastic surgical operations, I would suggest, if it were applied to the past and/or future performance of the American system.

Third, it is essential to deal explicitly and substantively with the kind of interests, or values, that may be served by political action. Otherwise, it is impossible to recognize the tremendous power of the vast network of common (as well as changing and conflicting) interests that help hold a society together and induce change in it. Otherwise, interest group theory becomes a recipe for "sterile negativism or formalism" rather than a tool for analyzing or shaping "the profusion of common interests, a profusion so rich that it can never be expressed, without serious distortion, in any single formula" (Gross, *The Managing of Organizations*, 1964, pp. 525–530). Unfortunately, Easton has thus far deferred action on his 1953 objective of providing "categories for examining the moral premises out of which the theory itself emerged." Indeed, firmly rejecting his 1953 prescription that the student of general theory seek "moral clarity" by devoting "serious attention to a constructive approach to his values," his two subsequent volumes rate high on the scale of moral *unclarity*.

Fourth, it is essential to deal with political life in all important dimensions. Here, one may accept the traditional assumption (as Easton has done) that nature is organized into disciplines the same way as universities are. This allows him to distinguish between a polity, an economy, a culture, and so on. But then one should also be expected to provide the conceptual equipment for dealing with the interrelations among these disciplinary "entities." This Easton has not yet done—as illustrated, for example, by the inadequacy of his model to deal with the role of wealth in American politics or the political aspects of such economic objectives as economic stability, economic growth or a "Great Society." Another alternative is to embark on the more difficult effort to deal with—in the words of Lasswell and Kaplan—"the political aspect of the social process in its entirety" (*Power and Society*, 1950, p. xvii). To do this, however, one must go much further than Easton has yet attempted in utilizing, and improving upon, concepts from other disciplines. If one accepts to some extent the Aristotelian dream of political science as a master science, one must work toward mastering at least some aspects of other disciplines. One must abandon the bureaucratic illusion that one can understand political life without looking directly at the society as a whole, its subsystems, its environment and the political aspects of all three. Here is the major weakness in the Easton tetralogy. *a pre-sputnik model, conceived of in disciplinary terms, has been rigidly adhered to at the very time when the forward thrust in systems analysis, is inter- or supra-disciplinary.*

These four areas are something more than gaps to be filled by plugging up some holes with mortar or putty. I hope that the Easton model will persist in time not by mere embellishment of the original blueprint but by creative adaptations that will, among other things, deal more explicitly with system structure (and structure-performance interrelations), with the multi-dimensionality of performance (in terms that will allow one to appraise all significant changes, whether for better or worse), with the interests of people and groups, and the "social process in its entirety." Finally, I believe that the author can deal most fruitfully with the many items on his own agenda of unfinished model-building business only by subjecting his improved concepts to the test of specific application to political change in at least one or two countries.

Bertram M. Gross

Syracuse University

Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Edited by Robert A. Dahl. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 458. $10.00.)

In this volume ten eminent authors from seven countries discuss the nature of, and trends in, political opposition in nine Western European nations and the United States. Most of the stock-in-trade of symposium reviewers applies: the contributions follow no standard format, are uneven in quality, and so on. Nevertheless, the book is an unusually meritorious example of the genre. All of the case-studies are at least good and some (e.g., Dahl on America, Rokkan on Norway, Daalder on the Netherlands) outstanding; nothing has been included solely because it could not, in good grace, be excluded. Best of all, the editor, Dahl, does not supply only the usual perfunctory preface but makes an extensive effort at generalization that is simultaneously summary, original theorizing, and an agenda for further work. This effort consumes about seventy large pages, constituting virtually a book in itself, and alone deserves a more extensive review than the present space permits.

* * *

Since the ten case-studies reveal no single pattern of "Western democratic opposition," Dahl begins his summing up with a typology of oppositions, not, incidentally, confined to the cases covered in the book. The least to be said for this exercise in classification is that it is carried out in the proper form, even if not altogether well in content. For once we do not simply get a set of arbitrarily selected and vaguely defined labels to attach somehow to phenomena. Dahl's procedure is to ask on what dimensions patterns of opposition vary, how they vary on these dimensions, and to what extent and in what ways variations on the dimensions cluster. The result is a conceptual scheme allowing one to distinguish specific patterns of opposition in detail and with precision, yet in a way immediately suitable to comparison and generalization. Other taxonomists would do well to follow suit.

Dahl's first dimension is *concentration*—the number of political "firms," as it were, in the political market and their internal unity. Four variations on this dimension are given: two-party sytsems with high unity, two-party systems with low unity, and multiparty systems with high/low unity. This does not strike me as satisfactory. It pertains only to parties, and since opposition is defined by Dahl as attempting to "change the conduct of government" in some manner, his subject includes also other units (e. g., pressure groups, political movements, revolutionary organizations) which, in fact, play a role elsewhere in the discussion. Moreover, the first variation, while logically possible, is empirically dubious. Britain is cited as an example, but much good work, especially Richard Rose's, warns us against taking too seriously parliamentary appearances; besides, it seems on the face of it unlikely that in a large society any two political "units" representing virtually all interests and opinions could really be "unities." It might be better to use the concentration dimension to distinguish tendencies to combine and cooperate as durable strategies for changing the conduct of government in a more general sense. Some interesting things then turn up: for instance, that the Scandinavian and British pressure group systems are very similar (one organized national group for every major "interest") despite differences in the party systems.

The second dimension is *competitiveness*—in effect, the extent to which parties actually oppose one another so that a single "winner" is identifiable in key electoral and parliamentary contests. Again, four variations are supplied: strictly competitive party systems (Britain), cooperative-competitive ones (USA, France, Italy), coalescent-competitive (Austria) and strictly coalescent ones (Uruguay). Here too there are difficulties additional to the restriction of the scheme to parties. The first variation happens to be very unlikely because, as Dahl himself says, it requires, at a minimum, a very rare kind of party system. The fourth is incongruous, because strict coalescence surely equals the absence of opposition. And the other two only distinguish inter-party cooperation and coalescence, which may not be much of a distinction. To make the competitiveness dimension more discriminating, and useful beyond the study of parties, it could perhaps be divided into two: *scope of competition*, referring to how much is contested in a polity, i.e., how extensive the political market is, and *competitive power*, referring to the likelihood of opposition units realizing their goals, much as one might speak of the competitive power of economic firms. (In fact, since Dahl has written so widely and well on political economy, it seems surprising that he did not make more general use of analogies between economic and political "markets" and "firms.")

The other dimensions Dahl uses are *site* (i.e., the decisive arenas of political competition), *distinctiveness* (a product of the first three, hence perhaps dispensable), *goals* and *strategies* (which are self-explanatory). These are all handled well, despite room for improvement; they are not confined to parties and make distinctions that discriminate. And it should be added that Dahl is agile and elegant in interrelating his variables, although he does not, in the end, identify overall typological clusters of them.

* * *

The next step in the analysis is to ask what causes different patterns of opposition. Dahl's answer is complex. Five "primary conditions" are discussed: (1) *constitutional structure and electoral systems*, including the existence of a separation of powers, federalism, and P R, and changes in the formal powers of the executive; (2) *shared cultural premises*, i.e., whether people are on the whole allegiant to or alienated from their polity, trustful towards others, cooperative or not, and pragmatic or "rationalistic" (abstract, dogmatic, deductive) in problem-solving; (3) *the existence of distinct subcultures*, especially ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional ones; (4) *the record of grievances*, i.e., output successes or failures by the authorities and the extent of civic incorporation of low-status groups; and (5) *social and economic cleavages*, such as class, status, occupation, religion, ethnicity, and language—these, presumably, if not foci of actual subcultures. The primary conditions operate on politics through an "intervening factor," the *specific pattern of cleavage, conflict, and agreement in* (political?) *attitudes*, including their distribution, coincidence, intensity, and institutional aggregation. (Dahl actually lists a second intervening factor, *polarization*, but this surely is just one form that patterns of conflict and agreement may take.) These factors are not merely listed but their effects on patterns of opposition are specified in an impressive array of exact hypotheses and less-exact speculations.

Without doing much research it is difficult to argue against any of Dahl's hypotheses, all being at least plausible. One may feel qualms, however, about the whole. Dahl presents a kind of multivariate analysis that has lately been very popular in political sociology, but raises serious misgivings. Not only are a great many explanatory variables cited, but each is considered capable of varying independently of the others (anyway "within limits" that are not specified), including even, within narrower limits, the intervening variable; and interplay between any two or more of them, it is argued, may be reinforcing, offsetting, or non-existent. If this is really so, it is unlikely that any generalization based on the scheme could be falsified even with much research. If opposition pattern X is attributed in one system to variable A, it will be useless, as falsification, to show that A did not lead to X in others, for that may be due to B, C, or D, or the different interplays of A with B, C, D in different cases. Multivariate theories of this type display a becoming modesty and sense of complexity, but they also work against testing and may be used too readily for an immodest purpose: saving any pet generalization. Hence, especially early in inquiry, it may be better to use fewer variables, and/or to assume their close interdependence, and/or to specify an order of potency for them. Dahl says, in defense, that the case-studies identify the variables he uses and point to their independence or erratic interplay. So they do; but perhaps only because they are done in so many different ways and, on the whole, less systematically than his own contribution.

Nevertheless the analysis teems with hypotheses, all eminently testable if we ignore or modify the overall approach. And some of them are very intriguing—for example, the argument that intense conflicts, in certain forms, encourage heterogeneous and conciliatory coalitions.

* * *

The final chapter deals, refreshingly for a work of this kind, mainly with normative problems, specifically with how much opposition and what kinds are most desirable in democracies, assuming numerous value standards that range from liberty of thought and expression to the effective resolution of urgent policy problems. This is a model exercise in relating political sociology to political evaluation—just as the whole book may serve as a model for the useful conduct of symposia among senior political scientists representing rather divergent political-science "cultures."

Despite its great merits, however, it left me wondering about which is the better approach to collaborative work: using a diversified team of established All-Stars who, inevitably, each go largely their accustomed ways, and do it very well—or using a less eminent group, more harmonious and more amenable to direction. Athletic coaches, I believe, have strong and well-founded views on which of the two tends to make the stronger team.

HARRY ECKSTEIN

Princeton University

The Communist Controversy in Washington—From the New Deal to McCarthy. BY EARL LATHAM. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 446. $7.95.)

While one may be certain that such a tremendous historical experience as that which passed into history as McCarthyism will be written about from many angles of vision by many scholars—and indeed much has already been published on this subject—it will be a long time before a scholar produces a better study than Professor Earl Latham's recent book on *The Communist Controversy in Washington.* Of course no one would venture to suggest that this book is the last word on the subject, but it certainly supplies the best scholarly analysis we now have of an important period of American history, the inner meaning of which has, from the beginning, been debated by observers and students of the American scene.

This volume is the tenth in a series on Communism in American life which was sponsored by the Fund for the Republic under the general editorship of Professor Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University. These ten books, including two notable volumes by Theodore Draper and one by David A. Shannon, add up to an important analysis of the Communist problem in the United States. Among them Latham's book stands out as a learned and sharply analytical study of Communist activity in the federal government from the beginning of the 1930's to the sudden demise of McCarthyism with the condemnation of the Wisconsin Senator by the Senate for unsenatorial conduct on December 2, 1954.

The historical record which Latham has spelled out rests upon a close study of innumerable public documents, and a vast miscellaneous literature which includes magazine articles, newspaper items, books and pamphlets. The documentation is full and very impressive. Obviously the book was written with great care and with close attention to accuracy in detail. While the author records the story of an historical epoch, albeit a recent one, this book is not straight history, but is, rather, history as told by an experienced, reflective political scientist who brings to his work a large body of knowledge about the structure and style of American government and politics. Latham has not only attempted to write up the historical record of Communism in Washington since the early New Deal days, but has also asked important questions as to how and why things happened and what they meant.

One of the basic conclusions of this book is that there had been, during the pre-war years, no planned and premeditated infiltration of federal agencies, according to some master plan, by the Communists. But the growth of the civil service which began with the swift expansion of governmental services in 1933 did facilitate the entry of members of the Communist Party into federal agencies, and finding them there, the Party found things for them to do. These Party members, who formed study groups, were scattered about in various agencies, and the total before the war was not very large; Chambers guessed there were about 75 among the half-million federal workers in Washington. There were small concentrations in a few key spots, such as the Department of Agriculture and the National Labor Relations Board. The aim of these groups was to promote left tendencies in governmental policy; they were not organized primarily for espionage, though there was some later on; and they did not succeed in achieving their objectives. Nevertheless, speaking generally, Latham concludes that even if exaggeration is discounted, there was "substantial" Communist activity in the government which may be characterized as "not negligible." It is recalled that during the war the Soviet Union was our gallant ally, and that this created a "hospitable public attitude" towards the Soviet Union. It should be added that as this story is developed, one is impressed by the ability of some of the Communists who held responsible positions in the government; they may have been dupes, but they were not dopes.

It is against the background of Communist activity in the federal government, and the "loss" of China, an event which Latham surveys in great depth, that Senator McCarthy rose to sudden prominence in 1950. The painful story of the McCarthy activities is reviewed, and while Latham concludes that there were Communists and fellow travelers in or near the State Department, that there was unwarranted access to classified information, and that security procedures in the forties were sadly lax, he rejects the notion that there had been a subversive conspiracy in the making of foreign policy. The thesis that conspirators in the State Department were responsible for "giving" China to the Communists is rejected not only as untenable, but as tending to detract from a true appreciation of what actually happened. Latham's general conclusion is that McCarthy's hearings turned up very little that was not previously known, and contributed nothing to the national security. On the other hand, he encouraged an "American Underground" in the government to feed to him and his staff "information, rumors, gossip, spite, and malice," thus maintaining "a state of high neurotic tension," and encouraging administrative disloyalty in several agencies.

What was the central meaning of McCarthyism? As we look back over the recent past, this is the most arresting question posed by Latham. Taking his cue from the astonishingly abrupt and complete deflation of McCarthy after the Senate voted its condemnation in 1954, the author concludes that the explanation is to be found primarily in the general pattern of American party politics. He argues that after the New Deal had run its course, the conservative forces in both political parties were frustrated in their quest for national power for an unusually long time—in 1940 by FDR's third term, in 1944 by the war and the fourth term, and in 1948 by Truman's wholly unexpected victory in a badly divided electorate which couldn't make up its mind. Thus the Republican victory of 1952 was very late in coming, and the cutting edge of all the frustration that had accumulated by then was the Communist issue. But once Eisenhower came to power, the issue disappeared. Of course, other scholars have offered other explanations for the phenomenon of McCarthyism—such as those which were couched in terms of mere demagoguery, or incipient totalitarianism, or latter-day populism, or status politics—but Latham offers very persuasive reasons for rejecting them, just as he rejects right-wing explanations, such as the simplistic notion that McCarthyism was merely a slanderous invention of its pro-Communist enemies. Latham does not assert that McCarthyism was nothing more than a narrowly political phenomenon, but he does make a very convincing argument for the proposition that it was a political phenomenon, and that as such it was largely an agent of fundamentalist conservatism, long frustrated in its search for power. This is a wholly sensible thesis, one which Latham has spelled out in a very impressive book.

David Fellman

University of Wisconsin

The Territorial Imperative. A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. By Robert Ardrey. (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1966. Pp. 390. $6.95.)

There is some ground for dismay in noting the large number of books that have had enormous impact in political science but have been written by outsiders, by those who did not dwell in academia or if they did, made and tested their constructs with tools unfamiliar to political scientists. A classic case is Thomas Hobbes, who was mostly despised and rejected by Oxonians and Cantabrigians. Others include Roberto Michels for his *Political Parties*, Sigmund Freud, the Lynds and their *Middletown*, Erich Fromm with his *Escape from Freedom*, Else Frenkel-Brunswik and her collaborators in *The Authoritarian Personality*, Eric Hoffer with his *True Believer*, and Erik Erikson with his identity crisis—so exquisitely elaborated in the *Young Man Luther*. Ardrey's *Territorial Imperative* is another such analysis, written by a former playwright whose academic qualifications rest on his graduation, Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Chicago in 1930. The book hammers away at a thesis and in the process forges another basic, hitherto neglected unit of analysis for politics.

Ardrey's central thesis is this: that man is so constituted by his genetic inheritance as to require the possession of territory in order to fulfill his most basic needs. Territory is not one of these needs but a condition for their fulfillment. He strongly suggests that this demand for land is more basic than for a sex partner, that it is the antecedent for marriage among men and is necessary to assure the care of the young. And he strongly declares that the territorial imperative underlies the behavioral syndrome called international war. He cites, as evidence of the depth of the impulse to defend one's own, the tenacity during the Second World War of the Finnish resistance to the Soviet armies and the Greek struggle against both Italian and German troops. He describes how American public opinion, disjointed with doubts and indecision, suddenly articulated and moved to action within hours after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The tenacious roots of this human attachment to delimited space Ardrey finds in the long process of evolution. He describes what he calls territorially defined nations among some primates, and suggests but does not insist that the origins are much more protean, observable among ants and perhaps in colonies of protozoa. He repeatedly emphasizes that territory is not a cause but a condition of both coöperation and conflict, not a basic need but a necessary means of satisfying needs.

The basic needs are three: security as opposed to anxiety, stimulation vs. boredom, and identity vs. anonymity. All activity—including sex, the acquisition of land, and by inference all political activity—relates to the frustration and satisfaction of these basic needs. Love is not a need but a response to a need. There may be a bit of innate amity in man, but roughly in the proportion of gold suspended in seawater.

In his thesis about territoriality, Ardrey is on what appears to be solid ground. It isn't just that he has spent many years in field research among higher vertebrates in Africa and in library research among the journals. These facts lend a vigor and freshness to his writing. It is also that his thesis is plausible and helps untangle many puzzling political phenomena.

But there is a more fundamental argument in the book which merits, if anything, closer attention than the territorial hypothesis. This is the argument that man is not only physically—i.e., in his anatomy—the product of millions of years of evolution but that he is also mentally a product of evolution. Some would consider this a grave charge. I consider it a serious assertion, for and against which the evidence needs to be gathered and appraised.

There has been a long series of blows to the pride of men, notably since the mid-nineteenth century. Darwin asserted our bodily continuity with lower animals. Freud asserted that our actions were determined to an enormous extent by our unconscious impulses—by forces of which we were largely (and remain largely) unaware. Ardrey now asserts a mental, behavioral continuity of man with the lower animals. And unfortunately his knowledge of the work of psychologists studying human behavior does not match his knowledge of animals.

René Spitz studied the sometimes lethal effects of maternal deprivation on children; Harry Harlow similarly studied the effects of substituting wire-and-cloth mothers for real mothers among rhesus monkeys. The many-linked chain between infantile emotional deprivation and political behavior has been unexamined, also by Ardrey. But he boldly reminds us that links between human and animal behavior exist, whether or not we examine them, and that if we fail to do so, we will be basing not only our private law but also our public law and public policy—foreign as well as domestic—on ignorance. Specifically, Ardrey is amazed at the ignorance which led to the savage land collectivization program in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and -30s and amused at the acknowledgment of the critical role for food production of the non-socialist private family plot. And he is amazed that the United States policy in Vietnam should be expected to succeed when Vietnamese see it as a defense of their own land against external, Occidental aggression.

Ardrey's writing is at times polemical. He blames both John B. Watson and Freud for the tendency of people to blame society or someone other than themselves for their actions. He blasts Rousseau as an incredible optimist for his fancies about the state of nature and yet Ardrey describes himself as optimistic. He fears the tendency to link the environmentalists with liberalism and hereditarians with conservatism. What with the conservatism of J. B. Watson and the liberalism of Rousseau and Jefferson—the latter two hereditarians if I ever heard of any—his anxiety is ill-founded. And he ignores the frightful consequences of racism for politics, perhaps because this would becloud his argument about the evolutionary (i.e. genetic) origin of territoriality.

His concluding argument is that man is not the only but the latest moral agent in the process of genetic evolution. He logically implies that some of our morality is indeed more than convention and indeed is attuned to our genetic, unnurtured nature. Whatever portion of the morality of the unbuttoned 1920s was indeed attuned to our human nature, we political scientists can not in the 1960s escape the scientific and moral responsibility of recognizing and appraising the hypothesis of territoriality. As Ardrey says, we may not only be scientifically wrong but also end up physically dead, because conquest is against each man's natural tendencies to defend his own and a worldwide testing of the proposition could be quite lethal.

James C. Davies

University of Oregon

Aus Naechster Naehe—Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927. By Arnold Brecht. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1966. Pp. 528. DM 38.)

These reminiscences of the justly famous author of *Political Theory* possess an unusual interest for the political scientist. For they contain a detailed account of the author's practical experiences in the Germany not only of the Weimar Republic where he occupied offices of high responsibility, but of the last decade of the moribund empire as well. Not all of his experiences are related; for another volume is to follow which will cover the years up to the seizure of power by Hitler and his work as a teacher and scholar after his emigration to America in 1933. Here is a life to inspire the political scientist by its impressive combination of theory and practice, the life of a truly great man whose depth of feeling, sincerity and strength can be sensed on every page, and whose real modesty is the true measure of his moral stature.

The work is divided into seven parts which deal with his youth, far removed from politics (politikferne Jugend); his political awakening; followed by three stages of "political education": the end of the war, the revolution and Weimar Republic's beginnings. He further discusses, in Part VI, the problems created for new German democracy by the disappearance of a majority in favor of democracy, and in the last part he describes his labors as a reformer and high official in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The ongoing tale of his life and works is at times halted for a broad and philosophical look around, as in Ch. 23 where Brecht discusses in basic terms the problem "democracy and constitution," or Ch. 30 which addresses itself to "thoughts on the disappearance of democratic majorities under a democratic constitution." But the author's theorizing is not limited to these broader reflections, but turns up at many points, always interesting, at times challenging.

Brecht tells us in his preface that he was much torn between writing either this book (and its sequel) or the second volume of his *Political Theory* or a "constitutional history of mankind," and that he finally decided to give preference to this work, since at the age of eighty one has to reckon that the decision for one is the decision against the other, and that only *he* himself could have written *this* book, whereas the others might be written by someone else; a capable political scientist might carry out his ideas on political theory, for example. While this reviewer doubts that anyone could, or if he could, would, he is still satisfied that Brecht made the right decision, especially if he should succeed in completing the work. For in these pages one encounters such a happy marriage of theory and practice, so many differentiated judgments on very concrete practical situations in the light of theory, and such penetrating theorizing based upon concrete practical experience, that these memoirs are in the best sense a work of applied theory.

Take for example Brecht's discussion or rather his "thoughts" on the loss of prodemocratic majorities under a democratic constitution (Ch. 30). This was in his view the situation in the Weimar Republic after 1920. He comments that the truly astounding thing is not that "formal democracy collapsed thirteen years later in Germany," but that "this did not happen much sooner." In any case, it was the "deadly worm which caused its death." He believes that the main reason for formal democracy's surviving for so long was that the antidemocratic majority was split into two or more parts. Even so, the situation was desperate, and the prodemocratic minority had only two possibilities of operating under the democratic and parliamentary system: they either had to form a minority government which could be overthrown any day, or they had to form a coalition with antidemocratic and antirepublican parties. This latter "solution" was bound to produce weak governments, because such a government could not pursue an unequivocally prodemocratic, prorepublican, antiauthoritarian and antimonarchical policy. It is therefore a mistake to condemn or ridicule the political leaders of the Weimar Republic: anyone who was prepared to follow the democratic rules of the game was at the outset condemned to appear "weak," no matter how able he was and how great his capacity for political leadership. Stresemann illustrates the point; others never got a chance. Brecht defends the Social Democrats particularly against the recurrent claim that they should have erected a true democracy; for the democracy which they had instituted was condemned to failure by the disappearance of prodemocratic majorities.

I am not quite sure that this defense is wholly adequate. For the appearance of the antidemocratic majorities—only after 1920—is itself part of the argument. I am not convinced that much more vigorous, and indeed revolutionary proceedings against the old "establishment" in the high bureaucracy, the army and business leadership might not have made a difference. I am inclined to think also that what might have encouraged the prodemocratic elements among the younger generation was a radical transformation of such preserves of reaction as the universities—the prodemocratic professor of public law in my university was prevented from lecturing in the winter of 1919/20 by a minority of nationalist rowdies among the students without any attempt made by the authorities at maintaining even mere public order.

Take the case of Rathenau, the brilliant exponent of the policy of fulfillment (of the Versailles treaty's provisions on reparations), who was murdered by the same elements cynically described by von Salomon in his too little-known *Die Geaechteten*. Some of the most moving pages in Brecht's book are devoted to this man who was an admired friend of the author and to his policy. Brecht invites the reader to look at these events from the point of view of a high civil servant. He rightly stresses the antisemitic aspect. He does not tell of that horrible view, reported by von Salomon, that when one of these murderers greatly impressed by a speech of Rathenau raised the question whether it would be right to kill him, another answered: just *because* he is so great, we must kill him. But Brecht says rightly that "Rathenau's 'elimination' became the typical example for the kind of thinking and acting and of the lack of resistance which later occurred under the National Socialists." This is true, and it seems to me the basic political problem, when the weakness of democracy after 1919 is at issue. Brecht contributes much to a better understanding of this absorbing topic. At the same time, he has left not only to his many friends but to generations to come a moving story of the political education of an outstanding German-American of our generation.

CARL J. FRIEDRICH

Harvard University

The Washington Community 1800–1828. BY JAMES STERLING YOUNG, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 307. $7.95.)

Among our enduring myths about the American past is a belief that political parties, though not mentioned in the Constitution, and alluded to only disparagingly in the 10th Federalist, quickly established themselves in the new Republic, one group coalescing around Alexander Hamilton in the Washington Administration, and the other around Thomas Jefferson. Rivalry between these groups extended over a substantial number of issues (bankers vs. planters, England vs. France) and back into the states, where local political organizations sprang up. At the seat of government, rivalry was focused in particular in Congress, where caucuses of copartisans from the earliest years effectively organized legislative programs and also met to determine their respective Presidential nominations.

To those attentive to the struggles of contemporary new nations in establishing political institutions on some sort of firm footing, this must seem an incredible success story. No one has ever satisfactorily accounted for the astounding rapidity with which American political parties were supposed to have established themselves. And so, in retrospect, it should not come as too great a shock to learn that a new, hard look at the available evidence at the national level suggests that the American party system got off to a much slower start than we had formerly thought.

Among the many virtues of *The Washington Community 1800–1828* is the fact that it is genuinely a reconstruction of the origins of American national politics, using materials that had been in plain sight, but neglected by a long generation of scholars intent upon establishing continuity between the present and the past. The perspective of this book relies less upon the tunnel vision of hindsight; it summons up a Jeffersonian era in which the future is open and the present filled with risks, alternatives, and possibilities.

The national government in the Jeffersonian era is described in this book as insignificant, removed from the sight of ordinary citizens, small, ill-housed, inefficiently run by transients and moonlighters, lacking in resources and physically planned so as to minimize easy concourse between its branches. Politics without institutions is invariably ideological politics. The prevailing ideology of the Jeffersonian era prized independence and intransigence, despised political professionalism, and adhered to the view that constitutional separations of power were proper prescriptions for informal behavior.

Thus the book is, in a way, a tribute to the statecraft of Thomas Jefferson, the first genuine consensus politician under the Constitution who, for a brief time, by great intelligence, charm and exertion overcame the disintegrative tendencies of the system sufficiently to enact what was, after all, predominantly a conservative program. But after Jefferson came "subdivisions and factions," "embarrassments of government," the impairment of public confidence (the quotes are from Secretary Gallatin), the entire panoply of ills that we have come to associate with the pre-institutionalized politics of new nations.

The Executive branch for the last two decades of the Jeffersonian era featured not Presidential leadership, but the "separate battalions"—social and political—of the cabinet, each officer making his own deals with Congress. On Capitol Hill, if there was party government or party cohesion or party organization, Professor Young cannot find it in the record. Congress at the time seems to have been run by cliques from the various boarding houses in which Congressmen made their homes while temporarily in the capital without their families, there to perform their hasty and meagerly rewarded duties as part-time representatives. To be sure these cliques were formed partially along sectional and partisan lines but Young is able to demonstrate that these primary groups were important in the lives of Congressmen independent of section and certainly of party.

All these disintegrative tendencies make for pessimistic reading; the one ray of hope at the end is a premonition that as the new government blunders from crisis to crisis, and gathers popular attention, people will begin to see the possibilities in a political vocation, ambitions will begin to focus upon the machinery of national politics, and institution-building can begin. But this process is not really a part of the Jeffersonian era as Young portrays it; the birth of national political institutions must await a later moment in history.

Too briefly, this is what *The Washington Community 1800–1828* seems to me to be about: it is a comprehensive description of Congress and the Excutive during the Jeffersonian era, an ingenious theory of why they were as they were, and a major critique and revision of current conceptions of the growth of American political institutions. It will be a long while before the insights of this book are thoroughly digested, mastered, debated and superseded by further research. In the meantime *The Washington Community* will be indispensable as a guide and a challenge to serious students of American national politics.

NELSON W. POLSBY

Wesleyan University

Politics in the American States, A Comparative Analysis. ED. BY HERBERT JACOB AND KENNETH N. VINES. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965. Pp. xv, 493. $7.00.)

More than a dozen years have elapsed since Oliver Garceau wrote his influential paper, "Research in State Politics," for the Social Science Research Council. He urged more effort toward systematic comparative study of state politics and suggested some plausible approaches and some caveats. A few of his proposals have been pursued with good results but in some respects we are just about where we were when Garceau wrote his paper. We know more about the recruitment of candidates and legislative behavior than we did then but we are not much ahead on such problems as interest group roles or the variations in operational characteristics of governorships. (Indeed the author who has the greatest difficulty in this present volume is the one who writes on interest groups; he devotes much of his space to the Almond and Verba survey research findings on attitudes about interest groups which do not allow for any significant comparative state analysis at all.)

Thus it is one of the problems of this book that the call to duty on state politics research has not produced enough usable data on the workings of state politics. There are a few regional comparative volumes, some that achieve systematic comparative analysis (like V. O. Key's *American State Politics: An Introduction*), but the total output is still very limited.

The lack of adequate descriptive monographs on state politics leaves us with glaring gaps in our information. We have had many case studies and several analyses of state legislatures, but we still founder when it comes to making firm generalizations about the operational aspects of these wondrously inefficient agencies. We can only say that one observer reports this for one state and another says that about a second, third, or fourth state. The easily gleaned statistical information about legislatures we have in good supply, but the more elusive data—such as the degree of intraparty cohesion in legislatures—are unavailable for almost half the states where it would be meaningful.

In the absence of such data and in the presence of the newer techniques of political science analysis the new generation of researchers do two things: rely on monographic accounts as far as they will take them (and that reliance can be heavy at times: one chapter here has over a hundred footnotes) and then to see whether correlation calculations can reveal factors that significantly affect state politics. Several of the present authors rely heavily on this methodological tool. (Interestingly none of the authors is credited with any publications prior to the time Garceau wrote his S.S.R.C. paper—unless they published works not cited in their brief biographies in this book.) In some cases these approaches produce some new and interesting observations; in others the reader is left in some doubt about the validity of inferences drawn because the statistical evidence seems to prove points that cannot be substantiated by evidence based upon close observation of operational politics.

This is particularly true with regard to the impact of political factors on policy making as opposed to the influence of socio-economic factors. In several chapters the impact of party competition on policy-making is shown by correlational analysis to be unimpressive, but there is little effort to look more closely at the "deviant" cases—states which have high party competition and low welfare allowances, for example, or states with non-competitive parties and relatively high pay-offs. The deviations are often more interesting than the correlations. Only by examining the operational realities of the states will we be able to do what Thomas Dye sets as the objective of his chapter on state legislatures: ". . . not only to describe these differences from state to state but, more importantly, to explain these differences."

The importance of supplementing statistical inference with direct evidence of political behavior may also be illustrated by the several references to the relatively unimportant role of malapportionment in state policy making. If the statistical rankings lead to doubt that apportionment methods have an effect, should one on that basis conclude that it probably is unimportant? I believe the reality is too complex to be so easily handled. The effects of malapportionment are felt in more ways than through simple rural overrepresentation; malapportionment also affects the chances that there will be divided party government between the governor and one or more houses of the legislature. Or the effects of malapportionment may be dampened by strong party leadership that persuades or pushes the overrepresented elements to go along with policies for the sake of compiling a record for the next gubernatorial election. Malapportionment is therefore not a static and uniform political factor—its consequences may be entirely different in various states, and the measurement of its impact will require us to do more than to rank policy outputs against the degree of malapportionment. For one thing it will be necessary to see in a number of specific cases whether policy-making is significantly affected by divided party control of government, and also what *quid pro quos* the overrepresented areas get as conditions of consent.

The work of the dozen scholars represented here is, for all the criticisms raised, a useful contribution to the long term project of achieving an understanding of state politics on the one hand and for moving toward more sophisticated methods of comparative analysis generally through the examination of fifty similar-but-different states. The authors not only bring some new and interesting evidence to light, they have also shown imagination and inventiveness in their treatment of materials. There is enough descriptive background material to make it quite useful for an advanced course textbook and enough use of new research tools (and appropriate language in analysis) to introduce the student to the argot he will need if he is to be able to read this journal in the years ahead. Indeed I suspect that the book will be useful for two kinds of instructors: those who adhere to and those who suspect the methods employed—the one to illustrate the methods' potential and the other their shortcomings. Finally, the book will have served a highly useful purpose if it spurs more research and monograph writing to test in operational situations the findings that these methods here abundantly provide.

DUANE LOCKARD

Princeton University

Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity. By Peter J. Fliess. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 194. $6.00.)

This is a book on a fascinating topic. It concerns the "international" system of the Greek city-states during the Peloponnesian War, and the characteristics and causes of that conflict. Professor Fliess pursues an analytical study from an explicitly systemic viewpoint. He shares Thucydides' conclusion: "the real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war." Thus the war stemmed from the nature of the power relationships in the system and not from any deliberate or readily avoidable events, which should be relegated merely to the category of proximate "causes."

There are many obvious points of reference for comparing the Greek city-state system of this period with the international system of the first two decades following 1945. The author carefully resists the temptation to articulate facile comparisons, but the elements of similarity cannot be missed. Most striking is, of course, the bipolar distribution of power in what he establishes was, for the Greek world much as for the present global ordering, essentially a closed system. The role of the barbarians and the Persians was discernible, but never central during these years. The differences between the two major powers, or better the blocs that they led, also strike familiar notes. There are cultural differences (Ionians vs. Doric peoples); constitutional differences (the Athenian-led league was predominantly composed of democratic states with an attractive ideology, the Spartan group by oligarchies); a difference in the organization of the blocs (the Athenian being rather hierarchically organized, the Lacedaemonians more pluralistic among the city-states, though, says the author, Thucydides exaggerated the difference); a naval power against a land based one; and there is also a basically status quo power (Sparta) arrayed against an imperialistic revisionist state (Athens).

Athens' foreign policy difficulties were, he suggests, compounded by the strains a long bipolar struggle imposed upon popular government and mass opinion, leading to rash and emotional commitments to unsupportable adventures. While the pattern of these characteristics does not make a full parallel with the recent past (the democratic states, for instance, are not now the revisionists) it is clear that in recent history great importance has attached to much the same *variables*. Other characteristics of the *total* system also are familiar, such as the critical risk of imbalance and thus an extreme sensitivity by the bloc leaders to any threatened shift of allegiance by an ally or a neutral. Furthermore, his conclusion that the war stemmed inherently from the tensions of such a bipolar system makes irrelevant any attempt to identify either side as aggressor or victim and renders the ideological and constitutional conflict secondary or derivative.

I believe that Professor Fleiss was correct in avoiding any rigid drawing of parallels; his decision merely to make the analogies in fairly low key (especially with his chapter subtitles, such as "Unconditional Surrender or Peace?," and "Power or Principle?") serves his purpose well. But there is a great deal of information and insight both here and in his major source, Thucydides' work itself. Some of the major proponents of simulation maintain that the chief function of simulating the international system is to generate hypotheses. If so, close analysis of the behavior of *actual* political decision-makers in the Greek setting should prove to be an extraordinarily fruitful supplement or substitute for simulation.

My principal objection to the book is that, for all its thought-provoking qualities, it is not systematic enough. Many of the analyses would benefit from tighter logic or definition. He interchangeably describes the system as bipolar and balance of power, and it is only after quite a bit of reading that it becomes clear he intends bipolarity to apply at *all* times, and balance of power is equated not with multipolarity as much of current usage implies, but merely with an unstable equilibrium, Furthermore, his discussion of the role of neutrals is not consistent. At some points we are told that there were few neutrals of any importance; at others the shifts of neutrals to and from alliance are clearly critical and his basic map shows a great deal of territory occupied by neutrals. Partly this inconsistency is due to true change over time, but not all of it. More careful logic here, perhaps with rigorous attention to theories of tight and loose bipolar systems, would add to the value of the book. In fact, a striking omission in this volume by a political scientist is the complete absence of reference to any modern theoretical work on the international system. With this omission the author lost a great opportunity, though the interest provoked by his treatment presents such an opportunity to another scholar. It provides a vital message that may be obvious to the classically trained members of the profession but is often forgotten by younger scholars who lack interest in political philosophy—

Greek theory (Thucydides' is more implicit than a modern writer's would be) and history are very relevant to international politics, especially that of the post World War II era.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT

Yale University

Ideology and Organization in Communist China. BY FRANZ SCHURMANN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xlvi, 540. $12.50.)

This extremely valuable book constitutes a major contribution to the literature of social science and Chinese studies. A professor of history and sociology, Franz Schurmann has brought to bear the best of several disciplines and a panorama of comparative illustrations—drawn largely from relevant Soviet experience—for illuminating Chinese data. His writing reflects painstaking scholarship and demonstrates the intellectual harvest that may be reaped by the systematic treatment of documentary materials and Chinese refugee information.

This, in my judgment, is not a book for the undergraduate or casual reader. In part this stems from the fact that Professor Schurmann has elected to write a very personal study. Organized around several long chapters, the themes flow from the active concerns of the author more than from the subject matter itself. The book does not provide a general theoretical framework as one might expect to find in a sociologist's work or even the careful chronological presentation of an historian. As the author explains, it was necessary for him to operate first on the level of intuition and only after sensing the relevance of China's problems could he decide how to "use the ordering capacities of the mind to construct patterns." He read, listened and discussed his insights until his "confidence in intuition was strong enough." Thereafter he was led to select seven chapter headings: Ideology, Party, Government, Management, Control, Cities, and Villages. Although intellectually valid, this approach to Chinese materials leaves one with the feeling that he has read a series of extremely intelligent essays rather than a well-integrated book. It also means that the reader is presented with the same topical focus in varied contexts and often with radically different methodological assumptions being used. When the wide-ranging comparative data are added, the result is to place an especially heavy burden on the reader.

Nonetheless, this should not be regarded as a serious fault. Rather, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* enters the unique realm of the second-stage studies of Chinese society and these are precisely the type of studies that are most needed. Moreover, few scholars in the field are likely to match the intellectual level of this volume, and we thus owe a considerable debt to Professor Schurmann.

The author's discussion of ideology reveals some important changes from his earlier well-known articles on the subject. As before in his writings the theme of contradictions serves as the leitmotiv, but he seems to have reconsidered fundamentally some aspects of the theory of contradictions as applied to organizations. Most important in this regard, perhaps, is his careful placement of Chinese Communist ideology (*szu-hsiang*) between pure or universal Marxist-type theory and practical operation. In the light of Peking's recent panegyrical descriptions of Mao Tse-tung's thought as having universal significance, that ideology, the author notes, may be undergoing a radical recasting. The chapter on ideology ends with an examination of ideology in action (largely devoted to its function in communications) and "the dialectical conception of Chinese society." The latter section analyzes much of the thinking that went into the Great Leap Forward.

The selection of emphases for the chapters on party and government is a familiar one: structures, membership, meetings and leaders. One of the author's best analyses comes in his differentiation of the concepts of vertical and dual rule in government agencies (pp. 188ff). There then follows an examination of the Communist attempts at decentralization on the eve of the Great Leap Forward. It is in this context that Professor Schurmann sets forth a slightly modified view of leadership factions ("cleavages of opinions"). His argument of this view would seem reasonably persuasive were it not for the fact that the assumptions underlying it seem to have been so thoroughly upset in the recent "great cultural revolution." We cannot in the light of the discrepancies between public speeches and private attitudes revealed in that "revolution" any longer take for granted, as Professor Schurmann does, that such speeches may be legitimately gleaned for solid evidence of the private, even oppositionist, opinions of the speakers.

The discussions of control and cities in Chapters V and VI are also concerned with the predominantly formal aspects of the two subjects. On controls, for example, the author deals especially with economic controls and with the interrelationships between economic and political controls. His study of the little known Harbin system of control work—a network of powerful accounting offices set up in 1954—is the most thorough presentation of this subject anywhere in the literature.

Though these chapters on ideology, party, government, control and cities will attract a considerable interest among political scientists, by far the most impressive chapters are those on management and the village. Here Professor Schurmann is at his best in comparative analysis and sociological theory and here his contribution is the most original. Although he has written widely and knowledgeably on both these subjects before, his discussion of management and the village marks a significant and often brilliant advance over his previous writings.

In his chapter on the village, for example, the author highlights the effects of the alternating use by the Chinese Communist elite of the "natural" and administrative villages in the political and social transformation of the rural society. This forms the basis for his analysis of the three stages of the social revolution on the land—land reform, cooperativization and communization. Mr. Schurmann concludes with an assessment of these Communist programs in the countryside and notes: "there can be no further phase to the social revolution. The three phases, each of which was aimed at one of the key social groups on the land (landlords, rich peasants, and poor peasants) have exhausted their revolutionary targets. The only revolution that can now follow is the economic revolution which will transform the technological basis of agriculture." The basis has been laid in the past acts of political and social revolution, the author states, for entering into a process of economic development. He considers the foregoing revolutions to have produced the kind of unity and social transformation that are the foundations of further technical and economic progress.

JOHN W. LEWIS

Cornell University

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics. BY MICHAEL WALZER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 334. $6.95.)

While setting out ostensibly to "make Puritan radicalism, so unattractive to my contemporaries, humanly comprehensible" (p. ix), Professor Walzer has in fact developed a wide-ranging series of conclusions, formulated into a general 'model' intended to complement the Max Weber typology of the emergence of modern systems of rational-legal social organization out of the traditional world. Setting aside at the outset the usual emphasis on the writings of Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin and Hobbes, each of whom in his own way had forcefully described what were still only dimly-perceived characteristics of the new political forms that were emerging out of the breakdown of feudal society, Dr. Walzer brings a knowledge of present day sociological theory to bear on a different aspect of 16th and 17th century intellectual history. His subject is a re-examination of Calvinism, in an attempt at demonstrating its close relationship to the foundation of the specifically modern politics of systematic ideas or ideology, and to the subsequent translation of the notion of politics from one of passivity into another emphasizing its likeness to a form of work, and requiring constant diligence on the part of a group of 'saints' or chosen (or choosing) men, set off from their fellows by a common dedication to the ultimate goal of radical reform.

While the leaning of Luther's theology had been towards a "privately cultivated communion" (p. 25) between God and the Protestant believer, Calvin's speculations, according to Walzer's reading of the *Institutes* and the *Fifth Book of Moses*, tended always to the "practical and social, programmatic and organizational" (pp. 25–26). His teachings appealed as an intellectual balm to remedy the spiritual alienation of the new 'masterless man' in an age of institutional confusion, by offering a fanatical religious discipline based upon a systematic, if equivocal, doctrine of voluntary obedience, expressed within and buttressed by the vigilance of a Christian Commonwealth of the elect. In two "case studies in Calvinist politics," Walzer first shows how in France the movement found its leadership among elements of the aristocracy, and thus the thrust of Huguenot political doctrine tended towards a moderate politics posited on the assumption of "self discipline . . . in the service of constitutional order" (p. 68). In contrast with this line of French Huguenot development, which subsequently provided the notion of "the saint-in-office" (p. 110), Walzer suggests that the English Marian exiles, who settled in Geneva after the accession of the Roman Catholic Mary, found their spiritual authority in a clerical intellectual elite, led by John Knox. Humble men without station, exiled from their country and heritage, they gave expression to their isolation in more extreme political terms, and thus, in Walzer's analysis, "another modern figure was [being] shaped: the saint-out-of-office, the oppositional man, the political radical" (p. 110).

Walzer sees a direct connection between these continental movements and the restatement and culmination of Calvinist inspired political radicalism in 17th century England, an assumption he makes little effort to substantiate. He believes that by refining this new Calvinist political imagery and metaphor, and propagating it through the skilled use of politico-theological sermons, the Puritan clergy of England continued the attack on the traditional imagery of social hierarchy, organic connection and family tie, replacing these with elements of the new ideological firmament. Walzer argues for example that the medieval belief in a 'great chain of being,' joining all things in nature and spirit to a fixed order, was thus chiefly undermined by Puritan manipulation of the notion of a consciously willed covenant that bound together the true believer in the new artificial family of the elect. In place of the time honoured imagery of organicism and cyclical regeneration, the Puritan ideology substituted the analogy of a ship of state, sailing forever the endless sea of statecraft, and finding safe and secure harbours only at the arbitrary will of God. In his advanced view of marriage as an institution founded on rational covenant freely entered into by the participants, and in which obligation stemmed from self-discipline, the Puritan saint was bound further to subvert yet another cherished old belief, the pervasive patriarchal imagery of authority based on the family tie, that was a mainstay of the traditional world-view. Moreover, the alliance of the Puritan clergy with the new English gentry class found ideological expression in the refined Calvinist doctrines of vocation and magistracy, which undermined the political position of the city-based courtier, by creating an intellectual atmosphere in which achievement came to be valued over ancestory. Concurrently, the persistent sermon theme of the saints as a well-disciplined army, engaged in a ceaseless crusade to safeguard the Commonwealth against the forces of Satan, a spirit best represented in Joseph Mead's *Clavis Apocalyptica* (1627), gained steadily until the imagery was transformed into a real military force for repression in practical politics. Ultimately, then, the closed system of Puritan ideas was applied to practice, led to the Civil War, justified the 'legal' execution of Charles I, and formed the religious guide for the foundation of a secular Commonwealth under the watchful eye of the saint.

This extremely compelling and well-written book is bound to appeal more to those who like their history on the grand scale than to those who feel more comfortable closer to the particularist school. It is a work that will be most profitably approached after a good preliminary grounding in the standard histories of political thought for the period, for it is avowedly interpretive. At the most general level of criticism, Dr. Walzer often falls short of adequately placing his subject matter in a specific historical focus, leaving the reader without appropriate terms of reference either for fully understanding the development of his argument, or for a critical assessment of his frequently wide-ranging inferences. Moreover, there is a tendency throughout the book for the author to view his discussion as one of "Calvinist *politics*," when he is in fact confining his attention to a body of reflective literature, only partly political in character, and existing outside the actual arena of politics. These criticisms aside, Walzer's general contribution is to provide evidence of the force of ideas in shaping events during this period of great social upheaval that effectively illustrates the incompleteness of an exclusive attention to the economic determinism of Weber and Tawney. And his enterprising adaptation of the work of recent theorists of political development and revolutionary politics points to further opportunities in related fields of historical investigation that have tended to be neglected by political scientists.
—GEORGE A. FEAVER, *University College London.*

A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History. BY A. JAMES GREGOR. (New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. x, 370. $4.95.)

The ABC of Communism. BY N. BUKHARIN AND E. PREOBRAZHENSKY. New Introduction by Sidney Heitman. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. 422. $2.95, paper.)

Professor Gregor's book presents us with a survey of Marxist philosophy in its evolution from the young Marx, through the mature Marx, then Engels, Lenin and contemporary Soviet philosophy. In similar fashion, he treats Marxist sociology and history; and, finally, in much more summary fashion, he discusses the reciprocal impact which contemporary natural science and Marxist philosophy had on each other. In this last field, Mr. Gregor has published some interesting articles, but was probably wise in keeping his treatment of this troubled issue to a minimum in the present volume.

His style is brisk and forthright; his attitude critical but sympathetic; his approach is that of analytical philosophy tempered by a commitment to liberal humanist values; his summary, in fine, is eminently competent. This competence, at times, comes close to being a liability, because the author's familiarity with his subject matter prevents him from communicating to the beginning student. Reviewers face similar handicaps: this reviewer found Mr. Gregor's book lucid and easy to read; but his students complained about its difficulty. Only when he was confronted with these complaints did the reviewer conclude that it might have been useful if Gregor had made a more extensive effort to translate Hegelian into English. A little Hegel is indeed a dangerous thing.

The author's aims are relatively modest: he wishes to provide an introductory survey of the subject. Surprisingly, such a survey has been needed, and the book therefore fills a gap. To be sure, we already have a wealth, if not glut, of one-volume introductions to Marxism. But, with its own judicious combination of simplicity, comprehensiveness, critical detachment, sympathy, and competence, Gregor's volume comes closer to the ideal than any other work I know.

Although its aims are modest, the book makes some original contributions, if only by stating some things with refreshing clarity and forthrightness. Such contributions include a clear and convincing presentation of the argument that Lenin turned Marx upside down and an even clearer marshalling of all support for the thesis that the views of Engels depart significantly from those of Marx. The complications resulting from the attempt made by Engels to incorporate the sexual urge into Marxist sociology and natural evolution into dialectics are shown very ably indeed. In summarizing the evolution of Marxist philosophy and sociology from the young to the mature Marx, Gregor shows far more convincingly than anyone before him the importance of Feuerbach's contribution to Marxist theory. Indeed, Feuerbach, not Marx, emerges as the man who stood Hegel on his feet.

No summary treatment, of course, will ever please another specialist, because some of his favorite topics will inevitably be slighted. This reviewer, for instance, misses a treatment of Marxian economics and, more specifically, the economic analysis of capitalism. Further, he thinks that the concepts of base and superstructure have been presented too skimpily; and, for a professional philosopher like Gregor, it is to be regretted particularly that the concept of ideology, or false consciousness, was not discussed. Finally, the jump from Engels to Lenin seems too wide; it might have been better to discuss the various Marxist schools contending with each other around the turn of the century, partly as background for Leninism, and partly as a bridge to contemporary Western reinterpretations of Marx. These criticisms are petty when compared with the over-all positive appraisal of the book.

The re-issue of the Bukharin-Preobrazhensky classic will be welcomed by all students of communism. For two decades, this book served a similar function for the parties of the Third International as *Anti-Dühring* had served for the parties affiliated with the Second: it was a Marxist primer, written in simple words which tried to translate Marxist jargon into common-sense language. In a way, Bukharin and Preobrazhensky tried to do for younger party members what Gregor sought to do for non-Marxist beginners in the study of communism.

The *ABC of Communism* is a commentary to the Program adopted by the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1919. Like that Program, to which, theoretically, the Party was committed until 1961, the book was written at a dramatic moment—in a period of violent civil war and near-total chaos and ruination, when the new Soviet regime was desperately struggling for survival. Its spokesmen, however, seemed confident that victory would not bring mere survival, but would lead to an instantaneous chain reaction of proletarian revolutions and thus spell true deliverance. In short, the Communist Party, during the Civil War, was drunk with revolutionary euphoria. Its utopian expectations for the immediate future were ludicrously out of tune with reality. Yet its leaders also faced practical problems of management, organization, education, and mobilization; and they had begun to realize the complexity of these tasks and the tremendous weight of the obstacles in the way toward even the most modest solutions.

Both the Party Program and the commentary provided by the authors reflect this mixture of utopia and pragmatism which characterized Bolshevik ideology in the first years of the revolution. Hence it is a summary, and a most able and readable one, of Marxism-Leninism at an important stage in its development, perhaps its major turning point.

In retrospect, the authors appear naive in their assessment of the difficulties, and vague in their prescriptions. Their party had hardly begun to take the first steps in governing the country. Moreover, comparisons with the most recent ideological primer of the USSR, the *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, would reveal the distance which Soviet ideology has traveled since 1919; some of the achievements of Soviet industry and science may be beyond anything expected by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky. The entire society has been transformed, though not always as the authors of this book imagined; the stratification of Soviet society and the total bureaucratization of life, to say nothing of the Stalinist style of ruthlessness, would doubtless repel them. In the realm of ideology, utopia has all but withered away. Expectations have been toned down. The new Program of the Party defines communism in terms, compared to which the hopes of 1919 appear to be both more democratic and more anarchic. Needless to add, the authors, as well as most of the authors they cite in their bibliographical notes, have long ago been liquidated as Enemies of the Revolution.

In its totality, therefore, the book serves to dramatize the curious pattern of great revolutions, which fulfill some of their promises beyond expectations, betray and explain away other promises, and kill off their own heroes.—ALFRED G. MEYER, *University of Michigan*.

Hobbes's Science of Politics. BY M. M. GOLDSMITH. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 274. $7.50.)

Hobbes Studies. EDITED BY KEITH C. BROWN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 300. $6.75.)

Hobbes's Science of Politics is a good study not because it is without flaws, but because Professor Goldsmith knows and is committed to his subject. For him it is Hobbes and Hobbes alone who is at issue, and though necessarily drawn into the controversies that bemuse specialists, he manages to keep Hobbes in focus. And this is indeed refreshing. But more importantly, he understands the need to rescue Hobbes from his reputation. At his best (in the chapter on "Sovereignty and Government", pp. 175–227) or at his worst (discussing metaphysics, pp. 1–47, with additional references scattered throughout), Goldsmith appears to have this mission in mind and attempts to carry it out in a manner that cannot fail to win both notice and admiration.

Why the concern to rescue Hobbes? In part, as Goldsmith says in the Preface, because the English philosopher has neither been understood nor taken seriously enough. Perhaps then the substance of Hobbes's work, properly explicated, justifies the effort. But beyond that, other reasons can be suggested, or so it seems to me, even if the traditional errors ascribed to Hobbes ultimately stand. In the history of political philosophy, Hobbes appears, if not as an innovator, then at least as a subverter who undertakes a radical transformation of political discourse. In his treatment, political life which had been dependent upon or authorized by God becomes an artifice necessitated by human nature (though yet sanctioned by scripture); natural laws which had been seen as reflections of the inherent reason of the universe become possible natural theorems rooted in the right reasoning of man (though still consistent with the word of God); and men, who have been regarded as sinners as well as aspirants to the good, become endeavourers, driven by the passions, using reason as "a spy" at the service of fears and hopes (though they still sin). It is this tendency to challenge customary modes of discourse which makes Hobbes appealing, especially at a time when, once again, the traditional dialogue shows signs of breaking down. Moreover, Hobbes demands that men must act if they are to preserve themselves. And the basis for action, he implies, as well as the medium through which action takes place, is political life. As Goldsmith notes (pp. 176–177), Hobbes believes that "the function of government is the preservation of order or peace, the conditions necessary for the existence of human beings." In addition, Hobbes insists that men act reasonably and by means of "certain rules," and his quest for certainty, for "The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths [which] consisteth in certain Rules as Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as tennis-play) on practice onely. . . ." (*De Cive*, Chapter XX), contrasts sharply with our own uncertain political theories and practices.

It is this quest for certainty that seems to provide Professor Goldsmith with both thesis and title. And there is little doubt that Hobbes is at one with Galileo, viz., that he seeks regularities in the physical or natural universe, but goes one step further and reduces the human universe as well to uniform tendencies; and that to do both, he employs "motion" (by analogy from Euclidean geometry) to construct a dynamics, thus producing propositions that in his judgment constitute 'the skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths.' But Goldsmith nowhere sets this pattern out clearly, not even in the section entitled "Hobbes's Science" (pp. 38–47), though his book is replete with information that suggests it; nowhere does he finally pull the system together. Rather, in concluding, he assesses Hobbes's political science of law, religion and history, and finds it untestable by any criterion of falsifiability. Hobbes's "science of politics" becomes an attempt which, though brilliant, is, in the light of Goldsmith's thesis, unsuccessful.

There are a number of difficulties in the book which may have driven its writer to this uneasy conclusion. Three of them—the problem of a systematic exposition of Hobbes's system; the question of the choice of terms employed to describe aspects of the system; and the need to clarify usage of common terms—will be illustrated.

Goldsmith's own thesis demands that he demonstrate that Hobbes is indeed systematic, and to do this he must not only attempt to link up each part of the system with every other part, he must also fully explicate each part. An example of the failure to do so, though not necessarily fatal to the entire book, is Goldsmith's treatment of Hobbes's ontology of space (and therefore of body). He argues that Hobbes cannot accept real space, either empty or full, though Hobbes in *De Corpore* (see Chapter VIII) repeatedly equates "magnitude" and "real space" and discusses both real and imaginary space. Maintaining that the ontology requires neither vacuum nor plenum, he says (pp. 16–20) that Hobbes uses only imaginary space for describing both how the world "is" and how men think about it. However, both sections he cites from *De Corpore* can be read differently. In discussing "imaginary space" (*English Works*, I, pp. 93–94), Hobbes warns the reader that he is about to consider "things . . . not as really existing but appearing only to exist, or to have a being without us." He is talking about place or our conception of space, that is, about appearance, phantasm, or, in this context, imagination. But to talk about imaginary space and to explain it is not to preclude the existence of real space. What it does mean is that to Hobbes, knowledge is ultimately dependent on sense and phantasm and therefore on imaginary space, viz., that it is within the context of "what can be known" that all inquiry proceeds (*Ibid.*, pp. 410–411). Furthermore, in the other section cited (*Ibid.*, pp. 414–426), Hobbes declares at pp. 414–415, that he takes one experiment concerning vacuity "for a sign that all space is full." If Goldsmith insists that Hobbes does not assume real space, he is also asserting that Hobbes is not really a materialist, and so it appears when he argues (p. 21) that Hobbes believed that "Body actually possesses real magnitude . . . [but] does not displace space as it would if space were something real; it occupies space." However, Hobbes appears to believe that if body possess real magnitude, it is (really) extended and it occupies (real) space. Since Hobbes appears to have spoken both of real and imaginary space, Goldsmith's dismissal of real space makes Hobbes's position either confused or incorrect. It therefore leaves unanswered the question of whether or not Hobbes was indeed systematic.

Secondly, Professor Goldsmith's choice of terms is also occasionally problematic; for example, when he discusses the laws of nature. He reduces them to necessary logical propositions derived from Hobbes's hypothetical construct of human behavior, and thus calls them scientific rules. They tell us "certain things that are causally related to war" (p. 109) and "provide a means of eliminating this danger", i.e., "the danger of death at the hands of other men" as well as the "means of minimizing discord" (p. 125). In Hobbes's sense of the term "science," it may be proper to call the laws of nature scientific rules, for they are derivative rules drawn from the knowledge of consequences. But if they are also moral precepts is Goldsmith also claiming that Hobbes attempts a science of morality and that moral precepts (natural law) are *its* derivative rules? If so, Goldsmith ought to demonstrate it. If not, he has damaged an otherwise excellent attempt to discuss natural laws as hypothetical imperatives by not more clearly indicating to the reader what the limits of his use of the terms "science" and "scientific rules" are.

Finally, Goldsmith either refuses to clarify or does not acknowledge any distinction between the social and the political. He describes (p. 172) the state of nature as "imaginary political space," non-social in character, in which there can be no society, no security of person, no property, etc. Men, in his reading of Hobbes, hypothetically move in a single step from a non-social or even anti-social and non-political condition into a condition which is simultaneously civil (political) and social. Yet he also correctly suggests (p. 199) that society, according to Hobbes, is not founded upon the right of the individual to property, but upon the desire of the individual to preserve his life, and elsewhere, as already noted, that this is the central function of the polity or sovereign. Is not the polity, on Goldsmith's own reading of Hobbes, therefore a precondition for the "living" of which society is the expression? Whatever the answer may be, it is not discussed in the book.

Hobbes Studies, a collection of reprints edited by K. C. Brown, all but one written since the Second World War, cannot in the usual sense be reviewed. In it, papers are reproduced by nearly all the celebrated contemporary Hobbes scholars, grouped so that their major confrontations come readily to hand. For beginners *Hobbes Studies* is no substitute for the study of Hobbes; for scholars it is a necessary and invaluable collection. Both beginners and scholars will, however, find much to profit from in Professor Goldsmith's *Hobbes's Science of Politics*.—ERWIN A. JAFFE, *University of New Hampshire.*

Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. BY ANATOL RAPOPORT AND ALBERT M. CHAMMAH. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965. Pp. 229. $7.50.)

Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas. BY ANATOL RAPOPORT. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. 214. $5.00, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Of these two books the first is a highly interesting original contribution to experimental gaming and to the construction of mathematical models of human behavior, while the second is a relatively brief and not completely satisfactory introduction to two-person game theory.

Neither book is particularly addressed to the political scientist, sociologist or psychologist, although either can be read for the most part by those who have considerably less mathematical sophistication than is required to read *Games and Decisions* by Luce and Raiffa.

Professor Rapoport is one of the very few individuals who both understands and appreciates the mathematical basis of game theory and who at the same time is seriously concerned with trying to exposit and demonstrate its uses to the behavioral scientist. He writes with considerable conviction and yet at the same time stresses the difficulties involved in, and the enormous amount of work needed for the construction of an adequate applied theory of games.

The book on the Prisoner's Dilemma reports on a series of experiments on a simple but paradoxical game which has been much discussed in the literature on game theory. The paradoxical feature of the game is that actions which appear to be entirely consistent with any reasonable view of individual rationality lead to outcomes in a two-person game which are far from being jointly optimal. The game may be used as a paradigm to illustrate problems in negotiation and in trust.

The first part of the book describes the experiments with sequences of plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma for different stakes. The second part is devoted to the development of several different mathematical models. These are respectively: Markov chain models; equilibrium models with adjustable parameters; stochastic learning models; and classical dynamic models in the style of Richardson. The third part deals with tests and interpretation of these models. Seven hundred and forty subjects were used and some games were played up to six hundred times.

In a relatively brief review it is not possible to go into a detailed discussion of the experimental results and their interpretation. Some fascinating interpretations were given. It appears that the interaction among the players causes them to behave more or less in the same manner. Women subjects, however, appeared to be less cooperative than men.

This reviewer is highly sympathetic to the type of experiment run by Rapoport and Chammah. The criticisms of the experiments are more in their interpretation than their execution. On page 26 the authors state that, "The theory of nonzero-sum games distinguishes between cooperative and non-cooperative games." This is so but unfortunately it is precisely in the situation where the same game is played many times that the distinction, so handy for the analysis of static situations, breaks down.

On page 40 the authors state that game theory "assumes 'rational players,' that is, 'perfect players.' " Unfortunately, rationality (at least group rationality) is not a well defined concept when there is more than one individual involved in a non-constant sum game. This is a central problem in game theory and the many solution concepts which have been investigated represent attempts to deal with this problem.

No adequate discussion is given of the utility assumptions in the experiment. Were the subjects assumed to have utilities which were, at least as a first order approximation, linear with regard to the payoffs? Were their utilities or evaluations of the payoffs meant to be comparable? For example, had the payoffs to one side been multiplied by a factor of ten would the authors have expected any effect on the results?

How good a paradigm is the Prisoner's Dilemma? The authors offer several dynamic theories and some evidence. They do not include theories which depend upon the sum or discounted sum of earnings; nor do they experiment with or consider the effect of games in which the Prisoner's Dilemma paradox still exists but in which the players have more than two choices. (Bidding games have this property.) It is this reviewer's opinion that the authors would have made their task easier for themselves had they used programmed dummy players as one of the members of most of their pairs.

The above comments should not be interpreted as negativistic criticisms of the work. On the contrary there is much to be done. Rapoport and Chammah have made a significant start; however, as they had expected, their work raises more questions than it answers.

The expository book on two-person games by Rapoport is a disappointment. It is hard to conceive of the audience for whom it is suited. It is not sufficiently mathematical for those with mathematical training and it is not sufficiently rich in relevant examples to provide the much needed expository text for the political or other behavioral scientist. However, owing to the extreme lack of expository material this book will still serve a useful purpose.

There are a few technical comments which need to be made. On page 20 it is stated that a game must have a termination rule. This is true of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory but not in general. Games with indeterminate ending are probably better models of many human activities than games with end rules.

On page 28 the statement is made that "the player's preference scale used in game theory must be stronger than the ordinal scale." This is false, as the work of Aumann, Peleg, Scarf, Shapley, Shubik, and others has shown. It is true enough for the examples Rapoport has in mind but this is sloppy exposition. (There should have been at least a footnote for the unwary.)

Chapter 8 on the negotiated game could have been made far stronger had the general problem of fixed threats been discussed. On page 144 the author states, "It is commonplace to view the theory of games as the logical foundation of a theory of rational conflict." It may be commonplace by those who do not know game theory;

however, for those who do, the meaning of rationality in situations involving two or more players is the central problem.

On page 128 the author states that "J. Nash has shown (1951) that every nonzero-sum game has at least one equilibrium point." This is not strictly true. Nash imposed some important restrictions on the type of game he was considering. —MARTIN SHUBIK, *Yale University*.

The Age of Keynes. BY ROBERT LEKACHMAN. (New York: Random House, 1966. Pp. vii, 324. $6.00.)

It is difficult for an economist to review an important book by another economist, when both the book and the review are intended primarily for non-economists. The task is made more difficult when the reviewer is sympathetic toward the point of view of the author and protective of the purity of the substance to be conveyed. Consequently, this review will be concerned with the benefits and the *caveats* for political scientists who seek in this book a basic understanding of Keynesian economics and its impact on contemporary economic theory and policy.

Professor Lekachman is one of a handful of academic economists who can clearly and simply explain in words the abstract theorizing of other economists. An historian of economic thought by speciality, he writes best, perhaps, when he is recounting the intellectual history of men and ideas, and *The Age of Keynes* is no exception. The first two-thirds of the book surveys the entire "life, times, and thought" of John Maynard Keynes, while the last third seeks to establish the "triumph" of his ideas in the two decades after his death. This is an enormous undertaking for a book of 300 pages (in contrast, the standard biography of Keynes, also written by an economist, is more than twice as long). Historians will doubtless be angered by the author's breathless (but always incisive) recounting of 20th century English and American economic and social history.

The chapters on Keynes' early life in Cambridge, his role in the Treasury during World War I and at Versailles, the reparations and international monetary reform controversies of the 1920's, and the events leading to the publication of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* in 1936 are the best written of the book and positively defy attempts to skim. There are some real insights into Keynes' character here, e.g., attributing his Treasury successes to "Keynes's possibly unique combination of the guts of a burglar and the intellect of a first-class economist" (p. 27).

Lekachman's verbal summary of *The General Theory* is adequate, although some of the discussion of the efficacy of wage cuts and the relation between aggregate supply price and demand price could be confusing to the unwary. Further, the author fails to get across the crucial importance of Keynes' theory of interest rates; the general sluggishness of interest rate movements in a Keynesian model is precisely what undermines the monetary and fiscal policy prescriptions of his Cambridge forebears.

The chapter on the New Deal is interesting but lacking in depth. The main purpose is to demonstrate that the prewar Roosevelt years were "Keynesian only by occasional coincidence" (p. 123). Two additional biographical chapters then recount Keynes' involvement in war finance, in the creation of the International Monetary Fund, and in negotiating the postwar loan from the U.S.

The final third of the book ("The Keynesian Era") is, perhaps, the least satisfactorily done. With digressions on such subjects as U.S. economic growth, automation and unemployment, cost-push inflation, and federal tax and expenditure policy in the 1960's, the author is really attempting to validate two important propositions:

1. "Keynes does not cease to be relevant. He becomes relevant in different ways and in different company" (p. 202).
2. ". . . Keynesian economics is not conservative, liberal, or radical. The techniques of economic stimulation and stabilization are simply neutral administrative tools . . ." (p. 285).

With regard to the first proposition, the author's discussion of postwar economic problems is deficient in two respects: the explicit relevance of Keynesian economics is rarely mentioned, and the exposition, particularly of economic growth and cost-push inflation, is based on too few and not always representative sources.

The second proposition leads the author to identify such creatures as the "twentieth-century liberal" (or "liberal expansionist") and "twentieth-century conservative" (or "conservative expansionist") and such doctrines as "commercial Keynesianism" ("the faith of modern businessmen," which constrains the range of consensus over appropriate tax and expenditure policies). On the other side are the "economic Neanderthals" espousing "antediluvian wisdom" and "ancient ideas" (the 1964 Goldwater campaign gets a total of seven or eight sentences in the book, while President Eisenhower is charged with holding "firmly to the simple moralistic opinions appropriate to the graduate of an Abilene boyhood"). Among other things, the nature of the 1964 tax cut, medicare, and the antipoverty program are all attributed to the acceptance by the electorate of "commercial Keynesianism."

Despite the book's many virtues as an eminently readable introduction to the basic arguments and applications of Keynesian economics, readers who might rely on the book as an adequate "Keynes for beginners" (Lekachman's phrase) should be warned of two serious shortcomings. For one, the author is discomfortingly charitable to the originality in Keynes' theoretical work and to what has survived without the need for substantial modification. Further, he makes mention neither of the widespread "neoclassical counterrevolution" to the "Keynesian revolution" (which reasserts the validity of neoclassical conclusions about even a *Keynesian* economy's automatic full employment tendencies) nor to many areas of theoretical or applied economics where Keynes' ideas have been of crucial and lasting significance. The construction of econometric models of the economy and their use in forecasting and quantitative policy planning and modern theories of international trade and economic growth are particular cases in point. —WILLIAM P. YOHE, *Duke University*.

Democracy and the Majority Principle: A Study in Twelve Contemporary Political Theories. BY ELIAS BERG. (Göteborg: Akademiförlaget-Gumperts, Scandinavian University Books, 1965. Pp. 166. Sv. Kr. 25; paper.)

If one starts with the premise that democracy is to be understood primarily and exclusively as a system of popular government, then the majority problem becomes to what extent and in what ways does the majority principle contribute to the realization of popular government. This, I think it is fair to say, is the focus of this closely reasoned and carefully researched book by Swedish political theorist Elias Berg.

In order to clarify the issues involved Berg begins by examining the treatment of the majority principle by twelve contemporary writers. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Harold J. Laski, Hans Kelsen, Bernard R. Berelson, T. V. Smith, Ernest Barker, Carl J. Friedrich, David B. Truman, Robert A. Dahl, G. D. H. Cole, Christian Bay, and John H. Hallowell are chosen—not because they are necessarily the most significant contributors to democratic thought, but because together they present a broad spectrum of answers to the problem of majority rule. Berg treats each theorist by first summarizing his particular treatment of majority rule and then by subjecting the argument to close analysis. This section is on the whole very well done and would alone make the book valuable.

In the second and final part of the book, Berg brings together various components of the twelve theories as elements in a systematic inquiry into the majority problem. This section is also carefully and intelligently done and is illuminating in a number of ways. In discussing the relationship of political equality and majority rule Berg makes what I found to be a particularly helpful distinction between equality of participation and equality of influence. The implications of this distinction are by no means fully exploited, but to do so would have taken Berg far beyond the scope of his present study.

Inevitably, the impact of a book so intricate and complex cannot be adequately summarized, but certain of Berg's major conclusions can be presented. If we "take as the starting point of the analysis an etymologically derived ideal concept of democracy as a system of popular government, in the sense of governance by all the citizens equally," then governance "by *all* the citizens can be approximated by maximizing the number of citizens who have any share in the governance, while governance by the citizens *equally* can be approximated by reducing the differences between their shares." Berg finds "first, that, with certain technical qualifications, the use of the majority principle is a prerequisite of maximization. Furthermore, having distinguished two types of political equality, we have found, second, that (within its area of application) the use of the majority principle implies equality of participation. . . . Yet finally, we have found, third, that there is no positive relationship between the use of the majority principle and equality of influence."

Although there is no *positive* relationship between the majority principle and equality of influence, equality of influence presupposes equality of participation which in turn involves the use of the majority principle. Thus, Berg continues "we can justify the majority principle (1) by its non-discriminatory character, which, by providing each individual within its sphere of application with the same share in formal governance, makes the use of the majority principle a *necessary condition* of both (a) government by all the citizens and (b) government by the citizens equally, as well as (2) by its maximizing character, which means that (applied to the whole people) it tends to produce an *approximation* to government by all the citizens (though not to government by the citizens equally)."

Berg's book, given its premises and its intentions, is quite a good one. My quarrel with it—and with most of contemporary democratic theorizing—is that the acceptance of what Berg quite correctly calls the "etymologically derived ideal concept of democracy as a system of popular government, in the sense of governance by all the citizens equally" leads to a lot of talk that is not really very important and may indeed be seriously misleading. If one holds up before his mind a simplified ideal in which men through the application of the majority principle literally govern themselves—whether this model is called democracy, polyarchy, or something else—and if one then examines this ideal in the light of contemporary political experience, one will certainly conclude with Berg, Dahl, and a number of others that the majority principle cannot fulfill the egalitarian promises of the democratic ideal.

Berg refers to these egalitarian promises in the last sentence of his book as "admittedly reckless." If they are reckless, as indeed I think they are, then why focus an analysis of the majority problem around them? When the democratic theorist concentrates his attention on the ideal of *self*-government, he tends to lose sight of the fact that what we know as modern democracy is above all a system of *government*. Of course, it has something to do with an eighteenth-century revolutionary ideal, but much more pertinently it is a set of institutions which process demands for change and which provide governors with feedback from the governed. What is the role of the *majority principle*—even if minorities *do* rule—in processing demands for change, in providing leaders with feedback on public policies and in forcing them to listen to it and, most interestingly perhaps, in stimulating followers to provide feedback? Of course, *these* questions about the relationship between democracy and the majority principle never even arise when one tests the majority principle against an ideal of popular government which almost everyone admits is unrealistic.—THOMAS LANDON THORSON, *University of Toronto*.

A Republic of Equals. BY LESLIE W. DUNBAR. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 132. $4.00.)

Every major social movement generates a body of literature which seeks to articulate the purposes and justify the goals of its proponents. When the rhetoric of the leadership is sufficiently inspired in its appeal to nourish and enlarge the constituency committed to reform it becomes incorporated into the ideology of the movement. With the civil rights movement the focus of students of ideology has quite naturally been on the speeches and writings of such articulate Negro leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr., A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young, Roy Wilkins, James Farmer, Stokely Carmichael and Floyd McKissick. A less conspicuous, although perhaps in the long run equally significant, body of literature has been developing however which also articulates the course of contemporary social change. This is the literature of the white, liberal Southerner. Leslie W. Dunbar's *A Republic of Equals* is a work in this genre.

Leslie W. Dunbar has a particularly good set of credentials to qualify him to write on this subject. A former research director and later executive director of the Southern Regional Council, he is now executive director of the Field Foundation. As a statement of political values, a witness so to speak, *A Republic of Equals* is both lucid and effective. Yet, for a political scientist, testament, however satisfying, is not enough; the book lacks a theoretical underpinning which would bolster persuasion and distinguish it from elevated assertion. In defense of the author, however, it should be noted that this manuscript was based upon a set of public lectures and therefore was initially intended for a listening rather than a reading audience. Still the over-all effect is one of fuzziness.

Such criticism may be offset in part by the author's uncommon gift of expression, his almost poetic sense of similitude and metaphor. As a sensitive kind of regional introspection, from the perspective of the white liberal Southerner in search of identity, this book is particularly effective. "Perhaps the wisest discovery of James Baldwin was that no American, Negro or white, has a given identity, that we have always been and are now a people in search of ourselves" (p. 24). In the past, however, the South has always given a sense of identity to those from that region. The attributes of this identity were, as Dunbar notes, best stated twenty five years ago by W. J. Cash in *The Mind of the South*. But even as the Southern veto in national politics is passing, so Dunbar observes is the South of W. J. Cash coming to an end.

> "The South is drawing to its close as a discrete political power· Its civilization also is ending, or, rather, is headed toward sameness with all America. No writer of a decade or so hence will need to explore the mind of the South, as Cash did, for it is about to become as mindless as New England or the mid-West and in the near future will have finally found its rest in the American union. One says this with sorrow. Gross as have been her sins and uncouth as have been many of her ways, the South inspired her sons and daughters, even her suffering black ones, to love her. What other region did that, and in doing it gave dimension and stamina to human spirits?" (Pp. 25–26.)

Among other things, what the Negro civil rights leaders have taught the rest of America, Dunbar declares, is that segregation is not "a condition of life but a policy adopted anew each day," a policy which could be altered by responsible action. In his indictment of Southern politics Dunbar writes: "The South furnishes an instructive example of the moral and social ravages of a political order based on ideology" (p. 41). The revolution which was overthrowing the ideology of white supremacy, was in turn restoring the country to its true heritage. "These are strange revolutionaries. They come as defenders of the land and its values. They come, as one prominent white Southerner once put it to me, to give us back our country" (p. 54). Assuredly, *A Republic of Equals* is not precisely political science; but it is a humane and reasonable statement of high purpose in a period of rapid social change.—ALAN P. GRIMES, *Michigan State University.*

Free Activities and Interpersonal Relations. BY C. W. CASSINELLI. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. vi, 116. Guilders 15.75.)

This study aims at explicating the idea of freedom by relating it to the concepts of political influence, control, power, authority, leadership, and legitimacy. The author shows that these are four term relations (two actors and their respective actions), that the control action is a sufficient, but need not be a necessary, condition for the respondent's behavior, and that having control, etc., unlike exercising control, etc., refers to contrary-to-fact conditionals. All this is said clearly, although most of it has been said before.

It is the more surprising that the author fails to point out that the concept of interpersonal freedom, too, designates interaction relationships, i.e., that A can be said to be unfree to do x only with respect to some other actor B. Furthermore, he claims that someone is unfree to violate a law only if he complies in order to avoid the penalty (pp. 87, 89); "but if he broke the law he was obviously free to commit the illegal act" (p. 35, fn.4). "The existence of a threatened punishment does not in itself create unfreedom. To say that a man is unfree to perform an activity that he in fact performs is logically most cumbersome" (p. 34). Perhaps, but this is precisely the way we use the term. To say that a government restricts freedom of speech means that it makes the propagation of certain views punishable, and that citizens are officially unfree to spread them whether they do and are punished or whether they comply, and whether they comply to avoid punishment or because they agree with the official doctrine. If B makes it impossible or punishable for A to do x, A is, with respect to B, unfree to do x, regardless of his actual behavior and motives. It is not illogical to say that I did something which I was unfree to do.

The author evidently fails to distinguish between interpersonal freedom and freedom of choice. If A is unfree to break a law, he may nevertheless have freedom of choice to act illegally or legally: i.e. he *can* break the law. If A lacks freedom of choice, i.e., *cannot* do x, he is unfree *to do* x only if the impediment has been caused by another actor B. It is therefore misleading to claim that "a man who has inadvertently fallen into a natural pit with unscalable walls is unfree in the same sense as the prisoner at night in his cell" (p. 28). Both *cannot* get out; the latter is also *unfree* to get out (with respect to wardens, police, government); but the former's freedom to leave has not been restricted by anyone. There are things I am free to do, yet cannot do, and there are actions I am unfree, yet able to perform. The distinction between inability and unfreedom to do something is of central importance to the analysis of political power relationships.

In this study, the terms "free" and "unfree" occur indiscriminately in yet another sense, namely as characteristics of actions, and again in a sense which unnecessarily deviates from common usage. "Activities are unfree when and only when there exist impediments to alternative activities" (p. 19). It would follow that my driving within the speed limits is always an unfree activity, even when I do so to enjoy a leisurely ride. Actions are usually considered unfree if they are motivated by fear of sanctions. I may do freely what I am unfree not to do (e.g., keeping within the speed limits), and I may do freely what I am unfree to do (e.g., speeding). The author assumes that most people prefer to obey the law rather than to risk punishment, and therefore holds that an action is unfree if the probability that similar actions will occur under similar circumstances is great, and free if it is small (p. 42). However, some tend to drive slowly, *predictably and freely*, while others may speed (freely) today but slow down tomorrow, *unpredictably and unfreely.*

When dealing with freedom, the author fails to meet his own standard that "the developed concepts should remain as close as possible to the essential meanings of the ideas [they express]" (p. 3). To do so, it is necessary to distinguish between interpersonal (or intergroup) freedom, so called freedom of choice, and free actions, and to provide an adequate explication for each of these concepts.—FELIX E. OPPENHEIM, *University of Massachusetts.*

Democracy or the Scientific Method in Law and Policy Making. BY FREDERICK K. BEUTEL. (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Universitaria Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1965. Pp. 269.)

This is a disturbing book. It should be unsettling to anyone who reads it on at least two counts.

In the first place, it is the product of long years of thought and research by an author who is familiar with government as both student and practitioner, and his conclusions about democratic policy-making are harsh. In one of Beutel's most penetrating passages, he points out that the public and those who study democratic processes take for granted the intrinsic merit of the concept of "equality." He suggests that this is a blind acceptance, particularly in the face of accumulating evidence that equality is not workable either in theory or in practice, and, in fact, to insist on equality is perhaps to perpetrate injustice by demanding more of some persons than of others. While the argument may be vulnerable, it is one to which political theorists and researchers urgently need to turn their attention.

In the second place, the reader will be disturbed by the author's conclusions and recommendations as a general posture. Beutel argues (apparently to his satisfaction, if not to mine) that democracy might once have worked, but cannot anymore. Since democracy does not work, he recommends that we replace it with a "Scienstate," that is, a form of government which relies on the empirical methodologies of modern science and technology to analyze the basic needs and demands of the populace and which will respond to these needs through controlled social experimentation. Although the author sensibly avoids attempting to delineate the precise structure of the Scienstate, it is obvious that The Scientist is to be the new ruling class, neutrally applying his neutral methods to arrive at public policy. Since Science is self-correcting, rule by The Scientists will be self-controlling.

If this book is read as data, it well expresses the enormous impact that the phrase "scientific method" has made on a whole generation. There is real magic in those words. And Beutel is openly advocating adopting the magic as an ultimate solution to governmental problems. The troublesome side of all this is that aside from the fact that scientists themselves become modestly vague when they try to describe their method, there is the problem that The Scientist, as neutral, self-denying arbiter of the truth, simply does not exist. Too many scientists, when given the opportunity to scramble for government grants, act dismayingly like the rest of us. In effect, Beutel is trying to prevent control by other special interest groups through promotion of one interest group (or a congeries of loosely confederated interest groups) to pre-eminent power. As a controlling pressure group, it might well be that scientists would do a better job than, say, businessmen, union leaders, or historians, but we may hesitate at the idea of accepting and institutionalizing the control of any single set of interests, whatever their manifest virtues.

As propaganda for scientists as a pressure group, this book is at least interesting. As a study in perhaps the final goal of a certain brand of intellectualism it is even more interesting. But, unless taken as a series of only semi-articulated propositions about the nature of democracy and the role of science in government, it is unconvincing as either a serious work in social science or as a polemic.—S. J. Makielski, Jr., *University of Virginia.*

Propaganda Comes of Age. By Michael Choukas. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 299. $5.00.)

Professor Choukas, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Dartmouth College, believes propaganda directed toward the citizens of the United States is out of control. He says, "Both at home and abroad our society is in a crisis, has been for some time, and from all indications will remain in such a state for some time to come" (p. iii). Much of this crisis, according to his view, can be attributed "to our relative ignorance about the role of propaganda in these tense and trying times" (p. iii). Considering the current talk of "credibility gaps" in domestic politics, and the continuing escalation of international propaganda this is a timely book which researches an area of some importance.

The definition of propaganda and a brief history of its use are considered for two chapters. Then the author differentiates between propaganda as an art and as a science and then points out the distinctions between black and white propaganda, strategic and tactical propaganda, and preparational and operational propaganda. Later chapters develop Choukas' ideas about the impact of propaganda on the individual and the group, and emphasize the nature and role of propaganda in the democratic society. Examples of the techniques of propagandists are given throughout, and these examples constitute the main contribution to the general field of public opinion and propaganda which the author makes in this work.

Professor Choukas assumes that the individual in a democratic society not only has an inherent rationality, goodness, and decency developed to a degree which is considerably beyond that accepted by many social scientists, but, also, he assumes that the individual in the democratic society is inherently superior in these respects to individuals in other societies. These assumptions, plus his view of propaganda as acting directly on individuals with little emphasis on intermediary situational factors, cause him to use a conceptual framework somewhat closer to the stimulus-response scheme of the early behaviorists than most social scientists accept today.

Due to the inadequacy of this theoretical framework, Professor Choukas views the propaganda audience as a mass of disparate and independent individuals overpowered by the impact of the propaganda. He does not adequately take into account either apathy (and consequent lack of information-seeking or information-receiving on the part of significant proportions of the populace in large scale societies—even democratic ones) or the varied group cocoons surrounding individuals. These cause propaganda to have differential impacts on the same individuals at different times, or on different individuals at the same time. Failing to take this into account, the author becomes overly concerned about the ability of propagandists to seduce the individual and thereby convert the individual to dangerous doctrines.

Some recent examples of propaganda techniques are given, but throughout much of the book World War II examples are used to the virtual exclusion of current techniques. Also, the author has used few recent theoretical works. (Less than ten of approximately one hundred and fifty footnote entries are dated later than 1959.) It is helpful that the author brings his experiences in the Office of Strategic Services to his research effort, but the value of the examples gleaned from that era suffers because he has not up-dated those experiences in light of recent work on the subtle relationship between propaganda and propaganda audiences.

To add to its inadequacy, the book is poorly written and has no index. Probably most frustrating from a readability point of view is the fact that many direct quotes, from one-fourth to one page in length, are run directly in with the text rather than being off-set. Because of this, one wonders at many points whether one is reading Choukas or someone else.

When compared to much of the recent work in this field (J. A. C. Brown's book, *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963, for example) Professor Choukas' book has little to offer the serious student of propaganda.—R. LEWIS BOWMAN, *University of Virginia.*

The Velikovsky Affair: The Warfare of Science and Scientism. EDITED BY ALFRED DE GRAZIA. (New York: University Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. 260. $5.95.)

In September 1963 the editors of *The American Behavioral Scientist* devoted a whole issue to examining the events in the scientific world surrounding the publication in 1950 of Immanuel Velikovsky's *Worlds in Collision.* The present book is a republication of that issue with some additions to bring it up to date. It represents a most significant contribution to the sociology of science.

In *Worlds in Collision* Velikovsky challenged the assumption of uniformity in the solar system. He suggested, in brief, that the solar system has not always been in its present state—that it has a history. This history consists of a series of vast disturbances, lasting sometimes for several centuries, the most recent of which happened within recorded time. The effect of these events on Earth was cataclysmic: mountain ranges were pushed up or pulled down, oceans advanced or receded, and civilizations were wiped out. In *Worlds in Collision* Velikovsky concerned himself with one of the most recent of such cataclysms. In early biblical times, he argued, an eruption on Jupiter threw a large comet into an erratic orbit around the sun. This comet came into recurring contact with Earth and Mars before eventually settling down to become the planet Venus. Its impact was powerful enough to tilt the Earth on its axis and to bring total destruction to most parts of the planet.

The contributors to *The Velikovsky Affair* argue most convincingly that Dr. Velikovsky was not accorded the reception from the scientific community that his ideas merited. That reception was almost wholly negative, but went considerably beyond the ideal of unimpassioned scientific discourse. In two introductory chapters, Ralph E. Juergens documents a history of unconsidered rejection, ridicule, and attempted suppression. The anti-Velikovsky campaign got under way even before *Worlds in Collision* was published. Once it *was* published, pressure was brought to bear on the Macmillian Company—by way of its vulnerable text-book division—to make it drop the book from its lists, despite the fact that it had rapidly become a bestseller. This pressure was successful, and the rights to the book were transferred to the Doubleday Company, which did not have a text-book division. In the following years, Velikovsky was unable to gain access to the accepted scientific journals or to persuade those with the necessary scientific resources to perform a few relatively simple tests of his hypotheses.

The theme common to the five articles in this volume is that, while Velikovsky adhered closely to the various dictates of the scientific credo in his writings and at every stage of the following dispute, his detractors did not. The book argues that he presented ample evidence for his ideas to have been taken seriously, that his evidence was well documented and that he made explicit, testable predictions from his theory. On the other hand, Velikovsky's critics frequently attacked him without ever having read his books (they often took pride in the fact); they misrepresented his ideas, and paid no serious attention to his predictions. That various Mariner space probes brought startling confirmation of several of these predictions emphasized the plausibility of Velikovsky's theories, without increasing his respectability in the scientific community. Velikovsky was condemned out of hand as a crank.

Several elements appear to have contributed to this rejection. The breadth of the theory Velikovsky propounded is undoubtedly one, for he challenged accepted notions in half-a-dozen fields of academic inquiry. By questioning the theory of uniformity, these authors suggest, he was questioning an assumption on which a great deal of psychic security depended. Further, there is the question of Velikovsky's style and the eclectic character of the evidence he saw fit to bring to bear on the problem. His heavy reliance on mythology as data, not to mention his straightforward literal interpretation of biblical events—

such as the parting of the Red Sea—presented an unfamiliar face to physical scientists.

Yet these considerations are inconsistent with the scientific credo by which scientists claim to live. Probably the most valuable chapter in *The Velikovsky Affair* is that by de Grazia entitled "The Scientific Reception System." In it de Grazia postulates four models of the scientific community as a sociological reception system. The first is the "rationalistic" model that conforms to the formal criteria of the scientific method. De Grazia suggests, of course, a poor degree of fit between this model and the case under consideration. The next is the "indeterminacy" model by which "truth" is selected randomly from incoming ideas. In the "power" model ideas are accepted or rejected by a scientific "power elite" depending upon the impact they have on the position of the powerful individuals. Finally, the "dogmatic" model involves the acceptance of ideas in proportion to their conformity with prevailing theories and norms. In its reaction to Velikovsky, de Grazia argues, the behavior of the scientific community reflected elements of the latter three models, and especially the latter two.

Behavioral scientists might be expected this time to have been on the side of the angels; they were, after all, nearly alone among scientists in not having some fundamental notions challenged by Velikovsky. We can only hope that de Grazia is not unduly optimistic when he advocates behavioral insights as an antidote to this kind of unfortunate performance.—JOHN M. ORBELL, *Ohio State University.*

The Psychology of Power. BY RONALD V. SAMPSON. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. Pp. 247. $4.95.)

This is a curious book and one that I neither fully understand nor appreciate. Consider the following statements that appear in the first paragraph:

> It will be the central argument and purpose of this book to deny that there is more than one plane of reality in which the moral judgment functions. . . . In other words, what is morally right cannot be pragmatically wrong or politically wrong or invalidated on grounds of apparent futility. . . . The nature of this moral law is, moreover, understood to some degree by all rational men; it is the only sure source of their welfare in this world; it can be spelt out and be clearly understood by all, and will be found to hold good at whatever point of human experience we seek to test it.

There is a Lockean air about these statements, and indeed Mr. Sampson owes a good deal to Locke although his name does not appear in the index. Like Locke and most of the Enlightenment thinkers, Mr. Sampson assumes that moral issues and choices are always clear-cut. Reasonable men perceive these issues without much difficulty, and resolve them in accordance with *the*(not *a*) moral law. The law commands us to love our neighbor as ourselves, and above all to avoid relationships based on either dominance or submission.

This latter emphasis may fall short of an *idee fixe* but it does manage to give the book its constant and somewhat repetitious theme. For Mr. Sampson, who lectures in politics at the University of Bristol, is unreservedly against dominance-submission relationships whether they occur in marriage, or between parents and children, or among states. He especially has no use for those who put women down (and hence takes issue with Freud, among others), or who argue that national interest rather than morality should guide foreign policy (a category of strategist that includes almost all foreign policy experts although Mr. Sampson singles out Hans Morganthau as his awful example).

The ideal standard, in accordance with the moral imperative, is love, equality, and maturity. On the other side, of course, is selfishness, inequality, and a debased lust for power. Mr. Sampson has no doubt that power corrupts and that the urge to power, in one form or another, is what destroys marriages and entire families, health and creativity, and peaceful relations between nations. We are doomed, he insists, unless power is tamed in every area of human endeavor.

I am inclined to think that he is right, but perhaps paradoxically I find it difficult to say exactly what he is right about. It is probably correct to believe that the urge to dominate in the home has some bearing on the urge to make war abroad (could Lyndon Johnson be a case in point?), but whether it does or not, what is to be done about the sick, the cruel, the morally maimed, and the cynically corrupt who 'govern' so many homes, institutions, and nations? Mr. Sampson's solution is the moral law and reason, but surely he is aware that such exhortation, characteristic of so much political philosophy from Locke to Bertrand Russell, is always listened to and rarely followed. While his analyses of disturbed relationships, particularly the literary ones (Elizabeth Barrett, Samuel Butler, John Stuart Mill, and others) are instructive, they do not lead to a conclusion that can be applied to families as such, let alone to nations and power politics.

It is possible that Mr. Sampson's argument would have been substantially aided by a psychodynamic theory of interpersonal and international relations. To be sure, there are chapters on "The Psychoanalysis of Power" and "The Divided Self," but I did not find these distinguished by either breadth or depth. The author, for example, seems totally unaware of advances in psychoanalysis since Freud, and he apparently is unfamiliar with *any* recent American political science research having to do with political behavior. Perhaps the unfortunate Professor Morganthau is the only American student of politics known to Mr. Sampson. Perhaps. As mentioned earlier, Locke does not appear in the index, either, but that is hardly because he is unknown.—ARNOLD A. ROGOW, *City University of New York.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The National Election of 1964. EDITED BY MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xi, 295. $5.00.)

The aim of this volume, editor Milton Cummings tells us, "is to present several interpretive and analytical essays that probe into selected aspects" of the most recent presidential election. To this end seven well known political scientists have contributed papers, each in his own field of expertise.

The late Paul Tillett—who taught so many of us what nomination politics was all about through the National Convention Fellowship program—drew upon material prepared by several 1964 Fellows to trace the pattern of events in San Francisco and Atlantic City. He suggests the Republicans may be taking on characteristics (factionalism, open disagreements openly arrived at) long associated with the Democrats, but genuinely associated with the minority party.

Stanley Kelley, Jr., gives us a tightly written account of what the candidates said and how they spent their time. This is built around some suggestive generalizations about campaign strategy: ". . . the way the candidate's time is distributed among the states should reflect the allocation of other scarce resources which can be transferred from state to state. . . ." "The initial strategy of a political campaign may be usefully regarded as an investment plan in which the level of investment in the several undertakings is set in accordance with estimates of the likely return of votes from each."

Nelson W. Polsby discusses the strategic alternatives open to a minority party, calls attention to the lack of evidence supporting the "hidden vote" hypothesis accepted by many Goldwaterites, and offers an explanation for the Goldwater nomination. After a brief discussion of the Democratic strategy and post-election events, Polsby takes up certain implications of the election: new evidence on the ability of the Democrats to govern because of the 89th Congress, the possibility that we are moving from a two-party system to a party-and-a-half system, and the increasing importance of a long pre-convention campaign in the outparty.

Charles A. H. Thomson discusses several aspects of the performance of the mass media. He gives considerable attention to one non-event of 1964, televised debates between the presidential candidates, and to important new developments in election reporting, the Network Election Service and the Vote Profile Analysis.

Herbert E. Alexander, the Certified Public Accountant of our profession, continues his task of detailing who spent how much for what purpose in a campaign he estimates to have cost $200 million. He points out that the "financing of the presidential campaigns of 1964 contrasted sharply with the voting patterns: the victory of Lyndon Baines Johnson was built on a narrow financial base but a broad electoral base; the Barry Goldwater candidacy had a broad financial but a narrow electoral base."

Milton Cummings contributes two chapters, one on the Senate elections and one on the House elections. The Republicans, Cummings says, lost a fine opportunity. Given the number of marginal seats, 1964 could have been a year for Republican gains. Instead the Democrats won 10 close victories which virtually assured them Senate control until 1971. In the House, Cummings finds Democratic gains in formerly Republican Eastern Suburban Districts, Democrats coming out on top in 1964 in the volatile Plains States, a continuation of Democratic growth in the West, and a mixed pattern in the South with Democrats doing better in the Peripheral South and Republican gains in the Deep South. All of this, he notes, added up to a major shift in Congressional power. Because of the number of conservatives defeated in both parties, the 89th Congress was the most liberal in a generation.

Angus Campbell presents some first findings from the 1964 study of the Survey Research Center. In these pages are the basic data on candidate image and party image for 1960 and 1964. He also analyzes the effect of the Goldwater nomination, and offers an estimate of 25% of the Goldwater vote (about 7 million votes) as the approximate size of the "conservative" vote, Campbell concludes by wondering whether the new Democratic advantage in party identification will be temporary or permanent. If it does persist, he notes, this will have profound consequences for the nature of party competition.

All in all, this is a fine book. The contributors know what they are about, and call attention to the right things in their allotted pages. The professor who wants to update his lectures to include developments of 1964 will find what he needs right here. Still there are a few questions which should be raised. The only major factual matter in need of challenge is whether Barry Goldwater embraced a Southern strategy and whether he won in the Deep South because of his stand on civil rights. There are assertions to this effect in four of the essays. However, the Goldwater campaign was not dominated by a Southern strategy and there were other attitudes motivating Southerners besides those concerning race.

The organization of the book makes it easy to relate the findings to existing knowledge about political parties, but I wonder if it facilitates an understanding of 1964. One chapter contains the facts on campaign finance, another what the candidates had to say, still another data on the voters' attitudes, and so on. Not only does it require a heroic act of imagination to reassemble these bits and pieces into one flesh-and-blood set of events, but there are many important questions about relationships *between* these categories. For example, what happens when the fund raisers decide they are experts on strategy? What sort of impact does the candidates' strategy have on the voters' attitudes? What sorts of anguishing strategy decisions had to be made by Republican congressional candidates in the Northeast and Democratic congressional candidates in the South because of the nature of the presidential campaign? When a number of important questions drop through our analytical screen, we should at least ask whether we are being well served by our organizing concepts.

Finally, there is an interesting contrast in the essays by Professors Kelley and Polsby. Kelley argues that much of the Goldwater campaign "was not very different from the kind of campaign one would have expected on behalf of a moderate Republican" while Polsby found "the Senator's campaign represented a sharp departure from Republican tactics of the recent past." Kelley tells us the "Democratic strategy was a carefully constructed response to the Goldwater experiment and was characterized, therefore, by a kind of mirror image unorthodoxy" while Polsby informs us "the Democratic strategy was a model of orthodoxy and scarcely needs either description or explanation." I happen to believe there were unique aspects to both campaigns, but this conclusion obviously is open to debate. When as many people are involved as in a presidential campaign, *no one* knows "the real story." It exists only as an ideal. The challenge and the fascination lie in trying to understand these complex phenomena on the basis of the fragmentary data available to us. And in this respect, Milton Cummings and his colleagues have done a fine job.—JOHN H. KESSEL, *Allegheny College.*

Midwest Politics. BY JOHN H. FENTON. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. Pp. ix, 244. $3.95, paper.)

The book treats the historical development of party politics and office-seeking in each of six states within the framework of a central typology. Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are classified as "issue-oriented" two-party states, exemplifying "programmatic" politics. Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio are described as traditional "job-oriented" two-party systems. The central proposition of the work arises out of the literature on inter-party competition, wherein several authors have focused upon the effects of the degree of inter-party competition upon political outcomes. Fenton has introduced a modification: Political outcomes will vary in relation to the degree to which state political systems are "job-oriented," or "programmatic." Given the fact that the most recent literature has minimized the significance of the effects of party competition (a point that Fenton does not make) in deference to the effects of socio-economic variables upon political outcomes, Fenton's modification may come to the rescue and open up an important line of inquiry. Many researchers in comparative state politics would be happy to find a truly political variable with a high degree of relevance for the many facets of state and local expenditure and effort.

The central typology of Fenton's work is an interesting one, but unless it is treated in relation to specific indices of political behavior, the relative value of the notion for explaining political behavior cannot be assessed. Fenton does provide a fairly persuasive argument that the typological distinction is a meaningful one, but, from beginning to end, the concepts of "job-oriented" and "issue-oriented" are treated as an amorphous dichotomy. In what ways and to what extent can the concepts be sharpened? One avenue of clarification would lead to lower order typologies of party structure, administrative organization, campaign technique, etc. A second alternative would lead to the introduction of concrete indices, such as the number of patronage jobs available to the governor, or the percentage of state employees protected by a merit system. Either route would have its value. The first would provide a systematic and more sophisticated conceptual apparatus, and for many scholars such an enterprise would perform a useful function. The second route would provide a cluster of operational referents that would relegate the dichotomy to a pedagogical tool (an inevitability if the basic distinction is meaningful). Fenton has not taken either route, and this is perhaps the most disturbing feature of the work.

If the typology were operationalized through the use of specific indices implied by the concepts, and if such indices were matched against a series of political output measures, then the analysis would certainly go a long way toward giving more plausible, cumulative, and balanced knowledge of the six states. Furthermore, the central proposition of the work would be exploited more fully—to the extent that such a proposition can be tested by looking at only six states. At one point (Table 8.1), the reader is told that the central proposition of the work is borne out by an examination of political output data, but only three output indices are employed. It would have been helpful to the reader if a larger number of specific indices were developed, giving some idea of whether there were differences in state effort not detected by gross measures of taxation and expenditure.

Midwest Politics is a study of the history and political subject-matter of each state, treating states individually more often than comparatively, based upon interviews with knowledgeable persons in each state as well as the works of several other authors. If the reader wishes to be introduced to the party politics of any or all of the six states, then this work will provide a beginning. If he wishes to be convinced that the basic argument of the work is meaningful, deserving further research, he will find the chapters persuasive. If he wishes to find a full examination of what appears to be the central hypothesis, he is likely to be disturbed by the book's shortcomings. It is not difficult to find events that contradict the typology (such as the Republicans coming to the 1963 Indiana legislative session with a series of legislative proposals based upon their party platform) and thus, without a comparative presentation of data linking concepts to indices of events, the reader is left in a state of uneasy curiosity. Data for six states would not satiate that curiosity, but at least our sense of discontent would be tempered by the consideration that not everyone should be forced to study fifty states at once.—WAYNE L. FRANCIS, *Syracuse University*.

House vs. Senate: Conflict in the Appropriations Process. BY JEFFEREY L. PRESSMAN. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 133. $4.50.)

For most of the second session of the 87th Congress, the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate conducted a highly publicized feud which stalled legislative activity and eventually left some federal agencies without the money to pay salaries. In the press, the battle was interpreted as a contest between the chairmen of the two committees; Representative Clarence Cannon and Senator Carl Hayden—each in his mid-eighties and each (so the story went) a little stubborn, senile and paranoid. In his intelligent, flavorful and nicely written little book, Jeffrey Pressman convincingly demonstrates the total inadequacy—indeed, the wrong headedness—of such a highly personalized interpretation of this intracongressional conflict. And in so doing, he provides us with an excellent example of just what it is that political scientists have that newspapermen do not—a perspective long enough and broad enough to encompass a cohering network of relationships and the desire to generalize about these relationships across individual cases.

The author argues that the 1962 contretemps should be viewed as one manifestation of a deep-seated, long-standing conflict between the House and Senate generally and their appropriations committees particularly. The point is that the two committees are quite different political systems and they are as Cannon's successor, George Mahon, put it "contentiously juxtaposed" by the bicameralism of the Constitution. Their disputes are explainable in terms of fairly durable, stable institutional and ideological factors, and not in terms of individual idiosyncracies.

Pressman describes the appropriations process, the differences between the two committees and the various sources of their conflict. His study then focuses upon the conference committee as the normal arena in which House-Senate disputes get settled and as the place where, predictably, the 1962 argument came to a head. (Neither committee would go to conference with the other.) Using a number of theoretical constructions to good advantage, he illustrates some conference committee strategies. And while his treatment is quite sketchy, it is sufficient to indicate the special attractiveness of the conference committee for anyone who wishes to apply bargaining theory to the congressional world. The book closes with a very sensible assessment of some perennial reform proposals—to which Pressman adds his own, a staff attached to the conference committee. Such a device, he speculates, could be the nub around which some unifying sentiments and loyalties might form.

This reader's major regret is that in a book whose logical centerpiece is the treatment of the conference committee, the author decided not to look at any conference activity himself. (This may have been part of a decision, also regrettable, not to research any primary source documents—hearings, reports, debates—since no indication of such usage appears in the book.) Conference reports are available, as are House floor debates on the adoption of conference reports. And, where appropriations are involved, it is easier than it is in other legislative areas to reconstruct the bargains (at least the money bargains) that were struck in conference. A few such reconstructions would have informed the pivotal description of the conference immeasurably; and they would have strengthened (or weakened?) the author's case for his conference-centered reform proposal. This book gives us a helpful overview; but the elementary task of description remains where it was when Gilbert Steiner left off 15 years ago.—RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., *University of Rochester.*

Congress and Lobbies: Image and Reality. BY ANDREW M. SCOTT AND MARGARET A. HUNT. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 106. $4.50.)

This small volume is an example of how a useful research design of limited dimensions can run aground of its authors' propensity to engage in academic polemics.

A major unfulfilled research task of the so-called "group theory of politics" is the specification of the conditions under which groups exert influence upon authoritative allocations of values and resources. The problems are familiar and formidable—both conceptually (e.g., what is "access" and "influence"?) and evidentially (e.g., how to uncover the group-relevant premises of decisions).

Presumably addressing themselves to this question, the authors interviewed a sample of 34 House Members during the 88th Congress. Their inquiries were designed to elicit a Member's perceptions of interest group activity in an area of his policy specialization, as well as in an area where he had only peripheral concern. Additionally, the Members were asked to assess the impact of groups and the effectiveness of various lobbying techniques.

With such a small sample of respondents, the cells in most cases are inadequate for confident generalizations. Tabular material is often fleshed out beyond reasonable limits; categories could have been collapsed and tables combined to lend greater impact to the findings. Still, several generalizations are advanced which are congruent with what we already know about the legislative process: (1) Congressmen have clearer perceptions of groups in their own field of specialization; in areas of peripheral concern, the general public image of the group seems controlling. (2) Low-seniority Members see groups as more important and influential than do high-seniority Members. (3) Democrats apparently hold a more congenial view of groups than Republicans (though, as the authors recognize, party affiliation may mask other variables, such as recruitment patterns or constituency differences).

Not content with these accomplishments, however, the authors seek to employ their evidence to destroy the straw-man of group omnipotence. For readers whose knowledge extends no further than the writings of certain gossip-columnists, this may provide a useful antidote. But for students familiar with the literature on interest groups, the effort is at best redundant.

Indeed, the authors themselves display some uncertainty about the locus of the myth they are attacking. True, pressure groups are the *eminences grises* of a considerable body of popular literature; but how widely is this belief infused into public ideology? The authors assume this to be a significant aspect of public ideology, but they adduce no evidence. Indeed, the evidence is spotty and inconclusive. Recently-published and forthcoming studies cast doubt on the myth that Americans distrust politics and politicians. Is it possible that there are other mythical myths about public attitudes toward politics?

When they seek to construct their straw-man out of the scholarly literature, the authors encounter greater difficulty. They charge that scholars have sought self-serving examples of group power and ignored contrary evidence. This may well be the case, but the reasons are not those implied by the authors and would constitute the material for an interesting essay on the sociology of scholarship. (And in this light, how is the reader to interpret the interviewer's injunction to her respondents that "It is my idea that while these groups play a role, the extent of interest group influence is often greatly exaggerated and, therefore, the actual workings of the House are seriously misunderstood.")

A second charge is that, in group research, "Congressmen almost invariably emerge as papier-mache figures" (p. 10). Thus, in spite of his explicit declarations to the contrary, David Truman is put down with the remark that "presumably, when one has dealt with the pressures exerted on Congress, there is not much left to say about that body." (*Ibid.*) The objection, one gathers, is simply that Truman dealt with Congress from the perspective of the group process rather than the other way around (though it must be observed that *The Governmental Process* is not Truman's last word on the subject of Congress). And, by the last chapter, the authors interpret group theory to require "virtual monopoly of access to Congress. . . " (p. 87).

Having thus fashioned group theory, the authors construct an equally implausible model of influence. Thus, influence (the authors find the word "pressure" semantically useful) is apparently equated with the use of coercive mechanisms and limited to the "lobbying" situation (pp. 14–15, 58–59, 87). Group potency can be demonstrated, they contend, only if demands are pressed which reflect values not internalized by legislators, and then are met because of coercion, either implicit or explicit. This is somewhat curious, since influence apparently proceeds most commonly through "mutual adjustments" (Lindblom) or "coordinated expectations" (Deutsch); and, indeed, the employment of threats might be thought to indicate the breakdown, rather than the effectiveness, of normal patterns of influence.

It is not surprising, then, that the authors find little "pressure" going on. Having excluded from traditional theory those elements of influence which psychological and political studies would suggest are most important (e.g., creation of predispositions to act throughout the entire socialization process; reinforcement of those predispositions; etc.), the authors are able to re-discover some of these elements and unveil an "altered perspective." One wonders why the authors did not take themselves more seriously when, in an unguarded moment, they observe that "it may seem strange that the interpretation of Congressional behavior in terms of interest group activity should have to be combatted when it was never established in the first place" (pp. 17–18).

The data from the study, moreover, are simply not sufficient to, as the authors put it, "shrink interest groups to life size." Besides excluding most group-related factors which may impinge upon the legislators' attitudes and values, the data permit no assessment of the strength of group influences relative to other factors. Nor do the data give any picture of the play of forces in such nonlegislative tasks as constituency casework. A more comprehensive audit of incoming cues would be required to answer this question with any certainty. Even accepting the authors' findings, however, it is entirely plausible to argue (for example) that: (a) the volume of external cues *from all sources* is smaller than one might assume; (b) group-related (and other) cues—in the form of information, policy claims, or whatever—enter Congress largely through the policy specialists and are communicated *by these Members* to their colleagues, either explicitly or implicitly; and (c) group-related cues are thus infused into the intralegislative communications network without being perceived by most Members as group "pressures" at all. These are merely propositions, but they are entirely plausible and illustrate the insufficiency of the authors' evidence for the task they set for it.

In brief, this book offers some suggestive findings of a limited nature concerning Congressional perceptions of interest groups. But as for its "altered perspective" of the role of groups, it has all been said before, more cogently and more systematically, by other observers—and not least by "group theorists" themselves.—ROGER H. DAVIDSON, *Dartmouth College.*

Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-Help. BY MARSHALL B. CLINARD. (New York: The Free Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 395. $7.95.)

This is an interesting and good book. It could be more helpful to those who are struggling to find solutions to slum problems. I confess to some frustration on this score.

Perhaps my frustration stems from the fact that I am one of those people whose profession calls for spending a lot of time searching for ways out. This is a desperate and unrewarding pursuit and the solutions are still eluding us. It is therefore disappointing when a new work on the subject doesn't seem to advance the front line much beyond where we are.

Maybe it's not supposed to do that.

The book does do a good job a) of describing the essential characteristics of slums (in many cultures); b) of presenting various theories about their formation and maintenance; c) of defining urban community development ("the development of effective community feeling with an urban context and the development of self-help and citizen participation, of individual initiative in seeking community integration and change"); d) of presenting various formulations of the principles of community development including the author's own; e) of describing in detail and analyzing an important and large scale community development program in India; f) of advocating community development as essential in changing or eradicating slums. On the last point I would have wished that Clinard's advocacy were a little less detached, cool and placid. This tone throughout the book ("Many people say. . . . " "It has been suggested. . . . " "On the other hand. . . .") makes the reader wonder how sure the author is of his own case.

My main criticisms of the book are several. First, it does not weigh urban community development techniques against alternative or complementary strategies of change. This is a crucial matter for decision makers (including ultimately the voters) who have to decide on the allocation of resources. Where is the payoff most likely to be? What are the priority objects and policies for investment? Should money and personnel be thrown into community development, building schools and training teachers, subsidizing economic enterprise, building new towns or improving municipal services and with what relative level of investment?

Second, Clinard fails in his analysis to encompass the entire urban system in assessing the forces that make slums and have potential for changing them. He tips his hat to it in a number of places and in the final paragraph of the book says, ". . . certain aspects of the slum problem

. . . reach far beyond small areas and the possibilities of self-help. . . . In both affluent and poor countries there is a need for more equitable distribution of wealth, elimination of poverty, improved housing conditions . . . [in] . . . less affluent societies there are problems of increased industrialization, overcoming widespread unemployment, and increasing health facilities." To change the slum, many facets of the total urban system are going to have to be manipulated, sentimentalists to the contrary notwithstanding, and community development is manipulation just as much as anything else. We need more analysis of the interaction of the elements of the urban system of which local citizen participation and determination is but one. The book doesn't do this.

Third, a little romanticism creeps in every now and then. Any good democrat, this reviewer included, wants democratic participation, community integration and self-help. It is possible to over-simplify this precept, however, and to be naive about how great things will be when we get it. For instance, Clinard says, "Change can be effectively accomplished only with the cooperation of the citizens as a group and through their perception of the need for change and their desire to cooperate with outside agencies in bringing about social change." This is doubtful dogma. Did the citizens as a group perceive and desire the electric light, the computer, Henry Ford and Robert Moses? Would not the distribution of higher income among the residents of slums produce change?

Fourth, even within its chosen arena the book would be more useful if it gave us more practical and earthy suggestions about how to accomplish some of the things it says are essential—such as demonstrating respect for uncultivated people, or developing effective communication between middle class people and lower class people, and inducing felt needs among the slum people and escalating them to levels of sophistication that hold real promise of changing their lives.

Now. Having vented these criticisms there are positive things to say. For researchers the pages on evaluating the Delhi project are interesting and helpful. This is an extraordinarily difficult subject to evaluate and the author slips a little bit in concluding this chapter with the statement: "Perhaps the most practical evidence of the success (of the project) was the adoption in India of a national program of urban community development . . . after a careful study of these two pilot projects." I'm afraid that cannot be called "evidence." The decision may well have been based on considerations of political popularity.

Clinard makes some very relevant observations on the role of non-professionals in community work. Relatively untrained and uneducated people can do much, often even better than the "professional." This is an important matter for attention in the United States.

He also emphasizes the importance of linking community development activities with the normal political processes. They cannot take place in a vacuum. Politicians can help or hinder and it is important to deal with this fact. Too often this is not done.

Another vital point well made is that "a change in identity or self-image is basic to successful community development. The continued reiteration of belief in (the local residents) by the community organizers and by others demonstrated W. I. Thomas' view that people come to act according to the expectations held of them." That motto should be on the wall of everyone who proposes to help people help themselves.

Clinard recognizes and deals well with the question of power. Lack of power and the feeling of powerlessness are potent contributors to the universally bemoaned "apathy" of slum residents. Successful community development must take the extension of power to the powerless as a prime objective.

One final word of complaint to the publisher, the Free Press. A book like this has many footnotes. They are all in the back of the book, arranged by chapters. In the text the individual pages do not indicate what chapter you are in. To refer to a footnote you have to turn back to find out what chapter you are reading, then shuffle to the back of the book to locate the footnote—a very time consuming business. Why not put "footnotes" right at the foot of the page to which they refer?—David R. Hunter, *Stern Family Fund.*

The Formative Years of Social Security. By Arthur J. Altmeyer. (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 314. $6.50.)

One of the more distinguished public administrators of our time, Arthur J. Altmeyer, has given us a useful account of the origin of the Social Security Act and its development from 1934 to 1954. As a member and chairman of the Social Security Board from 1934–46, and as Commissioner for Social Security from 1946–53, Mr. Altmeyer occupied a position which gave him a matchless opportunity to shape and observe the shaping of the social security system which means so much to so many Americans. His book is of special value to students of public administration but it can also serve political scientists concerned with the substance of public policy (there still are a few, aren't there?).

Mr. Altmeyer narrates and interprets the long succession of controversies which have embroiled the Social Security Act during its "formative years." He discusses and evaluates the pressures of the Townsend movement for uniform old age pensions for all elderly citizens; later modifications (though unacknowledged) of the Townsend plan put forward by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and certain prominent Republicans; the resistances to establishing state merit systems for administering the act; the perversion of old age assistance for partisan purposes by political spoilsmen in Ohio in 1936–38 and the hotly disputed decision to terminate federal aid until the evil was corrected; the attempt to establish adequate minimum unemployment compensation benefits in all states; the debate over pay-as-you-go financing versus "the full reserve system"; the dubious decision to limit social security taxes to a low level of earnings; the wrangling over the relationship between individual contributions and total potential benefits; the denial or reduction of old age benefits to those over 65 who continue to work; the financing of old age assistance on a 50-50 matching basis versus federal grants proportioned to per capita state income; the substitution of a strictly national unemployment insurance system for the federal-state system; the Flanders-Ives-Nixon bill to subsidize the purchase of private health insurance policies; the wisdom or folly of joint administration of employment service and unemployment benefits programs; the issue of social security benefits for the partially and the totally disabled; permitting the states to disclose the names of persons on public assistance rolls which are partially financed by federal revenues; the argument about whether social security beneficiaries have a contractual right to certain benefits or "only" a statutory right. With Medicare freshly on the statute books and future extensions of health insurance probable, Mr. Altmeyer has taken special care to insure that the background of Medicare was adequately chronicled.

Although *The Formative Years of Social Security* is invaluable from the standpoint of historical narrative, it is somewhat disappointing in its scanty treatment of the interplay of political forces which have caused social security to evolve into its present form. The opinions of Congressmen are cited from time to time, the reports of Congressional committees and study commissions and advisory groups are recorded, but Mr. Altmeyer was either not particularly interested in the rich mosaic of political pressures, strategies and counter-strategies which have brought about the Topsy-like growth of social security, or he decided largely to ignore them when writing this volume.

But if a systematic and searching probe into the political environment shaping social security is lacking, this is partially compensated for by the occasional introduction of illuminating vignettes. Mr. Altmeyer reveals that President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke to him in 1938 about using a National Health Program which had been endorsed by a National Health Conference as a campaign issue in 1940. Altmeyer suspects, therefore, that a third term was on Mr. Roosevelt's mind at least as early as 1938.

When a Huey Long filibuster brought Congress to adjournment in 1935 before action had been taken on an appropriation bill to finance the establishment of the social security apparatus, Comptroller General John R. McCarl saved the day by pointing out that "the work of the President's Committee on Economic Security had been financed as a research project by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration." McCarl said he saw no reason, therefore, why it would not be "entirely logical and proper to set up another research project to develop ways and means of putting the Social Security Act into operation."

Again, when Altmeyer urged the chairman of the Ways and Means committee to include farm workers under social security, the chairman replied, "Doctor, when the first farmer with manure on his shoes comes to me and asks to be covered, I will be willing to consider it." He also relates how Lord Beveridge (whose famous report was largely ignored by President Roosevelt) was made a deputy Sergeant-at-Arms by Sam Rayburn so that he could hear Winston Churchill address a joint session of Congress when every seat had already been taken.

In addition to such tidbits, Altmeyer offers various comments and suggestions containing a good bit of wisdom. He has a particularly instructive section on the quandaries and difficulties involved when federal grants to the states are suspended because the latter have flouted some provision of a law directing the administration of these grants. The cry is raised, "Why punish innocent people who need the money?" while the anguished administrator reminds his critics that unless the law is enforced, the states can disregard any federal requirement they find distasteful. In the Ohio affair, Altmeyer suggests that a useful compromise might have consisted of refusing to permit federal funds to be used to pay the salaries of persons hired outside the merit system in violation of federal law.

Commenting on the persistent efforts of Congressmen to influence the character of administrative decisions, he cites approvingly a political scientist who "after making an extensive study of the parliamentary form of government in a number of European countries, concluded that they had actual although not nominal separation of powers while we had nominal but not actual separation."

In the preface, Altmeyer confesses he has made no attempt "to analyze the long range economic, social and political forces at work." He sought, rather to discuss those immediate problems and policies which necessarily preoccupy the administrator. Similarly, the concluding chapter ("The Years Ahead") primarily deals with the work of tidying up the Social Security Act to make it a more effective instrument for achieving its original purposes. Unfortunately, the author does not seek to place today's law in the context of the historic transformations which prompted the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution to make such drastic recommendations. If Altmeyer had chosen to back away from the Act he administered so long and so well, and evaluated the relevance and adequacy of social security's basic premises in the world of tomorrow, his conclusions and logic would have commanded unusual interest. Or does total immersion in a program over a long period of time create a perspective and a defensiveness which ineluctably disqualify one for such a task?—REO M. CHRISTENSON, *Miami University (Ohio)*.

Financing the 1964 Election. BY HERBERT E. ALEXANDER. (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1966. Pp. 137. $1.00.)

The field of party and campaign finance currently attracts the research energies of only a handful of American political scientists. Rarely is the topic on the programs of the various American political science meetings (although it remains a subject of concern at the congresses of the International Political Science Association). Published systematic treatment of political finance is to be found for fewer than ten states. The inadequacy of records and public reports and the need for substantial funds to conduct research into the subject undoubtedly keep the number of researchers small. Those conducting interviews with donors and recipients of campaign money can attest to the difficulties of obtaining a full, candid report of amounts and sources involved and the difficulties of ascertaining motivations. Further, many do not see the field as a challenging one in which to apply sophisticated methodologies or theories.

In the face of this rather bleak picture, the profession owes a debt of gratitude to the Citizens' Research Foundation (which in turn receives support from the Ford Foundation) and in particular to Herbert E. Alexander who has written or edited more than half of its eleven reports. The 1964 study uses the same categories of analysis as his *Financing the 1960 Election*. These include pre-convention campaigns, convention costs, contributions and expenditures, labor and business in politics, the "aftermath," and issues of public policy.

Although a study of finance inevitably contains a large amount of descriptive material, Alexander does not hesitate to deal with broader issues and policies. To the student of comparisons and continuities in politics one of the best sections is that dealing with changes from 1952 to 1964. The latter pre-convention and general election campaigns are seen as the most expensive in history. The Goldwater campaign was a contradiction to the "widely held notions" that: large amounts in small sums could not be raised by direct mail or television appeals for funds; the out party is disadvantaged in fund-raising; and money is difficult to raise for a candidate with unfavorable poll results. Further, the drain of funds into expensive pre-nomination contests did not seem to cut into fund-raising ability in the general election campaign and, in a dramatic switch, Republicans attracted fewer large contributors and more small contributors than the Democrats.

In view of the importance of pecuniary factors for the political system, revitalization of the field as an object of research is much needed. Bolstered by adequate resources, political finance research, moreover, lends itself to a diversity of approaches. Alexander and others, for example, might be encouraged to plan now for a 1968 election study which would not only continue descriptive analysis but set up a series of propositions and hypotheses to be tested in light of available data since World War II. This period is exciting since it contains maintaining, deviating, reinstating, and critical elections. Theoretical leads put forth by Alexander Heard would be augmented by additional models and by widespread interviews. (Here the Michigan Survey Center's experience might be used.) The 1964 election, for example, suggests a hypothesis worthy of testing that the more ideological a candidate is perceived to be the more likely a large number of ideologically oriented voters will make donations.

Other fertile fields include the funding of congressional mid-term elections and a comparison of donors and of expenditures for legislative candidates in presidential and off-year elections. Despite inadequacy of records, comparative research on state political finance deserves a place with comparative research on state legislative behavior and party systems. Analysis of the relationship, if any, of finance to degrees of party competition is almost completely lacking, yet might reveal much about the political system. With most county governments remaining as bastions of considerable patronage, the campaign finances of county executives and legislators is also an obvious field for study.—HUGH A. BONE, *University of Washington*.

Money as a Campaign Resource: Tennessee Democratic Senatorial Primaries, 1948–1964. By WILLIAM BUCHANAN AND AGNES BIRD. (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens Research Foundation, 1966. Pp. 97. $.50.)

Money and Politics in California: Democratic Senatorial Primary, 1964. By JOHN R. OWENS. (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens Research Foundation, 1966. Pp. 62. $.50.)

A recent Ford grant to the Citizens' Research Foundation has made possible still further monographs on the impact of money on politics. These two studies are the first analyses of primary elections. They are lively, well written accounts and all of the authors deserve thanks for their efforts to present thoughtful assessments of data which to say the least are elusive.

Strangely enough, both studies are instructive to those who may still overrate the role of money in campaigns. Owens shows that in California money was not the decisive factor in either the pre-primary screening of candidates, the primary or general election. Furthermore, the biggest spender lost the primary and then the biggest spender lost the general election. The study of six senatorial primaries in Tennessee concludes that, "There is *no* correlation between amount spent and votes received, and there is a negative correlation between number of votes and cost per vote." Lest any prospective campaign managers feel they have a new victory formula here, both studies overwhelm the reader with the increasing amounts being spent in primaries. There is evidence that almost twice as much was spent in the California primary as was "reported spent in the general election." Cranston and Salinger each spent about $500,000 and their combined unpaid bills at the end of the campaign was nearly $500,000. The money problem became so oppressive that a share-the-deficit agreement was drawn up, committing the winner to help raise up to $150,000 of the loser's debt. In much less affluent Tennessee, no serious contender spent less than $75,000 and the average senatorial primary studied cost $200,000. Money alone, then, may not win elections but it certainly requires more and more to run a losing campaign nowadays.

These studies could not deal with one of the more difficult issues emerging from any analysis of primary politics—i.e., the ability of political parties to meet their essential obligation of nominating candidates. No Republican has been elected to the United States Senate from Tennessee for fifty years and the Democratic party is a potpourri of factions. The attitude of Californians toward party organization is equally bizarre but for different reasons. In Pennsylvania, however, in 1966 Democrat Milton Shapp trounced a perfectly respectable, if relatively unknown, organization candidate, state senator Robert Casey, by spending one million dollars in the last ten days of the primary campaign on the mass media. Indeed, four weeks before election day, a poll commissioned by Mr. Shapp showed that he had only six percent of the vote. If the major charge which can be levied against a candidate is that he bears the endorsement of his party's policy committee or, as in the case of Rolvaag versus Keith in Minnesota, of his party's state convention, then politicians and political scientists who feel strongly about the responsibilities of parties still have a long way to go. So many citizens (college professors included) are so hostile to the very concept of political parties that a contender who can label his opponent the "machine candidate" and do so with enough money, ends up with an immense advantage. Perhaps future monographs can be devoted to this new old problem.

Neither study is naive enough to see better disclosure laws as the answer; indeed Buchanan and Bird point out that candidates could not be truthful "without forfeiting the election." The problems are just too manifold. One only hopes that the Long rider to the foreign investors bill of 1966, which allows taxpayers to designate one dollar of their income taxes to a Presidential Election Campaign Fund, does not add further complexities by inducing citizens to believe that a dollar solves the problem at all levels. The Long rider was inadequate recognition of the problem of money and politics. A more helpful law will emerge only after careful study of monographs such as these. Again, students of the problem are indebted to the continuing leadership of Mr. Herbert Alexander, director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, and the Ralph Nader of money and politics.—SIDNEY WISE, *Franklin and Marshall College.*

Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar. By JEROME E. CARLIN, WITH A FOREWORD BY GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966. Pp. xxix, 267. $6.75.)

Despite the adage that no man can be a just judge in his own cause, professional associations have often sought self-government, asserting that only they can be adequate judges of their members' ethical behavior. As far as lawyers are concerned, it would appear from this study that the group is as ineffective a judge of the ethical actions of its members as the individual is of his own.

Using an index of ethical behavior constructed from the responses to thirteen hypothetical cases from conflict of interest to Christmas cards for clients, the author estimates the annual "number of serious violators" among lawyers in Manhattan and the Bronx to be about 4,500 (among 20,500 in active practice), but "in any given year fewer than 2 per cent of lawyers who violate the generally accepted norms of the bar are formally handled by the official disciplinary machinery; only about 0.02 per cent are publicly sanctioned by being disbarred, suspended, or censured." The notoriety of an offense "increases the likelihood of disbarment," so that the bar associations appear "to be less concerned with scrutinizing the moral integrity of the profession than with forestalling public criticism and control."

This report is based upon interviews with approximately 800 lawyers in active private practice in Manhattan and the Bronx. The sample was carefully constructed to be representative of such characteristics of the members of the New York bar as law school attended, ethnic background, religion, size of firm, and type of clientele. "The metropolitan bar is, upon the evidence of our sample, a highly stratified professional community. Substantial differences in clientele, type of practice, and income mark the divisions among the principal strata. The striking differences in background between lawyers of the upper and lower strata indicate a highly systematic process of selection, recruitment, and retention. . . ." Most (77 per cent) of the large-firm lawyers are graduates of the Ivy League law schools—Columbia, Harvard, and Yale—and these men are not acquainted with many of the small-firm and individual attorneys, so that unified group leadership appears difficult, nearly impossible. Large-firm lawyers tended to score much higher on the index of ethical behavior than lawyers in small firms and in individual practice.

Law schools teach courses in legal ethics; bar associations investigate the character of applicants for bar examinations or of applicants who have passed; associations have codes of ethics and committees to consider new canons for them; association and court machinery exists to discipline the lawyer who engages in some unethical conduct. But none of these matters affects behavior as much as the conditions of practice ("The lower the status of the clientele, the higher the rate of violation. . . ."), the type of practice ("Those handling personal injury, criminal, and divorce matters . . . generally have the highest rates of violation . . . regardless of the status of their clientele,") and the type of court before which the lawyer regularly appears. ("The lower the level of the courts and agencies with which he comes into contact, the more the lawyer is likely to violate generally accepted ethical norms.") The ethical climate of his firm will either support or discourage violations. The lawyer's "inner disposition," as shown by his choice of partners or office-mate, is about equal in importance to his responsiveness to clients who may urge him to cut legal corners for them. In the evidence here presented no short and simple way appears promising to improve the ethical conduct of the bar.

The study seems most carefully done, and we may hope that it will be repeated for other cities. Students of government would welcome in future studies, however, questions or hypothetical cases on the ethical behavior of the lawyer-legislator, lawyer-lobbyist, lawyer-bill drafter, and lawyer-administrator.

There are 78 pages of appendices which show the sample, the responses, how the indices were constructed, and the interview schedule.—DAYTON D. MCKEAN, *University of Colorado.*

The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation. BY BRUCE L. R. SMITH. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 332. $7.95.)

The prince has always had his counselors, but it is a distinctive mark of our age that advice-giving to political rulers and administrators has become institutionalized. Within the relatively short period since the end of the Second World War, the advisory function in the United States has undergone a startling evolution. From the long tradition of personal advisor and *ad hoc* study commitee, we have moved to the permanent advisory committee usually composed of natural scientists and other experts whose responsibility is to advise the President and other high officials on complex scientific-technical questions. While these two forms of advisors have persisted, they are today overshadowed by a third type whose importance for the American political system has yet to be appreciated fully: the advisory corporation.

To its detractors and to its upholders alike, the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California is the symbol of this new political institution. For the former, it is a diabolical place where brilliant though twisted minds write scenarios on megadeath and other "unthinkables." For its defenders, RAND is an ingenious response to the growing need for objective and helpful studies in complex areas of public policy. Physically located 3,000 miles from Washington, D.C., and occupying the status of a private, non-profit corporation under government contract, RAND keeps in balance (its defenders argue) the two essential, and frequently contradictory, traits of a good advisor: it is sufficiently close to government to be knowledgeable and responsible, yet, sufficiently detached to be objective and disinterested.

In this well written and thoughtful study Bruce Smith places himself in the latter category. Though his book may not still the critics of RAND, Smith has given us our first and, on almost all points, a satisfactory treatment of an institution and aspect of American politics today of which we political scientists are much too ignorant. But Smith gives us more than a history of the RAND Corporation. In addition, he discusses with skill and dispassion the many administrative and political issues raised by the devolution of essentially public responsibilities upon a private organization: in-house versus contract policy studies; the conflict of interest problem; independence versus responsibility; and the communication of results. His discussion of the development at RAND of systems analysis and program budgeting, which were subsequently introduced by Charles Hitch into the upper echelons of the Pentagon, and now, by Executive Order, are transforming all agencies of government, give the book added benefit to students of American politics.

For this reviewer, the most interesting and rewarding chapter of the book is a case study of the so-called overseas base study. Initiated in 1951 by the Air Force as a narrow technical study dealing with the cost of various locations for basing the Strategic Air Command in foreign countries, the base study was transformed by Albert Wohlstetter and his collaborators into a pioneering and broad analysis of American military strategy. While the details of the study can not be discussed here, its contributions to American politics were three-fold. In the first place, the origins of systems analysis—the systematic evaluation of policy alternatives by a multidisciplinary team—can be traced to the base study. Secondly, the analysis brought out the simple fact (unrecognized at the time by the Air Force) that it makes a considerable difference in nuclear war whether one strikes first or second; this discovery led to the concept of the invulnerable deterrent and eventually to arms control measures by which to stabilize the present system of mutual deterrence. Thirdly, the base study contributed to the emergence in the area of military strategy of "generalist experts" who are situated half-way between the "hard" scientist or engineer and the policy-maker.

The success of RAND leads Smith to inquire in the concluding section of his book whether it might not be a good idea to have "civilian" RAND-type organizations carrying out policy studies on policy issues such as water pollution, education, and poverty. In Smith's view this type of half-way house between the academic world of basic knowledge and the political world of action is essential if the United States is to bring natural and social scientific knowledge to bear upon the complex public policy questions of our society. One might add, too, the note that RAND itself will surely be moving in this direction under its new president Henry Rowen who worked with Wohlstetter on the base study, and, until recently, was responsible for the execution of the President's order making program budgeting (the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System) mandatory throughout most of the national government.

Before concluding, one sticky problem must be dealt with. This is the insinuation of certain reviewers that this is an "inside" book because its author was given access to confidential files, was a consultant to RAND for a brief period during the summer of 1962, and went to work for RAND following the completion of his Ph.D. at Harvard (the book is a revision of his dissertation). Smith freely acknowledges these connections without which this informed study could not have been written. In general, he rises above the limitation such close association can place upon one's objectivity. In the present reviewer's opinion, this book is no apologia for RAND. Though Smith is committed to the RAND concept, he is remarkably candid about the many sensitive issues with which he deals. There may be other equally sensitive questions which he might have discussed such as the alleged dispute between the "philosophers" and the "strategists" over the French deterrent and NATO or the allegation that RAND's advice tends to be too technical and negligent with respect to important political considerations. But whatever shortcomings the book may have with respect to this type of question, on balance Smith has written a forthright and scholarly study which enhances our knowledge considerably about a new feature of our political system.—Robert Gilpin, *Princeton University*.

Stockpiling Strategic Materials: Politics and National Defense. By Glenn H. Snyder. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. xii, 314. $6.00, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

Professor Glenn Snyder did not discover the bureaucratic law that any national policy dollar can be spent as ten different constituency dimes. But his case study of defense stockpiling since 1945 shows how divisive things can get under even the broad dollar-value umbrella of national security.

The United States squirrels dozens of raw and processed materials—from minerals to foods to footplasters—in several statutory stockpiles as insurance against war's shortages and ravages. Its logic seems just as compelling as the instincts that have prompted every postwar administration to let stockpiling go fitfully forward. And one doubts that most people separate—as Professor Snyder carefully does—stocks of "strategic and critical" aluminum and tin from silos of price-supported wheat from gleeful disclosures that the Army has somehow bought twenty years' supply of ground beef, or that the Navy has 110,000 surplus oyster forks.

It could be a muckraker's windfall, even a scholarly one. But with rare clean writing and enviable restraint, Professor Snyder tells the story of how more or less single-value defense stockpile planning after World War II fed on events, jurisdictional disputes, special interests, and conflicting "logic" and compromise to multiply into nine potential stockpiles, most of them several values removed from war insurance and national defense.

Multi-value policy comes from multiple pressures. Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture know nothing else. The military has peculiar problems with its constituencies, and the State Department's main constituency is the world. Mix them all with congressmen who read "conservation and development" of dwindling resources as "production and use," and this familiar situation leaves the door open for sincere poor judgment at best, and unlawful mismanagement at worst. Students of Kenneth Royall, Louis Johnson, Arthur Flemming and George Humphrey will find valuable evidence and suggestions. However, the book does not deeply explore intra-military politics behind stereotypical military behavior of the period, and therefore may be less helpful to advanced students of civilian-military relations than to other administrative policy students.

Professor Snyder's analysis is generally chronological. He uncovers periods of State-Interior-military *et al.* maneuvering for control before the Stock Piling Act of 1946 (P.L. 79–520, which amended 1939 legislation); the period of essentially military stockpiling criteria during the Cold War pubescence of 1947–1950; the period of mixed civilian-military control during Korea's quasi-mobilization; and the period of civilian say-so during post-Korean asymmetry of strategic doctrine, nuclear technology, and market instability. It has only been since 1960 and the Kennedy-inspired Symington hearings of 1962–1963 that doctrinal shifts and Robert McNamara's trusteeship "have removed most of the blatant contradiction between stockpiling and strategy which characterized the previous administration—when the United States was unprepared to fight, and had no intention of fighting, the only kind of war for which a stockpile of strategic raw materials made any sense at all." Indeed, now the job is getting rid of what became surplus when stockpile assumptions caught up with modern strategy and technology.

Professor Snyder does not use "any complex theoretical model of decision making," although he hopes that "devotees of more sophisticated decision-making models will have found empirical data . . . which do fit into their particular approach."[1] They certainly can. And the author need not have embraced stillborn models. However, it might be that more attention to some of the ideally exclusive categories of domestic-international decision making models could explain more about Professor Snyder's crucial variables of actors' "interests" and "bargaining power."

Nothing haunts social scientists more than precisely establishing relationships called "power." It doesn't help when power is both independent and dependent variable. Policy and policy outcomes can be described in terms of interests and power. But unless there is definitive agreement on what power is related to in Interior, State, the Pentagon or elsewhere, can policy and policy outcomes be explained in these terms? What many of the stockpiling actors were talking about, after all, was a Runyonesque "piece of the action." That may not be scientific, but it implies simpler pursuits and less insatiable appetites than "power."

Professor Snyder does not fling his own "national security" definitions at the reader. Like national interest, national security can be defined just so far before definitions crumble under layerings of ever more tenuous stipulations. Professor Snyder knows this well, and it is to his high credit that he induces a fascinating story largely from the actors' own assumptions, perceptions, and exploitations of a constantly debatable area of national security policy.—ALDEN WILLIAMS, *University of Denver.*

Defense Purchases and Regional Growth. BY ROGER E. BOLTON. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xiii, 189. $2.50, paper.)

Professor Bolton classifies each state and Census region according to its dependence on defense income in 1962 and the relative stimulus given to growth by defense income in the 1952–62 period. A wide spectrum of cases are reported. Among them, the author finds heavy reliance on defense expenditures and relatively strong growth effects in some cases, slight dependence and, indeed, growth depressed by adverse defense expenditure trends in others. Not all rapidly growing states owe their growth to defense activity. In some cases, the analysis indicates growth stimulus primarily from the civilian sector and rapid growth despite a slow rate of increase in defense income.

The study is primarily descriptive, as opposed to normative. Alternative criteria for an evaluation of policy are discussed, though there is not the opportunity to apply them with the main focus of the work on the description of impact. One is immediately impressed by the clarity and directness of the exposition. In a subject matter area that is fraught with approximations of both concept and datum, Professor Bolton has made important contributions to precision.

---

[1] The author's original 1956 dissertation—here refined and updated—was being written at Columbia about the same time that the monograph by Professors Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (*Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics.* Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 3. Princeton, 1954.) was first being received.

The central model is a simple regional multiplier in which defense income enters as a part of exogenous income. This in itself is several conceptual notches above the more frequent practice of comparing defense payrolls directly with regional nondefense payrolls. The limitations of an aggregate multiplier approach lead the author to supplement it with a "ratchet effect" (Duesenberry type) predictor of the ratio of locally generated to total personal income in a few states. The model stands up to his statistical tests better than one might expect in view of its assumptions. Input-output data made available since Bolton's work was completed would today, nevertheless, invite a more disaggregated approach.

Some of the difficulties arising from unwanted aggregation are handled by sensitivity analysis. The two parameterizations express: (1) the relation between prime and subcontractor volume within a given geographic area; and (2) differences in breadth of definition of "defense-related" industries. The important conclusions of the study withstand these sensitivity tests though remain conditioned by other approximations (such as the use of a national average to convert procurement dollars to personal income state-by-state). In the same class, one might also refer to the problem of dealing with a time lag between contract award and time of production, though Professor Bolton's treatment of this problem is more sophisticated than most.

The work as a whole is the most definitive study of the subject known to this reviewer, though it is well to heed the author's caution:

> "Some readers may feel that (the shortcomings of data and method) are so serious as to render the estimates of little value. I would prefer to have more readers of this kind than of those who would rely upon the figures down to the last decimal place. . . . I hope the study is useful in pointing out some of the difficulties of research in this field, and that the initial efforts to deal with them will suggest methods of greater refinement." (P. 7.)

—Richard A. Tybout, *Ohio State University.*

The New York Times Annual Indexes, 1863–74. (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1966. $44.50.)

The first publication in book form of the *Times* index for these years. The Bowker Company is printing or reprinting all of the annual indexes from 1851 to the present.—C.B.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. A Critique of Sources, Conditions, and Issues, with Appended Documents. By Ralph Braibanti. Published for the Program in Comparative Studies on Southern Asia of the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966. Pp. xxvii, 569. $12.50.)

This book with the long name is in reality a combination of three modes: reader, annotated bibliography, and analysis. The author, Professor Ralph Braibanti, aims at "integrating the written record" of Pakistan's bureaucracy. He uses the latter term in a broad fashion to include local government and many judicial issues, as well as public administration. The reviewer agrees readily with Braibanti that this work is a "useful first step in evaluating the bureaucratic system of Pakistan" (p. viii). If writing on a single country's government or administration is not a stylish exercise in American political science today, it is nevertheless a crucial one for persons studying administration generally in the developing countries. Public administration in Pakistan is a tempting subject. There has been rapid economic development there during the Second Five-Year Plan, 1960–1965, and many observers see political development in the changes in recent years. Administrators have been at the center of all of this.

There is far more documentary evidence about administration in Pakistan than in most of the new states outside the influence of the Indian Civil Service. Some materials go back a century or even more, and they can provide the researcher with many worthwhile perspectives on present-day issues. Professor Braibanti acknowledges that the written record in Pakistan, as in other new countries, is "a source of ideological aspiration rather than necessarily a record of accomplishment." "Recorded aspiration is a crucial source of ideology" (p. viii), but it also has a dogged tendency to become accepted as factual analysis. A basic difficulty for the analyst is that organizational and program data (much less behavioral information) are simply not being generated by Pakistan's administration today in any useable volume. That is what is most needed. This problem, however, like most of those I find in the book, is beyond the control of the author-compiler.

Braibanti's métier is the study of administrative and constitutional law. There is fresh proof of that proposition herein. He gives a clear and provocative discussion of the administration of justice in tribal areas, with special reference to the Frontier Crimes Regulations of 1901. The high point of the book is a long chapter on legal research. Braibanti clarified for me the ways in which contempt proceedings threaten researchers on judicial and legal topics. He goes further to analyze a number of legal issues relevant to bureaucracy: the relationships between the 1956 Constitution and the martial law beginning in 1958; the second, 1962 Constitution as it departs from pre-1958 ideas and precedents; corruption in administration; and his favorite problem, the use of traditional writs. He feels that the use of such writs—mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus—is "by far the most compelling intellectual problem in the law of Pakistan" (p. 299).

An annotated bibliography of several broad subject-matter areas occupies most of the book. The second best feature of the volume is the author's commentary on some of the landmark documents in Indian administrative history. There is valuable guidance to the materials on local government. On the relatively few occasions when he expresses opinions, one tends to agree with them.

I am not sure how another scholar can use the section concerning commissions and their work. There are long listings and brief descriptions of the reports of 38 commissions on organizational and procedural reforms and those of 33 commissions of inquiry during the period, 1958 to 1962. The author points out that this is a sketchy treatment, but also that a few of the documents are inaccessible or unavailable at all in Pakistan. An important minority has not been released or released *in toto* by the Government.

Fifteen appendixes (about 178 pages of text) present the same difficulty. Two appendixes are brief excerpts from commission reports which recommend administrative reforms. Three are press releases which served in lieu of full commission reports on administrative questions. Each contains assertions about what "should" happen, so they may be employed as research materials on other speculations about how reform might proceed. Ten of the appendixes are speeches by the President and the Chief Justice.

Professor Braibanti warns the reader he can scarcely generalize about the current state of Pakistan's administration by looking at these documents. They contain only a small amount of straight reporting and no real sense of the economic, political, or administrative changes that have been taking place. Programs and projects in the forefront of Pakistani attention today are not emphasized: the Rural Works Programme, Basic Democracies, Plan implementation, industrial expansion, and water resources administration in such forms as the Indus Basin Plan and the Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects. Some of the greatest movement forward is occurring in these programs, but literature about them is exceedingly scarce.

Such development-oriented literature is becoming more accessible in the United States as we cope with the mass of materials in 19 libraries that receive Pakistani publications through the P.L. 480 program. Professor Braibanti has been able to include a few of these in his bibliography, but he intends the book as a foundation for subsequent use of the new items. There may soon be more access to these current writings in the United States than in Pakistan. The Civil Service of Pakistan and other services have traditionally studied and criticized administration. Today however there is a counter-trend toward secrecy and classification of information. Foreigners find it difficult to gain access to study problems of any currency. Pakistani social science researchers remain few and far between. Braibanti sees a tiny glimmer of hope for growing strength in research in Pakistan "and a spreading appreciation for the autonomy, dignity, and utility of professional scholarship" (p. 96).

I do wish this capable scholar had given us more of his own opinions of the literature he reviews. He considers that "the quality of government documents in Pakistan is generally of a high order" (p. 62), a dictum on which there will be disagreement. Students of Pakistan will agree when he praises many specific books, reports, and articles. By and large, however, the reader must fend for himself in evaluating the sources. Perhaps Professor Braibanti means to tell us a book is inadequate or poorly done when he makes no comment about it. As the best-known American scholar of Pakistan's bureaucracy, however, Braibanti owed his readers plainer talk in several instances—especially his Pakistani readers.—GUTHRIE S. BIRKHEAD, *Syracuse University*.

The Accountability and Audit of Governments: A Comparative Study. By E. L. NORMANTON. (Manchester: Manchester University Press and New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xx, 452. $11.00.)

This volume is a major contribution to the study of financial administration. The author, who has held senior positions in the Exchequer and Audit Department and with NATO, has also had administrative experience and the opportunity for research in the United States and in Western European countries. The resulting analysis traces major historical developments in each of the countries under review but is basically a comparative study. At the same time, Normanton arranges his topics so that the reader is led from the rudiments of state audit in an orderly sequence to the more complex aspects of accountability.

The countries under review are Great Britain, the United States, France and Federal Germany, with occasional reference to the history and organization of government audit in Italy, Austria, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Israel. The evolutionary treatment begins with the lowest common denominator—regularity—and proceeds to the "advance beyond regularity," where the state auditor is ". . . an impartial and studious fact-finder about government" (p. 123). The next stage is the concern of the auditor with organization and management, and finally the concern with administrative efficiency in the broadest sense. Normanton has useful chapters on "Fraud, Waste, and Extravagance" and on "Unsound Projects and Complicated Policies," where he concludes, not surprisingly, that most of the serious problems arise from a failure to plan policies and transactions related thereto.

The most interesting chapter in the book is on the nationalized industries. The United States, operating under the Government Corporation Control Act, gets very high marks in terms of the scope, depth and flexibility of GAO audit procedures. Normanton finds it paradoxical that the country most firmly opposed to public enterprise appears to be one of the very few ". . . which has so successfully integrated nationally-owned corporations into its administration that their control has ceased to be a public issue" (p. 319). There is really no paradox here. The Corporation Control Act was sufficiently rigorous in its budget and audit requirements that it discouraged the organization of government activities in the corporate form. It was a conservative victory.

France also comes off well in Normanton's appraisal. The Commission de Vérification des Comptes des Enterprises Publiques, established in 1948, has operated most effectively and ingeniously both alongside but somehow below the Cour des Comptes. It utilizes key personnel from the Cour, draws many temporary rapporteurs from other ministries, and reports (confidentially) to the Parliament, the Prime Minister and to the Cour. The Commission audits both the accounts and the efficiency of the enterprise and occasionally produces public reports.

In Great Britain the basic problems of public accountability for the nationalized industries have not yet been resolved, and for this Normanton is most critical of the Labour Party, which has been unwilling to apply the techniques necessary to assure public responsibility. The Comptroller and Auditor General continues to be excluded from responsibility. Private auditors report to the corporations themselves, not to the Parliament, and ministerial responsibility is most tenuous. Now, one hundred years after the Gladstone reforms, Normanton feels that the time has come for a Royal Commission on Accountability.

Normanton is quite properly convinced that state audit must have broad scope and depth if it is to strengthen administrative responsiblity in a constitutional system. He is less concerned about the relationship of state audit to management's responsibility for budget and planning. There is an unfortunate tendency in every government for the results of state audit to come so belatedly that its potential contribution to an improvement in budget review for both the executive and the legislature is largely lost.

It is possible that current developments in the U. S. Government in the introduction of the Program-Performance Budget System will one day extend to a more sophisticated articulation of efficiency audits with budget preparation and review.—JESSE BURKHEAD, *Syracuse University*.

Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator. BY ROBERT D. CRASSWELLER. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. xii, 468. $8.95.)

This book deserves to be welcomed as perhaps the most valuable addition to the general literature on Latin America in a long time. Significantly, the author is not an academician but a lawyer, formerly with the Department of State and now a member of the legal staff of a U. S. airline. A major contribution to our understanding of the politics of Latin America in general and of the Caribbean area in particular has been made by a non-professional unconcerned with new scientific techniques and approaches, but who is a careful researcher, an accomplished writer, and who also has a first hand acquaintance with the area. It is definitely the best work on the Dominican Republic during the "Era of Trujillo" (1930–1961).

Written in a lucid and sprightly style which makes it as readable as good fiction, it is also obviously based on thorough basic research. The author has used vast documentary material from governmental sources, both Dominican and American. In addition, he has used an extensive body of information obtained over a period of several years from personal interviews with many individuals who were principal actors in Dominican affairs during Trujillo's long rule. Occasionally he includes verbatim quotations of conversations with Trujillo but he assures the reader that they were supplied by participants or witnesses. He remarks on the particular accuracy of the informants' memory and speculates that this ability derives from the crucial role of oral communication in a society which forbids or controls the various forms of written expression. In spite of the eerie and bizarre nature of some of the stories Mr. Crassweller's honest efforts to convey the truth are always convincing, and leave no doubt of his discretion and objectivity.

The book is essentially a fascinating case history of the unrestrained use of power. Trujillo, a product of the United States occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916–1924, began as a typical Latin American *caudillo* in the historic pattern but ended as a modern dictator, without ideology, to be sure, but otherwise as an authoritarian leader who, seeking a totality of power, knew instinctively how to utilize this century's techniques of science and propaganda to this end. The demonic and monstrous traits of his personality are vividly portrayed. Every trait "was in some manner or degree a buttress for the central arch of his being, the power instinct." His desire for and faith in money, his phenomenal sense of ego mounting into megalomania, his remarkable physical energy and capacity for work, his passion for system, precision, and diligence, his nervous but rigidly disciplined temperament, his personal magnetism, his deep distrust of everyone, and his complete absence of scruples, were all related to his unrelenting drive for power. Also important in his power pattern, as it has often been the case with the great tyrants of history, was his instinct for secrecy and for unpredictability.

Trujillo developed a "system in which secrecy, uncertainty, helplessness and the denial of all the criteria of logic fortified the power of one man by devaluing the dignity and worth of all others." The uses of vanity and pomp, derived from his love of finery and his extraordinary dramatic sense, were among the many intuitions by which the dictator glimpsed the Dominican national character. He even knew how to use sex as a lever, as another source of power. Feeding his passion to dominate was also a feeling of social rejection by the upper class in the rigidly stratified Dominican society, which caused him to seek every opportunity to humiliate and degrade the high-born and the well-regarded. He was convinced that "humiliation and mistreatment and bullying were among the necessary ingredients of prestige and authority."

With keen insight, Mr. Crassweller notes that Trujillo, more than any other Latin American despot, saw in the entire economic process a source of political control as effective as the army. Recalling that the power structure developed by the typical *caudillos* resembled the Gothic construction—the great traditional vested interests, the Army, the Church and the landowning class serving as the high, vaulting ribs sustaining the arched edifice—,he sees Trujillo's structure as one based on the principle of the honeycomb. The traditional centers of power, to be sure, each had their cell in the walls of the comb, but also represented were every business interest, every financial interest, every tax, every exemption, every permit and license and trade regulation, and every law, all joined together and supporting each other, producing the balance and strength of the whole. Thus, every economic facet of national life, even the seemingly most remote, was subverted to political ends in some manner. The most pertinent parallel to Trujillo's case in the paranoia of power, notes the author, can only be found among the classical despotisms of Asia.

Mr. Crassweller's book can be read with pleasure and profit by any reader, but it is simply a must for students of Latin America seeking an understanding of the peculiar complexity of Caribbean politics.—FEDERICO G. GIL, *University of North Carolina.*

An Explanation of De Gaulle. BY ROBERT ARON. Translated from the French by Marianne Sinclair. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp xiv, 210. $4.95.)

De Gaulle: Implacable Ally. EDITED BY ROY C. MACRIDIS. With a special introduction by Maurice Duverger. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xxxv, 248. $6.00.)

A curious train of thought was set in motion by the dust jacket identification of the author of one of the two books under review. M. Robert Aron won the Prix Fémina in 1961 for his book *Jesus of Nazareth: The Hidden Years* and is reported to be engaged in a "vast project called *The History of God.*" Though it might well skirt blasphemy, it should be said immediately that these two books are in no way engaged in the search for the "historical de Gaulle." That is surely too bad, for the one thing we do not need at this time is further myth-making about de Gaulle, and this is what both books do unashamedly: M. Aron by using his own words, Professor Macridis by letting de Gaulle speak for himself.

Pursuing the parallel with the "historical Jesus" further—with a repeated disclaimer about blasphemy—we are set to wonder how much better contemporary political science could have done than Albert Schweitzer and others, particularly if it had been able to operate circa 50 A.D. with the tools it has today. Glendon Schubert would have explained it all by analyzing voting blocs in the Sanhedrin; Arnold Rogow would have done a psychiatric study of Pilate; Ed Bock would have commissioned a case study; Robert Lane would have conducted depth interview with twelve average residents of Jerusalem; Robert Dahl would have shown that as a result of the multi-peaked power structure of the Roman Empire nobody really made the crucial decision, only to be attacked by Hunter, Bachrach, Baratz, and company for his obtuseness and his obvious commitment to the Roman status quo. Undoubtedly Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson would have compared three cities in Galilee with three cities in Cappodocia, and, last but not least, Deutsch, Russett and associates would have compiled gross national indicators measuring intra-empire communication flows and occupational mobility in Caesarea and Jerusalem as compared with other cities of the Empire such as Londinium, Lutetia, and Vindobona.

Would they have done better? An appropriate space will be left here for each reader to supply his own answer; the reviewer will carefully sidestep this task. But the spoofing does have a rather serious side as it relates to both contemporary political science and the subject of these two books. For I would contend that up to now, at least, modern political science has not dealt effectively with the Gaullist phenomenon—it treats it *hors classe*—while the more conventional modes, as represented by these two books, certainly seem to be unable to do any better.

A very high priority among the sort of questions both modern and traditional political science consider important must surely be assigned to the question or questions about the nature and function of political leadership. Exactly what do the modern techniques alluded to above contribute to an explanation of that extraordinary phenomenon called leadership? For that matter, to what extent is not modern social science deficient precisely because it cannot cope with the extraordinary: with revolution, with rapid change, with charismatic leadership? And if the conventional modes, as represented by these two books, deal with leadership by embroidering existing myths, where does that leave us?

It is difficult to credit M. Aron with this current volume. How the author of *The Vichy Regime*—a systematic, exhaustive, and supremely competent analysis of the Petain regime—could have perpetrated this adulatory (though not totally uncritical), diffuse, and poorly organized tract staggers the imagination. From the almost genuflecting introduction to the end he presents us with a set of reflections, which seem to have no clearly recognizable structure, on the paradoxical character of de Gaulle. Part I, in which over fifty out of approximately eighty pages are devoted to events of 1940, supposedly treats the subject chronologically, while Part II is labelled "De Gaulle and French Politics—Circumstances and Strategies." There is no clear distinction between these two parts and several topics are covered in both; in some instances the same quotations are used twice. In the concluding chapter, "Gaullism as a Doctrine," M. Aron suggests that Gaullism might possibly be the alternative to the two decadent "isms" of the world today: liberalism as represented by the U.S. and Marxism. In between the opening and closing genuflections we are treated to such aperçus as the following: "De Gaulle, a poet of action who makes his own legends come true, wrote the legend of his life in his *Memoirs*. . . . It is as if the *Song of Roland* were written in Roland's own words." (P. 68.) And also: "Without admitting it France was waiting, from 1946 to 1958, for the return of the man of June 18, 1940" (p. 92). And again: "He is the first man from the biblical tradition who has taken the initiative back from atheistic materialism" (p. 111). These quotations, though obviously isolated from their context, nevertheless accurately reflect the general tone and style of the work. The question, indeed, is: what has been added to our understanding of the phenomenon of political leadership?

A. J. P. Taylor in his usual acerbic way has already disposed of Professor Macridis' editorial effort by suggesting that de Gaulle's speeches and proclamations, being nothing more than the incantations of a self-intoxicated witch doctor, are simply irrelevant to an understanding of de Gaulle's actions. To follow Professor Taylor would be an easy way out but it would be unfair to the value of this particular collection. We can by-pass both Professor Duverger's "Special Introduction" as well as Professor Macridis' own "General Introduction." They are of high analytic quality but are more concerned with criticizing de Gaulle than with understanding the man and the phenomenon of leadership. De Gaulle's statements, coming chiefly from his own books and memoirs and from the collection of speeches published by official sources, are grouped in three parts: "The Conditions of Independence," "The Margins of Independence," and "French Independence." In each part the readings are divided into several chapters; in addition to the editor's already mentioned general introduction, there is an introduction for each part and also to each chapter; there is also a brief note preceding each selection.

The General's own words are quite obviously hard to take, even in small quantities. But a total immersion in them had one unexpected result: it became evident quickly that the more general and "global" the topic, the more unpalatable and incomprehensible de Gaulle becomes; the more precise and technical the subject the more lucid his words come through to the reader. In Part I the chapter on the economy—perhaps the most surprising topic of all—, in Part II the chapter dealing with the army and nuclear weapons, and in Part III the selections dealing, in two separate chapters, with Franco-American and with Franco-German relations were to me the most exciting. Perhaps the General is not a generalist after all (pun intended!) but feels most at ease when he deals with specific policy issues. Might it not be that he has discovered that leadership is not a vague "Ding an sich" but is exercised successfully only in the context of specific situations and by dealing with specific policies? The charisma is there, and surely needs to be there—see the contrast between John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson—but unless things get done in specific policy areas there can be no successful leadership. Professor Macridis nowhere suggests that such a conclusion can be drawn from the selections he has assembled and I would thus hesitate to advance it as anything but a tentative suggestion, worth some future consideration.

One might think that one "tentative suggestion" would be a poor harvest for a few days of concentrated reading—not at all. The number of verified hypotheses in political science is all too small; that of verifiable hypotheses not much larger. If this review has possibly suggested the construction of *one* other verifiable hypothesis, it will represent time well spent in the interest of ordering the knowledge over which this discipline disposes.—ALFRED DIAMANT, *Haverford College and Ruhr-Universität Bochum.*

Khrushchev: A Career. BY EDWARD CRANKSHAW. (New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. 311. $7.50.)

The man who emerged from obscurity to rule the Soviet Union and become the chief actor on the world's stage for a time, only to fall back again into obscurity, is the subject of a new biography. The author, a distinguished political journalist and Soviet specialist, Edward Crankshaw, has subtitled it "A Career," presumably because most of it deals with the years before 1957, when Khrushchev finally succeeded in purging the party Presidium of holdovers from Stalin's day and packed it with his own followers.

Crankshaw traces Khrushchev's life from its beginnings in the borderland of Russia and the Ukraine. His career was slow to begin. He was almost 23 years of age when the tsarist regime was brought down, yet he played no noteworthy part in the momentous events that followed, and he did not join the Communist Party until 1918. A decade later he was still only a provincial official in the Ukraine. In 1929, however, he was transferred to Moscow and, borne up by the party's social and industrial revolution, he rose in a half-dozen years to be the party boss of Moscow. A second wave, the Great Purge, carried him still higher. By 1939 he was Stalin's lieutenant in the Ukraine and a member of the Politburo. In early 1947 he met a sharp setback, presumably because of the famine in the Ukraine the previous year. He recovered, however, and returned to Moscow at the end of 1949 as the third ranking member in the party apparatus, after Stalin and Malenkov. There is suggestive, though not conclusive evidence of Khrushchev's collusion with Stalin in fabricating the so-called "doctors affair," an alleged Zionist plot to murder Soviet army leaders. Crankshaw, however, does not allude to this evidence and he devotes few pages to the key but obscure developments in the last months of Stalin's life.

The bare facts of Khrushchev's career in the Stalin period are accessible. To get beyond them requires extensive research. Fortunately for Crankshaw, the work had been done previously, and done well, by Lazar Pistrak in *The Grand Tactician* (1961). Crankshaw's evocation of Russia's past is livelier (and somewhat wordier), but interested political scientists should return to Pistrak's scholarly account of this period in Khrushchev's life.

The last third of the book deals with Khrushchev's career after Stalin's death. Crankshaw has already written much about these events, and his interest seems to lag as he draws closer to the present. Nevertheless, the general reader will find here a thoughtful appraisal of Khrushchev's period of rule.

Crankshaw is a knowledgeable, and frequently reliable interpreter of the events he deals with. Too often, however, we encounter odd judgments.

> When we ask ourselves how the Khrushchev who had clawed and maneuvered his way upwards . . . managed to retain more than a spark of common humanity, the answer must be, can only be, that he was married to Nina Petrovna. The life story of this remarkable woman, if it could be told, would help us to understand Russian reality better than any account of the activities of her husband (p. 116).

To the many theories about the Soviet regime has there now been added a "petticoat theory" of Soviet politics? Again, Crankshaw believes that in February 1956 "Khrushchev achieved the summit of his career. The Soviet Union lay at his feet: there was nothing he might not do, and this was never again to be true" (p. 233). Few Soviet specialists would agree. Khrushchev still had powerful rivals in the leadership at that time, and it was many months before he could be rid of them and carry out some of the limited reforms at which he aimed.

Crankshaw is not always careful with historical details. For example, he says Lenin was "scarcely aware" of the existence of the party apparatus (p. 36); actually, to his credit, Lenin warned in his

"Testament" against the dangerous power Stalin had acquired as "general secretary," that is, head of the party apparatus. Again, Crankshaw writes that after the second World War Stalin at first neglected nuclear weapons (p. 149); actually, from 1943 on Stalin gave them high priority, so that at his death the Soviet Union was much farther along in the development of modern strategic weapons systems than the West had supposed.

Crankshaw's book is highly readable and will satisfy many of his readers. A serious political biography of the retired dictator, however, lies in the future.—Myron Rush, *Cornell University.*

Power in the Liberal Party: A Study in Australian Politics. By Katharine West. (Melbourne: F. W. Chesire, 1965. Pp. viii, 289. $5.20.) *Political Parties in New Zealand.* By R. S. Milne. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 313. $8.00.)

For some reason—perhaps the shortage of political scientists in both countries—Australia and New Zealand have long been marked by the lack of scholarly attention paid to politics and government there. Before World War II, there was virtually nothing published of much substance about either country's political system. Slowly since then, part of the deficiency has been made up, at least as far as attention to the form and structure of government is concerned, until today a quite respectable bibliography of titles in the area with regard to both countries can be compiled. Now with the publication of these two books, much of the deficiency with regard to politics "Down Under" has also been made up—and made up very well, it might be added, for both books are thoroughly researched, well written, and vastly informative.

Mrs. West's book (Mrs. West is a lecturer in political science at the Australian National University in Canberra) is confined quite narrowly to the Liberal Party in Australia (and to the Country Party insofar as it operates in partnership with the Liberal Party), while Professor Milne's book (he is chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia) covers both the dominant parties in New Zealand as well as the several smaller parties and anti-party groups which are characteristic of New Zealand politics. Mrs. West is concerned primarily with the power relations *within* the Liberal Party while Professor Milne provides us with a broad study of each of the important aspects of political party history, composition, organization, and operation in New Zealand. And Mrs. West by and large confines her remarks to Australia alone, while Professor Milne introduces a good deal of comparative data, particularly from Britain, Australia, and Canada. Put together, the two books give one the feeling that they cover the antipodean party system very well and that for the first time one can speak with some authority on that subject.

Power in the Liberal Party is based on an examination of official party records and on interviews with major and minor party officials all across Australia. Its objective is to identify the leadership in each of the state units of the Liberal Party and to explore the relations between them. Unfortunately for the reader unfamiliar with the context within which Australian parties operate, no introduction or general setting is provided before he is plunged directly into a detailed analysis of the leadership in each of the six state divisions of the party, beginning with the states in which it has traditionally been in power (Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, and Queensland) and concluding with the states in which the party has generally been in opposition (New South Wales and Tasmania). Mrs. West makes it abundantly clear that the leadership of a party unit operates differently in the two situations. The study is brought to an end with a discussion of the national party as it functions in Parliament and with an excellent chapter of conclusions. Mrs. West finds that "there is no such thing as The Liberal Party of Australia" (p. 261); instead, it is a composite of several distinctive parties, each set apart from the others not only by differences between the dominant personalities in each but by the different environments in which each operates. Because of these differences the possibility of intra-party conflict is always present and often realized. Turning to power within the party, Mrs. West finds that "the securely-ensconced Liberal Leader has been one who has been able to guard against being too closely identified in the electorate's mind with specific business interests" (p. 263). In parties out of office, leadership changes have been more frequent than in parties ordinarily in office. Finally, she finds that intra-party democracy is less real than apparent; instead, "power is both formally and informally concentrated in the upper reaches" of the party units, at whatever level they exist (p. 265) and this with at least the tacit approval of the ordinary party member.

Professor Milne approaches his subject with far less assurance that the reader knows something about New Zealand and New Zealand politics than Mrs. West approaches hers. Thus he begins with a discussion of the social and political setting for party politics in New Zealand (her equalitarianism, her basic conservatism, and the slowness with which New Zealanders become excited about political issues—indeed, the paucity of issues—seem to be the basic factors affecting party politics) and of the history of politics and of the National and Labour Parties there since 1890. His perception and understanding of New Zealand and of the quality of New Zealand life is evident throughout the discussion. He then turns to a consideration of voting behavior in New Zealand, of the relation between parties and interest groups, of the organization and membership of the two major parties in and outside of Parliament, of party conferences, and of problems in candidate selection. Like Mrs. West, Professor Milne sums up his findings in a concluding chapter. He reminds the reader of New Zealand's size and of the limitation that size places on possible differentiation between the parties. He points out the average New Zealander's insistence on involvement and the consequent greater emphasis on democracy and equality in internal party operations than is found, for example, in either British or Australian parties. And he comments on the contradictory growth of political apathy and of the possibility of its coming to undermine both the party system and democracy in New Zealand.

Although Mrs. West's book is more limited in scope, one comes away from reading the two books convinced that party politics are lively and meaningful in both countries and that the major parties are responsive to the peculiar needs of the people there. But their value is greater than that. Australia will be increasingly important to the United States in the years ahead, at least because of the extensive mutual defense agreements between the two countries, growing economic ties between them, and the development of a common cultural pattern in the two countries. New Zealand may well move into Australia's orbit—there is continued talk about statehood status for New Zealand—and even if not, she has an importance of her own to the United States. Thus it is good to have knowledge of the status of the political systems of both countries, and particularly of the Liberal and National Parties, both of which seem likely at this writing to emerge victorious once again in the November, 1966 elections, on which to base projected future action.

Mrs. West's book has already been recognized as a *tour de force* in Australia and is being widely acclaimed both at home and abroad; and Professor Milne's book can hardly help but acquire a similar high reputation as it becomes known. Both books will serve for a long time as models of their type, and the literature of political behavior is the richer because of them.—RICHARD H. LEACH, *Duke University.*

The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962. BY JOHN STEWARD AMBLER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 427. $6.50.)

In the post-World War II years, the French Army has twice refused to obey the commands of the civilian government it legally serves. Certain elements within the military establishment, in May, 1958 and again in January, 1961, chose to distinguish between the political regime, which they despised, and the nation, which they honored and served. In both instances, the immediate causes of the insurrections were related to the Algerian question, a dominant issue in French politics from 1944 to Algeria's independence in 1962.

The result of the first insurrection was the demise of the Fourth French Republic, the return of Charles de Gaulle, and increased political involvement and influence for the Army. After the 1961 rebellion, however, the presidential system was on stronger political ground and civilian control over the military was restored, albeit tenuously. *The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962,* is essentially an effort to explain these political intrusions by an extensive analysis of the military establishment itself and its complex, unrewarding role in postwar colonial policy.

Professor Ambler begins with an examination of the historical-traditional relationship between the French Army and the French Nation from 1815–1945. Although he notes some explicit exceptions, Ambler characterizes the military as impressively non-political during this period. Underlying the civilian control of the period were several factors. Diversities of social origins and political attitudes among the officer corps inhibited unified political action from this element. Other factors included the Army's well-nurtured sense of professional obedience to the government of the day, and the "safety valve" of colonial service, an outlet providing French officers with opportunities for power, action, and status unavailable in the *metrepole.* Having established the elements that supported civilian supremacy, Ambler turns his attention to the factors that led to the demise of this "Great Mute" and the increasing politicization of the Army in the postwar period.

Underlying the Army's violent intrusion into politics was, first, the deepening and continuous isolation of the military from the civilian community in France. The military disgrace and subsequent disunity of World War II, unsuccessful and internally frustrating involvement in two sustained and unsupported guerrilla wars, Indochina and Algeria, and later reliance upon a reluctant Army for the performance of technological and civil functions all contributed to this isolation. In brief, the result was a crisis of self-esteem, status and honor, which led those elements most deeply involved to resort to political intrigue, violence, and finally mutiny.

Professor Ambler condenses a sizable accumulation of data including military diaries, newspapers and courtroom testimonies, elaborate secondary sources of an academic nature, and some interviews. The data are not always well integrated, but documentation is extensive. The author is at his best in his treatment of France's post-war involvement in the guerrilla conflicts of Algeria and Indochina, the politico-military organizations and tactics of the Vietminh and the *Front de la Libération Nationale*, and the responses of the French military in each instance. His treatment of military politics and counter-insurgency, the evolution of the French military's doctrine of *La Guerre Révolutionnaire*, and the cleaveages within the military establishment are excellent. However, the author has a tendency to dilute his effort by summary judgments and qualifications that suggest uncertainty more than temperance and undercut his strongest, most thoroughly amplified points.

The French Army in Politics is uneven and, at its best, explanatory. From time to time, Professor Ambler fails to touch upon major aspects of the political involvement of the French military establishment. The reader is informed at the outset that he must look beyond traditional theories of civil-military relations to explain the crumbling foundations of civilian control in France. Weak constitutional consensus, therefore, is treated as merely one contributory factor in the French case. Well enough, but the author's examination of this aspect of the problem is both unsystematic and inadequate. Herein lies the major weakness of Ambler's effort. It is never easy to establish the parameters of a case-study, and this reviewer has full sympathy for the difficulties involved. However, once the boundaries are defined, the author assumes responsibility for full treatment of all aspects of the problem. "All patterns of civil-military relations can be understood only in the context of the entire political system within which they exist," we are told (p. viii). This book contains no adequate treatment of the political side of the coin during the years 1945–1962. The Fourth Republic is depicted as an unstable arrangement that suffered a constantly diminishing base of popular support. No adequate treatment is provided, however, of the political parties, coalitional arrangements, leadership, or governmental ups and downs—those aspects of the weakened political system that presumably impinged directly upon the military and beckoned them to redress. A serious omission is a well-ordered discussion of the Fifth Republic and the political impact of Charles de Gaulle. The reader gleans the barest hint of the legal, constitutional base of the Fifth Republic and of important realignments in the party system. There is simply no treatment of the several referenda that altered the governmental structure and granted independence to Algeria; and finally, only passing reference is made to the extraordinary powers granted to de Gaulle to meet the various Algerian crises.

Much, of a specifically political nature, would seem to fall within the scope of this book that was touched upon only superficially. Nevertheless, for the scholar interested in the politics of the French military establishment in the post-war period, it is a contribution of substance and depth.—KEN A. BODE, *Michigan State University*.

Studies in British Politics: A Reader in Political Sociology. ED. BY RICHARD ROSE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 340. $5.95.)

Readers in political behavior are now coin of the realm in the United States, but the appearance of one from beyond the Atlantic must still be treated as a distinct event (or perhaps as a harbinger of an impending New Wave). First is not always best, but this happens to be a very good and useful collection, and one that fills a pedagogical gap not yet discovered by the industrious Bobbs-Merrill editors.

Several years ago Rose wrote a particularly insightful text on British politics which presented an interpretation of the subject from the standpoint of modern social science. Now he has attempted to make available representative slices of the periodical literature that influenced his thinking in the earlier volume. (All but three of the 26 selections are articles or reports, happily presented *in toto* or nearly so.) Again the framework is modified Almond, and again the emphasis displays the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. Predictably it is heavy on political culture, socialization, communications, and the articulation of group demands, and it reflects the editor's belief in party as the key instrument of British political life. While a companion volume on "political behavior within the policy-making process of government" is promised, it is noteworthy that political sociology as Rose employs it in the present book touches only in the lightest way upon formal institutions of official policy-making and only briefly on the extent to which policy output, or the general situation of the country, may affect the choices of political actors. This of course may simply mirror the difficulty experienced by scholars of this persuasion in analyzing the linkages between the main concerns of the sociologist and the political scientist; but the disjuncture still remains, and this collection is evidence of it.

What we are given, then, is an admittedly eclectic array of approaches to British politics—ranging from a discursive BBC interview with Harold Wilson on his family background and youthful experiences to a preview of McKenzie and Silver's historical-behavioral study of the working class Tory to an audience research report on television and the 1964 General Election. The scope of the selections should be of undoubted value to the student contemplating methodological strategies, not only because it permits him to sample and assess a number of research techniques, but also because it underlines the editor's sensible advice that "Quantitative or descriptive techniques are not good or bad in themselves; rather, they are more or less relevant to particular problems in the study of politics" (p. x).

The same diversity and breadth of outlook, at least within his loose organizational framework, has also influenced Rose's choice of sources. He has included a number of pieces from such relatively uncommon sources as *The Listener*, *Time and Tide*, *The Twentieth Century*, and *Crossbow*, and from hitherto unpublished conference papers and polling files. The need to look outside the house organs of the academy seems to have been particularly great in the area of political communications, where the quality, scope and rigor of the pieces clearly indicate how underdeveloped this aspect of British political sociology is at present. Which is another way of saying that in Britain as elsewhere, the movement toward behaviorism has advanced more quickly and more easily in certain fields than in others—for example, fairly strongly in the analysis of demographic variables (notably social class), in voting studies, and in party behavior, and less so in the study of political (as contrasted with political-cultural) attitudes, of communications, and of the instrumental links between social and political processes. The editor's introductory and bibliographical comments serve nicely to relate the individual studies to the larger framework of social science concerns, although it would be equally useful had he pointed out to fellow students of British politics where the numerous lacunae still lie.

It is nevertheless heartening to recall that a collection such as this could not have been pulled together ten years ago. And it is equally encouraging to contemplate that when, three or four years from now, Rose brings out a second edition of the *Studies*, he is bound to be at least slightly embarrassed by the riches presently being extracted by his colleagues, and by himself. I understand that there are more books of this kind in the making. This is a good one, which ought to set a challenge and a high standard for the others. Teachers of British politics, and of comparative politics generally, will find it useful for supplementing (though hardly supplanting) the book-length arguments of Alford, Almond-Verba, Beer and McKenzie, and for documenting the present diversity of outlook and method in what the British persist in calling "political studies."—JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, *Ohio State University*.

The Defendant's Rights Under English Law. BY DAVID FELLMAN, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. Pp. x, 137. $4.00.)

David Fellman, Vilas Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, offers us a concise and scholarly statement of the rights of criminal law defendants in England. Students will find it a useful companion piece for the author's earlier (1958) study of *The Defendant's Rights* in the United States. The reader will be disappointed, however, if he expects a study in comparative law. The author concedes at the outset that he has "made no systematic effort to compare American with English law and practice in describing the rights of those who in England are accused of crime." He but mentions in passing "some similarities and differences in the two legal systems." The exposition is impressively documented with references to classic treatises as well as to current literature in English criminal law. It is copiously footnoted with citations to cases in the English courts from time immemorial to the present decade, and also includes many recent and controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court which point up the "similarities and differences" in the two legal systems.

The critic is initially disarmed by Professor Fellman's Preface. As he explains, his purpose in writing the book was "a very modest one: to describe those rules of law which we in the United States have come to regard as the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime." The book is not concerned with the sociology of crime, or with the politics of criminal law enforcement, or with problems of penology. As the author points out, these are interesting and important subjects but it was not his intention to write about them. Nor has he followed the academic fashion in public law to interpret judicial behavior in terms of the judges' political attitudes and personal predilections. The critic might wish that Professor Fellman had pursued such relevant lines of inquiry; the study might have been enhanced by enlarging its scope; but the author preferred to "cast a small net."

Only in the last chapter—and that less than a score of pages—does Professor Fellman attempt "an evaluation." He recognizes the general smugness, the almost universal admiration, with which most English people, and especially English judges, view their courts of law. He does, however, cull a few trenchant criticisms from such diverse authorities as Barbara Wooton, J. B. Priestley, a Royal Commission, a Home Office

Study, and the interdepartmental Streatfield Committee. Thus he concludes, "While it cannot be said that the English system of justice is perfect (as indeed no system is) and while further reform is necessary and is being urged in responsible circles of British life, there is world-wide admiration for a system which displays such solicitude for the plight of one who is accused of crime."

The Defendant's Rights Under English Law is certainly more than an academic pot-boiler, but it is not a great, or even ambitious, piece of work. Perhaps some day—and would that it be soon—David Fellman can be induced to write more than "a small book." It would be more than interesting to his professional colleagues; it could be provocative and influential in the public forum, if this outstanding authority in constitutional law would project more of his own views and values into his final statement of the defendant's rights, both in the American and in the English courts. A distinguished professor—and David Fellman is that by all accounts—has an obligation not merely to share his knowledge but also to impart some of his wisdom.—MARIAN D. IRISH, *The American University*.

Ireland Since the Rising. BY TIMOTHY PATRICK COOGAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 355. $6.95.)

Students of Irish Politics have long felt the need for a book like *Ireland Since the Rising*. It is the first serious attempt to provide a coordinated picture of the political, social and economic changes that have taken place in Ireland during the past fifty years.

Fifty years ago, on April 24th, 1916, a handful of men, members of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, rose in armed revolt against English occupation. The "Rising," as it is called in Ireland, lasted only about a week and the general reaction of Irishmen was cool, if not cold. Within months, however, feelings had drastically changed, and the nation united in a struggle that ranged from passive resistance to guerilla warfare, directed most bitterly at the "Black and Tans" who had been sent from England with instructions to "make Ireland hell for the devils." Unfortunately the Treaty which ended this conflict split the country between those who were prepared to accept partition, with Dominion status, and those (led by Eamon de Valera) who wanted to hold out for an independent, united Ireland. The men who had fought against England now fought among themselves in a civil war that lasted almost a year and led inevitably to the defeat of those opposed to the Treaty. It is interesting, however, that the "Anti-Treatyites" ended their boycott of the Dublin Dáil (Parliament) five years later; and five years later again, at the General Election held on February 16th, 1932, they were returned (still under the leadership of de Valera) as the largest single party. With the exception of two short periods, de Valera's party, Fianna Fáil, has been in power ever since.

Political scientists will find this period from 1916 to 1966 full of fascinating questions that have yet to be fully answered. It is very unusual, for example, to see the losers of a civil war peacefully take over political power a decade later. How was this possible in Ireland? One would like to see a study also of the difference between the three main political parties, and the reason why the Labour Party has never developed as it has done, for example, in England. Indeed, there is material for research in practically every aspect of Irish political life, both north and south of the "Border."

Coogan's book, however, is not simply the story of political development in Ireland. He has much to say also of the present structure of the State (local government, the legal system, etc.), Ireland's Economy (right up to the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with England in December, 1965), modern Irish culture, the Gaelic Movement, and Religion, with special sections also on the I.R.A. and Northern Ireland. In some places, Mr. Coogan's summary is, to quote his own words in the section on Religion, "impressionistic and sketchy." But this is inevitable in a field in which so little solid research has been carried out. Indeed, it is a tremendous credit to him that he has succeeded in presenting an intelligible and convincing picture of one of the most revolutionary periods in Irish history, a period so close to us that readers will inevitably disagree with him in his interpretation of some events and in his judgement of some people. Perhaps it is a sign of his objectivity that those on opposing sides will be ready to scalp him for many of his comments.

For political scientists and sociologists, this book is an excellent introduction—indeed the only one—to a study of the political and social changes that have taken place in modern Ireland. I shall be surprised if some American political scientists and sociologists, on reading this book, are not tempted to bring their research to Ireland. Scholars thus tempted will be welcome by Irish universities.—EUSTACE M. HAYDEN, Social Sciences Research Center, *University College, Galway, Ireland*.

The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis. BY MURRAY EDELMAN AND R. W. FLEMING. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965. Pp. 331. $6.75.)

The authors of *The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions* "tried to learn what has made workers, union officials, managements, and governmental agencies in four Western European countries act and react as they did regarding wage decisions and price decisions related to wage decisions." Their task was formidable, and they have succeeded in piecing together a summary of the background, development, and implementation of public and private wage and price policies in Italy, Germany, Great Britain and The Netherlands, in the post-war years up to 1963. Their focus is on institutional behavior, and the study is most successful when it traces the patterns of public and private wage and price decisions in the light of the organizational, social, political, and economic environments. The chapters on Great Britain and The Netherlands in particular provide a valuable guide through their experiments with innovative wage-price policies.

The study is a valuable source book for those who are concerned with the possibility of preventing inflation while demand pressures build up on product and labor markets. The authors are not very optimistic about the effectiveness of voluntary controls, and conclude that exhortation "is not regarded as a serious control device." But it may be that their conclusion is based on too restrictive a definition of success. They admit that exhortation "may have some effect in keeping things from getting worse, and it may help in creating a climate of opinion which will exercise a braking influence." If, on the average it is possible to maintain (or create) low unemployment rates at a reduced rate of price increase as a result of public exhortation, such appeals cannot be dismissed as a "political rather than an economic exercise." The authors overly discount the economic importance of causing "economic changes to be less than they would otherwise be," and they overlook such evidence of the serious economic role of exhortation as the German government's early reduction of automobile tariffs when Volkswagen flouted its campaign for a price-wage moderation.

One theme that runs through the book is that a policy of voluntary restraint depends for its effectiveness on acceptance by the institutions and individuals in the economy. Why should unions forego wage increases? Why should managers forego profits? In extreme circumstances, such as a critical balance of payments problems, the objective situation may make it clear that restraint is essential to avoid disaster. But, as the British Labor government is learning currently, the painful alternatives to restraint may not be perceived as inevitable, and powerful groups may continue to press for their own gains in spite of the clear and present risk of serious aggregate consequences. A report by the British National Economic Development Council, quoted in the chapter on Great Britain, states,

> "A policy for prices and money incomes can succeed only if those concerned are convinced that it is a necessary part of the wide programme for growth of real income, and that restraint by one section of the community will not merely result in a gain by other sections."

And acceptance must go beyond formal pronouncements by major labor and management organizations. Individual companies, unions, and even union members must have adequate reasons for withholding their economic power. "Ultimately, . . . the viability of a wage policy, so far as the unions are concerned, will depend upon convincing individual workers that they are likely to gain from such a policy, in short, by offering a quid pro quo for restraint on their part." The identical principle applies to management on the price side. The public interest must be translated into private interest to be effective.

In every country studied, participation by private groups in the planning and implementation of economic policy was considered a necessary condition for cooperation in a program of voluntary restraint. Even full participation by unions and management in the decision process does not insure success. As the study points out:

> "Private organizations of the kind which represent labor and management spring into being in response to a felt need for power mobilized in the common interest of the members. When such organizations are asked to participate in planning, which includes other interest groups, it is self-evident that each will be required to sacrifice something of its own interests in favor of the whole. If the sacrifice can be said to result in offsetting benefits of sufficient value there may be no problem, but this will rarely be so clear as to permit no doubt."

As inflation threatens in the United States and as public exhortation for price and wage moderation in accordance with the "Guideposts" becomes less and less effective, we are approaching a situation similar to that faced by the countries of Western Europe. We, too, must face the problem of whether we will be able to continue our prosperity without disruptive inflation or formal controls. The European experience suggests that management and labor may be increasingly acquiescent to some form of voluntary planning in their own interests. "It is significant that the most serious interest in planning has come in all these countries in periods of prosperity, with unemployment virtually nonexistent or at low levels."

In a final chapter the authors discuss the use of wage-price decisions as symbols, and suggest that "private and public wage-price pronouncements, acts, gestures, and programs not only have economic consequences, but also wide and deep implications for social stability." They have observed that in all of the countries studied behavior related to wage-price policies was used to increase political power and to further individual and organizational objectives in government, labor, and union organizations. This is indeed an important point, but it should not be permitted to obscure the strength of the economic forces within which wage-price decisions are made. The authors appear to have a misleadingly narrow concept of economics when they assert that "powerful managements, . . . often made concessions that are hard to explain in economic terms but that make a good deal of sense in the light of their organizational and political consequences." A wage increase to support the more desirable union or to attract needed labor makes perfectly good economic sense. Management may not always act in terms of a narrowly defined profit motive, but the evidence reported in this study does not provide a basis for discounting the importance of economic motivation.

A major flaw in the study is its failure to give adequate consideration to or to assess the relative importance of the economic forces relative to the social, psychological, and institutional variables. Market forces make themselves felt through the behavior of individuals and organizations, but careful observation of the actors may not provide a valid basis for explaining the resultant patterns of wage-price decisions. This is particularly true when the analyses are based on ex-post rationalizations of economic behavior. At several points the authors discuss the impact of economic forces, but the treatment of economic variables in the study is uneven and frequently misleading. In discussing wage increases in low and high productivity industries, the authors tend to ignore the critical role of labor market conditions. They report that the Italian cost-of-living index increased between 1948 and 1959 "by an annual average of only 1.69%." But the index has 1938 as a base year, and stood at 48.44 in 1948. The annual average increase in the cost of living was therefore closer to 3.1%. At another point the study asserts that "only a relatively small proportion of the population could afford to pay the rents that would be charged in the absence of controls." Who, then, would live in the available housing? Unless a large proportion of the population was without any housing at the outset, a completely free market would push prices up to the point where the population could (but would prefer not to) pay the rents. The careless treatment of economic analysis is coupled with an overemphasis on psychological and cultural explanations for which no evidence is provided. It is hard to reconcile the labor black market in The Netherlands with their alleged "disposition toward conformity" and their "sense of discipline."

The historical description is on firmer grounds than the analysis, and this study of the politics of wage-price decisions fills an important gap by compensating for the economists' tendency to overlook important social and institutional variables. The authors' perceptive institutional analysis and their many insights into the complexities of organizational behavior and the problems of social control based on voluntary cooperation, make this study required reading for anyone who is concerned with the ability of a democracy to maintain satisfactory levels of economic growth in the face of inevitable inflationary pressures.—Myron L. Joseph, *Carnegie Institute of Technology.*

Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations. By Emily Clark Brown. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 394. $6.95.)

Professor Brown's intention in this book is to describe and appraise Soviet unions and industrial relations since Stalin's death. Ostensibly, her "analysis is not concerned with the desirability of one or another social system, or with what 'real trade unions' are or ought to be." She has not assumed that "human dignity, individual freedom, and equality of opportunity are, inevitably, the monopoly of any one system." And one principal conclusion is that: "in brief, the industrial relations system in the Soviet Union, however imperfect in application, tends toward a constitutional system with large elements of worker participation." The book might have been more properly entitled "gullible's travels through the world of Soviet trade unions."

There is much of value in this book. Professor Brown is technically expert, and there is very good factual and descriptive material in her book. She is to be commended for trying to be very cautious, and for trying to give a very balanced account of the shortcomings as well as the intentions of the Soviet labor system. The few factual errors relate primarily to the early period, e.g., collective agreements "played an important role in regulating wages and other labor conditions in the first years. . . . " They did exist, but were quite ineffective. This is a typical error.

The main problems, however, are those of perspective, of excessive formalism, of a technocratic bias, and of contradiction. Professor Brown explains Soviet industrial relations primarily by its formal institutional structure. This has about the same result as an attempt to explain Soviet politics in terms of its constitution would have. Complicating matters is the fact that she appears to operate from a set of assumptions about technology, social development, and democracy. She believes that in "all industrial society there is a need for institutions to speak effectively for the working people." Democracy appears to be the inevitable result of technological maturity. This ontological judgment leads to a contradiction. Originally stating she was not concerned with what trade unions ought to be, she concludes with an affirmation of independent unions. She believes unions, "if they are to fill the role expected of them, must, in part at least, be agencies speaking for their members and responsive to opinion from below."

If Professor Brown believes she is neutral, if she thinks she is taking an objective stand on the Soviet Union, she is mistaken. She has a very distorted view of the realities of the Soviet system. There is indeed wisdom in the position "people will be people," but this does not tell us very much about the system, or what it does to people. Incredibly, she appears to believe democracy exists on the plant level in Soviet trade unions (p. 145 ff.). As we follow her journeys through the world of Soviet industrial relations, Professor Brown proves to be naive indeed.

The major issue since the death of Stalin has been destalinization. The Russians appear to be terribly confused and unable to resolve the political and economic problems they inherited from Stalin. They do not appear to know where or how to go, and they are deeply divided, politically and ideologically. Confusion and vacillation over increased liberalization of the regime—this has been the main lesson of the past thirteen years. Yet, when one is finished with her book, nowhere has one found an examination of destalinization, its problems and consequences. Professor Brown takes destalinization for granted, and is optimistic about the unions growing stronger and more responsive to their members' needs and wishes. She deals with Khrushchev's effort to create stronger unions, but she does not examine it as part of a political effort to curb the powers of the managers. She does not explore the possibility that labor's increased power reflects the larger political conflict between the party and the economic administrators. Nor does she trace policy disagreement and confusion over labor turnover, discipline, labor productivity, the work book, the cut work week, or unemployment—all of which have been very sensitive questions; all of which have been subject to a great deal of discussion by people who favor and oppose increased labor reforms.

In short, Professor Brown has flown right by the larger issue of destalinization, the one which sets the very context for her study and for her main conclusions. It is this kind of oversight that leads one to wonder again about her realism. Though there is much valuable information in this book, I am afraid the book we need on Soviet trade unions is still to be written.—JAY B. SORENSON, *Smith College.*

Agriculture Under Communism. BY LORD WALSTON. (Chester Springs, Pennsylvania: Dufour Editions, 1962. Pp. 108. $2.95.)

If political science should be a study (descriptive or scientific) of the relationships among people in politics, government and administration, political science is sadly failing its responsibilities, and Lord Walston's little book for the "general reader" carries an important message also for the student of politics. The wants and needs of the various groupings of people are surely at the heart of social sciences. Yet any quick survey of the literature of political science will reveal that the vast majority of political studies are urban oriented when, in fact, the majority of mankind (52% according to a United Nations' survey) still resides in agricultural areas. More than this, outside of industrialized United States and Western Europe, some two thirds of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits, and agriculture comprises the most important domestic problem of the nations involved. This political reality emphatically applies to the communist states where, ironically, communist governments came to power by turning Marxism on its head. Communist revolutions have not succeeded in industrialized proletarian nations, but in predominantly agricultural peasant nations where rural unrest was exploited for communist ends.

Not only are most contemporary political studies written in seeming ignorance of the enormous impact of rural wants and needs upon national politics, but so also are economic studies often relatively blind to the urban dependence on the countryside's food and fibers. As the author underlines, "even the greatest tycoon, . . . insulated by his millions from the ordinary world, cannot survive for twenty-four hours without the help of farmers or the peasants" (p. 7). Written in the deceptively easy style of the British essayist there is much that is profound in this book. Unfortunately, there is an almost total lack of documentation or statistics and some of what is cited is in error. For example, Lord Walston is incorrect in asserting that between 1926 and 1938 twenty-four million Russian peasants found work in the towns, and he also errs in asserting that in 1928 individual peasants were producing over 40 percent (p. 34) of the "food production" in the U.S.S.R.

Most of all, Lord Walston surely is wrong in concluding that "force and compulsion may even be justified" (p. 100) as a means of achieving much needed rural change in developing nations. Beyond democratic objections to such means, force inevitably destroys peasant incentives to produce most efficiently. Would agriculture be the major domestic problem in communist states today (especially in the Soviet Union) if force had not been the major means of instigating rural policies? Ironically, the major thrust of the argument in this book goes quite the other way. Communist nations, plus the whole range of the other developing nations, will progress significantly only if and when the full import of peasant political and economic forces is realized, and thus policies are designed that exploit the "full co-operation and good will of the cultivator himself" (p. 106).

In the main this book is a sound although incomplete introduction to the problem of "agriculture and communism," because its author has a long background as an agricultural administrator and practical farmer and some first hand knowledge of some of the states discussed. Unfortunately, most American political scientists (and economists) won't read its lessons, because most Western social scientists are urban bred and oriented and over impressed by the impact of the industrial revolution on society, and thus they assume falsely that the socio-political change in the cities has been (or shortly will be) paralleled by similar change in the countryside. Thomas Jefferson's agrarian idea was not entirely a false prophecy. American political scientists, especially those in the international and comparative fields, could well devote much more attention to rural politics. Authors such as Lord Walston document this need.—ROY D. LAIRD, *University of Kansas.*

Aspects of Political Development. BY LUCIAN W. PYE. The Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966. Pp. ix, 205. $1.95.)

Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village. BY ANDRÉ BÉTEILLE. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. 238. $5.00.)

It might be revealing if one were to measure the volume of works published since 1946 that deal directly with the traditional and transitional polities. If volume is any indication of seriousness, then it can only be inferred that contemporary social science is in dead earnest as it focuses upon society and polity in Africa and Asia. These two small books reflect the continuing seriousness and skill with which careful social science scholars put non-Westerners on the couch for a close look at their changing values, their shifting cognitions and psychic processes, and at the old and new institutions and agencies that appear to be articulating these phenomena along discernible lines. The study of comparative politics in the developing lands has in a short time come by its own approaches, its own theoretical guidelines, and its own attendant vocabulary. Both of these books are a continuation of this trend, one through the medium of descriptive theory, the other by painstaking analysis of a single development case.

The material presented by Lucian Pye is not especially new. In fact only two of ten chapters can fairly be described as new material, the bulk of the work being slight modifications of earlier writings and reproductions-by-permission under the same cover. But the book is none the worse off for that. It has, to begin with, a modest aim: "to introduce students to an exciting and growing field of study." As an introduction to the study of political development, Pye's *Aspects* will have to be almost necessary reading and it has the advantage from the beginner's viewpoint of summarizing at appropriate places the findings and conclusions of others in the political development field. The net effect, as an introductory book, is to acquaint the reader with most of the literature and ideas concerning political development.

Perhaps a stronger case can be made for the usefulness of *Aspects of Political Development* in that it meets in part the larger design of the Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics, i.e., to help in re-establishing the long-lost relationship between comparative politics and political theory. It is a constructively theoretical book, dealing in turn with the normative bias of most of the literature of non-Western comparative politics, with the conceptual ambiguities of "political development," and with the institutions and socio-psychological patterns that accompany political change. The major explorations in the theory of political development come in Chapter III, where Pye assays the contributions of social theorists and examines the problem caused by a "lack of doctrine." This is a particularly interesting chapter, and its most interesting pages are contained in a short section entitled "Crises in Political Development." Pye and his fellow gatekeepers of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council have isolated six more or less distinct crises with which a society must successfully deal before it can become a modern nation-state. These are the Identity Crisis, the Legitimacy Crisis, the Penetration Crisis, the Participation Crisis, and the Integration Crisis. It is the contention of the author that the basic pattern of a society's development will depend on the sequence of occurrence of these crises and the ways in which they are resolved. These critical stages are no more than outlined, however, and the balance of the book departs in various directions according to what have been the particular issues of political modernization and development: the appropriateness of democracy, personality and changing values, law, insurgency, communications and the military.

This summary book by an established scholar in the political development field should be a handy teaching guide for political science courses that encounter non-Western countries or systems in rapid transition. The reviewer believes it has additional merit in providing a succinct statement of most of the relevant descriptive theory pertinent to political development, thereby helping the apprentice scholar to detect the ties and linkages between a set of functions in one developing culture and those in another.

Caste, Class, and Power is a thorough and detailed case study of a single Indian village with specific regard to the changing patterns of interaction among the villagers as they are deployed in castes, classes, and power groupings. André Béteille has conjured up a picture of significant change in the village of Sripuram, in Tanjore District of Tamil-speaking South India. The changes in this thousand-year-old village in fact appear to have moved in a cumulative way from caste to class to power, yielding a power foundation for contemporary elites that the author has trouble describing. Although only approximately one-third of this book deals explicitly with the political dimension of Sripuram, most of the information presented has an ultimate political payoff. This is nowhere more evident than in the case of the Sripuram Brahmins, who show no signs of yielding their ritually superior ascriptive status, but from under whose feet the power base has clearly and dramatically shifted. It is a frequent observation of the author that local influence has moved away from the Brahmins—even when they are substantial landholders—and toward the "new popular leaders," who are almost certain to be non-Brahmins. To some extent, these changes are a reflection of regional and national trends.

A noteworthy feature of this fine piece of research is the finding that, despite the general tone of change and movement, the modern political agencies of India—political parties and interest associations—have not been the key agencies in articulating political claims or in resolution of conflict. Nor for that matter have the State Legislative Assemblies or even the local *Panchayats*. Rather the most salient conflicts and their final resolution have tended to assume the lines of caste. Béteille's finding in this case only lends greater weight to the idea that the national intermediaries and elites must in various ways accept the fact of caste as a principle of political deployment, whereby the locally dominant caste secures its position through the system of representation.—EDWARD L. PINNEY. *Washington and Lee University.*

Dilemmas of Democratic Politics in India. EDITED BY G. S. HALAPPA. (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966. Pp. xiv, 292. Rs. 26.)

This is a collection of 21 papers presented at a seminar in India in 1965. Nearly all the participants were Indian academicians, most of them political scientists with, however, a sprinkling of participants from law, economics, and government institutions. All the participants appear to have been deeply committed to the development of democracy in India and made a serious attempt to find out where India has succeeded and where she has failed in her effort to develop a democratic political system. While all aspects of the political system could not be examined, the seminar managed to look at a remarkably large number of them. They looked, for example, at civil liberties, voting behavior, the federal system, checks and balances, the bureaucracy, and the influence of caste. They examined also the various legislatures and their relationships to the parties, the courts, and the executives. Grass roots democracy in the villages was peered at, and in addition, the seminar looked at such larger matters as the role of economic development and planning in the development of democracy and at the role of a changing political system in producing change in the social system.

Needless to say, the authors of these papers had little difficulty finding non-democratic elements in the Indian political system. They seemed to find more to deplore than to praise; and their general conclusion seemed to be that although there is much that is democratic in India, and although much progress toward a predominantly democratic system has been made, democracy in India cannot yet be taken for granted. It is still in what Selig Harrison has referred to as the "dangerous decades" and much still needs to be done even to build the infra-structure upon which democracy can grow. The illiteracy, poverty, hierarchical-authoritarian tradition, and language loyalties that pervade India provide a weak base for the development of democracy. Disappointment after disappointment has followed the effort to develop democratic attitudes, processes, and institutions in the multitude of Indian villages in which the bulk of the people live. Yet no one in the seminar visualized any acceptable alternative to democracy for India or suggested that the experiment be abandoned.

Most hopeful for the future of political science in India were those papers that called attention to the dearth of empirical data on the Indian political system and suggested a host of questions feasible for empirical research.

As is normal with such symposia, the contributions are uneven, some being of first rate quality while others add so little to our political knowledge that they might better have been left out. A tighter editorial job on both content and English expression would have improved the volume.

The book renders a service, however, by giving us in one volume the thinking of what appears to be a fairly good sample of India's academia regarding Indian democracy; and it summarizes in one volume most of the weaknesses of, obstacles to, and problems of democracy-building in a country whose experiment with democracy is looked upon as a major test case for our time.—WILLARD RANGE, *University of Georgia*.

Africa's Golden Road. BY KWESI ARMAH. (New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Foreword by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. Pp. xii, 292. $6.00.)

Africa's Search for Identity. BY VICTOR C. FERKISS. (New York: George Braziller, 1966. Pp. 346. $6.50.)

Who speaks for the Africans? Do those who pretend to be able to articulate the felt but often unexpressed needs of most Africans write merely with the national interest of a particular country in mind, or about the views of a particular stratum of the African population with which they—African or non-African authors—identify or communicate most easily?

The survey book on Africa has the potential to generalize about the complexities of development and change and to attempt an assessment of the desires of Africans. Not limited by the bounds of a scholarly monograph, the author of the survey is able to make some contribution to the understanding a general reader or student might have of the real problems, hopes, and needs among different strata, in different African countries.

A problem with the survey is that, so often, one book has about the same information between its covers as another. For the same information an author attempts a slightly different interpretation, or he attempts to reach a new audience. Sometimes, it is unclear who the author is trying to reach and what new point he is making. Kwesi Armah's *Africa's Golden Road* and Victor Ferkiss' *Africa's Search for Identity* have little focus, make no attempt to distinguish between what different strata and countries may want. And, these two books are essentially attempts to consider Africa's place in the contemporary world by summarizing, once again, recent events in world history, with a new twist to give the illusion of originality: a golden road here, a search for identity there.

Ghana's former High Commissioner in London asserts the need for African unity. He discusses the one-party state at length and justifies what he calls democratic centralism; the regime of Dr. Nkrumah for which he worked; and the meaning, for him, of non-alignment. He says nothing about the military. Even in the area of greatest interest—African unity—Mr. Armah says little about the history of Pan-Africanism; there is also no serious discussion of regional planning, the possible disadvantages of certain forms of unity, the implications of links with the Common Market, and other economic and political complexities. In his discussion of Ghana, Mr. Armah might have added to the interest of the book by a longer personal statement of his own career.

Kwesi Armah was the chairman of the Committee of African Organizations in London from 1959 to 1961, and he does have some interesting things to say about this group which attempted to provide links among African student organizations. Many important intellectuals and politicians were members of this committee, and leaders were provided with a forum. Meetings the committee sponsored are discussed, and the author includes in three appendices communiques and constitutions of the All-African Students' Union in Europe set up by the Committee.

Mr. Armah tells us the future looks bright. All is well in Africa because African leaders are "devoted" and "truth-speaking," the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is stronger every day, and, happily for all, African states "refuse to engage in war-mongering and war-making" (p. 148). For this author, the continent of Africa is rapidly becoming a paradise destined to play an important role in the world by showing the rest of us the road to sanity and peace. This golden road of history is leading to the golden age. March on!

Dr. Victor Ferkiss, Professor at Georgetown University, writes as an American political scientist out to discover the "basic dynamic of African politics" (p. 5). He claims to know *The Problem* Africans face, and he defines it as one of "identity," or role in the contemporary world. The author insists that every African whether in the high administration or on the farm, from the city of Kinshasa to the village of Boundji is concerned with identity. Once the American author defines the single problem, he offers advice about the solution of it but warns Africans not to take the paths suggested by some leaders.

In his first warning he advises against African unity and assertions of Africanness or blackness; African unity, he says, might mean the construction of a racially chauvinistic society, opposed to the West, and assertions of blackness often mean, he continues, "the antithesis of everything white."

In a discussion of southern Africa he warns the Blacks to strive to build a multi-racial society lest Africa become "an isolated empire of bitterness or an adherent of a new international based on racism and economic backwardness" (p. 340). Concerning Angola, the author is already outraged by what he asserts has been African brutality toward Whites; Angolan nationalists' political ideas include, Ferkiss says, "possession of white man's goods, homes and women, a kind of perversion of the cargo-cult pattern familiar to anthropologists, the reaction of a dispossessed and despairing primitive group" (pp. 196–197). One wonders why Dr. Ferkiss did not tell us more of the civilized and unperverted torture in South African prisons or the cultivated brutality of the Portuguese in Angola. To be fair, the Whites of southern Africa do not escape a little criticism, but the author blandly assumes that a "peaceful transfer of power" with "patience" and "good luck" is possible and even imminent.

The essential idea in his incredible discussion of southern Africa is that although Whites oppress and dehumanize Africans, the African must wait for the White to cease the oppression, or the African must gently and courteously promote changes which will peacefully promote the multiracial societies Whites are unwilling to accept. If, on the other hand, Africans engage in violence, the author of this book stands ready to condemn them in the strongest terms: "brutal," "perversion," "primitive," words long used to justify colonialism.

Around this Ferkiss sketches pre-colonial days, colonialism in Africa, the growth of nationalism (African "states are the creation of many different nationalist movements." p. 81), the meaning of freedom, and the problems of nation-building ("African society is politicized from the seats of government to the most remote villages." p. 117), Africa in international relations. Thus, with the destruction of some incorrect images the author succeeds in establishing new ones. His discussion of southern Africa, his presumptuous manner, and the odd collection of half-truths, errors, and ambiguous, often gratuitous, statements make the book very tedious to read.

With full assurance Ferkiss tells the world that Bantu are lighter in skin color than many other Africans because they are half Bushman; he refers to Lord Hailey as the "late Lord Hailey" (p. 282) although the gentleman is alive. French phrases are incorrectly transcribed, and Ferkiss claims that in almost all of Africa "kinship ties are the *only ties with real meaning*" (p. 32) although age groups, secret societies, and other groupings are very important too. His lack of understanding of what Africans want is reflected in his comment about one of the most controversial men in Africa: "Tshombe's major fault is his difference in temperament from the dominant type of African nationalist leader, his phlegmatic and pragmatic manner, his disdain for ideology and public relations" (p. 189). This might have been written by any one of Tshombe's European public relations firms.

Of these two books, Kwesi Armah's is clearer and better written. It is clear he speaks only for himself and the Nkrumah regime. He is also careful to indicate sources of his information whereas Ferkiss is not. The latter claims to write as a disinterested observer, but it seems evident he speaks for those who claim, in Africa and elsewhere, to know the needs of black men and the solution to problems of development better than black men. He speaks for those who fear that Africans and others will take the initiative in ridding themselves of visible and hidden oppressors.—Brian Weinstein, *Howard University.*

Nigerian Government and Politics. By John P. Mackintosh, et al. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966. Pp. 651. $12.95.)

This book is a notable contribution to the study of Nigerian politics. Most of it has been written by Professor Mackintosh on the basis of his extensive research. In addition, five able co-authors have contributed chapters on special topics. Readers may disagree with the authors of this book on matters of interpretation, but they are bound to value the wealth of information it provides.

Recent studies of African politics are distinguished by imaginative attempts to develop social theory as suggested by the concept of "political culture," numerous concepts associated with "political development," and other concepts that probe the nature of social change. This study, however, can lay claim to no such distinction. In that respect, the author's introductory statement, "This book does not attempt to prove anything," is accurate. His chapter on local politics includes three interesting surveys of voter opinion, but it reveals little of the relation between personal conflicts and the underlying movement of social forces. The result is sheer empiricism. Similarly, a lack of appreciation for the underlying ideological nature of the Western Regional crisis of 1962 is, in this reviewer's judgment, a shortcoming in his otherwise excellent account of the matter. These criticisms may simply cavil. Mackintosh does demonstrate conclusively the tendency to a one party system in the several regions. But his approach to the nature of Nigerian politics is essentially Shakesperian: a struggle for personal gain and power, suffused with tribal sentiments, but unencumbered by the forces of social change. Many readers will be satisfied, but this reviewer is not.

A highly informative account of the 1964–65 election crisis features the argument that ex-President Azikiwe attempted to take over the Nigerian Government in January 1965. Azikiwe does appear to have weighed advice to the effect that in the absence of a valid election he could exercise discretion in the appointment of a new prime minister. However, the facts revealed in this book also support an easier burden of interpretation: that Azikiwe merely wanted to avert a takeover of the government by the Nigerian National Alliance by means which, if not technically unconstitutional or wholly fradulent, were nonetheless contrary to constitutionalism in the accepted sense of that term. Analyzing Azikiwe's actions in the crisis, Mackintosh implies (in chapters I, XIII, and XIV) that the president did not fully appreciate (or accept) his status as a figurehead under the Nigerian Constitution. Azikiwe's published statements could be cited in rebuttal. Mackintosh also asserts that the United Progressive Grand Alliance's decision to boycott the election of December, 1964 was born of a belated awareness that it could not win even a relatively fair election since its electoral position in the north had deteriorated irretrievably. Therefore, he concludes, "an element of irrationalism" entered the calculations of UPGA leaders. He may, however, overstate his case in asserting that free elections in the Northern Region would have made little difference in the result: "total rejection" of the regional opposition. It is also extreme to say that, apart from Tivland, the election of 1964 "clearly marks the end of opposition in the North."

Critical observations should not dim the appreciation of readers for this important and comprehensive work. However, a rival interpretation of the recent crises might serve to bring one of its central arguments into sharper focus. These crises might be seen as an outcome of the long and continuing struggle over regional power. Mackintosh's thesis on the one party tendency in the regions is sound. But the strength of antiregionalism in Nigeria should not be discounted, although it requires a different conceptual framework than this book provides to be understood. A decisive defeat of the antiregionalist democratic forces could still lead to dismemberment of the country. Mackintosh does not retrieve his position by stating at the end that the military *coup* of January, 1966 could strengthen a previously described trend toward unitary government. A stable unitary government, indeed a stable federation, would require new political formations that transcend tribalism, regionalism, and the analysis of this book. Their emergence might prompt the author to revise his sharp views on the cultural inaptitude of Nigerian society for libertarian democracy. His observations on the existence of a "double standard" or wide divergence between the precepts of democracy and the practices of the people do not apply in Africa more than elsewhere. One might believe in the universality of democracy in our time and still agree with Mackintosh that "Nigerian politics will develop on their own lines in response to and as a part of the changes in Nigerian society."—RICHARD L. SKLAR, *The University of Zambia.*

Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society. BY BURTON BENEDICT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. vi, 72. $4.00.)

Sudan Republic. BY K. D. D. HENDERSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 256. $8.50.)

The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today. BY VIRGINIA THOMPSON AND RICHARD ADLOFF. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 504. $12.50.)

Burton Benedict has written a worthwhile study of the tiny, multiracial island of Mauritius. His work, *Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society,* will serve as a useful adjunct to the existing, largely romantic literature of the 19th century which attempted to deal with the procession of Portuguese, Dutch, French, Africans, English, Indians and Chinese who have formed the history of this Indian Ocean pinnacle.

Tiny, overpopulated, unindustrialized and overly dependent upon a single primary product (sugar provides 99 per cent of its export revenues), Mauritius is further handicapped by its heterogeneous population. For some reason, although they are residentially interspersed, the people of Mauritius have not fused their diverse backgrounds into a single culture as have their counterparts on the nearby island of Reunion. Instead they have gravitated, slowly, but seemingly resolutely toward a more fragmented society until, with the approach of independence, the Creole, Chinese, Moslem and Tamil minorities fear for their future at the hands of the more numerous Hindus who currently make up two-thirds of the population.

Dr. Benedict has a deep feeling for the variety of social, economic and racial cleavages which underscore the validity of his final prognosis: "The danger of communal conflict increases." At the same time, his flat, listless style detracts from the sense of urgency he wishes to impart. And while he gives the reader a superb picture of the confluence of political forces on the local level, his treatment of national politics (to which on this small island, local political socialization must inexorably flow) is less than adequate. He mentions no national figures, ignoring the leading statesman of the powerful Hindu Labor Party, Sewoosagur Ramgoolam, and the passionate Creole orator of the Parti Mauricien, Gaetan Duval. He also neglects the ideological overtones of the existing national parties and thus gives an overly parochial view of the political situation.

Contrary to the paucity of literature on Mauritius, much has been written about the Sudan, and K. D. D. Henderson himself has already composed two books about it, *Survey of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* and *The Making of the Modern Sudan.* His *Sudan Republic* is essentially a popularized spin-off from these earlier works and hence is a bit repetitious. Some of his description also seems to be charmingly irrelevant. In describing part of the western frontier, for example, he declares that the boundary "bears a curious resemblance to the profile of the late Lord Oxford."

The Sudan, largest country in Africa and lying astride the umbilical cord of the Nile, has had a long, fascinating and often tragic history which Henderson summarizes rather well. His only real contribution to the field, however, is his analysis of the Sudan's "southern problem" and he devotes half the pages of the book and most of its documentation to the task. The largely animistic Christian Negroid tribes of the southern Sudan have found it increasingly intolerable to live under the rule of the more populous, better educated, Arabic peoples of the north. Largely ignored, and intermittently persecuted, the southern peoples have taken to violence in recent years to dramatize their dissatisfaction. The simmering revolt in the south has plagued every Sudanese regime since 1954 and has, by virtue of its 100,000 refugees, spilled over into the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, Central African Republic and the Congo (Kinshasa).

Yet even in his area of concentration, Henderson misjudges the political climate, disregarding for example the importance of the Congo issue in internal Sudanese politics. In an antic episode, leftist pressure in 1964 led the then Prime Minister Serr el Khatim Khalifa to support the Congolese rebels despite their racial affinities with the southern tribes. The Sudanese government allowed the Algerians, Egyptians and Russians to pour in far more weapons than the disorganized rebels could utilize. This miscalculation had serious repercussions. Many of the weapons destined for the Congolese fell into the hands of the southerners and when the Congolese rebellion failed, Khalifa became associated with its failure and the increasing strength of the southerners. He was then ousted by a resurgence of conservative Moslem elements under Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub. Henderson is, however, quite right in pointing out that the leaders of the Sudan, both north and south, must solve the "southern problem" not only for internal peace but in order to prevent the increasing polarization of Arab and Negro groups in many of the countries in the vast savanna regions of north central Africa.

Of the three books, *The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today* by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff is the most exciting combination of solid scholarship and readability. It represents a substantial contribution to the literature of Africa. Well documented and perspicacious, *The Malagasy Republic* is a welcome event and fills a serious void in the English language literature of this largely unknown and exotic island. Geographically close to Africa, culturally proximate to Asia and economically linked to the underdeveloped world, Madagascar stands largely alone, almost xenophobic in its fear of economic innovation, foreign ideology and social change.

Happily, the authors have avoided a common mistake of political scientists and sociologists who when dealing with African cultures have stressed either the European influence or the traditional societies themselves instead of viewing the development of political institutions as part of a space-time continuum affected by previous African forms, Asian and Near Eastern intrusions, European impositions and finally—through the education of African elites—global political theory. Thus Adloff and Thompson view the modest "human investment" programs of the present government of Philibert Tsiranana in light of previous national work projects, including the forced labor under the French and the semi-slavery of the earlier Merina monarchy.

The book is not flawless. The historical chapters are uncertain and both the analysis and mechanics of the crucial 1947 revolt are weak. The book could also use a final summarizing chapter to bring together the many strands of investigation which the authors have pursued. In addition, one may have a good deal of difficulty with their interpretation of the so called "cult of the dead" which they find "stultifying" and which they see as an explanation for the placidity of the Malagasy people. Anthropology aside, it may simply be that the people of Madagascar prefer peace and serenity to social and political turmoil and have thus far been fortunate enough to realize this preference. Still, Adloff and Thompson have attempted a great deal and most of it has come off very well. Serious students of Africana will find *The Malagasy Republic* rich in detail, admirable in scope and substantial in interpretation.—CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM, *Dartmouth College.*

Area Studies and the Library. ED. BY TSUEN-HSUIN TSIEN AND HOWARD W. WINGER. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 184. $4.50.)

Contains papers and discussion on the problems of supporting area studies with library resources, submitted to the Thirtieth Annual Conference of the Graduate Library School, University of Chicago.—C.B.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Deterrence and Strategy. BY ANDRE BEAUFRE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 174. $6.95. Translated by Major General R. H. Barry.)

Air Transport Policy and National Security: A Political, Economic, and Military Analysis. BY FREDERICK C. THAYER, JR. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Pp. xxiii, 352. $8.00.)

These two books have only a few things in common. They were both written by professional soldiers—a French Army general and a U. S. Air Force colonel. Both are concerned, more or less, with military subjects, and both deal with certain other aspects of security policy. Here the similarity ends, however, for the Beaufre volume is what is commonly referred to as a "think piece," which focuses on international nuclear deterrence, and the Thayer volume is a detailed, interdisciplinary case study of U. S. air transport policy. The Beaufre volume is written with flair and imagination; the Thayer volume is written skillfully but more pedantically.

With typical Gallic intellectual force, General Beaufre defends the French *force de frappe* and at the same time presents a concise summary of some of the controversial issues involved in nuclear deterrence and strategy. Decision makers, teachers, and laymen interested in national security policy will find this relatively small volume extremely useful. It is also an important sequel to the author's *An Introduction to Strategy* published in the U. S. last year.

General Beaufre's new book is divided into two, parts. Part I, the larger portion, is a discussion of the concept of deterrence, including an analysis of bilateral and multilateral deterrence at three levels—nuclear, conventional, and cold war—and the way each level affects the others. Part II reviews the effects of some of the principles of nuclear deterrence upon strategy and military structure. Here Beaufre emphasizes the need for maintaining a flexible and adaptable military system.

The author argues that the nuclear bomb has become "the most powerful stabilizer man has ever known" (p. 19). While he admits that possession of nuclear weapons by all nations would make for an unstable world, he is nevertheless convinced that independent ownership by a few "reasonable" powers would make for a stable world. His treatment of multilateral deterrence among three or more nuclear powers is the most fascinating part of the book. He believes, for example, that since a weaker third party would be allied with one of the superpowers, calculations of risks and costs in war would be more difficult and uncertain. "The effects of the existence of the third party," therefore, "is to restrict to some extent the freedom of action of the two principals" (p. 85). Lower levels of conflict—conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, etc.—would become less likely to occur. In contrast, in the existing bilateral nuclear deterrent "stalemate," conflict is more likely to occur at lower levels and possibly to escalate out of control. Although Beaufre admits that an independent nuclear force can be dangerous unless it is "truly allied," he neglects to give the blueprint for assuring a truly allied relationship.

Beaufre, of course, has the same problem that everyone has in writing on the subject of nuclear deterrence. That is, advocates of nuclear proliferation cannot, in the absence of war, prove their case with finality; neither can their opponents. Nonetheless, Beaufre's arguments are crisp, precise, and compelling. Moreover, his case for the independent French nuclear force is the most convincing to date. Yet he neglects some critical considerations: whether the French *force de frappe* perpetuates a divisive force in the political and economic integration of Western Europe; whether other jealous nations will also want "the bomb"; and the fact that development of nuclear weapons is an enormous drain on any state's resources. The fact remains, above all, that relative military stability exists in the bipolar situation whereas the multilateral situation is an unknown.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly with reference to France, continues to be one of the most important and controversial developments in international politics. The appearance of General Beaufre's sophisticated volume is a welcome addition to the dialogue on this subject.

Colonel Thayer's history and analysis of United States air transport policy is the type of study often sought by political scientists who are interested mainly in national security policy and civil-military affairs. Teachers of public administration will also find this volume useful. The book is written much in the style of the two books of case studies edited by Harold Stein, for the Thayer volume is a detailed account of one of the more confusing, esoteric areas of public policy. However, it is more than a history. The author also analyzes many of the problems associated with his subject and, in addition, has the courage to suggest rather specific solutions to those problems.

A major thesis of the author is that with regard to American air transport policy, "the U. S. has too quickly rejected reasonable and pragmatic solutions in favor of less satisfactory policies" (p. vii). Moreover, he argues, "no administration since Hoover's has explicitly accepted responsibility for a national airlift policy" (p. 4). Instead, the history of government action appears to reveal a long series of ad hoc responses to immediate problems. There is a noticeable absence of long-range programming which would demonstrate appreciation for the delicate interrelationships of foreign relations, military strategy, and international economics involved in the making of U. S. air transport policy. Thayer admits that "strategic military airlift and international air transportation on a truly massive scale are relatively new phenomena" (p. viii), but would insist that they will both become increasingly critical concerns of national security.

This heavily documented book is organized into four parts. The first three parts are mainly descriptive-historical. Part I contains two relatively short chapters on "International Airline Policy Before World War II." The four chapters in Part II are concerned with "World War II and Its Aftermath." And Part III, with three chapters, is entitled "Congressional Policy-Making and the Strange Military Alliance." However, the bulk of the author's analytical work is found in Part IV, where the two concluding chapters are devoted to "Military and Commercial Policies, Today and Tomorrow." There is also an extremely helpful 10-page bibliography.

The unique methodological feature of the study is that Colonel Thayer, within an historical framework, rather skillfully employs an interdisciplinary approach, stressing the interaction of politics, economics, and military strategy. (The author has particular personal expertise in the latter, having spent half of his approximately 20 years in the USAF in assignments involving military airlift or military air transport.)

The book is obviously a doctoral dissertation, albeit a very good one. It is too bad, for example, that it was not descholasticized to the extent that would have permitted incorporating into the text much of the interesting and sometimes vital information now contained in the innumerable footnotes. Nevertheless, the author's diligence in distilling pertinent information from dozens of government documents (a hazardous, time-consuming, laborious task, well known to all who write on military subjects), from other related studies by many other writers, and from his own experience and insights, and finally piecing all these data together in order to tell an incredibly complex story is certainly admirable. In short, quite aside from its own merits, it is a valuable source book for those persons interested in this aspect of public policy.—CLAUDE J. JOHNS, JR., *United States Air Force Academy.*

The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949. BY EDGAR O'BALLANCE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 237. $7.50.)

Major O'Ballance's scholarly study effectively complements Professor D. G. Kousoulas' earlier and classic *Revolution and Defeat, The Story of the Greek Communist Party.* While Kousoulas' book provided the political profile of recent Greek Communism, O'Ballance offers its military counterpart with a detailed examination of the strategy and tactics of the Greek guerrilla war of 1944–1949. This painstakingly researched work was not written for the uninitiated or the general public, but it is nevertheless of the greatest professional interest to the advanced student of international Communism, national guerrilla movements or the peculiarities of Southeastern European politics.

The overall significance of the military aspects of the Greek civil war is further enhanced today by the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. The five long and savage years of in-fighting in Greece should provide numerous valuable lessons and serious reminders to Western observers. Mostly, we must remember that the Greek and other Balkan Communists fought a tough and carefully planned war to seize power in Greece, and yet it is still the only country where they were decisively defeated.

The true pattern of the protracted Greek civil conflict is almost beyond unraveling. The author should be heartily congratulated for systematizing the unsystematic and attempting to rationalize the fundamentally irrational. Thus the civil war is divided into three military rounds, the first two of which ended in political stalemates with the Greek Communist elite occupying advantageous and fairly significant positions. The third round, of most particular interest to the American reader since it heralded the introduction into the Greek political scene of massive United States military aid, is astutely covered under two chronologically related headings: first a year (1948) of essentially "watchful waiting" on both sides, military build-up and minor guerrilla skirmishing, then the crucial year (1949) of Communist defeat and the collapse of the Greek Communist movement both at home and externally, among the disenchanted and warring Balkan guerrilla groups from Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. An excellent final chapter presents a brief analysis of the reasons for the decisive Communist defeat.

One of the author's principal conclusions is to dispel forcefully the myth that the Communist collapse in Greece must be "ascribed to Tito closing his frontier. . . . Many pundits," he observes, "are convinced, even to this day, that had this not been done, the insurgent war would still be in progress" (p. 18). This is not so, Major O'Ballance states; although closing the Yugoslav border deprived the Greek guerrillas of such essentials as a mainstay, refuge and principal supplier, they still had the support, space, bases and supplies from such adjoining countries as Albania and Bulgaria. The far more significant factors properly stressed by the author are:

1) the neglect by the Greek Communists of one of the primary principles of insurgent warfare, "winning the minds and hearts of the majority of the people" (p. 210),

2) the faulty judgment of KKE leadership which produced several major tactical errors. The author is convinced that at least two of these were in the "disaster" category: the misjudgment in 1945 of the British reaction to an attempt at the armed take-over of the country, and the backing of Stalin in 1948 instead of Tito, thus choosing the wrong side—from the Greek geopolitical perspec-

tive—in the bitter Cominform struggle, and

3) last but not least, the Greek Communist movement's sudden switch in 1948 from guerrilla to conventional warfare, a "colossal mistake" (p. 212 et seq.) which helped to maximize the battle-effectiveness of the Greek Royalist Army and of the ever-expanding American material aid. It is most heartening to read, in this context, a proper appreciation of the role played by American foreign policy—a factor often neglected or minimized in the recent literature dealing with the Greek civil war. This reviewer most emphatically agrees with Major O'Ballance's strategic estimate that had the Truman Doctrine not been formulated in early 1947, had U. S. aid not begun to arrive by late 1947, had it been delayed or more restricted in volume, the Greek National Army might well have been defeated. Thus massive American intervention "brought new hope and gave the essential material supremacy over the 'Democratic Army.'" (p. 214).—ANDREW GYORGY, *The George Washington University.*

Viet-Nam Witness: 1953–66. By BERNARD B. FALL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. ix, 363. $6.95.)

The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia. By BERNARD K. GORDON. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Pp. xiv, 201. $4.95.)

Vietnam: Between Two Truces. By JEAN LACOUTURE. Introduction by Joseph Kraft, translated from the French by Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael. (New York: Random House, 1966. Pp. xv, 295. $5.95, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Provocative analysis of the genesis and evolution of Indochina's seemingly perpetual nightmare is provided dramatically by Bernard B. Fall's collected essays in *Vietnam Witness* and by Jean Lacouture in *Vietnam: Between Two Truces.* Unquestionably, both treat their complicated, multifaceted subject matter with enviable accuracy, although the two authors display a disturbing propensity for certainty when dealing with extremely complex situations. Nor does either hestitate, when analyzing hypotheses of his own construction, to accept their validity as articles of faith even when lack of evidence prevents the complete disavowal of alternative hypotheses.

Independently, both internationally recognized authorities on Vietnam expand upon a common theme: Vietnam's dilemma is incomprehensible without understanding the interplay of truly indigenous forces, despite the considerable impact of external forces and of the vicissitudes of great power diplomacy. Both support their contention with significant evidence that the conflict of the 1960's is the product, first, of purely "local" (i.e., South Vietnamese) political processes and, second, of inadequacies manifested by the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors. The outline of anti-Diem criticisms has often been voiced, and both present it eloquently: land reform failure; excessive administrative centralization and general administrative irrationality; overzealous programs which backfired against "former resistance fighters"; elimination of village council elections (which really were a relatively new development and Diem's innovation in this regard was an attempt to displace the local power structure with his own more than an attempt to dislodge a non-existent pure democracy system at the village and hamlet level); and alienation of nearly each important Vietnamese interest group, i.e., the sects, Chinese, intellectuals, tribesmen, Buddhists, and military.

Despite the persuasive articulation of Saigon regime failures, it is the local nature of insurgency which is stressed. Fall, in fact, is admittedly most proud of his early comprehension and warning of deterioration in the south several years prior to the formation of the National Liberation Front. This point is of especial significance as it defies the official analysis concerning the incidence and control of the Second Indochina War. Nonetheless Fall's hypothesis relating to the southern nature of the pre-1960 development of revolutionary structure has gained increased credence even in official United States publications and in Douglas Pike's comprehensive *Viet Cong.* But even Fall appears to have recognized the nature of the forces directing pre-1964 insurgence only much after the fact. Only one of Fall's introductions written in 1966, for example, voices an appreciation of the importance of the religious sects before the post-Diem advent of a strengthened Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In one of his most original and important essays published originally in 1955 he notes "the sects had to disappear," a projection which at the least must be considered premature.

On the basis of the thesis that southern particularism dominates the insurgency both Fall and Lacouture advance the further arguments that only a rapprochement within the south, including the National Liberation Front, can eliminate insurgency. Fall, in an extremely powerful 1966 statement, appears to abandon this premise by documenting in considerable detail the impact of both American firepower and Democratic Republic of Vietnam regular forces upon the tenor of the conflict. But he remains unprepared to accept the thesis of post-1964 Tonkinese suzerainty over the National Liberation Front.

Supplementing their assumption of southern, primarily Cochinchinese, control over the forces of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam both Fall and Lacouture opt for Norodom Sihanouk's alternative of an "Indochina solution." It is here that the two Vietnam authorities present a prognosis similar to that of Bernard K. Gordon in *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia.* A well documented analysis of southeast Asian boundary dispute problems, Gordon's book suggests that regional cooperation may be a technique for sidestepping the great issues of the cold war as well as the problems of lack of national identity and of particularistic antagonisms. In many ways Fall and Lacouture accept Gordon's formula for southeast Asia (which under present circumstances could hardly include Indochina for, as Gordon states, "war has effectively removed the two Vietnams from much of the region's international politics") as a formula for resolving political conflict in Indochina. Thus the Fall-Lacouture formula reads: first, recognition of southern pluralism and of the demands of numerous regional, particularistic non-communist and communist elites (most of whom distrust the Tonkinese, to be certain, but who are still deeply divided even in the south along regional, ethnic, religious, and ideological lines); second, acceptance of regional autonomy and probably "neutralism"; and third, economic and cultural Indochinese regionalism. None of the formula's ingredients is intrinsically in disagreement with the stated objectives of American foreign policy as promulgated before publication of these two works although that policy and the stages of decision making prior to its promulgation are the object of considered and occasionally devastating criticism by both authorities.

Undoubtedly regionalism is a concept which merits advocacy in the abstract by each of the three authors as well as by the White House. In time the product of regional cooperation, whether within all Southeast Asia or simply within Indochina, could conceivably be prosperity and even the development of a "third force." Yet where even intra-national cooperation has been markedly absent, as it has been in varying degrees throughout southeast Asia, the formula obviously must be approached cautiously. The cold war, ironically, has simultaneously made the region a foremost international issue while applying external pressures which have precluded small, inter-nation wars of nineteenth century vintage and probably precluded many civil wars as well. Thus the irony of contemporary Asian romanticism presents itself on a nineteenth century stage in a twentieth century world, a problem none of the authors despite their keen appreciation of political processes in southeast Asia treats with precision.

Debates over the inclusion or exclusion of materials by Fall (particularly when he does reproduce dubious statements such as his advocacy of Tonkinese Catholics owning and cultivating the fields of the southern highlands and a 1954 projection that Hanoi would starve or become a Chinese colony if Vietnam were divided), debates over Lacouture's accuracy in detail (relative to the 1964–5 Pnom Penh conference for an "Indochinese solution" and relative to the evolution of revitalized Vietnamese Buddhism), and debates over Gordon's fairly unquestioning acceptance of the potential role of the Association of Southeast Asia (and of a possibly less conservative successor organization) and over the fruitfulness of his interpretation of personality as a variable in regionalism—these are at most secondary matters in a critique of the three works. A more underlying criticism of these three important contributions is that they advance regional cooperation with certainty while paying inadequate attention to the very problems rendering such cooperation difficult if not impossible, namely, romantic particularism and administrative inefficiency. As Fall has noted, "victory goes to the side that out-administers the other." When the variable of administrative effectiveness is lacking and when separatist forces are positioned to exploit this lack, regional and even "national" solutions are more in the category of dreams than of alternatives.—CHARLES A. JOINER, *Temple University.*

South Asia and United States Policy. BY NORMAN D. PALMER. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966. Pp. x, 332. $4.25.)

Professor Palmer writes that this study is a product of five years of field work, research and reflection; that it deals with the internal dynamics and external policies of South Asia, chiefly of India and Pakistan; and the implications for U. S. policy. "It is in effect, three interrelated studies in one." He has packed in relatively limited space a measured treatment of the political and economic development of the two main countries since independence, their relation to each other and to the chief centers of power external to them, the U. S., the U.S.S.R., the Peoples Republic of China. He has reviewed and incorporated when pertinent an ample, though not exhaustive, supply of South Asian and Western sources. He uses 1965 as a cut-off date and, though dealing with near-contemporary issues it is worth noting that his work is not "dated." Thus, *South Asia and United States Policy* offers a rapid two-decade survey of a "pivotal area in contemporary international relations . . . one of the world's greatest laboratories of political, economic and social change . . . [that] embodies all the hopes and most of the problems of mankind."

For specialists in the field there will be little novelty in all but one of Professor Palmer's twelve chapters. On the other hand, Chapter

Eight, "Problems of Security and Defense," some 28 pages, pulls together scattered and scarce Indian and Pakistan data on defense strategy, force levels and materiel. One wishes that Professor Palmer might have extended his treatment of the subject. The defense of the Indian Ocean area is a much neglected item, not only by Indians and Pakistanis but also by others. For this subject, Palmer cites in his bibliography (p. 322) the less than a dozen pertinent items, not all of equal merit. Among these is the article, "Pakistan Perspective," by President Ayub Khan, *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1960, who wrote:

> As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean . . . this push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. . . . If, on the other hand we resolve our problems and disengage our armed forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards. I feel that we shall have a good chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past.

These words of 1960 are applicable today. India and Pakistan have not stopped their "squabbling." On the contrary, they recently engaged in a short border war. Kashmir is still the central issue between them as it has been since August 1947. The Tashkent detente has largely evaporated. Neither the Communist Chinese invasion of Indian territory nor Peking's fourth atmospheric demonstration of a growing nuclear capacity has brought President Ayub Khan's words any nearer to realization.

In a major way, Professor Palmer's other chapters are designed as an analysis of the "conditions and policies" in both India and Pakistan which will help the reader understand why the foregoing issue remains where it is. (Ceylon, Nepal and Bhutan are noticed very briefly in this study of South Asia. Afghanistan, if it "belongs" to South Asia, is not included.) And to this analysis he adds an "evaluation"—his word—of U. S. policies toward both countries. U. S. involvement in the area is revealed in a variety of ways but perhaps no single item reveals more than this one: By mid-1965 *economic* bilateral aid—exclusive of U. S. aid through the World Bank and the International Development Association—to India reached $6 billion, "the largest amount of economic assistance to any developing country"; and to Pakistan, $3 billion.

Professor Palmer set for himself the goal of being "fair" to both India and Pakistan in carrying out his design. I am not sure what "fair" means. I assume that Palmer strives, as do other scholars, for objectivity in research and for judgment, where involved, based on his findings. But I suspect he means more than that—that is, he wishes to avoid "taking sides" in the Pakistan-Indian debate even when the data might lead to a specific judgment. Some evidence for this interpretation arises especially from his treatment of Pakistan as "an aligned country" (e.g., CENTO and SEATO) and India as a non-aligned country, and U.S. response to each and to both. Repeatedly he tells that the U. S. should "not praise or criticize" India and Pakistan "in accordance with their willingness or unwillingness to take an aligned position." To do one or the other is a short-sighted view, and it could be a disastrous one" (pp. 181, 267–269, 300, 302, etc.). But he never tells us why he thinks that to criticize the policy of another state is either short-sighted or disastrous. Surely stated differences in inter-state policy on so key an issue as alignment and non-alignment cannot be swept under the rug—nor should they be. For only through critical debate can national interests be understood and where possible conciliated.

Professor Palmer concludes his useful study with a prescriptive policy chapter designed, as he sees it, to further good relations for "the growing United States-South Asian encounter" based on "broadening commitments," "sounder foundations of understanding" and "more extensive contacts on official and unofficial levels." Obviously these are impeccable desiderata.—FRANK N. TRAGER, *New York University*.

China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy. BY VIDYA PRAKASH DUTT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. x, 356. $7.50.)

Communist China and Arms Control. BY MORTON H. HALPERIN AND DWIGHT H. PERKINS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xi, 191. $7.50.)

The two volumes under review are worthy contributions to the study of Communist China's role in international affairs. Both books are readable, informative, and well documented. They also represent two different, and complementary, ways of approaching Chinese foreign policy. The first volume, by an Indian scholar, covers the broad aspects of Peking's foreign relations since 1958. The second volume, by two Harvard professors, is a more analytical treatment of a specific issue—the Chinese position regarding arms control.

China and the World is an enlarged version of *China's Foreign Policy, 1958–62*, published in 1964 and reviewed in the September 1965 issue of this REVIEW (pp. 758–759). An epilogue that summarizes the principal currents in China's foreign policy between 1963 and 1966 has been added to the present volume. The book maintains a commendable degree of objectivity with some understandable exceptions in its treatment of issues involving India and Pakistan.

Communist China and Arms Control was prepared by Professors Halperin and Perkins as a report to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Completed after China's second nuclear explosion, this book is a scholarly and dispassionate study of Chinese policies toward disarmament and their political and strategic implications. The discussion starts with an examination of the foreign policy objectives, economic capacity, and military strategy of Communist China. Then follows a consideration of Peking's attitudes toward various arms control measures, international agreements, and international organizations. The book concludes with an analysis of possible ways to make China arms-control-minded and of the impact of arms control discussions and agreements upon Chinese Communist policy.

Although the volume is too concise to cover all issues adequately, its basic themes are both sensible and perceptive. Contrary to Soviet charges, Halperin and Perkins argue that Peking is no more a nuclear warmonger than Moscow, and that the Sino-Soviet disagreement is largely over the possibility and desirability of avoiding local wars. The authors also suggest four Chinese motivations for acquiring a nuclear capability. The first two, security and prestige considerations, are undoubtedly the overriding factors. Less convincing, however, are the other two reasons given: to support wars of national liberation and to establish Chinese hegemony in Asia. It would appear that in either case the Chinese nuclear threat could be readily countered by a superior deterrent.

According to Halperin and Perkins, Communist China currently has little interest in arms control and disarmament. As an anti-*status quo* power, she is opposed to any agreement that might limit her freedom to acquire nuclear weapons and to modernize her conventional forces. Consequently, her proposals for certain forms of disarmament and arms control must be viewed as political-propaganda moves, designed to appeal to underdeveloped countries and to inhibit the United States from using nuclear weapons. Moreover, the authors find little encouragement in the treaty behavior of Communist China, which has no hesitation to break or ignore international agreements whenever its interest so dictates. Under these circumstances, to induce China to become seriously interested in arms control is indeed a difficult task. The only concrete suggestions advanced by the authors are for the United States to keep open all available channels of communication with Communist China, including the Warsaw talks and the deployment of American forces.

In short, Halperin and Perkins rightfully entertain few illusions about Chinese attitudes and have good reasons to be skeptical about the prospects of establishing a meaningful disarmament dialogue with Peking at this stage. Nevertheless, in view of the crucial importance of the arms control problem, it is doubtful that the Chinese positions on this matter should be dismissed as purely political without further exploration. Is it possible that Peking may actually frown upon nuclear diffusion to other states and advocate proliferation only to justify its nuclear development? Given the relative backwardness of Chinese economy, is it conceivable that the Chinese Communists may have a genuine interest in achieving some sort of military parity with the superpowers through staged disarmament rather than through a costly arms race? As for treaty violations, is Communist China's record any worse than that of the Soviet Union? Could concern for a "bad image," retaliations, or other adverse consequences deter China from breaching voluntary treaty obligations? These and other questions remain to be examined more fully, although pioneering work has already been done by Professors Halperin and Perkins.—SHAO-CHUAN LENG, *University of Virginia.*

The American People and China. BY A. T. STEELE. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Pp. x, 325. $7.50.)

This is a major contribution to the understanding of the functioning of public opinion in a democracy for three reasons:

1) It is an effort to relate and locate the role of public opinion on the subject of China policy in terms of what policy is and what it might be.

2) The author is willing to draw meaningful and lucid conclusions from his data on hand.

3) The book is written in superb English—no small feat when dealing with survey research.

A qualifying note should be entered at the outset: the reviewer did not read it until November, 1966, while the book obviously was written around mid-1965. Much has changed in the political outlook of America, important shifts have occurred in public attitudes toward China, and rather shattering events appear to be happening to Communist China abroad and at home.

Yet, A. T. Steele's careful research stands up remarkably well—good enough so that another edition with up to date revisions would make it even more real.

The Steele thesis is that U. S. policy toward China has been in a deep freeze since the Korean War in the early 1950's. That war hardened American public opinion toward the Mao regime, and little that has taken place since has encouraged a dialogue within this country to reassess U. S. policy. The lobby for the status quo, the author believes, has successfully locked the

United States into an inflexible, unbending stance. Congress, reflecting the public hostility toward Red China, sees little mileage in initiating a more flexible policy. The executive branch, especially under Lyndon Johnson, shows little inclination toward establishing real contact with the government or people of China. The press and other media simply reflect the prevailing view of not rocking the boat on China.

At the time of the writing, these important events had not developed:

1) China had not lost decisively in its efforts to penetrate its brand of non-revisionist Communism in Indonesia, Ghana, Algeria, Cuba, and other key areas of the world.

2) The struggle for succession in China and the apparently even deeper ideological cleavage marked by the purges and rampant Red Guards, had not yet emerged.

3) The willingness of American public opinion to back admission of Red China to the UN on a two-China basis, as well as to exchange Ambassadors, had not yet become clear.

With some form of offer by the UN to seat the Mao government in the offing, with China seemingly beset at home by internal divisions, with Soviet pressures to isolate China in the world Communist movement mounting, and with Chinese prestige slipping precipitously abroad, obviously American policy must react—beyond merely intensifying the effort to repulse the Communists in Vietnam.

Therefore, whether ready or not, a front and center dialogue over China policy appears to be confronting the American people. In this context, the Steele work is a beginning, a point of departure. The Survey Research Center questions were limited and are much out of date on Vietnam. They have been updated by a fair amount of subsequent survey material. One would have wished for a more integrated analysis of opinion leader attitudes compared with those of the rank and file. Mr. Steele is clearly more at home in his own field of discussing the problems of proper news coverage and analysis of China than in dissecting and making hard numbers from survey data talk. He has problems in differentiating solid cross-sectional data from impressionistic, spotty evidence.

But these are minor and mostly technical reservations in what has been one of the few attempts to make public opinion research functional. The Council on Foreign Affairs and Mr. Steele are to be commended for undertaking the kind of interdisciplinary effort on a much neglected subject. As the author correctly pays tribute to the growing and painstaking efforts in universities and in government to document the shadowy world of China, so this book is a pioneering venture of first rank in its own right.—Louis Harris, *Louis Harris and Associates.*

Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents. Edited by A. M. Halpern. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Pp. xiv, 523. $9.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

"We are at war with China!" This was the recent response of a Peace Corps trainee bound for West Africa to an African's criticism of a tendency of some recent American movies to depict "the villain" as Chinese. While it is doubtful that this would be the dominant view among Peace Corps personnel, it is nonetheless sobering to think that this recent graduate of an American University might be articulating a growing American conviction that we are in the beginning stages of a war against the People's Republic of China. Whether or not the Council on Foreign Relations had the specific dangers of self-fulfilling prophecies in mind when it embarked upon publishing a series on the United States and China in World Affairs, one would hope that this series might do something to bring reason, perspective and information to bear in the struggle to fashion a China policy which will not push us all toward destruction.

Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, edited by A. M. Halpern (the first publication in the series), appears to be designed to inform the attentive publics about the range of non-Soviet Bloc strategy and tactics toward Communist China and the state of current thought about China in most of the major countries or areas of the world. Each of sixteen articles that comprise the major part of this book is written by a native or by an outside expert who specializes in the analysis of politics of the country or area in question. (Seven of the ten articles from the *non-western* world are written by *westerners*.)

Although the articles contain much information and some first rate descriptive analysis of value to the expert, they appear to be focused mainly at the non-expert attentive publics if one can judge from the basically non-theoretical orientation of the book. While editor Halpern himself has contributed an interesting summary chapter in which he develops a typology of China policies, it seems reasonably clear that there has been very little attempt to make explicit the theoretical underpinnings upon which policies have been based nor has there been a sustained effort to operationalize some of the concepts such as "balance of power" or "world power balance." (Concepts, of course, which have been under attack in the more sophisticated types of social science analysis.) Nonetheless the book has significant value for both public and expert alike in terms of the insights it gives, the reflection it promotes, and the questions it stimulates. Since it would be impossible to discuss the articles in terms of specifics, the remainder of this review will focus upon the general impressions that one may get from these explicit reminders of policies toward China from around the world.

China as an Object of Foreign Policy. Richard Harris in the article on Britain and China mentions that historically China has been considered by the British to be an object of British power, not a prime mover in international affairs. Although this book gives ample testimony to the fact that China has rapidly become an active, and at times threatening, global participant in international relations, there seems to be a curious vestige of this object orientation in the policy deliberations of many countries. If these articles (particularly by Westerners) are a fair indication of the thinking about China in the foreign offices of the world, then it would appear that much more consideration need be given to the subject of Chinese goals, aspirations, and motives than we find in this book or in many other places for that matter. One is struck by the general absence of any sophisticated effort to plumb the sources of Chinese conduct (even in passing) in these articles. Instead of presenting some evidence of a searching analysis of Chinese behavior as a part of the interactive process of fashioning policies toward China, the analyses in this context rarely rise much above the rather naive German analysis that "the Communists are constantly pressing against South Vietnam and Laos and the P.R.C. is in *every* way the ultimate source of this pressure" (p. 100). Apparently, the perception of a Communist Monolith still persists and the Sino-Soviet split, Yugloslavia, polycentrism and national Communism have not been fully perceived or appreciated. Communist doctrine may indeed help structure the range of alternatives for decision-makers in Communist countries, but our understanding is not enhanced if no real effort is made to take into account other variables such as nationalism, the role of reference groups, the psychology of attaining and retaining decision-making power, etc. Yet, from most of the articles in the book (the article on Japanese policies is the main exception) one finds little explicit evidence that the foreign policy decision-makers have fully attempted to appreciate the psychological or motivational underpinning of Chinese policies. Hence, the non-expert reader is almost forced to look at only one side of the equation of interaction between China and other countries of the world. While a fair rejoinder might be that these were intended to be views toward China and not articles on Chinese foreign policies, and that this evidence is implicit in the discussion of the policies themselves, it seems fair to comment that an evaluation of these policies toward China would have been improved if the reader had been given more explicit cross-national insights into what makes the Chinese behave as they do. It is not just the policies toward China that are of interest, but also how successful these policies are likely to be. Other than Monday-morning quarterbacking, we are unlikely to be able to make sound judgments about the range of policies toward China without some reasonably sophisticated attempts at determining the world view and orientations of the Chinese communists. We hope, of course, that this is being done in the foreign offices of the world but actions of the U. S. government and others give us cause to wonder whether enough effort is being made to place assumptions about Chinese conduct in a sufficiently coherent and precise framework for test and argument. China is no longer an "object of policy." It is an abiding subject.

Fading Dominance of U. S. China Policy. Another impression that one may gain from this book is how dominant American policy toward China once was (in terms of non-Communist world) and how serious is the challenge to that dominance today. Although the U. S. attempt to isolate, contain and precipitate the downfall of the Chinese Communists, best symbolized by keeping China out of the United Nations, was never accepted by all of the major non-communist powers, the power and influence of the United States in the 1940's and 1950's was sufficiently great so that the U. S. was permitted to be the architect of the "free world's" China policy. This book should make it obvious, even to the casual reader, that many countries including Great Britain, Canada, France, Japan, and Brazil were less than enthusiastic about the rationale and direction of American policy, but partially followed it because other more immediate matters of mutual interest and concern dictated that the U. S. was to have its way if only on the prestigious matter of entry into the United Nations.

That the American China policy is only partially successful is demonstrated by a number of the articles. Even those countries like West Germany and Australia who rest philosophically close to the United States on the China question have embarked on significant trading and other intercourse with China. Japan, Canada, Pakistan, France, Brazil and Great Britain, to mention a few, also have found the isolation policy of the United States unacceptable and have shown willingness to trade with China and to have interchange of people at least on an unofficial level. Only the idea of containment seems to continue to be a viable one, but there is considerable difference on how that might best be done. The essentially military emphasis of the United States is now supported mainly by Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia. India too could be put in the military containment category since her friendship policy failed to deter the Chinese from taking what they considered was their territory. Different strategies of containment are exemplified by the efforts of Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia and France to place their relationships upon a basis of friendship and mutual interest. It is probably significant that in this latter category are found two nations, France and Pakistan, who have been generally allied with the United States in the past, but are now pushing the ties of alliance aside in dealing with China. Their action may at once be a demonstration and a demand that American China policy be rethought if the U. S. is to aspire to widespread support in dealing with China. Perhaps the U. S. and others can learn something from the successful tactics of Burma and Cambodia which focus on giving full recognition to the Chinese aspirations for prestige, respect and consideration in world politics without sacrificing their own basic interest in security. It can be argued that U. S.-China policy at this stage serves mainly to antagonize the Chinese and at the same time lessen the confidence of much of the world in American judgment. If this is indeed the case, then the U. S. has truly maneuvered itself into a policy position that approaches the hopeless.

A final impression seems worth mentioning. In the chapters on African, Middle Eastern, and Yugoslavian policies one is forcefully reminded that all is not clear sailing for Chinese policy makers in the non-aligned world. While certain aspects of the Chinese way toward industrial and political stature in the international arena do attract followers in many places both at the official and revolutionary level, the articles highlight growing doubts in these areas concerning the desirability of becoming too closely involved with or dependent upon the Chinese. However, this may be only temporary comfort for the West if the situations in these areas deteriorate on the political and economic level. The articles make clear that Chinese have established the contacts and indicated the revolutionary desire to lead the non-white, poverty-punished areas of the world in the struggle against the white, increasingly affluent one-third of the rest of the world. Whether these desires will wax or wane may, in no small part, depend upon the policies from six continents toward China. In these terms the description, information and review of the past in this book should be a valuable addition to the necessary dialogue on China policy.—DEVERE E. PENTONY, *San Francisco State College.*

Neighbors Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States. EDITED BY LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xv., 166. $4.95.)

Academicians concerned with United States' foreign policy have adopted the national habit of ignoring Canadian-American relations. This behavior is reflected in the paucity of our scholarly resources devoted to Canadian studies. Exceptions can be dispatched with alacrity: the University of Rochester, the Duke Commonwealth Center and perhaps three dozen or so Canadian oriented courses scattered across the country. Unfortunately, one book, or even a series (as the Carnegie Foundation volumes demonstrate), cannot fundamentally alter so ingrained a trait. Livingston T. Merchant, former Ambassador to Canada, however, has edited a collection of essays by newspapermen, government officials and a historian which attempts to start afresh at bridging the ignorance gap. Unlike many other such compilations, the bulk of these contributions are worthwhile especially those touching aspects of defense and economic relations.

The defense needs of the North American continent forged a partnership between Canada and the United States. Reduction of the tangible Soviet threat and changes in defense strategy have altered that association. General Charles Foulkes of Canada notes the strategic shift from manned bombers and the decreasing importance of radar networks in a missile age and wonders if Canada's voice will continue to be heard in mutual military affairs. Is Canada's ability to contribute obsolete? Can the Joint Command remain an effective body? Indeed, can Canada even defend herself without reliance upon the United States? Should the answers be in the negative, is there any significant role for Canada to play in continental defense?

Economic relations are undergoing a similar reappraisal for it is here that the American impact on Canada is felt most intensely. Since the mid-fifties, Canadians have been sorely troubled by the flow of American capital over the border. Michael Barkway, editor of Montreal's *Financial Times*, offers a strident, nationalistic argument contending that if this capital flow is not dammed in another decade there will be very little of Canada not owned by the United States. The statistics are always impressive. United States' firms control 70% of all Canadian oil and gas, mining and smelting plus 50% of all manufacturing. This economic penetration, benign in intention, is not without justification. Defending

American investment against criticism is Ivan White, former Minister to Canada, who cites the need for and advantages of this capital and also notes its slowing pace, both in absolute and relative terms. White even moves to the attack. Is the expense of maintaining a separate Canadian economy truly worth the cost? Is a $2,000 average annual wage differential between a citizen of Canada and his southern neighbor necessary? Must Canadian industry, lacking economies of scale and serving a small market, be protected while transportation costs mount as goods are shipped non-rationally parallel to the border rather than across it? These judgments are wisely left to the reader. However, the implicit suggestion of the value of a North American free trade zone should be made explicit. Canada and the United States are each other's best customer. A common market between them would give Canadian industry the benefit of a population ten times that of Canada while the United States, in return, could fairly expect to discuss the allocation of natural resources as a continental, rather than a national, problem. Although such discussion is anathema to Canadian nationalists who desire Canadian resources pledged to benefit Canada alone, it is not an unreasonable *quid pro quo.* Hydroelectric power, oil, natural gas and water already cross the border. Continentalization would only strengthen the partnership and the economies.

If the mutual and sorbering economic and defense problems of these giants are to be resolved with the least damage to the United States and to Canadian-American relations, the academic community of the United States must free itself of its traditional apathy with respect to Canada. Mutual policies of partnership must be analyzed, understood and furthered. At best, this book will spur academicians to counteract their habits. At worst, the essays will serve as useful bibliographic entries for the faithful few who already are aware of the significance of Canada for the United States.—J. RICHARD WAGNER, *University of Arizona.*

The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics. BY MALCOLM KERR. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 139. 10s. 6d. net.)

Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World: (The Middle East and North Africa). BY HISHAM SHARABI. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966. Pp. iv, 176. $1.95, paper.)

Arab politics constitute the focus of both of these small, scholarly studies, but they differ in purpose and scope. Dr. Kerr's work does not represent exhaustive research, he states, but is an interpretive essay. He is primarily concerned with the idea of Arab unity in Arab politics from the formation of the United Arab Republic (1958) to the Arab Summit Conference (1964). Although this means that the scope of the study is limited in time and place, the broader implications of the formation and break-up of the United Arab Republic are also examined.

By contrast, Dr. Sharabi sets himself the admittedly ambitious goal of analyzing "the forces that have shaped contemporary Arab politics both in the Middle East and North Africa." Although one may wonder whether a scholarly but slender volume like this could really accomplish such a task, the author's high aim has not damaged the quality of his work. His intellectual boldness is matched by the excellence of his scholarship—he makes no claim to the completeness of his study.

The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964 starts with the Syrian-Egyptian union against the background of a brief but penetrating discussion of the relevant ideological-psychological as well as political forces, including the development of socialist and revolutionary ideas, anti-colonial sentiment, and the struggle of the Syrian Ba'th, the Communists and the army. The author challenges a common explanation that the Ba'th sought union with 'Abd al-Nāṣir to avert a Communist take-over, but his own explanation must be pieced together from scattered pages: Apparently the Syrians opted for union with Egypt in order to save themselves from "isolation" (p. 6), to prevent "anarchy" (p. 11), to rescue the government from its insecurity (p. 21), and to stimulate the overthrow of conservative regimes and bring such countries as Iraq into an Arab Union (p. 24). The reasons underlying the secession of Syria were also numerous and complex, including the dissatisfaction with Egypt of not only the very rich but also various other groups of people ranging from the businessman down to the ordinary shopkeeper. What was perhaps at the heart of the breakdown of the union was the failure of the Egyptians to provide for the Syrians "a field for effective political participation" (p. 33), although the Ba'th leaders also bungled the chances for unity.

In discussing political developments from the break-up of the union up to the beginning of the Cairo negotiations in March, 1963, Dr. Kerr outlines not only the Syrian and Egyptian reactions but also the basic tenets of 'Abd al-Nāṣir's "Arab Socialism" which manifested itself once the symbolic lure of "Arab Nationalism" had suffered from the first dismal experiment in Arab unity. The author perceptively observes that the ideological shift of emphasis from Arabism to Socialism was not merely a matter of doctrinal development but also a shrewd tactical move by the Egyptian leaders "to hold tenaciously to the initiative, [and] to counter-attack whenever in danger of being outmaneuvered and isolated within the Arab world" (p. 43). A similar realistic approach characterizes the treatment of the interesting Cairo negotiations for unity. The author probes beneath the facade of slogans and doctrinal pronouncements and reveals the real power, tactical and psychological considerations.

Dr. Kerr's realistic appraisal extends to the aftermath of the unity talks and the resulting Cairo agreement as well as the Cairo summit of January, 1964. Bickering and factional strifes characterized the relationship of Cairo with Damascus and Baghdad in the wake of the Cairo "agreement." And at the end of 1963 "more Arab states were at each other's throats at once than ever before" (p. 127). Of the thirteen members of the Arab League only three were on satisfactory terms and the most bitter quarrels were those between the revolutionary movements of Cairo and Damascus. The struggle between these two rivals finally plunged Syria into a new military dictatorship.

Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World ends on a somewhat similar note, although its conclusions transcend the fate of the Syrian regime. Dr. Sharabi seems to lament the failure of the Arab revolution to humanize politics and "to serve those it aimed to uplift." But his real concern is with the analysis of forces influencing Arab politics rather than with the evaluation of Arab regimes. Islam and "colonial domination" are two of the most important forces, although only the general features of Islam are outlined. European domination, particularly by the British and French, is treated in detail as it profoundly influenced "the Arab world's political character and institutions in modern times" (p. 23). With the end of this domination came the emergence of four "systems of power" (the preface mentions only three) in terms of the various kinds of colonial experience, and "sources and claims to legitimation." These are the *patriarchal system*, the *"palace" system*, the *multiparty system*, and the *single-party system*. The author also takes up coups d'etat and their far-reaching and adverse implications for parliamentary democracy. He concludes justifiably that the seizure of power by the military has not been followed by any real politicization of personalistic military rule which is devoid of any institutional base for "orderly transition of power" (p. 65). The Arab states are also classified into the *revolutionary* and *monarchical* groups, as well as an *intermediate* one. The 1949–1958 period was characterized by coups d'etat while the 1960's have been marked by doctrinal and practical manifestations of "socialism and revolution."

Socialism and revolution are brilliantly examined not only as ideologies but also as forces influencing Arab political behavior. The revolutionary states such as Egypt and Algeria still uphold Arab nationalism but emphasize radical social and economic change. Egypt, for example, has nationalized all banks, insurance companies, transportation lines, etc. The ideology of Arab socialism, however, seems "to owe more to Proudhon than to Marx, to British socialism than to Communism" (p. 68).

Both comparativists and area specialists should find these books useful not only for their scholarly contributions but also as welcome teaching aids. *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* in particular fills a real gap in teaching materials on contemporary Arab politics; its chapter on "The Language of Politics" and especially its documentary material—most of which appears in English in this book for the first time—are very useful indeed.—ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI, *University of Virginia*.

The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad. BY CHARLES FRANKEL. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965. Pp. xi, 156. $5.00.)

Professor Frankel examines the educational and cultural policy of the United States in a descriptive study which outlines institutional arrangements and appraises current practice. The author notes the quickening tempo of exchange activities due to improved communications which makes possible the existence of a real international intellectual forum. The increased demand for exchange is also found to be due in part to the technological and skilled manpower needs of developing areas.

The study declares that on the whole instrumentalities developed by the government to meet existent needs are "less of a forethought than a series of afterthoughts" (p. 5). The administrative structure is a complicated one in which policy implementation and decision making are shared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development and a host of other federal agencies. The worst feature of this unwieldy structure is that U.S.I.A. has a mission to promote the foreign policy of the United States, but is not a part of the Department of State, whereas educational and cultural affairs which should transcend the day to day pressures brought to bear on foreign policy are located inside of the

Department of State (p. 29). The writer finds that educational and cultural programs have long range objectives which prevent their fitting into annual country plans. Such programs are also weakened by close identification with diplomacy and propaganda.

The monograph under review does have some methodological problems. The writer interviewed over three hundred individuals, but the twelve countries from which the respondents originate are hardly representative of either major geographic areas or cultures. Statistical descriptions of official American personnel engaged in educational and cultural affairs activities are based on files that "were made available," which tells the reader little of the representative quality of the data or the manner in which the files were selected. However, this is a most useful, informative and thoughtful study.

Professor Frankel is perhaps at his best in Chapter IV which contains an excellent account of communications between American and foreign intellectuals. He speaks particularly to social scientists in describing the impact of behavioral studies on the academic community abroad. This section is essential reading for anyone planning to teach or to conduct research outside of the United States.

In conclusion the author calls attention to the need for focusing and upgrading the proliferated educational and cultural affairs program. He prescribes the strengthening of the position of the cultural affairs officer. The role of academics and private agencies would also be increased by the creation of a semi-autonomous foundation for educational and cultural exchange composed of government agencies, universities, and learned societies. Professor Frankel maintains that responsibility for educational and cultural affairs should be placed under the Department of State rather than U.S.I.A. and that an office of Under-Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs should be created. Since the publication of this work the author has become Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. The reviewer wishes him luck in the operationalization of his study.—ROBERT E. CLUTE, *The University of Georgia.*

Outlook on Space. BY F. T. EVANS AND H. T. HOWARD. (New York: Hillary House Publishers Ltd., 1965. Pp. 175. $5.50.)

This little book is an excellent approach to the general problem of outer space. It falls into two parts. The first 115 pages deal with the astrophysical aspects of space, while the second part is concerned with the international scene—law in a new dimension, the national past, and the international future. The appendix includes, inter alia, a planetary table, the structure of the United Nations, various documents, as well as tables of space probes and satellites. The book is written in a popular style, and is clearly directed more towards the general reader than the scientist or space expert.

It is pointed out that the present aims and methods of space scientists and engineers are firmly based on the experience of the past, and that they have grown out of traditional astronomy and rocket technology. At the same time, and in response to the advancing technology, international organizations have been growing both in scale and effectiveness in spite of a chaotic world of sovereign national states.

In this age it is very clear that human activity in all its aspects cannot be contained within respective national frontiers, but tend to spill over into regional and universal space, as the nature of a given activity may require. Thus the genius of inventiveness and the power of scientific knowledge must in time cause the boundaries of nations to blur more and more as functional international organizations, both regional and universal, are made necessary.

In dealing with international law, in part two of the book, the authors contend that "so far no body of international Space Law exists" (p. 120). This may be true in a very narrow sense, but it would seem to the present reviewer that the statement is too categorical and in need of some modification. The Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was accepted unanimously by that body on December 20, 1961, is cited by the authors on p. 121, but declared not to be law, "but merely an agreement, between those countries only which are members of the U. N. and which are accordingly bound by the U. N. Charter."

The present reviewer wishes respectively to point out that it is not necessary for an agreement to include all the states in the world to be binding international law. Furthermore, as the authors admit, the states party to the Resolution "are accordingly bound by the U. N. Charter." It might be pointed out also that on December 19, 1962, a second resolution (U. N. Doc. A/5341, Resolution 1802, XVII) on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space was adopted by the General Assembly, stressing further elaboration of legal principles governing activities of states in outer space. It is of course true that as to the legal value of General Assembly resolutions there is *divided opinion* among authorities, but it is precisely for this reason that categorical statements regarding this matter should be avoided. In a paper presented before the Second World Conference on World Peace Through Law held in Washington in September of 1965, Professor Ivan A. Vlasic had this to say: "The requirements and speed in man's activities in space are such that the world community has in many instances no alternative to accepting the U. N. resolutions as the appropriate channel for setting standards of conduct in this new medium. Whether one characterizes these resolutions as merely providing evidence of customary law or as *law creating*, their effect in practice is the same."

Inasmuch as this rather small volume attempts "to sketch the development both of space travel and internationalism" it is not to be expected that the whole of the argument could have been presented. This book, not intended for specialists in science and law, is a charming introduction to the relationship between space research and international organization.—OSCAR SVARLIEN, *University of Florida.*

Politics, International Relations and Law: Scope, Methodology and Classification. BY GIRJA KUMAR. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965. Distributed by Taplinger Publishing Company. Pp. xxiii, 209. $10.25.)

Chiefly a critique of existing schemes of library classification as they are applied to political science, with tentative elaboration of a new classification schedule based on the postulational approach of the Indian librarian, S. R. Ranganathan.—C.B.

NEWS AND NOTES

The sixty-third Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9, 1967 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

NATIONAL OFFICE'S CHANGE OF ADDRESS

The American Political Science Association's national office has moved to its new quarters in the Political Science Building. Henceforth all correspondence to the Executive Director, officers, and staff should be addressed to:

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

New officers of the Southern Political Science Association are: Preston W. Edsall, North Carolina State University, president; Gladys M. Kammer, University of Florida, president-elect; and S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky, vice president and program chairman for the 1967 annual meeting. Other members of the program committee are Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and John T. Dorsey, Jr., Vanderbilt University. The 1967 meeting will be held in New Orleans, November 2, 3 and 4.

At the first meeting of the Central States Conference on Public Administration, held October 21–22, 1966 in Kansas City, George J. Mauer, Oklahoma State University, was chosen president-elect. The Oklahoma chapter of the ASPA presented a program on "The Association of Central Oklahoma Governments: An Experiment in Intergovernmental Relations."

The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy elected the following officers at its annual meeting in September: Jerome Hall, Indiana University, president; John Rawls, Harvard University, vice president; John Lewis, Oberlin, vice president; John Ladd, Brown University, secretary-treasurer.

The International Studies Association will hold its eighth annual national convention on April 14–15 on the Washington Square campus of the New York University in Manhattan. Those planning to attend should communicate with Vincent Davis, Executive Secretary, ISA National Office, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80210.

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists will hold its 25th annual meeting on April 27–29 at the Memorial Union, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Public Affairs Conference Center was transferred from the University of Chicago to Kenyon College in September, 1966. ROBERT GOLDWIN, Kenyon College, has been appointed director.

Harvard University on October 17, 1966, changed the name of its Graduate School of Public Administration to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government. At the same time it created within the School an Institute of Politics to be supported by an endowment to be provided by the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Inc. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT has been named director of the Institute.

The Australian National University invites applications for its scholarships in political science, including public administration. Applicants should be postgraduate students with a capacity for research. Scholars will normally enroll for a Ph.D. degree, the course for which extends over three years. An award is initially made for two years, but will be normally extended for the whole period of the approved course. The basic scholarship allowance is $A2330 per annum. Married scholars with dependent children receive additional allowances. Fares to and from Canberra are paid.

Application forms and further particulars are available from the University. Applications should reach the University by April 30, 1967. Scholarships may be taken up at any time after the award, subject to agreement by the head of the department. Interested persons should write to D. K. R. Hodgkin, Registrar, Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, Box 4, P.O. Canberra, A.C.T. Australia.

The editorial staff of the forthcoming new journal, *General Politics Quarterly* include the following: JOHN E. WESTBURG, St. Ambrose College, editor; JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, University of Iowa, JOHN B. MCCONNAUGHY, University of South Carolina; URBAN G. WHITAKER, San Francisco State College; RITA KAPOOR BRICKSIN, St. Ambrose College, associate editors.

For the twentieth consecutive year, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, will hold a summer institute in survey research techniques. The 1967 institute will be presented in two four-week sessions, the first from June 28 to July 21 and the second from July 24 to August 18. The sessions may be taken independently or successively. For further information write to the Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

The first issue of *Metropolitan Viewpoints*, published by the Graduate School of Public Affairs, SUNY, appeared on August 1, 1966.

The Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois and the Department of Political Science at Chicago Circle, held an Assembly on the State and its Cities, December 8–10, 1966.

In cooperation with the American Political Science Association, the Illinois Legislative Council held a conference for newly elected members of the Illinois General Assembly at the University of Illinois conference center, November 30–December 1, 1966. SAMUEL K. GOVE, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, served as consultant to the Association in preparing for the meeting.

ELTON ATWATER, Pennsylvania State University, was on research leave during the fall term. He is also administering a U.N. internship project at the university.

ROBERT BERDAHL, San Francsico State College, served as research consultant with the American Council on Education in Washington, D.C. during the fall term.

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK, University of South Carolina, was the 1966 recipient of the Russell Creative Research award in the Humanities given annually by the University.

DONALD C. BLAISDELL, City College of CUNY, is a trustee of the Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters.

BERNARD C. BORNING, University of Idaho, will conduct an NDEA Civics Institute for secondary school teachers on the Idaho campus this summer.

PAUL R. BRASS, University of Washington, is doing research in India during 1966–67, under a grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies and the American Council of Learned Societies.

DONALD CASTLEBERRY has resumed his duties at San Francisco State College after spending 1965–66 in Sweden where he was resident director of the California State Colleges International Program.

RICHARD C. COLLINS, Seattle University, has taken a year's leave of absence to serve as associate director of the U. S. Civil Service Commission's Executive Seminar Center in Berkeley.

GEORGE A. CONDON, Washington State University, spent the summer acting as legislative assistant to the governor of Washington.

EDMOND COSTANTINI, University of California at Davis, served during the autumn term as educational secretary to the governor of California.

FRANK C. DARLING, University of Colorado, has returned after a Fulbright lecture grant to the Philippines. He lectured on American foreign policy in Singapore, Malaysia, Great Britain and Western Germany.

HENRY DAVID, National Science Foundation, has been appointed Executive Secretary of the Division of Behavioral Sciences of the National Research Council.

JOHN A. DAVIS, City College, CUNY, is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; is the editor of *African Forum*, a new magazine which began publication in 1965; and was co-chairman of the U. S. Committee of UNESCO for the first World Festival of Negro Arts, held in Dakar in April, 1966.

Ted Diamond has been appointed counsel to a commissioner of the N. Y. City Department of Parks.

Jack D. Powell, Washington State University, is spending a sabbatical leave at Stanford University.

Alex N. Dragnich, Vanderbilt University, was elected president of the Southern Conference of Slavic Studies at the annual meeting in October. He spent the summer of 1966 in Yugoslavia doing research.

Elliott P. Fagerberg, Graduate Institute of International Studies of the University of Geneva and the European Division of the University of Maryland, is doing research at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, the Ohio State University.

John Ferguson is on leave from the Pennsylvania State University during 1966–67. Part of his time is spent as senior political scientist for the Joint State Government Commission, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Marguerite J. Fisher, Syracuse University, presented a paper at the U. N. Conference on National Development and the Status of Women in Asia in December. The conference was in the Philippines.

Gerald Friedbery, University of California, was on autumn research leave.

Fred Gantt, Jr., North Texas State University, will do research during the summer of 1967 under a university faculty grant.

Edward B. Glick, Temple University, conducted research in Panama and El Salvador during the past summer under grants from the Office of Naval Research and Temple University.

Rudolph Gomez, Colorado College, will spend the summer and fall of 1967 as Fulbright lecturer at the Catholic and San Marcos Universities in Lima, Peru.

Harry A. Green, formerly deputy director, Division of Economic Opportunity, Office of the Governor of Florida, has been named special assistant in the Department of Housing and Urban Welfare.

Clarke Hagensick, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, served on the Wisconsin Governor's Committee on Improved Expenditure Management in the summer of 1966.

Charles M. Hardin, University of California at Davis, was on autumn research leave.

Charles A. Hollister, Bucknell University, was on leave during the fall term.

John E. Horner, U. S. Department of State, is "diplomat in residence" at Tulane University during 1966–67 and is attached to the political science department.

Clyde Jacobs, University of California at Davis, was on leave during the fall and winter terms.

George McT. Kahin, Cornell University, is on sabbatical leave during 1966–67.

Ladis K. D. Kristof, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, presented a paper at the First International Congress of Balkan Studies in Sofia during the summer of 1966.

John C. Lane, SUNY at Buffalo, spent a sabbatical leave in England and East Germany during the fall term.

Gerard J. Mangone, Syracuse University, will be on leave in Washington, D. C. during the spring term.

David S. McLellan, University of California at Riverside, will be on leave through 1968 and will serve as director of the University of California Study Center at Bordeaux, France.

Glenn G. Morgan, San Jose State College, spent a month in the Soviet Union. He is on leave during 1966–67 under a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies.

Benjamin Nimer, The George Washington University, was on leave during the autumn term. He also conducted research in Western Europe during the summer.

John R. Owens, University of California at Davis, was on research leave during the fall and winter terms.

Julius Paul, research political scientist in the Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, has been appointed by the mayor of Rockville, Md., to the city's Human Relations Commission.

Thomas Payne, University of Montana, served as resource person for the American Broadcasting System in Helena on election night in November.

Robert Pfaltzgraff, Seton Hall University, has been appointed to the Board of Editors, *Journal of European Affairs*.

Don C. Piper, University of Maryland, received one of the University's ten "Excellence in Teaching" awards for 1966.

Elmer Plischke, University of Maryland, was on sabbatical leave during the fall term.

Bhagwati P. K. Poddar, currently in India on a research grant from the Relm Foundation, is assisting in revising the political science program at the Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi.

Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati, did research in India while on leave of absence during the fall term.

Raymond L. Randall, Indiana University, has been appointed director of the Institutional and Social Service, Office of Technical Cooperation and Research, AID.

Melvin Richter, Hunter College, has been awarded the Conference on British Studies prize for his book, *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age.*

Robert S. Robins, Tulane University, served as director of Duke University's Summer Institute on Southern Asia, 1966.

Donald B. Rosenthal, SUNY at Buffalo, is on leave during 1966–67 and is studying at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Ford Foundation.

Donald S. Rothchild, University of California, is on leave during the current academic year and is teaching at the University College, Nairobi, Kenya, as a field representative of the Rockefeller Foundation.

H. Pierre Secher, Western Reserve University, was on research leave during the fall term.

Jerome N. Slater, SUNY at Buffalo, will be on leave spring and summer terms to conduct research in Washington, D. C. under an SSRC grant.

Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania, attended a Round Table on "Government and Politics of Economic Organizations" of ISPA in Warsaw, Poland. He also attended a conference on "Theory and Practice of Political Development" at the Brookings Institution. He gave papers at both conferences.

Harold Stanley Thames, North Texas State University, conducted research at the United Nations during the summer of 1966 under a university grant.

Ellis Waldron, University of Montana, and **Boyd A. Martin**, University of Idaho, were director and associate director, respectively, of a joint Montana-Idaho Assembly on State Legislatures in December. Some sixty interested persons from the two states considered various recommendations aimed at improving the functioning of state legislatures in the light of reapportionment.

Richard L. Walker has returned to his post at the University of South Carolina, after spending the year in Taiwan.

Herbert Waltzer, Miami University (Ohio), was invited to return to CBS during the week of the November elections to continue a study of the impact of television on the election.

William V. Weber, Western Michigan University, has been elected to the Michigan State House of Representatives.

STAFF CHANGES

New Appointments

Alvin A. Abbott, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point; formerly of Central Michigan University.

James Carl Akins, assistant professor, University of Houston.

James E. Anderson, associate professor, University of Houston; formerly of Wake Forest College.

Thomas J. Anton, professor, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

Douglas Ashford, associate professor, Cornell University.

David Barney, lecturer, University of California at Davis.

Askoe K. Basu, assistant professor, University of Southern California.

Sylan M. Berman, associate professor, Institute of International Law and Relations, The Catholic University of America.

Paul W. Boeyink, lecturer, San Jose State College.

A. Stephen Boyan, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of the University of Chicago.

Stephen N. Bryant, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

Douglas P. Bwy, assistant professor, Western Reserve University.

Wallace F. Caldwell, associate professor, Washington State University; formerly of Kansas State University.

Ira Carmen, associate professor, Coe College; formerly of Ball State University.

David N. Chamberlin, assistant professor, Kansas State University.

Peter Cheng, associate professor, University of Nebraska.

David E. Clarke, associate professor, Western Washington State College; formerly of the University of Alaska.

Louellyn Cohan, lecturer and post-graduate research political scientist, University of California at Davis.

Genevieve Collins Linebarger, lecturer, University of Maryland, 1966–67.

Jett B. Conner, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

Donald Dahlin, assistant professor, University of South Dakota.

Theodore Denno, lecturer, University of Southern California; formerly of San Diego State College.

Robert Delorme, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

Ernest R. DeProspo, Jr., instructor, Pennsylvania State University.

Karl W. Deutsch, professor, Harvard University.

Eldon Eisenach, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of the University of California.

Gordon H. Evans, assistant professor, SUNY, New Paltz.

Edward L. Farley, instructor, University of Houston.

Yale Ferguson, instructor, Newark College of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers.

Stephen Fraser, assistant professor, San Francisco State College.

Richard W. Gable, professor and research political scientist, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California at Davis.

William R. Garner, associate professor, Southern Illinois University; formerly of North Texas State University.

Harvey R. Glassen, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

Robert Goldwin, associate professor, Kenyon College.

Donald Gregory, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

Kenneth W. Grundy, associate professor, Western Reserve University; formerly of San Fernando Valley State College.

Andrew Gyorgy, professor, Institute for Sino-Soviet Study, George Washington University; formerly of Boston University; Sept. 1966.

Kenneth I. Hanf, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis.

David K. Hart, assistant professor, San Francisco State College.

Frederick H. Hartmann, special advisor to the president of the Naval War College and the first occupant of the newly created permanent Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy.

Margaret Haupt, assistant professor, Coe College.

Donald C. Hellman, associate professor, joint appointment in political science and the Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington, September, 1967.

Calvin Hiibner, University of Utah.

Ruben J. DeHoyos, Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh.

E. Terrence Jones, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of Georgetown University.

Ronald D. Jones, associate professor, School of Business and Public Administration, University of Missouri at Kansas City; formerly of the RAND Corporation.

Ruth Jones, instructor, Kansas State University.

Robert Dale Judy, assistant professor, North Texas State University.

George Kacewicz, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

Lindsay Keffer, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

Eldon G. Kenworthy, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of Yale University.

Hong Nack Kim, assistant professor, North Texas State University.

Richard J. Landry, instructor, Cornell University.

Robert LaPorte, Jr., assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of Syracuse University.

Michael Lawrence, assistant professor, De Pauw University; formerly of the University of Chicago.

Robert D. Lee, Jr., assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of Harvard University.

William Leiter, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

Christopher Leu, lecturer, University of California at Davis.

Orma Linford, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of Wisconsin State University, Kenosha.

Peter C. Loder, instructor, Bucknell University.

David W. Lubkert, instructor, San Jose State College.

O. G. A. Mastroianni, instructor, Augusta College.

R. D. McLaurin, instructor, Merrimack College.

Ruth T. McVey, lecturer, Cornell University.

Vernon C. Mechtensheimer, assistant professor, Madison College.

Lawrence C. Meyer, assistant professor, California State College, Fullerton; formerly of the University of Texas.

Robert Miewald, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

George Modelski, professor, University of Washington, formerly of the Australian National University.

Robert Mollan, University of Utah.

John D. Molloy, assistant professor, Michigan State University; formerly of the University of Cincinnati.

W. Edmund Moomaw, assistant professor, Eastern Kentucky University.

Richard W. Murray, instructor, University of Houston.

Thomas P. Murphy, professor and director of Public Administration, University of Missouri at Kansas City; formerly of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

David A. Nichols, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

Catherine D. Papastathopoulos, research associate, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan.

Jack W. Peltason, Chancellor, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, July, 1967; formerly Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs, University of California, Irvine.

O. William Perlmutter, professor, SUNY at Albany; formerly of Kent State University.

Keith S. Peterson, associate professor, North Carolina State College.

Amir Rafat, associate professor, DePauw University; formerly of Kent State University.

Knud Rasmussen, associate professor, Clark University; formerly of Colgate University.

David Ricci, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of Harvard University.

Linda Richter, instructor, Kansas State University.

William L. Richter, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of the University of Hawaii.

Winston W. Riddick, assistant professor, Louisana State University.

O. Zeller Robertson, assistant professor, University of South Dakota.

Evan D. Rogers, instructor, Washington State University; formerly of the University of Minnesota.

Arnold A. Rogow, professor, City College, CUNY.

Richard Rose, professor, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, Scotland; formerly of Manchester University.

Arthur W. Rovine, assistant professor, Cornell University.

Leonas Sabaliunas, assistant professor, Eastern Michigan University.

Guenther Schaefer, assistant professor, San Francisco State College.

William A. Schultze, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of Valparaiso University.

Philip Siegelman, associate professor, San Francisco State College.

John W. Sloan, instructor, North Texas State University.

Jeffrey A. Spencer, instructor, Illinois Wesleyan University.

Emil Starr, associate professor, University of Massachusetts at Boston; formerly Regional Director for the Foreign Policy Association.

David Steiniche, instructor, DePauw University.

Paul R. Tennant, assistant professor, the University of British Columbia.

Anne Thompson Feraru, assistant professor, California State College at Fullerton; formerly of the University of Hawaii.

Thomas Landon Thorson, associate professor, University of Toronto.

Glen E. Thurow, instructor, Bucknell University.

Ivan Volgyes, instructor, University of Nebraska.

Joan Wadlow, assistant professor, University of Nebraska.

Mary June Wall, assistant professor, Madison College.

Jerry Weaver, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

Bernard Weiner, assistant professor, Western Washington State College; formerly of San Diego State College.

Herbert G. Wilcox, assistant professor, California State College at Fullerton; formerly of St. Johns University.

Freeman J. Wright, assistant professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Quito, Ecuador; formerly of Fresno State College.

Richard F. Wright, instructor, University of Montana, 1966–67.

Jon A. Yinger, assistant professor, California State College at Fullerton; formerly of San Bernadino Valley College.

Matthew Zuckerbraun, Lafayette College.

Visiting Appointments (1966–67)

Kenneth G. Armstrong, University of Melbourne: Carnegie Fellow, 1967, and research associate, fall term, 1967, Cornell University.

Paul C. Bartholomew, University of Notre Dame: professor, National University of Ireland, University College, Dublin, January–June, 1967.

William J. Block, North Carolina State University: professor, Duke University, fall, 1966–67.

Tao Cheng, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University.

John H. Ferguson, Pennsylvania State University: professor, University of Pennsylvania.

Andrew Gyorgy, professor, University of Arizona, spring, 1966.

Klaus J. Herrmann, Sir George Williams University: professor, Hochschule für Politische Wissenschaften, Munich; lecturer, Julius Maximilians University of Wuerzburg, summer, 1966.

Anthony King, University of Essex: professor, University of Wisconsin, spring, 1967.

Morton Kroll, University of Washington: professor, University of West Indies, Jamaica, 1966–67.

Richard H. Leach, Duke University: professor, North Carolina State University, spring, 1966.

Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University: professor, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, 1966–67.

Louis S. Loeb, American University: lecturer, University of California at Davis.

Grant McConnell, University of Chicago: professor, University of Washington, spring, 1967.

Andrew Milnor, Boston University: assistant professor, Cornell University.

Chester A. Newland, North Texas State University: professor, University of Southern California.

Robert E. O'Brien, lecturer, Pennsylvania State University.

Lincoln Smith, New York University: professor, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B., summer, 1966.

Harold M. Vinacke, lecturer, Miami University (Ohio), spring, 1967.

D. J. Wenden, Oxford University: professor, San Francisco State College.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

Burton R. Brazil, San Jose State College: acting dean, School of Humanities and Arts, fall term, 1966.

Edward H. Buehrig, Indiana University: acting chairman, 1966–67.

J. W. Bradury, Southern Colorado State College: associate professor and assistant to the president of the university; formerly of the U. S. Air Forces Systems Command.

Donald Brandon, University of San Francisco: chairman.

Byrum E. Carter, Indiana University: dean, College of Arts and Sciences.

James W. Davis, Central Michigan University: chairman; formerly of St. Cloud State College.

Mario Einaudi, Cornell University: director, Center for International Studies.

Joseph Hajda, Kansas State University: director of International Activities.

Horace V. Harrison, University of Maryland: acting head, fall term, 1966–67.

Ferrel Heady, University of New Mexico: academic vice-president; formerly of the University of Michigan.

Bernard Hennessey, Pennsylvania State University: professor and chairman.

Mary Evelyn Huey, North Texas State University: director, Joint University Community Services Center, 1966–67.

H. W. Kamp, North Texas State University: chairman.

James Kessler, Indiana University: acting director, Institute of Public Administration, replacing York Willbern during 1966–67.

Harold M. Klein, Rutgers: extension associate, Bureau of Government Research.

Lee Layport, Santa Ana College: chairman, Division of Social Sciences, January 1, 1967.

Charles G. Mayo, University of Southern California: assistant professor and associate dean of the Graduate School; formerly of San Francisco State College.

Raymond A. Moore, University of Southern California: director of graduate studies, Department of International Studies.

William L. Morrow, DePauw University: acting chairman.

Steven Muller, Cornell University: vice-president for Public Affairs.

Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University: graduate advisor, Department of Government.

Roland I. Perusse, Inter-American University, San Jose, P. R.: chairman and director of Inter-American Studies.

Samuel R. Solomon, Eastern Michigan University: chairman.

Matthew C. Stewart, associate director, Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina.

Joseph L. Sutton, Indiana University: dean of the Faculties.

Clarence E. Thurber, University of Oregon: professor and deputy director, Institute of International Studies and Overseas Administration; formerly of Pennsylvania State University.

Donald E. Weatherbee, University of South Carolina: director of undergraduate studies, Department of International Studies.

Joseph Woodka, Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point: professor and chairman; formerly of Central Michigan University.

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California at Davis: associate professor and chairman.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

Dean Alfange, Jr., Lafayette College, assistant professor.

Ramon Arango, Kenyon College, associate professor.

William C. Baum, Grand Valley State College: associate professor.

Lawton E. Bennett, North Carolina State University, assistant professor.

John P. Bradley, North Texas State University: associate professor.

Warner O. Chapman, Indiana University: professor.

Ira S. Cohen, California State College, Long Beach: associate professor.

Morris H. Cohen, Clark University, professor.

Richard R. Fagen, Stanford University, associate professor.

Glenn W. Fisher, University of Illinois, professor.

Garland Fothergill, Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point, professor.

Jack B. Gabbert, Washington State University, associate professor.

Fred Gantt, North Texas State University, professor.

John H. Gilbert, North Carolina State University, assistant professor.

Bates M. Gilliam, Virginia Military Institute, professor and colonel.

Edward M. Goldberg, California State College at Los Angeles, associate professor.

E. Ray Griffin, North Texas State University, associate professor.

Milton Hobbs, Indiana University, associate professor.

Mary Evelyn Huey, North Texas State University, professor.

Lee R Kerschner, California State College at Fullerton, associate professor.

Youngnok Koo, Eastern Michigan University, assistant professor.

Marcelino Miyares, St. Procopius College, assistant professor.

Bernard S. Morris, Indiana University, professor.

Donald C. Mundinger, Valparaiso University, professor.

Hans Ridder, California State College, Long Beach, assistant professor.

Leroy N. Rieselbach, Indiana University, associate professor.

Edgar L. Shor, Colgate University, professor.

William J. Siffin, Indiana University, professor.

Crodell A. Smith, North Texas State College, associate professor.

Richard C. Spencer, Coe College, professor emeritus.

Thor Swanson, Washington State University, professor.

Woodworth G. Thrombley, Indiana University, associate professor.

Thomas P. Trombetas, California State College at Long Beach, associate professor.

Walter F. Weiker, Newark College of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers, associate professor.

Resignations and Retirements

Houston I. Flournoy has resigned from Pomona College to assume the post of State Controller for the State of California.

Gilbert Y. Steiner, University of Illinois, has resigned to accept a position as Senior Associate at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Harry W. Voltmer has retired as professor and head of the department at De Pauw University. He will continue to teach on a part-time basis.

IN MEMORIAM

Peter H. Odegard, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former President of the American Political Association, died suddenly in Berkeley on December 7, 1966.

He was a distinguished scholar and practitioner of politics, a gracious colleague, superb teacher, and inventive government official. In his lifetime he combined two attributes—political commitment and scholarly detachment—which, when thus fused, mark the rare civilized practitioner of our profession. His career as scholar and teacher spanned four decades; it spanned also a wide range of American colleges and universities. His colleagues and former students are ubiquitous and legion. He was concerned for the quality of American liberal education, and this was especially manifest in his intense conviction that the teaching of politics was necessarily both a scientific and a civic enterprise. From his father, a Norwegian immigrant and Socialist, he inherited a deep concern for social reform. In politics a liberal democrat, he held deep and sometimes passionate convictions—and these with human warmth rather than humorless dogmatism. His affection for people extended to those with whom he strongly disagreed, and among his close friends were many of these.

Born in Montana in 1901 of Norwegian immigrant parents, Odegard studied at the University of Washington where he was influenced by Vernon L. Parrington and J. Allen Smith. At Columbia University, where he received his doctorate and taught in the Department of Public Law and

Government, he studied under John Dewey, Thomas Reed Powell, Arthur MacMahon, and Lindsay Rogers. Afterwards he taught at Williams College (1928–1930), Ohio State University (1930–1938), Stanford University (1934), Amherst College (1938–1945), and the University of California (1948–1966). For three years (1945–1948) he served as President of Reed College. He held honorary degrees from Amherst College; Oriel College, Oxford University; Ohio State University; the University of Pittsburgh; and the University of Montana. His public service in national and state affairs included work with the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury; the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission; the President's Commission on Migratory Labor; and the National Commission for UNESCO. His candidacies for the Democratic nominations for the California Lieutenant-Governorship and the U. S. Senate were pressed unsuccessfully by California liberals in 1954 and 1958. To many million Americans in the early 1960's, Professor Odegard's popular, nationally televised "Continental Classroom" served as a first systematic introduction to American government and politics.

Professor Odegard's influence in American higher education was pervasive and intangible; the warm enthusiasm and vigor which he brought to all things touched colleagues and students alike. While chairman of the Berkeley Political Science Department between 1948 and 1956, he raised its quality in large measure by undogmatic respect for, and encouragement of, the quality of intellect, irrespective of methodological differences; if this Department continues today, as it does, to embrace a catholic and excellent representation of viewpoints of our discipline, this legacy is owed in the first instance to him.

PAUL SEABURY

University of California, Santa Cruz

STANLEY KUHL HORNBECK, widely respected for his contributions to the literature on the Far East and on international legal subjects, died in Washington, D. C., on December 10, 1966. His long public career brought him to prominence as a major policy counselor, particularly on Far Eastern diplomacy in the Department of State from 1928 to 1944, and culminated with his service for three years thereafter as ambassador to the Netherlands.

Born in Franklin, Massachusetts, on May 4, 1883, he earned B.A. degrees from the University of Denver and from Oxford (at the latter as Rhodes Scholar from 1904–07) and the Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. He taught in colleges in China and at Wisconsin, Michigan, and Harvard. His varied career brought him many assignments abroad, including duties in the Far East staff at the Peace Conference in Paris; he became also a colonel in the Army Reserve.

Always a precise scholar, he wrote and spoke with brevity and lucidity in terms of broad application. He believed strongly, as he wrote in 1941, in "*the* foreign policy of the United States," not "separate and peculiar" for regions of the world, made by officers "sensitively receptive and responsive" to public opinion and "designed to safeguard and promote the legitimate national interests of the United States." Gravely courteous and of wry humor, he was perhaps most of all interested in people. His four books and numerous articles, as his friends and readers of four generations will recognize, are monuments to his personal wisdom and intellectual integrity.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

WILLIAM R. MARTIN, assistant professor of government at North Texas State University and the president of ISA Southwest, died in Paris, France, on July 2, 1966, following a cerebral hemorrhage six days earlier and emergency brain surgery. Professor Martin was in Paris engaged in research on the defense policy of the French government, and had planned to go to Sweden later in the summer for work on another research project. He was 33 years old at the time of his death.

Professor Martin was born and raised in Ardmore, Oklahoma, where he graduated from Ardmore High School in 1950. He received his B.A. degree from Princeton University in 1954, and his M.A. degree (1957) and Ph.D. degree (1964) from the University of Oklahoma. He also held a Certificate from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

He had held faculty positions at Texas Technological College and at the University of Cincinnati prior to joining the faculty of the Department of Government at North Texas State University in Denton in the fall of 1964. He is survived by his widow, Patricia Anne, and by his parents in Ardmore, Mr. and Mrs. Rupert Martin.

Professor Martin's colleagues and students admired him for his professional competence, his congenial pleasant personality, and his quiet but effective enthusiasm and dedication. He will be greatly missed by members of the profession who knew him as an able scholar and an inspiring teacher.

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

North Texas State University

GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a one-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review.* To be eligible, applicants must reside in one of the Asian countries listed below.

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 5-9, in the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any of the following Asian countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Ruyukyus, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Thailand, and Vietnam. Applicants who have not previously received grants will be given first consideration. Application forms may be obtained from The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.)

1961 BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY AVAILABLE AT REDUCED RATES

A limited supply of the fourth edition of the Biographical Directory, published in 1961, is available for $1.25 per copy for the paperbound copy and $2.25 per copy for the clothbound copy. Formerly, the price was $12.50 for the clothbound and $10.00 for the paperbound. Orders should be sent to:

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

in the study of politics

New research areas
open new approaches
to government
through exploration
of new concepts
and theories.
For research-based
books that are
carefully integrated
with existing
literature:
Rand McNally
books in
political science.

AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH SERIES

Edited by AARON WILDAVSKY
University of California, Berkeley

Each book in the series consists of an original research venture tied into existing information and theory in such a way as to make a new contribution to the field.

POWER IN COMMITTEES: An Experiment in the Governmental Process
JAMES DAVID BARBER • Yale University
1966 • 189 pages • $5.00

SOCIAL INSECURITY: The Politics of Welfare
GILBERT Y. STEINER • The Brookings Institution
1966 • 270 pages • $6.00

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC: Policy Outcomes in the American States
THOMAS R. DYE • University of Georgia
1966 • 325 pages • $6.00

AMBITION AND POLITICS: Political Careers in the United States
JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER • Michigan State University
1966 • 226 pages • $6.00

STUDIES IN POLITICAL CHANGE

Edited by MYRON WEINER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Aspects of political change in developing nations are illustrated through specific examples of change and combined with a theoretical understanding of the processes of such change.

CREATING POLITICAL ORDER: The Party-States of West Africa
ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG • University of Chicago
1966 • 168 pages • $2.50 paper

SONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT: Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica
DANIEL GOLDRICH • University of Oregon
1966 • 139 pages • $2.50 paper

PUBLIC LIBERTIES IN THE NEW STATES
DAVID H. BAYLEY • University of Denver
1964 • 152 pages • $2.50 paper

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department • Chicago, Illinois 60680

the study of international politics

A demanding,
interdisciplinary
study calls for
currency, accuracy,
and competent analysis.
Whether you are
concerned with the
laws of nations,
aspects of human
behavior, or the
prospects for peace,
look to the books
in political science
from
Rand McNally.

INTERNATIONAL REGIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
A Study in Political Ecology

BRUCE M. RUSSETT • Yale University
New 1967

Explores some of the relationships between political systems and their social/physical environments in order to group political units into larger clusters. Comparisons are made at two times: the early 1950's and the early 1960's. They are based on five criteria: socio-cultural similarity, similarity of political behavior in international politics, political interdependence, economic interdependence, and geographic proximity. No other book has as rigorous quantitative analysis and hard evidence applied to these theoretical interests at the global level.

THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
An Introduction to the Role of International Law in the Contemporary World

WILLIAM D. COPLIN • Wayne State University
1966 • 312 pages • $3.50 paper

Discusses contemporary operation of international law through an interdisciplinary approach and in terms of social science concepts. Outlines the means by which international law and organization contribute to the development of an international political culture. Appendices contain seven examples of treaties and other documents of international law.

HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
Contributions from the Social-Psychological Sciences

Edited by J. DAVID SINGER • University of Michigan
1965 • 466 pages • $9.00

Nearly fifty articles by prominent sociologists and psychologists are carefully edited and condensed to point up the connection between behavioral sciences and international relations. Organized in terms of one theoretical approach to comparative foreign policy.

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE

Edited by WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1965 • 264 pages • $3.50 paper

The obstacles to peace—as well as the approaches to a strategy of peace—are examined by more than a dozen scholars and public officials. The selections show interrelationships of domestic and international affairs.

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department • Chicago, Illinois 60680

Oxford University Press

The Nature and Function of International Organization *Second Edition*

By **Stephen S. Goodspeed**, *University of California, Santa Barbara*
In a completely revised and updated study, Professor Goodspeed draws an objective picture of international organization, past and present. New material in the Second Edition includes an analysis of the most recent developments affecting colonialism, full coverage of all cases and advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, and a survey of the financial problems of the United Nations from 1960.
1967 736 pp. illus. $7.50

Freedom and the Court:

Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States

By **Henry J. Abraham**, *University of Pennsylvania*

The study examines the role of the judiciary in the United States from 1789 to the present in determining the evolution and implementation of certain fundamental civil rights. Its central purpose is to consider the lines a democratic society must draw between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community as a whole.
April 1967 352 pp. cloth $7.50 paper $2.75

The Politics of the Third World

By **J. D. B. Miller**, *Australian National University*

The study examines those countries of the Afro-Asian bloc united by the common attributes of being non-European, non-Communist, and poor. Professor Miller is primarily concerned with international behavior of the Third World states and devotes particular attention to those aspects of their domestic affairs that contribute towards foreign policy. The general conclusion of the study is that Third World unity as a distinctive political force has not been achieved and that harmony of view within the Third World exists only on issues of symbolic importance such as colonialism and economic development.
1967 144 pp. cloth $3.75 paper $1.50

Modern Capitalism:

The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power

By **Andrew Shonfield**, *Royal Institute of International Affairs*

"Perhaps the most important book of the last decade, Mr. Shonfield achieves the difficult task of making sense out of present day politics and economics of the Western World."—Henry W. Morton, Queens College, New York
1966 475 pp. cloth $10.50 paper $4.50

Contemporary French Political Thought

By **Roy Pierce**, *University of Michigan*

"A pioneering work which opens a number of avenues for exploration by American political scientists. Basic to any course in comparative political theory dealing with contemporary problems."—H. Malcolm Macdonald, University of Texas
1966 288 pp. cloth $5.75 paper $2.50

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The New States of Asia: *A Political Analysis*

By **Michael Brecher,** *McGill University*

Recent events in Southern Asia and their relevance for all peoples are described in these six political essays. Following an introductory chapter, Professor Brecher discusses the colonial epoch, the quest for internal political stability, the role of Israel in the Afro-Asian community, and the often misunderstood non-alignment policy. At the heart of the study is an analysis of the theory of subordinate state systems.

1966 240 pp. paper $1.50

South-East Asia: *Race, Culture, and Nation*

By **Guy Hunter,** *Institute of Race Relations, London*

Professor Hunter investigates the experience of the nations of South-East Asia as they attempt to weld many diverse peoples and cultures into unified, modern nations. Following a historical and geographical survey of the area of his study, he turns to aspects affecting the social and economic life of the region. Within the context of the nationalism of developing countries, the study indicates the global relevance of the Asian nations' experience.

1966 208 pp. 16 tables cloth $4.50 paper $1.95

Three Worlds of Development:

The Theory and Practice of International Stratification

By **Irving Louis Horowitz,** *Washington University*

One of the clearest and most carefully documented studies of the underlying crises of development I have seen."—D. E. Ashford, Cornell University

1966 528 pp. cloth $8.50 paper $2.95

The Springtime of Freedom:

Evolution of Developing Societies

By **William McCord,** *Rice University*

1965 342 pp. cloth $6.00 paper $2.25

Readings in American Democracy *Second Edition*

Edited by **Gerald Stourzh** ***and*** **Ralph Lerner.** ***Revised by*** **H. C. Harlan,** *Chicago City Junior College*

1966 486 pp. paper $2.25

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y. 10016

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

The Democratic Civilization

By **Leslie Lipson**, *University of California at Berkeley*

1964 632 pp. $7.50

Elements of Democratic Government

Fourth Edition

By **J. A. Corry**, *Queen's University, and* **Henry J. Abraham**, *University of Pennsylvania*

1964 842 pp. $7.75

Free Government in the Making:

Readings in American Political Thought
Third Edition

By **Alpheus T. Mason**, *Princeton University*

1965 952 pp. $8.00

Readings in Economics and Politics

Second Edition

Edited by **H. C. Harlan**, *Chicago City Junior College*

1966 800 pp. paper $2.75

Equality in America: *Religion, Race, and the Urban Majority*

By **Alan P. Grimes**, *Michigan State University*

1964 144 pp. cloth $4.00 paper $1.50

The Judicial Process:

An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France

By **Henry J. Abraham**, *University of Pennsylvania*

1962 384 pp. paper $2.50

Men at the Top: *A Study in Community Power*

By **Robert Presthus**, *University of Oregon*

1964 496 pp. cloth $8.50 paper $2.95

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y. 10016

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

The Quest for Security in New Zealand 1840-1966

By **W. B. Sutch.** The first third of this book was originally published in 1942 and established itself as a pioneer and key work on New Zealand history. Now the original volume serves as an introduction to the social history of the last thirty years. The author was close to the policymakers throughout these years and gives a vivid account of the various measures and achievements of the first Labour government, the post-war conflicts, the Holmes case, legislation that diminished civil liberties, the influences of U.S. foreign policy, and the country's failure to build a balanced economy. *Cloth,* $10.40; *paper,* $4.40

Australia, Britain and E.E.C.

By **H. G. Gelber,** *Monash University, Melbourne.* Reactions to Britain's desire to apply for membership in the European Economic Community were many and varied, in Britain itself, in Europe, and throughout the Commonwealth. In this book the author has put into world perspective Australia's position and attitudes, from the time of the first tentative discussion to the final breakdown of the Brussels talks. It is against the background of the evolving situation in Europe and the political preoccupations of Mr. Macmillan that the factors affecting Australia are discussed in detail. $9.60

The NATO International Staff / Secretariat 1952-1957

A Study in International Administration

By **Robert S. Jordan,** *George Washington University.* This book examines three connected themes of international importance: the origin and powers of the office of Secretary-General of NATO from its foundation in 1952 to 1957; the establishment, growth, and function of the International Staff/Secretariat in the same period; and, as a major influence on the development of both, the professional background, personality, and ideas of Lord Ismay, the First Secretary-General. The information is closely documented, and much of it is published here for the first time. $9.60

The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System

From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965

By **Patrick O'Brien,** *School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.* The transformation in Egypt's economic organization is traced, explained, and evaluated in its historical sequence. Various facets of the subject are studied, including investments and savings, industrialization, agriculture, consumption, and the role of ideology. Central to the analysis is the explanation for the profound and rapid changes in Egypt, which can add to our understanding of the widespread rejection of private enterprise by other nationalist régimes in Asia and Africa. *2 tables.* (*Royal Institute of International Affairs.*) $8.80

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y., 10016

American Government and Politics
A Reader



1967 **400 pages** **$4.25**

William J. Moore, Walter C. Schuling, Aram M. Sogomonian, *and* George K. Zaharopoulos, *San Bernardino Valley College*

CHAPTER HEADINGS AND AUTHORS REPRESENTED

Government and Politics: A Prologue

Aristotle, Montesquieu, Robert MacIver, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin, J. William Fulbright, Charles Frankel.

The American Constitutional System

James Madison, Clinton Rossiter, Martin Diamond, Russell Kirk, Sidney Hook, *States' Rights Party Platform of 1948*, Orville Freeman, Walter Millis.

The Courts

Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas, *Marbury v. Madison*, Irving R. Kaufman, Thurgood Marshall.

Political Behavior and Party Politics

Clinton Rossiter, Campbell-Converse-Miller-Stokes, Henry A. Turner, Berelson-Lazarsfeld-McPhee, Roper-Gallup-McDonald, Adlai E. Stevenson.

The Congress

Lewis Anthony Dexter, Clem Miller, Hubert H. Humphrey, Tom Wicker, Douglas M. Davis.

The President

Sidney Hyman, Louis W. Koenig, John F. Kennedy, Theodore C. Sorensen, Arthur M. Schlesinger.

The Government and the People

Stuart Chase, Barry Goldwater, Frank Church, Paul H. Douglas, Harlan Cleveland, *Brown v. Board of Education*, Burke Marshall, Lyndon B. Johnson.

The United States and the World

George W. Ball, Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, J. William Fulbright, Dean Rusk, Stuart Chase, C. P. Fitzgerald, George C. Lodge, Robert L. Heilbroner.

State and Local Government

LeRoy Collins, William B. Munro, *Constitution of the State of California*, *Reynolds v. Sims*, Andrew Hacker, *Newsweek*, *The American Assembly*, Donald J. Curran.

Contemporary Challenges

Richard F. Hamilton, Robert M. Hutchins, Robert L. Heilbroner.

College Division
American Book Company
55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003

"A monumental conception"[1]

"Raymond Aron's masterpiece"[2]



"Far more elaborate and convincing than any of the theoretical formulations worked out on this side of the Atlantic."—*Stanley Hoffman, Harvard University.*[1]

"A recapitulation of everything that politicians and historians have learned over the past thirty or forty years. A more impressive discussion of the nature of war has not been written since Clausewitz."—*Golo Mann.*[2]

One of the world's foremost political scientists considers the way in which nations have dealt with one another on the "diplomatic-strategic" level from the beginnings of history to the present, showing the social, cultural and philosophical as well as the political and economic factors that have always entered into such relations and underlining the moral perspectives confronting mankind today. Panoramic in scope, PEACE AND WAR expands the reader's horizons and gives new perspective to the day's news. Translated from the French by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, PEACE AND WAR is now at all booksellers. 840 pages, $10.00

DOUBLEDAY

The BIG Issues in Politics from Spectrum Books . . .

POLITICS IN AFRICA—Five political scientists examine the growth of the "master science" in Africa today . . .

PATTERNS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: Five Comparisons

edited by Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania

In this new book, Herbert J. Spiro, Carl J. Friedrich, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Ali A. Mazrui compare Africa's development with that of other newly-emerging nations of the world, to determine if African nations are repeating traditional political methods or establishing new ones. *Feb., 1967 Cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

THE COMMUNIST WORLD—45 documents illustrate Communism's domestic trials . . .

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AMONG COMMUNISTS

edited by Robert H. McNeal, University of Toronto

Using 45 of the Communist's own pronouncements, the editor shows the ideological, institutional, and historical characteristics of their "closed network" of alignments and antagonisms. *March 1967 Cloth $4.95, paper $2.45*

THE COMMON MARKET—An evolving European political union, argues this author . . .

THE POLITICS OF THE COMMON MARKET

by W. Hartley Clark, Carleton College

The paramount interest of the Common Market is not business and economics, states the author, but politics and the building of a "United States of Europe." Clark examines the policy-making processes of the European league, appraising recent issues and influences. *April, 1967 Cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

ALSO OF INTEREST—A series of volumes on today's nation-states and the historical forces which helped mold them . . .

THE MODERN NATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Volumes in the series: Argentina • Australia • The Balkans • Central America • Ceylon • China • Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic • Egypt & The Sudan • France • India • Indonesia • Italy • Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia • New Zealand • Nigeria & Ghana • The Philippines • Portuguese Africa • Russia • Scandinavia • Venezuela & Colombia • West Africa: The Former French States • The West Indies & The Guianas *each volume in the series: cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

Available at your bookstore

(Teachers: examination copies available from Prentice-Hall fieldmen. Write for free brochure on Modern Nations series! Spectrum Advertising Dept., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 07632)

SPECTRUM BOOKS Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Do They Know Something You Don't Know? . . .



Educators bought 50% more **TIAA** life insurance in 1965 than in 1964, the previous all-time high. And the *average* policy ($30,000) continues to be much higher than the average for companies insuring the general public.

It must be **TIAA's** new lower premium rates.



For example,

A $50,000 POLICY COSTS ONLY $98 at age 30. Here's how:

$50,000 20-Year Home Protection Policy

Age at Issue	25	30	35	40
Annual Premium *(Payable only 16 years)*	$134.00	$159.00	$206.50	$290.00
Cash Dividend End of First Year *(based on 1966 dividend scale; not guaranteed for the future)*	55.50	61.00	70.50	88.00
First Year Net Premium	$ 78.50	$ 98.00	$136.00	$202.00

This is a plan of level premium Term insurance which provides its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year over a 20-year period to recognize decreasing insurance needs. There are several other insurance periods, and Home Protection policies are available at all ages under 56.

ARE YOU ELIGIBLE FOR TIAA? Yes, if you are employed by a college, university, private school, or other nonprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for TIAA eligibility.



Mail the coupon for the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration of TIAA policies for your age.

tiaa

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017
TG

Please mail the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name______________ Your Date of Birth________

Address______________ ZIP________

Dependents' Ages______________

Nonprofit Employer______________
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

ANNOUNCING

POLITICAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
Peter H. Merkl

This comprehensive introduction to political theory and comparative government explores the continuity of Western political tradition in terms of some of the seminal concepts of the great political philosophers, examines political institutions and processes of modern government through comparison with the systems of various Western and non-Western countries, and considers processes of revolutionary change as they have affected to the West, and more particularly, today's developing nations. Instructor's Manual. *Just published.*

and a reminder

These are the first three volumes in Harper's COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT SERIES, Michael Curtis, Advisory Editor

Latin-American Politics and Government
Robert J. Alexander

Western European Integration
Michael Curtis

Governments of the Commonwealth
Josephine F. Milburn

Harper & Row
Publishers

18 17

49 East 33d Street
New York, 10016

Recently Published Volumes in Harper's COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT SERIES

Michael Curtis, Advisory Editor

Eastern European Government and Politics

Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, and George Stambuk

This country-by-country study considers the development and structure of the Eastern European states, their individual Communist parties, the forces that shape their leadership, and their relations with the Soviet Union since World War II. The authors, each a native of the region and an expert in its affairs, strive to effect a balance between two diverging interpretations: that which recognizes very little change in the Eastern European scene and that which exaggerates any appearance of change. *247 pages; $3.50 paper*

The Government of the German Federal Republic

Robert G. Neumann

This analysis of the government and politics of the Federal Republic today includes a brief historical introduction, the controversial issue of German reunification and its political significance, Germany's place in the European and Atlantic worlds, reasons for her political stability and instability, and points of cooperation and friction between Germany and her neighbors. *192 pages; $2.75 paper*

Japanese Political Style

An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan

Warren M. Tsuneishi

This book introduces the most important aspects of contemporary Japanese politics and government and discusses Japan's geographic and economic foundation, its national characteristics, and historical and constitutional background. *226 pages; $2.50 paper*

British Government and Politics

Douglas V. Verney

In describing contemporary British political life, the author assumes the basic premise that its significance lies in its adjustment—or inability to adjust—to the loss of an Empire and to the impoverishment caused by two world wars. *226 pages; $2.50 paper*

Harper & Row, Publishers
49 East 33d Street, New York 10016

A Selection of New Political Science Texts

18 17

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY
Twelve Lectures at Harvard
Carl J. Friedrich

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
A Systemic Perspective
Charles G. Mayo and Beryl L. Crowe

AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
The Creation of Public Order
Roland Young

AMERICAN LEGISLATURES
Structure and Process
George S. Blair

HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL POLITICS
Third Edition
Paul Van Riper, Jr.

CHALLENGE AND DECISION
Political Issues of Our Time, Second Edition
Reo M. Christenson

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
OF THE UNITED STATES
William C. Havard

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Readings and Documents, Second Edition
Peter H. Odegard
Late of University of California, Berkeley

Harper & Row, Publishers
49 east 33d street, new york 10016

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:
An Introduction to American National Government

MARTIN DIAMOND • Claremont Men's College
WINSTON MILLS FISK • Claremont Men's College
HERBERT GARFINKEL • Michigan State University

> "This is a major new teaching resource . . . a text book with style . . . The writing is lean and exciting . . . The analysis of contemporary institutions and problems is crisp and informative . . ."
>
> **C. Herman Pritchett,** University of Chicago

> "A great deal of careful planning has gone into this work . . . it includes the historical, the constitutional, the descriptive, and the behavioral approach, but in an integrated fashion so that it can be seen how each contributes to a proper understanding of the American governmental system."
>
> **Jerome H. Kerwin,** University of Santa Clara

> "This perceptive and imaginative book will surely go to the top of the long list of texts for the introductory course in American national government. I am especially pleased by the 'decent respect' it pays to both history and theory . . ."
>
> **Clinton Rossiter,** Cornell University

In 15 chapters, The Democratic Republic provides a comprehensive view of the American political order—a concise, factual account of the essential structure, functions, regulations, and powers of American government. The talents of a political theorist, a constitutional lawyer and a political parties specialist have produced a unified, well-organized book with strong continuity between chapters.

The Instructor's Manual was prepared by Morton Frisch, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University.

Contents

Part I. Origin of the Republic
1. The Formative Years
2. Framing the More Perfect Union

Part II. Constituting Democracy
3. The Fundamental Political Principles
4. The American Constitutional System: Powers and Constraints

Part III. The Branches of Government
5. The Legislative Branch: Congress
6. The Executive Branch: The Presidency
7. The Judicial Branch: Courts for the American Constitutional System
8. The Administrative System

Part IV. Politics
9. Parties, Politics, and Groups
10. The Political Community: Suffrage, Immigration, and Citizenship
11. Machinery of Representation: Apportionment, Nominations, and Elections
12. Campaigns and Voting Behavior

Part V. Governing
13. Government and Personal Freedom
14. Governing the Economy
15. The Conduct of Foreign Affairs

1966 • 572 pages • $7.50

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY
The College Department • Box 7600 • Chicago, Illinois 60680

Appleton-Century-Crofts

THE SUPREME COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, Second Edition

GEORGE W. SPICER, *University of Virginia*

A remarkably incisive, brief critical analysis of the Supreme Court as guardian of American civil liberties. The long-awaited revision of this highly regarded study contains additional chapters on civil and criminal procedure and retains the useful summary analysis at the end of each chapter.

February 1967 280 pages paperback $2.45

A SECOND FEDERALIST: Congress Creates a Government

Edited by CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, *Indiana University*
and GEORGE W. CAREY, *Georgetown University*

Superbly edited, this compilation of the Congressional debates from 1789 to 1824, is abridged and excerpted from the Annals of Congress, the most complete record of what was said and done by Congress in its first four decades.

January 1967 325 pages paperback $2.95

WORLD TENSIONS: Conflict and Accommodation

ELTON ATWATER, KENT FORSTER, and JAN S. PRYBYLA, all of *The Pennsylvania State University*

An interdisciplinary approach to world affairs, for students with no previous training in the social sciences. The authors, an historian, political scientist, and economist, examine both the sources and resolution of conflict between sovereign states, conveying a sense of immediacy through illustrations of actual practice of contemporary governments. Features include a series of western and non-western views, in each chapter, on the problems discussed, and guidance on how to prepare a "position paper" on an international issue.

April 1967 400 pages illustrated paperback

PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present

THOMAS A. BAILEY, *Stanford University*

Written with wit and incisiveness, this widely reviewed and acclaimed analysis of executive leadership takes a perceptive new look at old stereotypes and establishes criteria for Presidential excellence.

September 1966 386 pages paperback $3.95

SOURCES IN MODERN EAST ASIAN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Edited by THEODORE MCNELLY, *University of Maryland*

A collection of source materials on the recent history, politics, ideologies, and international relations of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam correlated with standard textbooks on the Far East. Introductory notes and headnotes summarize recent Far Eastern history and provide a framework for understanding the significance of the selections.

April 1967 416 pages illustrated paperback

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS
Division of Meredith Publishing Company
440 Park Avenue South, New York 10016

Appleton-Century-Crofts

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Second Edition

VERNON VAN DYKE, *The University of Iowa*

Topical rather than historical, this reasoned analysis of the behavior of states in their relations with one another draws not only on diplomatic history, but on psychology, economics, and political theory as well.

April 1966 527 pages $6.50

OGG AND RAY'S . . .

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Thirteenth Edition

May 1966 979 pages illustrated $8.75

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Thirteenth Edition

May 1966 755 pages illustrated $7.95

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition

1965 printing 718 pages illustrated paperback $4.95

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition

1965 printing 550 pages illustrated paperback $3.95

all by WILLIAM H. YOUNG, *The University of Wisconsin*

Instructor's manual available for all Ogg and Ray books.

BASIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, Fifth Edition

Edited by HILLMAN M. BISHOP and SAMUEL HENDEL,

both of *The City College of New York*

Dealing with the fundamental values and persistent issues of our democracy, this best-selling collection of authoritative readings presents a broad spectrum of divergent viewpoints on the vital questions confronting the American political system.

1965 603 pages paperback $3.65

LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS, Thirteenth Edition

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, *National Historical Publications Commission, in* collaboration with ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, *New York University*

With decisions as recent as the 1966 Voting Rights case, the thirteenth edition of this highly successful and widely adopted text is the most complete and up to date of the smaller casebooks.

August 1966 585 pages paperback $3.95

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1964-1966

ROBERT F. CUSHMAN

The first of a series of inexpensive supplements, designed to bring Cushman and Cushman: *Cases in Constitutional Law* and all other casebooks fully up to the minute.

December 1966 73 pages paperback $ .95

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS
Division of Meredith Publishing Company
440 Park Avenue South, New York 10016

ACC

CHINA AFTER MAO

With Selected Documents

By A. Doak Barnett

One of America's leading authorities on China outlines and assesses the implications of the inevitable passing of Mao Tse-tung and the older generation of revolutionary leaders from their position of command in China. Describing the mid-1960's as "a transitional period of great historic significance," the author outlines the basic unsolved problems and unresolved issues that face Peking's leaders, speculates on future changes in Chinese Communist leadership and policies. Part II of the book presents documents pertinent to the developing crisis in China, including "Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," and "Great Cultural Revolution." *China After Mao* is based on the Walter E. Edge lectures given at Princeton University in October 1966. *312 pages. cloth, $6.00*

paperback, $1.95

COMMUNISM IN FINLAND

A History and Interpretation

By John H. Hodgson

Why is it that Finland, a country which fought the Soviet Union twice during World War II, is one of the few democratic nations with a strong Communist party? Professor Hodgson answers this question by tracing the history of Finnish Communism from the emergence of a left wing within the Finnish Social Democratic Party to the present day. *240 pages. $6.00*

THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING, 1878-1912

By Stavro Skendi

In its long struggle for national unity, Albania faced complex problems, both internal and external. The progress and setbacks of that struggle are traced step by step in this study of the least-well-known period in the intricate history of this small but strategic country and its old and interesting people.

544 pages. $12.50

Princeton University Press

The Fabric of Democracy:

Readings in American Government

329 PAGES ✶ 1966 ✶ PAPER COVER ✶ $3.50

Charles P. Blackmore and Abraham Yeselson,
Rutgers University

Articles and cases illuminating the development, processes, and operation of the American federal system from its beginnings through Lyndon B. Johnson. Men in government and political analysts and critics examine the pressures, stresses, and strengths inherent in the overlapping prerogatives of a federal system. The authors provide an accurate, concise, lucid introduction to each of the thirteen chapters.

There are portions of Congressional debates on some currently controversial issues.

CHAPTER HEADINGS AND AUTHORS REPRESENTED:

Roots of American Democracy and Constitutional Development
The Declaration of Independence, Thomas Paine, James Madison, Hugo L. Black.

The Nature of Federalism: Conflict and Cooperation
Southern Declaration on Integration, McCulloch v. Maryland, General Analysis of Grants-in-Aid, Arthur S. Miller, Lyndon B. Johnson.

The Rights of Free Men
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, Abington School District v. Schempp, Gitlow v. New York, Chambers v. Florida, Mapp v. Ohio, Brown v. Board of Education, Senators Stennis and Javitz, Senator Goldwater.

The Political Process
Stephen K. Bailey, Malcolm Moos, Henry Steele Commager, Lyndon B. Johnson, Jack Edwards, How an Election was Bought and Sold (Anon.), Interview with Elmo Roper, John F. Kennedy.

The Legislative Process
Hubert H. Humphrey, The Congress and America's Future, The House Reduces the Powers of Its Committee on Rules, Wesberry v. Sanders.

The Judicial Process
Julius J. Marke, Anthony Lewis, Representative Jamie L. Whitten, Representative Emanuel Celler.

The Presidency and the National Administration
John F. Kennedy, *U. S. News & World Report,* Birch Bayh, Jr., Frank C. Porter, Clarence B. Randall.

Financing Government
Leon H. Keyserling, Lyndon B. Johnson, Senator Harry Byrd.

Government and the National Economy
Ira Wolfert, The Government's Role in Consumer Protection, Neil McElroy.

Government and The Working Man
Max Lerner, E. J. Hanley, Emanuel Celler.

Government, The Farmer, and Natural Resources
John F. Kennedy, G. D. Arndt, Charles B. Schuman, Thomas W. Glaze, Joseph P. Lyford, Charles A. Reich, Stewart L. Udall, Wayne N. Aspinall.

The National Government and The People's Welfare
Senator Pat McNamara, Senator Tower, Senator Aiken, Lyndon B. Johnson, Edward J. Gurney, Joseph S. Clark.

Foreign Policy and National Defense
Holmes Welch, J. William Fulbright, Lyndon B. Johnson, Walter Millis, Abraham Yeselson.

College Division
American Book Company
55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

New from the University of Chicago Press

The Court and the Constitution

A series edited by Philip B. Kurland

This new paperback series brings back into print in modestly priced editions a number of important books on past Supreme Court Justices and on the role of the Court in American life. As well as filling a need for students of law, political science, government, and history, these volumes will provide, collectively, a history of the Supreme Court.

Melville Weston Fuller

Chief Justice of the United States, 1888-1910

Willard L. King

With an Introduction by Phil C. Neal

Melville Weston Fuller presided over the Supreme Court for twenty-two terms—a period in which the Court handed down such important decisions as those on the Income Tax Cases of 1895, the "original-package doctrine," the Insular Cases, and the now discredited "separate but equal" doctrine of *Plessy* v. *Ferguson.* In his new Introduction to this biography Phil C. Neal writes, "Fuller emerges in these pages as, among other things, an attractive human being. . . . Our understanding of a major era of the Supreme Court is the richer for this work."

1967 416 pages Paper $2.95

The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis

The Supreme Court at Work

Alexander M. Bickel

With an Introduction by Paul A. Freund

From 1916 to 1939 Louis Dembitz Brandeis opposed the tendency of a majority on the Supreme Court to cling to a "laissez-faire" conservatism. Both without and within the Court, he exerted enormous influence in shaping the social and economic thought of the nation. This book gives the reader a rare opportunity to explore the mind of one of America's greatest jurists. Dean Acheson, in commending Professor Bickel's "excellent book," notes: "For the lawyer who wants a full-length view of Justice Brandeis' judicial methodology it is indispensable."

1967 320 pages Paper $2.45

John Marshall

James Bradley Thayer

With a Foreword by Mark De Wolfe Howe

First published in 1901, this concise biography remains an eminently readable introduction to the great Chief Justice. Thayer demonstrates that Marshall's most enduring contribution to the nation's welfare lay in his "strong constitutional doctrine, explained in detail, elaborated, powerfully argued, over and over again, with unsurpassable earnestness and force, placed permanently in our judicial records, holding its own during the long emergence of a feebler political theory, and showing itself in all its majesty when war and civil dissension came."

1967 196 pages Paper $1.95

The Growth of American Constitutional Law

Benjamin F. Wright

With an Introduction by Robert G. McCloskey

This brilliant survey evaluates the work of the Supreme Court up to the early 1940's, when the two great issues of modern constitutional history—the decline of laissez-faire and the rise of civil rights—were just taking shape. In his new introduction Robert G. McCloskey describes Wright as embodying "a deep knowledge of the institutional and intellectual history of America; a political scientist's concern to understand the Court as an operative instrument of government; and a respect for the judicial ideal of rationality and a sharply critical eye for the Court's shortcomings in its pursuit of that ideal."

1967 296 pages Paper $2.45

The Russian Revolution of 1905

The Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism

Solomon M. Schwarz

Translated by Gertrude Vakar

Hoover Institution Publications

This book covers the critical period during 1905 when Social-Democracy emerged as a factor of consequence on the political scene, only to divide into the two parts that became Social-Democracy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the authoritarian labor movement that assumed the name of Communism. Solomon M. Schwarz was a Menshevik spokesman on labor affairs and a member of the Kerensky government. His new book, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, is the first volume in a comprehensive series, "The History of Menshevism," that will alter the understanding of the Russian revolution. Under Leopold H. Haimson, surviving Menshevik leaders have co-operated to prepare memoirs, monographs, and other scholarly materials. English-language volumes in this series will include "The Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian Social-Democracy, 1891-1903," by Allan Wildman, and "Menshevism under Soviet Rule," edited by Haimson.

1967 LC:66-20582 384 pages, $8.95

The Death of Slavery

The United States, 1837-65

Elbert B. Smith

This fast-paced account of the crucial pre-Civil War period completes the chronological series of the "Chicago History of American Civilization." Smith's first-hand knowledge of politics gives the work an unusual emphasis which is especially appropriate for the politics of the times.

1967 LC:67-16779 232 pages, $5.00

The American Revisionists

The Lessons of Intervention in World War I

Warren I. Cohen

In this original analysis of Revisionism Cohen examines the thinking of those American historians and social scientists who took it upon themselves to persuade their countrymen that they should not have gone to war in 1917. *The American Revisionists* is an important study of a tradition in American thought which remains alive today among supporters of the Great Society who oppose United States involvement in Southeast Asia.

1967 LC:66-20594 252 pages, $7.95

Theory and Practice in American Politics

Edited by William H. Nelson and Francis L. Loewenheim

Contributors: Lawrence H. Chamberlain, Carl N. Degler, Felix Gilbert, Dumas Malone, Alpheus Thomas Mason, Ernest R. May, Hans J. Morgenthau, Louis Morton, and Benjamin F. Wright. ". . . a distinguished and timely contribution . . . the finest brief analyses of problems in American political thought to appear in the last decade."—Edward N. MacConomy, *American Historical Review.* *1967 165 pages Paper $1.95*

Benchmarks

Henry J. Friendly

These articles and lectures by one of America's leading jurists include reflections on the nature of judging, on the federal administrative agencies, and on other problems of deep interest to lawyers and students of government. Four chapters are appreciations of four great judges: Holmes; Brandeis, for whom Judge Friendly was law clerk; Learned Hand, a colleague in the last two years of Judge Hand's long life; and Frankfurter, his teacher and long-time friend.

1967 LC:67-12149 328 pages, $7.95

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

New and recent books
from the Little, Brown College Department

The Power of the Purse

Appropriations Politics in Congress

RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., *University of Rochester*

The author describes a political process vital to congressional power—the wielding of the power of the purse. He sees the House and Senate as political systems engaged in *internal* and *external* activities. The external relationships are those between the committees and House or Senate, between committees and Executive branch, or between two appropriations committees. The internal are those involving methods of organization, committee members' desires and perceptions, etc. This is the most comprehensive treatment ever given to this subject. *clothbound 704 pages $8.75*

The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy

Revised Edition

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Since publication in late 1960, this book has been accepted as the definitive analysis of the U.N. from the viewpoint of United States' national interest. This major revision reflects the realities in the late 1960's and the problems and prospects for the early 1970's. All sections are thoroughly upated and include new material on international peace keeping, outer space, arms control, and the problem of Communist China. *paperbound 288 pages $2.95*

Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics

The American and British Experience

KENNETH N. WALTZ, *Brandeis University*

No other book has so systematically compared the British and American political systems in order to discover their foreign-policy capabilities. Professor Waltz critically explores the relationship between internal politics and external policy, and explains policy and process in terms of political structure. He applies an original analysis of political systems to the processes of making and conducting foreign policy, and uses specific cases and problems to illustrate these theories and analyses. *paperbound 352 pages $3.95*

New and recent additions
to the Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics

Comparative Politics
A Developmental Approach

GABRIEL A. ALMOND and G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.
Stanford University

This is a general introduction to the study of comparative political systems. The authors adapt structural-functional and systems theory to politics and treat political systems at three levels. As they review individual functions and classify political systems, the authors develop the themes of structural differentiation and the secularization of political culture. Political development is viewed historically. They examine experiences of individual countries with system development problems of state and nation building, participation, and welfare. Investment strategies in the new and modernizing nations are also considered. *paper 348 pages $2.75*

Politics in Israel

LEONARD J. FEIN, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Based on very recent data, this study offers new insights into the present relationship of two of Israel's major problems: the integration of immigrants, and security. Professor Fein examines the country's dwindling pioneering ideology and explores the nation's quest for a meaningful identity in the 1960's. *paperbound 256 pages $2.75*

Politics in Japan

FRANK C. LANGDON, *University of British Columbia*

Professor Langdon describes the way in which political groups and organizations in Japan combine and interact to effect government policy. He shows how political attitudes are acquired and how political leaders are recruited and trained. This excellent study treats an important "border" country which is significant to the critical relationship of Western to non-Western societies. *paperbound 304 pages $2.95*

Little, Brown College Department
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

The expanding Basic Studies in Politics Series

Edited by Sheldon S. Wolin, *University of California, Berkeley*

Two new additions . .

The Theory of Democratic Elitism

A Critical Analysis

PETER BACHRACH, *Bryn Mawr College*

This incisive discussion of the theory of democratic elitism attempts to reconcile democratic theory and elitist theory. Professor Bachrach views democratic elitism as a basic cause of much recent political theorizing. He attacks democratic elitism as factually unsound empirical theory and as a theory unable to meet normatively the initial political needs of contemporary man. He presents a new theory, founded on the classic principle of self-development, as a meaningful alternative. *paperbound 128 pages 5⅜ × 8¼ $1.95*

Revolutionary Change

CHALMERS JOHNSON, *University of California, Berkeley*

Professor Johnson offers an introductory analysis of revolutionary resorts to violence in society. He utilizes a model of the social system to analyze the causes of revolution and draws upon political theory, anthropology, and social psychology to describe how public actions promote or retard revolutionary conditions. All social science concepts employed in the book are introduced and explained for the student new to social theory. *paperbound 208 pages 5⅜ × 8¼ $2.50*

Federalism

Origin • Operation • Significance

WILLIAM H. RIKER, *University of Rochester*

An outstanding volume in the series, this is a concise analysis of the concept of federalism and systems of federalism with the emphasis on the United States. What occasions the adoption of a federal government, what induces societies to keep federal governments they already have? Professor Riker answers these questions by examining past and present federal systems and their workings. *paperbound 5⅜ × 8¼ 169 pages $1.95*

Political Parties in the American System

FRANK J. SORAUF, *University of Minnesota*

This is an interpretation and analysis of American political parties. Professor Sorauf focuses on the broad outline of the nature and function of the parties, drawing on comparisons with parties of other democracies to add depth to his analysis. He suggests a theory of political parties and, in the last chapter, even suggests in a schematic way the main relationships between party functions and organization on the one hand and the general political and social system on the other. *paperbound 5⅜ × 8¼ 194 pages $1.95*

A New Text on . . .

American Political Patterns

Conflict and Consensus

DAN D. NIMMO, *University of Houston*
THOMAS D. UNGS, *Wichita State University*

Nimmo and Ungs describe the principal patterns of American political behavior within the consistent theoretical framework of conflict representation.

In American communities social conflict is regulated by certain patterns of behavior. Examination of these patterns reveals an underlying consensus necessary to the preservation of the community.

Representation in American government is a process of communication that brings the conflict to light through patterns of participation, opinion, leadership, choice, partisanship, and pressure.

Resolution is a process of accommodation that keeps conflict within manageable limits through policy-making. Officials make binding public policy with acts of formulation, leadership, adoption, application, and adjudication.

The style of *American Political Patterns* is particularly clear. Nimmo and Ungs include only truly relevant examples to illustrate basic principles of American democratic government.

clothbound *6 × 9* *480 pages* *$5.95*

Little, Brown College Department
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

Exceptional publications treating
the basic issues in American Government:

GOVERNING THE AMERICAN NATION

By Richard H. Leach, Duke University. Just Published, 1967. "It is a solid, professional piece of work . . . of high quality, excellent teachability." Peter Woll, Brandeis University, from a pre-publication review. College list $8.95.

INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By William C. Havard and David R. Mayhew, both of the University of Massachusetts. Scheduled April 1967 publication. "I find this a highly promising collection of readings. It has several advantages over many of the other reading books in the field. More notably, the editors have avoided the kind of proliferation which marks so many efforts and which bewilders students through such a variety of riches." Gordon Baker, University of California, Santa Barbara, from a pre-publication review. College list $5.50 tent.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Behavior and Controversy

By Lewis Lipsitz, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Scheduled March, 1967 publication. "I have reviewed [the text]. It has excellent materials, a widely read and intellectually sensitive editor, and a definite role within the college community. . . ." Edgar Litt, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, from a pre-publication review. Paperbound. College list $5.25 tent.

ALLYN AND BACON, INC.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

By William J. Crotty, Northwestern University; Donald M. Freeman, University of Arizona; and Douglas S. Gatlin, Florida Atlantic University. Just Published, 1966. "It is a superior work, one which I would very probably use in a course on parties and one which I would seriously consider for an introductory course in American Government. . . ." Joseph Cooper, Harvard University. College list $6.25.

THE JUDICIARY: The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process

By Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania. Recently Published, 1965. Part of the Allyn and Bacon Series in American Government, Consulting Editor: William Beaney. Paperbound. College list $1.95.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA

By Daniel R. Grant, Vanderbilt University; and H. C. Nixon, Professor Emeritus, Vanderbilt University. College list $8.50.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE: FROM BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM

By Albert Somit, State University of New York at Buffalo; and Joseph Tanenhaus, State University of Iowa. Scheduled April, 1967 publication. The underlying theme of this text is that an understanding of the issues, problems, and controversies facing American political science today requires familiarity with certain aspects of the development of the discipline during the past three quarters of a century. The book traces the rise of political science as a profession, examines the manner in which its practitioners have defined their professional responsibilities and goals, describes how political scientists have viewed their field since its emergence as an independent and scholarly inquiry, and analyzes the recurrent efforts to develop a "science of politics." College list $5.25 tent.

RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

By Norman J. Powell, the City College of the City University of New York. Scheduled 1967 publication. Examines the meaning of bureaucracy and the mechanisms which enforce responsibility, then evaluates the American system. Paperbound.

OTHER OUTSTANDING PUBLICATIONS:

BASIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Peter Toma, University of Arizona; and Andrew Gyorgy, George Washington University. Scheduled April, 1967 publication. Emphasis is on studying the scope and method of International Relations, international politics, organization, and law, through concepts and clash of issues. Paperbound. College list $5.00 tent.

READINGS IN COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By Nimrod Raphaeli, Hebrew University. Just Published, 1967. Presents materials that probe beneath the formal administrative organizations and into the broader context of the social sciences. Paperbound. College list $6.50 tent.

WORLD POLITICS: The Writings of Practitioners, Classical and Modern

By Arend Lijphart, University of California, Berkeley. Just Published, 1966. Presents material on the basic concepts and persistent issues of world politics. Selections are from outstanding classic and contemporary political theorists in the field of international relations and by political practitioners who can speak authoritatively on world affairs. Paperbound. College list $4.95.

ALLYN & BACON, INC.
DEPT. K-1
150 Tremont Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02111

Important New Texts From

THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS,

Third Edition

By Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval War College

Thoroughly revised and updated, the Third Edition of this text continues to provide a systematic analysis of international politics in a careful combination of theory and historical data. The book progresses from general background material to specific relations between countries, and case studies are used throughout. Numerous charts, tables, and maps illustrate the text.

1967, approx. 752 pages, prob. $8.95

WORLD IN CRISIS

Readings in International Relations

Third Edition

Edited by Frederick H. Hartmann

Here is a collection of essays which provides the student with the stimulating thinking of scholars and statesmen on all major aspects of international relations. More than one half of the selections in this edition are new. Each of the selections is given at sufficient length to develop fully the contributor's position and contrasting views are frequently represented. New to the book is a complete case study of the Cuban Crisis and a chapter on Vietnam.

1967, approx. 448 pages, prob. $3.95

Write to the faculty service desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Macmillan In Political Science

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, *Second Edition*

By John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson, both of Sacramento State College

The Second Edition of this successful text has been sharpened and clarified by establishing, in the first four chapters, the democratic frame of reference needed before proceeding to an examination of American practices and institutions. The authors then pose questions about the nature of democracy and present their answers as well as those propounded by liberal, conservative, and "brokerage" theory. There is a detailed outline at the beginning of each chapter and a list of suggested readings are provided at the end of the book.

1966, 608 pages, $6.95

To Accompany the Text . . . Examine these selections from the GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN WORLD SERIES

The Democratic Party in American Politics

By Ralph M. Goldman, San Francisco State College

1966, 160 pages, paper, $1.50

Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style

By Erwin C. Hargrove, Brown University

1966, 153 pages, paper, $1.50

Interest Groups and Lobbying

By Abraham Holtzman, North Carolina State University

1966, 154 pages, paper, $1.50

The Republican Party in American Politics

By Charles O. Jones, University of Arizona

1965, 160 pages, paper, $1.50

The Supreme Court in the Political Process

By Samuel Krislov, University of Minnesota

1965, 155 pages, paper, $1.50

The Role of Government in the American Economy

By Emmette S. Redford, The University of Texas

1966, 160 pages, paper, $1.50

866 Third Avenue / New York, N.Y. 10022

NEW FROM BLAISDELL

IDEOLOGIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Andrew Gyorgy, *George Washington University*
George Blackwood, *Boston University*

Ideologies or "ism's" may be defined as concise sets of economic, political, and social beliefs governing the lives of societies. In an increasingly *political* world, ideologies play a crucial role. This introductory text examines such questions as the role of ideas in world affairs; the nature and characteristics of an "ideology"; and the distinction between political parties and political movements. In answering the key question, *What is an ideology?*, the authors classify today's major "ism's" into such free world ideologies as capitalism, democracy, and socialism, and into such ideologies of dictatorship as the various forms of fascism, national socialism, and communism.

1967. 272 pages. Paperbound. $3.50

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA

Origin and Evolution of its Fundamental Ideas

Arthur E. Sutherland, *Harvard University Law School*

This book is a history of five constitutional ideas: rule by majority will, justice despite majorities, equality of man, diffusion of governmental power, and the ideal of a fundamental written law. The author traces their origin and growth from Magna Carta through five centuries in England; through a century and a half in Colonial America; and through the experience of the United States from independence to present day.

1965. 618 pages. $9.50

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY, Revised Edition

Carl J. Friedrich, *Harvard University*

This well-known text studies the nature and development of modern government, the pattern of constitutional government, the functioning processes of constitutional government, and governmental tension, breakdowns, and adjustments.

1950. 688 pages. $9.50

MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

John J. Kemeny, *Dartmouth College*
J. Laurie Snell, *Dartmouth College*

This text is appropriate for use in a one-semester course at the junior level which requires as prerequisites a year of calculus and a course in finite mathematics. As such it is important in the mathematics curriculum, but it can be used and understood by social scientists. After the general introduction the authors present a series of cases which can be chosen by the instructor and presented in an order which is flexible.

1962. 145 pages. $8.50

B·P

BLAISDELL PUBLISHING COMPANY
A Division of Ginn and Company
275 Wyman Street, Waltham, Massachusetts 02154

FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Patterns for New Legal Structures

by Peter Hay

Increasing economic interdependence and the need for transnational cooperation have given rise to new types of international organizations, particularly since World War II. Using the three European Communities as models, these timely essays explore the nature of supranational organizations, the techniques they utilize, and their contribution to the formulation of international law. The author offers a provocative discussion of the constitutional problems that would evolve from United States participation in such Communities and examines similar adjustments being effected in Germany under the Bonn Constitution. 335 pp. $7.50.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND ORGANIZATION

edited by Wayne R. LaFave and Peter Hay

In this comprehensive introduction to the rapidly expanding area of international trade and investment, nineteen authorities in the field examine current practical problems of international trade, its regulation by regional international organizations, and the impact of these organizations on the development of uniform standards and legal norms. The wide range of topics discussed include basic trends in East-West trade, the move to reduce tariff restrictions, incorporation of American business abroad, regional trade associations, and the implications of economic association among underdeveloped countries. 499 pp. $7.50.

THE POLITICS OF WAGE-PRICE DECISIONS

A Four-Country Analysis

by Murray Edelman and R. W. Fleming

Here is a multifaceted evaluation of the ways in which Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and The Netherlands have attempted to exert a restraining influence on price and wage levels since World War II. It includes a comparison with the United States that throws light upon current American wage-price decisions and policies. ". . . a first-rate piece of work, subtle and well informed."—*The Journal of Politics.* 331 pp. $6.75.

WHITE-COLLAR TRADE UNIONS

Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies

edited by Adolf Sturmthal

The past, present, and future of white-collar trade unionism and its implications for traditional blue-collar unions in Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Sweden, and the United States are traced and analyzed by authorities in each of these countries in this timely and important book. 412 pp. $7.95.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS, URBANA, ILLINOIS

Introduction to Political Science

Recently published . . .

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

An Introduction to Political Science

Edited by JOHN C. WAHLKE, *University of Iowa and*
ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University*
Random House, 1966; 624 pages; $7.95

A collaborative effort by eight specialists, this new text combines description of political systems with analysis of the nature of political science itself. The resulting perspective affords a broad, systematic, and unified introduction to the whole field of political science.

In preparation . . . the Third Edition of

COMMUNISM

by ALFRED G. MEYER, *The University of Michigan*
PS34; about 220 pages; about $1.95 paperbound

A brilliant, short introduction to the study of communism as a system of ideas, a political movement, and a form of government.

INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT

Third Edition, Revised

by ROBERT REINOW, *State University of New York, Albany*
Knopf, 568 pages; $7.95

A study of the principles of government based on comparative methods, with particular emphasis on government in the United States, this introductory text offers a detailed examination of the forces at work in political decision-making. The present edition, carefully revised and brought up to date, is written in the same straightforward and engaging style that won immediate favor for the earlier editions, and takes full account of the most recent findings of behavioral research on voting, elections, legislatures, and legislative behavior.

Legislative Process

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES

by MALCOLM E. JEWELL, *University of Kentucky and*
SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, *University of Iowa*
Random House, 1966; 589 pages; $7.95

A wide-ranging survey of the legislative process in this country as it can be studied in Congress and the fifty state legislatures. The authors discuss in detail the multitudinous aspects of American legislatures: the role of executives in the legislative process; legislators and their backgrounds; and legislative voting behavior.

CONGRESS MAKES A LAW

by STEPHEN KEMP BAILEY
V511; 304 pages; $2.45 paperbound

CONGRESS Politics and Practice

by NORMAN C. THOMAS
The University of Michigan
and KARL A. LAMB
University of California, Santa Cruz
PS45; 155 pages; $1.95 paperbound

For further information, write to
RANDOM HOUSE & ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc.

State and Local Government

Just published . . .

THE FIFTY STATES and Their Local Governments

JAMES W. FESLER, *Editor, Yale University,* KARL A. BOSWORTH, *University of Connecticut,* DAYTON D. McKEAN, *University of Colorado,* HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University,* ROBERT L. MORLAN, *University of Redlands,* ALLAN R. RICHARDS, *Louisiana State University,* VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, *Northwestern University,* YORK WILLBERN, *Indiana University.*
Knopf, February 1967; 640 pages; $8.50

A revision and substantial expansion of THE 48 STATES, on which six of the present authors collaborated. Its focal concern is the capacity of state and local governments to exercise power responsibility, democratically, intelligently, and efficiently.

THE STATE LEGISLATURE
Politics and Practice

by MALCOLM E. JEWELL, *University of Kentucky*

A short, but comprehensive study of the realities of party politics and legislative behavior at the state level. PS37; 152 pages $1.45 paperbound

THE STUDY OF LOCAL POLITICS

by WILLIAM H. RIKER, *Lawrence University*

An introduction to the subject of field research in politics, prepared especially for the undergraduate student. PS29; 126 pages; $.95 paperbound

THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION

Representation, Political Power, and The Supreme Court

by GORDON E. BAKER, *University of California, Santa Barbara*
PS20; 192 pages $1.95; paperbound

A survey of the background and issues involved in one of the most important problems facing American government today. An appendix gives excerpts from the most significant recent Supreme Court cases on reapportionment.

RULE 9: POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS

by NORMAN C. THOMAS, *The University of Michigan*
PS57; 144 pages; $1.95 paperbound

A case study of policy making by an administrative rather than a legislative branch of state government.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

by ANWAR SYED, *University of Massachusetts* PS54; 224 pages; $2.25 paperbound

A synthesis of what American political philosophers, from Jefferson to the present, have thought about local government and its place in the American system.

Civil Rights

Available in a Second Edition

COURTS AND RIGHTS The American Judiciary in Action

by JOHN ROCHE, *Brandeis University* PS36; 160 pages; $1.95 paperbound

Examines the role of America's judicial institutions in the struggle for civil rights.

THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

by CHARLES V. HAMILTON, *Lincoln University*

This incisive study of Negro civil rights in America stresses the inadequacy of "traditional" political processes and the need for innovation in dealing with civil rights issues.
Fall 1967; PS56; 192 pages; $1.95 paperbound

The College Department **501 Madison Avenue** **New York 10022**

Comparative Government

PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT

The Major Political Systems of Europe
Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged
by SAMUEL H. BEER *and* ADAM B. ULAM, *Harvard University,*
HARRY ECKSTEIN *and* NICHOLAS WAHL, *Princeton University, and*
HERBERT J. SPIRO, *University of Pennsylvania*
Random House, 832 pages; 18 tables and figures; $7.95

Substantially expanded and updated, this is the revised edition of a book which has established itself as one of the foremost texts in comparative government on the introductory level.

Recently published . . .

DOCUMENTS OF MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

by RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM, *The City College of The City University of New York*
Knopf, 1966; 224 pages; $2.45 paperbound

Brings together (either complete or in carefully-edited excerpts) the constitutions, electoral laws, most recent party programs, and post-World War II election results of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the USSR. Compact, yet comprehensive, the collection can be used with any standard comparative government text.

Winner of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for 1965

BRITISH POLITICS IN THE COLLECTIVIST AGE

by SAMUEL H. BEER, *Harvard University*
Knopf, 1965; 384 pages; $5.95

An assessment-in-depth of contemporary British political life, this new book focuses on the role of parties and interest groups in the formation of public policy. Professor Beer discusses present-day British politics—Labour and Conservative—in terms of the historical evolution of political behavior in Britain since the sixteenth century.

In preparation . . .

USSR 50 YEARS LATER

The Promise and the Reality
Edited by SAMUEL HENDEL *and* RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM,
The City College of The City University of New York
Knopf, Summer 1967; about 400 pages; about $3.95 paperbound

Nine specialists assess the record of the Soviet Union: the political system in general, the economy, social and cultural developments, relations with other Communist states, the USSR in world affairs, and the future of the Soviet Union.
Revised Edition

Recently published . . .

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION Revised Edition

Edited by ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, *University of Pennsylvania*
Random House, 1966; 458 pages; $4.95 paperbound

A new edition in paperback of a comprehensive collection of readings on Soviet foreign policy since 1917. The present revision includes selections on the USSR-Cuba dispute, the nuclear test-ban treaty, and the changing Soviet attitude toward India.

Newly revised

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE SOVIET UNION
by LEONARD SCHAPIRO V176; 194 pages; $1.95 paperbound

For further information, write to

RANDOM HOUSE & ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc.

International Relations

Just published . . . the Fourth Edition of

POLITICS AMONG NATIONS

The Struggle for Power and Peace
by HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *University of Chicago*
Knopf, January 1967; 672 pages; $7.95

Professor Morgenthau appraises the fateful struggle of sovereign states for power and peace in our time in what is still the most comprehensive and useful survey in the field of contemporary international politics.

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS

Revised Edition
World Politics in Our Time
by JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College of The City University of New York*
Foreword by Arthur N. Holcombe
Random House, 1965; 460 pages; $6.75

The revised and updated edition of the text won the Bancroft Prize in International Relations. The major problems of international politics, organization, and law are covered, including such recent developments as the liquidation of the African colonies, disarmament negotiations, and the U.N. financial crisis.

CRISIS AND CONTINUITY IN WORLD POLITICS

Readings in International Relations
Edited by GEORGE A. LANYI *and* WILSON C. McWILLIAMS, *both of Oberlin College*
Random House, 1966; 768 pages; $4.95 paperbound

An important new anthology of extraordinary range and scope, offering significant readings on the abiding issues of international relations by writers from Machiavelli to the leading contemporary scholars and commentators.

Theory and Methods of Political Science

In preparation . . .

CONTEMPORARY RADICAL IDEOLOGIES

by A. JAMES GREGOR, *University of Texas*
Random House, Fall 1967; about 450 pages; about $4.95

A description and original analysis of the major radical ideologies of our time: Leninism, Fascism, National Socialism, Apartheid and African Socialism. Drawing extensively on primary source material, the accounts of each system are compact but thorough and balanced in coverage. Especially notable are the chapters on Fascism and Apartheid, since there are few comprehensive accounts in English of these systems *as ideologies.*

Recently published . . .

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN AMERICA

New Directions
Edited by HEINZ EULAU, *Stanford University*
Random House, 1966; 455 pages; $6.95 hardcover, $4.95 paperbound

A major collection of significant readings on political behavior in the United States, illustrating important trends in research and in the development of theory and methodology. This is a companion volume to Professor Eulau's THE BEHAVIORAL PERSUASION IN POLITICS (A Random House Study in Political Science).

The College Department **501 Madison Avenue** **New York 10022**

DORSEY
PRESS

1967 Books in

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM:

Notes and Readings

Edited by BERNARD E. BROWN, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, and JOHN C. WAHLKE, The University of Iowa

Systematic, analytic, and dynamic, this new text encourages students to view the United States as one political system among many. To this end, the editors have organized the material around the theme "systems analysis." After exploring some problems of methodology, the student has his attention directed to the following topics: (1) legitimacy and consensus, (2) political dynamics, (3) decision-making and policy formulation, and (4) political change. Each of these topics is spelled out as an analytic category in terms of which the American or any other political system may be examined. In viewing and analyzing the American political system in terms of these four categories, the student will be able more easily to compare the United States with other nations, to identify the similarities and differences, and to recognize the unique and the universal. This book is valuable as a supplementary text for introductory courses in American government or political science.

682 pages *Paperbound* *Text price:* *$4.75*

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING:

A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative, *Revised Edition*

By JAMES A. ROBINSON, The Ohio State University

With more than one third of its material completely rewritten, this text continues to give students excellent and up-to-date insight into the influence of Congress on U. S. foreign policy. New material has been incorporated on legislative-executive relations regarding foreign policy, and on the frequency of communications with members of Congress. This Revised Edition also includes a newer and more extensive analysis of how variations in communications processes among Congressmen affect their voting on foreign policy legislation. The book concludes with a reappraisal of Congress' role in foreign policy.

About 300 pages *Paperbound* *Tentative text price:* *$3.50*

Write Today to Reserve Your Examination Copies

DORSEY
PRESS

Published in The Dorsey Series in Political Science

THE DORSEY PRESS

The Dorsey Series in Political Science

THE LANGUAGE OF MODERN POLITICS

An Introduction to the Study of Government

By H. MARK ROELOFS, New York University

This book presents to the beginning student an important point of view: that politics should be studied for what it is—a distinctly human activity in which men attempt to converse about and communicate their problems. The student is also given a conceptual framework with which to discover and interpret information for himself. Roelofs' text is purposely brief, *each chapter written with an eye toward the special appendix listing paperbacks which* might be assigned as collateral reading. *About 550 pages; Tentative text price: $8.25*

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY

By EUGENE J. MEEHAN, *Brandeis University*

A critical, analytic study, this book analyzes discussions now taking place in the field about methodological, conceptual, and evaluative problems in the study of politics. It provides a framework useful for examining major works produced recently, and a framework in which the study of political thought can be made relevant to the study of politics generally. *About 600 pages; Tentative text price: $8.50*

THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Revised Edition

By GERARD J. MANGONE, Syracuse University

Greatly expanded and completely updated, this new Revised Edition presents additional introductory text material for each section of cases and documents. Current materials have been added to almost every subject, especially in problems of jurisdiction and the legal regulation of international force. The opinions from national and international courts have been combined with cogent essays by the author. *About 550 pages; Tentative text price: $8.25*

PATTERNS OF SOVIET POLITICS, Revised Edition

By RICHARD C. GRIPP, *San Diego State College*

Expanded and reorganized, this new edition provides recent information on such developments as Khrushchev's downfall, the new five-year plan, the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, and related governmental and political changes since 1936. Discussed are such concepts as political socialization and recruitment and legitimacy regarding the Soviet political system. An expanded final chapter elaborates summary concepts on the patterns of Soviet politics. *About 400 pages; Tentative text price: $7.75*

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

By FRED M. FROHOCK, Syracuse University

Bringing together both classical and modern political theory at a methodological level, this book defines political inquiry through a discussion of the necessary role of theory in investigation. The wide range of problems scrutinized makes this text an appropriate volume for both undergraduate and graduate courses and seminars. *About 250 pages; Tentative text price: $5.00*

Consulting Editor: Norton E. Long, Brandeis University

HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS

DORSEY
PRESS

Fp

Domestic Sources Of Foreign Policy

Edited by James N. Rosenau, ***Rutgers University***

The first multidisciplinary approach to the study of the influence of domestic factors in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Excerpts from several disciplines—political science, sociology, and psychology—discuss such topics as voting and foreign policy, mass communications and foreign policy, and the significance of various interest groups. Among the contributors are Bernard C. Cohen, Scott Greer, Theodore J. Lowi, Herbert McClosky, Lester W. Milbrath, and Warren E. Miller.

Just Published | 352 pages (approx.) | $7.50 tent.

International Politics And Foreign Policy

A Reader in Research and Theory

Edited by James N. Rosenau, ***Rutgers University***

Fifty-five selections from the work of Gabriel Almond, Karl W. Deutsch, Morton Kaplan, Arnold Wolfers and others present a remarkably broad range of contemporary theory and theoretical approach. ". . . brings together a comprehensive selection of articles covering most aspects of the advancing field. . . . I find Rosenau's selection very satisfying, in the sense that I cannot think of anything else I want to put in . . . here is an excellent broad sample of recent writing."
—Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*

1961 | 511 pages | $8.95

Contemporary Political Analysis

Edited by James C. Charlesworth, ***University of Pennsylvania***

Twenty distinguished contributors including Heinz Eulau, James N. Rosenau, Karl W. Deutsch, David Easton, and Andrew Hacker discuss and evaluate the major contemporary methodologies in political science research. Each of eight research approaches—behavioralism; functional analysis; the quantitative approach; systems theory; decision-making theory; game theory; communications theory; and political development theory—is described, analyzed, and evaluated.

July, 1967 | 480 pages (approx.) | $7.95 tent.

FP

Quantitative International Politics

Insights and Evidence

Edited by J. David Singer, *University of Michigan*
Volume Six in the Series *International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research,* Heinz Eulau, General Editor

The work of fourteen political scientists and historians has been gathered in the first book-length presentation of data-based studies to touch all areas of international politics. The contributors demonstrate how the rigorous methodology of the behavioral disciplines can be brought to bear on the raw information of world politics to sort out useful data, test hypotheses, and support meaningful generalizations.

May, 1967 352 pages (approx.) $8.50 tent.

Knowledge And Power

Essays on Science and Government

Edited by Sanford A. Lakoff, *State University of New York at Stony Brook*

Fifteen authoritative readings, none of which has ever before appeared in book form, consider the controversies and modern relationships between science and government. Included are an examination of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Oppenheimer case, Project Mohole, NASA, the nuclear test-ban controversy, and the Congressional inquiry into smoking and health. Daniel S. Greenberg, McGeorge Bundy, Stanley J. Reiser, Carl W. Fischer, Harvey Brooks, and Alan T. Waterman are among the distinguished contributors.

1966 550 pages $9.95

Congressmen And The Electorate

Elections for the U.S. House and the President, 1920-1964

By Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Johns Hopkins University*

The first thorough analysis of the way Americans have voted for the President and for congressmen from 1920 to 1964. Over-all conclusions about American voting habits are drawn from considerations which include split-ticket voting, incumbent congressmen and the electoral verdict, policy and personality differences between presidential and congressional tickets of the same party, and minor parties.

1966 304 pages $5.95

***more from* THE FREE PRESS ▶**

Three Distinguished Free Press Paperbacks—

Political Ideology

Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does

By Robert E. Lane

"With this volume Lane consolidates his position as a leader of his generation in the development of a social psychology of political life. . . . He has produced our first sustained empirical exploration of the content, sources, and consequences of common political ideologies in psycho-social categories of analysis."—Daniel Lerner, *American Sociological Review*. ". . . a fascinating document that should be read by all of us."—Andrew Hacker, *The American Political Science Review*. "The author has employed a technique that is first-rate in political science. . . . Seldom can the political beliefs of a number of people have been probed in either such breadth or depth . . . may well become a classic of its kind."

—H. B. Mayo, *The Journal of Politics*

320 pages (paper) $2.95

Political Life

Why and How People Get Involved in Politics

By Robert E. Lane

Political Life is the first comprehensive view of popular participation in American democracy. It summarizes, interprets, and organizes hundreds of research studies on the political process as well as the theoretical literature in the field. ". . . careful and thoughtful . . . Lane has produced a study that deserves to be widely used by all students of politics."—*Political Science Quarterly*

374 pages (paper) $2.45

The Nerves Of Government

Models of Political Communication and Control

By Karl W. Deutsch

The Nerves of Government examines the theory that government is more a problem of steering than of power. "Professor Deutsch is one of the important figures in modern political science and this is his most significant book. . . . it needs to be read and reread."—Richard A. Brody, *The American Political Science Review*

334 pages (paper) $2.95

Available at your bookstore or directly from . . .

THE FREE PRESS A Division of The Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York 10022

New—for college courses

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Webb S. Fiser, State University of New York at Albany;
Stuart Gerry Brown, University of Hawaii; and
John S. Gibson, Tufts University

Coming in April! This textbook surveys concisely but comprehensively the framework of the American governmental system. Intergovernmental relations are developed as cooperative action between levels of government rather than as compartmentalized treatments of federal, state and local systems. Going beyond discussion of politics, parties, and pressure groups, this book shows how the political process unfolds around concrete policy issues in the context of changing historical developments. Particular attention is given to such currently important problems as urban renewal, metropolitan areas, poverty, race relations, law enforcement, agriculture, and education. The chapter on science and government and those on the international scene create a sense of student involvement in America's place in the world order.

1967. 803 pages. $8.50

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California; and
Robert Presthus, University of Oregon

Coming in April! A standard for over three decades, this textbook examines administration at all levels of government. The book integrates traditional descriptive-institutional materials of administrative science with behavioral analyses of administration in action. It analyzes such aspects of administration as its historical and institutional framework, the separation of powers, the role of executives (particularly that of the specialist in modern administration), and the problem of obtaining superior talent in government.
Fifth Edition covers decision-making and the data-processing revolution, and discusses the new human-relations approach—incorporating recent research into group behavior, individual motivation, and leadership dynamics.

5th Ed., 1967. 530 pages. $8.00

The Ronald Press Company

......15 East 26th Street / New York, N.Y. 10010

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

by EMMETTE S. REDFORD, DAVID B. TRUMAN, ANDREW HACKER ALAN F. WESTIN, and ROBERT C. WOOD

Now in use at over 180 colleges and universities, *Politics and Government in the United States* presents a full-scale study of the structure and process of American democracy. The book reflects a breadth of knowledge and experience seldom found in a beginning textbook; at the same time, its skillful balance of fact and interpretation, hard analysis, and vigorous style make it an absorbing introduction to American government. *"An excellent work from almost every conceivable point of view."*—Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania. With Instructor's Manual.
National Edition: 874 pages, $8.50
National, State & Local Edition: 1,004 pages, $8.95
Student Guide by Robert J. Quinlan: Paperbound, 205 pages, $2.95

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

by LOUIS KOENIG

"Mr. Koenig's knowledge of the Presidency and its history, a knowledge that includes both the Constitutional Convention and the first months of the Johnson Administration, is not much short of encyclopedic. In fact, I cannot recall a book on the same subject, nor even those . . . that are required reading in the colleges, that brings together so much information and insight in an organized fashion."—Arnold A. Rogow in *Book Week*. Text Edition: 435 pages, $7.50

VIEWS OF AMERICA

Edited by ALAN F. WESTIN, JULIAN H. FRANKLIN PAUL E. SIGMUND, and HOWARD R. SWEARER

Fifty-nine contemporary articles that express the dominant, characteristic opinions of America held in Western Europe, the Communist bloc, and the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A final section explores American reactions to foreign observers and includes recent analyses of the sources and import of foreign commentary. "This is an unusual, I am almost tempted to say unique, book, in that it gathers together what is for the most part difficult to obtain information and opinion on a most important topic, and makes it useful for and relevant to a number of class users."—Russel B. Nye, Michigan State University. Text Edition: Paperbound, 375 pages, $3.95

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS
Fifth Edition

by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER and JOHN H. HERZ

Coming in the spring—a thorough revision and updating of the widely respected text for the basic comparative government course. *Major Foreign Powers,* Fifth Edition, describes and compares in detail the governments and politics of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and France—making frequent reference throughout to relevant aspects of government in the United States and other countries. 720 pages, $9.50 (probable). Publication: April, 1967

POLITICAL PATTERNS IN TODAY'S WORLD

by D. W. BROGAN and DOUGLAS V. VERNEY

Two noted political scientists appraise the operations of democracy and totalitarianism in selected countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and the U.S.S.R. "I consider *Political Patterns in Today's World* the best supplementary reading to a textbook on comparative government."—Nimrod Raphaeli, University of Michigan. Paperbound, 274 pages, $2.95

POLITICS IN AFRICA: 7 Cases

Edited by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

"Professor Carter's book offers a lively, highly readable discussion of some of the major current issues in African politics. The case approach is particularly useful for an introductory course, combining as it does a sense for general issues with an appreciation of the circumstances within which each African country, and set of leaders, must operate."—David B. Abernethy, Stanford University. Paperbound, 283 pages, $3.25

POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION: 7 Cases

Edited by ALEXANDER DALLIN and ALAN F. WESTIN

"This collection of essays is remarkable not only for the coverage—everything from literature and art to the military—but for the citations from Soviet writings and the reproductions of Soviet cartoons. The extensive and up-to-date bibliographies are also very valuable. I intend to use this not only for comparative government courses, but also for Russian History."—Mother Jane Miller, San Francisco College for Women. Paperbound, 282 pages, $3.25

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

A highly successful text which analyzes the ideological conflicts, discordant national interests and the social and economic factors that underlie today's revolutionary transformations. Close attention is given to the problems of the underdeveloped nations—the "Third World"—and their role in today's power struggle. *"Of the perhaps dozen books on the subject that this reviewer has read in the past year, this is by far the most knowledgeable and useful. It can be recommended for student, intellectual and technician alike."*—America

650 Pages **$7.25**

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: EAST AND WEST

KURT LONDON, George Washington University

The author scans the policy machinery of the main protagonists of the East-West conflict—United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. Special emphasis is given to the vital roles of intelligence and propaganda in the making and implementation of policy, and the agencies and media are carefully defined.

368 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN

HARRY SCHWARTZ

Russia's current economic difficulties and the reasons for them are analyzed by the *New York Times'* specialist on Russian affairs. The continuing problem of Soviet agriculture and the ouster of Khrushchev are given close attention.

256 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

LA GUARDIA COMES TO POWER: 1933

ARTHUR MANN, University of Chicago

A distinguished historian examines the significant elements of the election that was a turning point in the history of American urban politics. *". . . contains the best account of an urban election we have ever had."*—Atlantic Monthly

192 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

KARL W. DEUTSCH, Yale University; PHILIP E. JACOB, HENRY TEUNE,
JAMES V. TOSCANO, WILLIAM L. C. WHEATON,
University of Pennsylvania

Integrated political behavior at the metropolitan and international levels is explored in ten essays based on empirical studies in a wide range of fields, including communications, international tensions, planning and regional science, local government, social structure, social psychology and cultural anthropology.

314 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY **College Department, East Washington Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105**

1792

The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
and
The Inter-University Case Program, Inc.
announce

Governmental Reorganizations: A Casebook

Edited and with Analytical Commentary / by **FREDERICK C. MOSHER,**
University of California at Berkeley

The product of a five-year experimental effort sponsored jointly by the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California at Berkeley and the Inter-University Case Program, Inc., this book uses the case study method for systematic research and analysis about the process of administrative reorganization.

A methodological and substantive introduction is followed by 13 case studies, including six not previously published in the ICP series. Part Two of the book is a substantial analysis and commentary on organizations in public administration, the dynamics of organizational change, the participation hypothesis in reorganization, and related factors.

The cases describe a spread of reorganizations—from successful to unsuccessful—in federal, state, and local agencies.

Spring 1967 *750 pages* *$12.00 clothbound*
An "on approval" title

Some Recent Case Studies in the ICP Series:

ICP No.	*TITLE*	*AUTHOR*	*PP.*	*PRICE*
89	Reorganization of the U.S. Public Health Service	Edith T. Carper	75	$1.45
91	Defeating the Leadership's Nominee in the House Democratic Caucus	Rep. Richard W. Bolling	15	.50
95	Detroit Experiment: Citizens Plan for a New High School	Roberta S. Sigel	70	2.25
98	The Federal-State Struggle for Offshore Oil	Hubert Marshall and Betty Zisk	53	1.50
99	Labor Lobbying and Labor Reform: The Passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act	Samuel C. Patterson	40	1.00
100	The Office of Education and the Education Act of 1955	Stephen K. Bailey	20	.50
101	Bases in Spain	Theodore J. Lowi	40	.75

For these cases, and new catalog, *Index and Summary of Case Studies, The Inter-University Case Program, Inc.,* listing and describing cases published by ICP from 1948 to the present, write today to:

COLLEGE DIVISION
THE **BOBBS-MERRILL** COMPANY, INC.
SUBSIDIARY OF HOWARD W. SAMS & CO., INC.
4300 WEST 62nd ST. • INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46206

THE STATE OF THE UNION:

Commentaries on American Democracy

Edited by Robert B. Dishman, University of New Hampshire. **This collection of sixty-four readings on major issues in American life by prominent people in political science, history, economics, politics, education, sociology, and the arts has been organized around key phrases of the Preamble to the Constitution. The editor's essays introduce each subject and discuss the problems and issues involved. There is an additional *Topical Table of Contents* in the back of the book.** ***1965. x, 546 pages. Paper. $4.85***

PRESSURE GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Edited by H. R. Mahood, Memphis State University. **This collection of essays by distinguished writers introduces the student to the important role played by pressure groups in public policy-making and brings to his attention the existence of a group theory of politics. It presents both a theoretical and factual framework for a "group" basis of politics—viewing politics as the activity of different groups in conflict.** ***1967. x, 304 pages. Paper. $2.75***

DEMOCRACY AND ELITISM: Two Essays with Selected Readings

By Harry Girvetz, University of California, Santa Barbara. **For courses on the "isms" and political philosophy, this book presents an informative symposium on democracy and elitism. Two long essays by the author present clear and reasoned definitions of democracy and elitism. The readings which follow document and expand points made in the first two essays. In summation an Epilogue asks: Do elitist or democratic tendencies now dominate in the United States?** ***1967. xi, 349 pages. Paper. $3.50***

NEUTRALISM AND DISENGAGEMENT

Edited by Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati. **This anthology examines the various forms of neutralism and disengagement as they are avowed and practiced by many nations today. The editor has drawn upon government documents, speeches, articles, reports, and excerpts from treatises to represent the different approaches taken to these policies throughout the world. With suggested topics for controlled and library research.** ***1964. xii, 192 pages. Paper. $2.50***

FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE:

A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics

By Karl W. Deutsch, Yale University, Lewis J. Edinger, Washington University St. Louis, Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University, and Richard L. Merritt, Yale University. **This study, for courses in international politics or foreign relations, summarizes and discusses elite opinions on such questions as the future of NATO and the Western Alliance, arms control and disarmament, the reunification of Germany, and France after De Gaulle.** ***1967. xii, 324 pages. Paper. $2.95***

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT · 597 FIFTH AVENUE · NEW YORK

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

From ST. MARTIN'S

St. Martin's Series in American Politics:

The Modern Presidency

Grant McConnell, *The University of Chicago*

A coherent exposition of the modern presidency as it has emerged through the long term of American history, and especially as it has been transformed in the years since the Depression. 1967. 128 pages. Paper: $1.50

Other books in the Series:

The New Congress

Stephen K. Bailey, *Syracuse University*

"This insightful and compact treatment by a sophisticated scholar and practitioner of politics should be a particularly convenient introduction to the subject for both laymen and undergraduates. It contains some points which may be instructive to the more advanced and experienced reader as well. Well written throughout."

—**Herman Somers,** *Princeton University*

1966. 128 pages. Paper: $1.50

Political Parties in the United States

Allen P. Sindler, *Cornell University*

"This is a delightful book to be read both by the specialist and by the non-specialist in the field of politics. Chapter IV on the general characteristics of American National Parties is especially penetrating and thought-provoking.

—**James A. Gathings,** *Bucknell University*

1966. 128 pages. Paper: $1.50

The Convention and the Constitution

The Political Ideas of the Founding Fathers

David G. Smith, *Swarthmore College*

"Places the great issues of the 1787 Constitutional Convention in the perspective of the political theories of the drafters—an illuminating volume."

—**C. Edwin Gilmour,** *Grinnell College*

1965. 128 pages. Paper: $1.75

To be published:

Political Theory *George Kateb, Amherst College Spring 1968. Paper: $1.50 tent.*

College Department
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

INCENTIVES
to thoughtful and spirited discussions

STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Each volume in this distinctive series combines thematic organization, primary sources, scholarly interpretive essays along with editorial introductions and comments in order to provide valuable historical-political perspectives on topics in

- American History
- European History
- American Politics
- Comparative Politics

Latest Titles

BRITISH POLITICS—
People, Parties and Parliament
ANTHONY KING, University of Essex

SOLDIERS AND STATES—
Civil-Military Relations in Modern Europe
DAVID B. RALSTON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Already Available

CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY
JOHN F. WILSON, Princeton University

RUSSIA AND THE WEST—
from Peter to Khrushchev
L. JAY OLIVA, New York University

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC
ROGER W. PETHYBRIDGE, University College, Swansea

PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

- **THE DEBATE OVER THERMONUCLEAR STRATEGY**
- **THE MEANING OF McCARTHYISM**
- **INTERVENTION, 1917:** Why America Fought
- **THE WAR OF 1812:** Past Justifications and Present Interpretations
- **PEARL HARBOR:** Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, Revised Edition

All volumes paperbound

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY
college department

Home Office: Boston, Mass. 02116 Sales Offices: Englewood, N.J. 07631
Indianapolis, Ind. 46219 San Francisco, Calif. 94105 Atlanta, Ga. 30324
Dallas, Tex. 75247 London W.C. 1 Toronto 2-B

The New Inter-Nation Simulation Kit

for teaching and research has been developed

by Harold Guetzkow, Northwestern University
Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Michigan State University

SRA, long a leader in innovation for education, has published INSKit™ to bring new dimensions to teaching and research in the social sciences. The model used is the result of years of continuing research and refinement at Northwestern University.

INSKit provides, besides the basic model, details on conduct and variations of the simulation and line-by-line directions for the several forms used to record, report, and calculate the consequences of the economic, military, and political decisions.

With INSKit, you need only students, time, and space to open the full potentialities of inter-nation simulation . . . and at far less cost than you would need to prepare your own model and materials.

Write for prices or for a visit from an SRA College Associate:

S R A

Science Research Associates, Inc.
259 E. Erie St., Chicago, Ill. 60611

A Subsidiary of IBM


Inter-Nation Simulation Kit
S R A
Inter-Nation Simulation Kit
Inter-Nation Simulation Kit

Now is the time
for all good political scientists—

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II: A Short History

By CHARLES L. ROBERTSON, *Smith College.* INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II combines a fairly detailed summary of international events and crises since the war with an overview of broad changes in the political pattern of the world. It takes as a starting point the world of sovereign nation-states that developed in previous centuries. It then shows how recent events result from the combination of older patterns of politics with new developments in mass communications and mass ideologies, increases in population, the rise to power of new major states and the transformation of old empires into a large number of new successor states, and finally, the development of new weapons. *1966. 385 pages. Cloth: $6.95. Paper: $3.95.*

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Edited by JASON L. FINKLE, *The University of Michigan; and* RICHARD W. GABLE, *University of California, Davis.* This reader in political sociology provides a systems approach and a conceptual framework for analyzing the contemporary process of political development and its relationship to other societal transformations. *1966. 599 pages. $8.95.*

METROPOLIS ON THE MOVE: Geographers Look at Urban Sprawl

Edited by JEAN GOTTMANN, *Ecole des Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne); and* ROBERT A. HARPER, *Southern Illinois University.* Considers the form, forces, and pressures created by urban sprawl, examines its impact upon the functioning of the city, and offers an alternative for the future. *1967. 203 pages. Cloth: $6.50. Paper: $3.45.*

CHINESE SOCIETY UNDER COMMUNISM: A Reader

Edited by WILLIAM T. LIU, *University of Notre Dame.* Emphasizes the control apparatus of Chinese society and the various institutional consequences of control from the dynastic periods, through the transitional interlude, to the contemporary Communist regime. *1967. 496 pages. Cloth: $8.50. Paper: $5.50.*

FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
Readings in International Organization and the Maintenance of Peace

Edited by JOEL LARUS, *Brandeis University.* "This collection of writings and documents constitutes a useful and original approach to the study of contemporary international organization. It is particularly helpful to have in a handy form some of the actual documents."—Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1965. 556 pages. Cloth: $6.95. Paper: $4.95.*

SOCIAL CHANGE: The Colonial Situation

Edited by IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *Columbia University.* A comparative and inter-disciplinary approach to the process of change in colonial societies within a world context of modernization. "This is a valuable reference work for anyone seriously interested in developing nations."—*Current History. 1966. 674 pages. $9.50.*

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.

—to make sure they haven't missed these important Wiley publications

ARMS CONTROL AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

By KARL W. DEUTSCH, *Yale University.* Based on the results of a major research effort on the acceptability of disarmament and arms control measures in the European political environment, this is the first book to test the judgments of scholars and political analysts against verifiable data. Focusing on France and Germany as the key countries of Europe, it combines five streams of evidence: intensive elite opinion surveys; mass opinion data; content analysis of major newspapers; quantitative data about the actual social and economic behavior of countries and peoples; and the historic and diplomatic record. *1967. Approx. 184 pages. Prob. $5.95.*

ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER

By ANGUS CAMPBELL, PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER, *and* DONALD E. STOKES, *all at the Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan.* In many ways a successor to THE AMERICAN VOTER by the same authors, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER expresses better than any book yet written the profound shift of electoral research from problems of individual behavior to the problems of a wider political order. *1966. 385 pages. $8.75.*

SIMULATION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By ANDREW M. SCOTT, *University of North Carolina; with* WILLIAM A. LUCAS *and* TRUDI M. LUCAS. This book examines the research potential of one kind of simulation for the investigation of social change in modernizing societies. It demonstrates ways that the central features of entire social, political, and economic systems can be simulated. By simplifying the complex processes of development, by compressing the time required for their evolution, and by building a working model of them, the observer can learn about the larger processes by studying the miniature. *1966. 177 pages. $5.95.*

JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL

Law Enforcement in Democratic Society

By JEROME H. SKOLNICK, *University of California, Berkeley.* "To my mind it is by far the best thing that has been done on the police and is a must for anyone who attempts to understand the current controversy over the relation between individual rights and the protection of society. Mr. Skolnick has not only done an able job of research, but has presented his material in a well-written and fascinating form. This study should be a model for those it will inspire over the next generation."—John Kaplan, *Stanford University School of Law. 1966. 279 pages. $7.95.*

now available in paperback . . .

HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS

By JAMES C. DAVIES, *University of Oregon. 1963. 403 pages. Paper: $4.95. (Cloth: $7.95.)*

THE DYNAMICS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY

Compiled and edited by DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, *University of Iowa; and* JACK L. WALKER, *The University of Michigan. 1964. 355 pages. Paper: $4.95. (Cloth: $7.95.*

605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Photo by Fred Stein

Hannah Arendt

"An achievement in historiography ...also in political science."

—DAVID RIESMAN, *Commentary*

"A classic" —*Times Literary Supplement*

A new introduction, written from the perspective of the nineteen sixties, and an enlarged bibliography bring up-to-date this classic study of twentieth century politics. The extended essay which introduces this new edition takes into account Stalin's plans during the last years of his life as well as a consideration of the significance of the Chinese revolution and the present crisis which had just started when this edition went to press.

THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM

$8.75 HARCOURT, BRACE & WORLD

CQ

BACKGROUND PAPERBACKS

FOR FALL 1967

CQ GUIDE TO CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
. . . recent significant developments in American Government
120 pages, 8½"x11" $2.00
Fall edition in print late August 1967
(Spring 1967 edition available now)

REPRESENTATION AND APPORTIONMENT
. . . response of the nation to Supreme Court's decisions
August 1966, 96 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50

HOUSING A NATION
. . . federal policy from 1945 through 1965 creation of Department of Housing and Urban Development
March 1966, 96 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50

POLITICS IN AMERICA 1945-1966
. . . elections since 1945 reviewed and related to national and international events; data on results; election law developments
About May 1967, 124 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50
(1945-1964 edition available now)

REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS
. . . developments since 1945 through 1965 Voting Rights Act
September 1965, 96 pages, 8½"x11". $2.50
(To be updated through 1966 about June 1967)

LEGISLATORS AND THE LOBBYISTS
. . . how Congress is pressured and by whom; the military-industrial lobby; case studies of legislation
August 1965, 80 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50

Examination copies available to faculty members upon request

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE
1735 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006

DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

THE FIRST NAME IN QUALITY PAPERBACK PUBLISHING

FROM RACE RIOT TO SIT-IN: 1919 and the 1960s

A Study in the Connections Between Conflict and Violence

Arthur I. Waskow

An analysis of the race riots of 1919 and the recent movement of "creative disorder," offering entirely new evidence and new "inventions" by which racial justice can be achieved without national catastrophe. "Brilliant and creative."—*Washington Star* $1.45

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF INDIA

W. H. Morris-Jones

This study of the operation of political institutions in independent India concentrates on how local loyalties, the caste system, overpopulation, language barriers, and other factors influence the formal framework of government. $1.25

URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING

Edited by Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht

This reader on the political controversies and sociological realities of revitalizing the American city deals with such topics as constitutional questions, slum clearance, leadership problems, citizen participation, and the effects of public housing. *An Anchor Original.* $1.95

THE RADICAL PAPERS

Edited with an Introduction by Irving Howe

Michael Harrington, Bayard Rustin, Harvey Swados, Paul Goodman, Christopher Jencks, Daniel Bell, George Lichtheim, and fifteen other Americans call for radical social reforms as they write on education, urban renewal, civil rights, and poverty. $1.45

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.

Garden City, New York

Our Laidlaw division, River Forest, Illinois,

serves the textbook needs of today's schools.

THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT

By ***ARTHUR F. BENTLEY***

Edited by PETER H ODEGARD

The Process of Government, an extraordinarily original introduction to interest group analysis in political science, was written in 1908 by Arthur F. Bentley, a pioneer in contemporary behavioral science. Largely ignored for two decades, the book is now generally regarded as a seminal contribution to modern political analysis. *A John Harvard Library Book.* $6.95

FARM POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE TRUMAN YEARS

By ***ALLEN J. MATUSOW***

In the years immediately following World War II, Mr. Matusow relates the process by which the government overcame internal political disharmony and the alienation of the farmers to save Europe from famine. Included is an assessment of the role of the farm issues in the 1948 election and the origin and ultimate defeat of the controversial Brannan Plan. *Harvard Historical Studies, 80.* $7.50

THE SOVIET BLOC

Unity and Conflict

Revised and Enlarged Edition

By ***ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI***

Mr. Brzezinski, who is currently serving on the State Department's Policy Planning Council, has revised and updated his important study wherever necessary and added three extensive new chapters on recent developments. He gives particular attention to the Sino-Soviet dispute. *Russian Research Center Studies, 37. Center for International Affairs.* $9.95

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN

Revised Edition

By ***DEXTER PERKINS***

This revision of an important study shows how the immense economic disparities between this country and its southern neighbors, the threat of Communism, and our ever-increasing involvement in Europe and Asia have given a new color to our relations with the peoples of the Caribbean. *American Foreign Policy Library.* $4.75

HARVARD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

LOOKING FOR A BOOK PUBLISHER?

It is no secret that publication is regarded as the foundation stone of a scholar's career. In order to gain recognition, prestige, and advancement, the scholar must seek publication.

Here at Exposition Press, we offer scholars a complete publishing service, under our special academic imprint, "Exposition-University Books." Though the proportion of scholarly publications in the lists of the trade houses is shrinking, due to economic pressures, many of our recent titles in the academic fields have gained popular reviews, professional recognition and steady sales. These books are the result of a publishing plan that is bringing a steady flow of scholarly writers to Exposition Press. They reflect the high editorial standards and quality of design and production which have won the respect of libraries, schools, booksellers and critics. Ask for free catalogs.

FREE! The behind-the-scenes story of book publishing revealed in two fact-filled, illustrated brochures, containing a detailed description for our subsidy plan including a breakdown of contract terms and typical costs (in print for the first time). Copies are available on request. Your inquiries and manuscripts are invited. An editorial appraisal will be furnished promptly without obligation. References upon request.

Please write to Dept. 93C

EXPOSITION PRESS, *Main Office, 386 Park Ave. So., New York 16, N.Y.*
California office: 9172 Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles 69, Calif.

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal on International Relations
Under the Editorial Sponsorship of the
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Vol. XIX **April 1967** **No. 3**

CONTENTS

Containment in Asia Reconsidered .... David P. Mozingo
On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia .... Johan Galtung
French Strategy Emergent: General André Beaufre—A Critique .... Edward Y. Kolodziej
The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations .... Paul Y. Hammond
Social Science Research Abroad: Problems and Remedies .... Klaus Knorr

Research Note

Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis .... Claude Ake

Review Articles

The Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda .... Ann Ruth Willner
The Tragedy of Syria .... Leonard Binder

Subscriptions, $7.50 a year (two years, $12.50), single copies $2.50

WORLD POLITICS
Corwin Hall, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

SPRING, 1967, TEXTS FROM DODD MEAD

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

by DELL G. HITCHNER and CAROL LEVINE

The extraordinary success of *Modern Government: A Survey of Political Science,* Second Edition, 1965, by Dell G. Hitchner and William H. Harbold, The University of Washington, has led Professor Hitchner and Carol Levine to prepare a derivative paperback designed for the comparative government course. It may be used with the various short books devoted to the government of a single country that are commonly used in that course. The perspective is entirely comparative and analytical. The authors refer to a wide range of governments, especially the developing countries. Included is a treatment of communist governments and politics.

April *approx. 250 pages* *paperback* *tentative price $2.95*

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

A CASE STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

by CLYDE E. JACOBS and JOHN F. GALLAGHER

The authors offer a case study of the legislative enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1948 and of executive implementation and judicial interpretation of this legislation. The study is designed to show the student how each of the three branches of government participates in the policy-making process. It is designed for use in introductory courses in American government and in advanced courses in American government and in public policy formulation. Clyde E. Jacobs is at the University of California, Davis, and John F. Gallagher is a member of the commission on the New York State Constitutional Convention.

April *approx. 200 pages* *paperback* *tentative price $2.50*

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY, INC.

79 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

In Canada: 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 16, Ontario

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

CROWELL STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The titles in this new series focus upon topics that are crucial to the understanding of political processes. The volumes, which are primarily analytical, have been designed for use by undergraduates; they are clearly and succinctly written, and they make use of the most recent research and data. Teachers of Political Science should find the books in this series valuable for supplementary assignments in survey courses as well as courses on the advanced level.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

Harry Lazer, City College of New York

How adaptable has the American political system, conceived in the eighteenth century, been to the dramatic changes of the last two hundred years? How well has our method of government adjusted to the shift from a rural agricultural society to an urban industrial one? This volume attempts to find the answers to these questions by analyzing the impact of social and economic change upon the institutions of our government. Mr. Lazer first traces the historical development of these changes, noting the effects they have had on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. He then asks this important question: In what ways have the branches of government succeeded in rising to the challenges of the twentieth century and in what ways have they failed?

April, 1967 *256 pages* *about $2.50*

PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES

Road to the White House

James W. Davis, Central Michigan University

In the twentieth century the Presidency has emerged as the keystone of the American system of government. This raises a crucial question for students of politics: By what process does the victorious candidate reach the White House? This book analyzes the first essential step in this process—the winning of the presidential nomination. Mr. Davis contends that in the past three decades the successful candidates have laid the groundwork for victory in the presidential primaries. By using the primaries to bypass state leaders and party professionals supporting other candidates, the eventual nominees have placed the choice of the presidential nomination in the hands of the voters in the primary states, even though less than a third of the states use the primary system. Thus, the national conventions have tended to become ratifying bodies rather than deliberative assemblies convened to choose the "best qualified" candidates. To support this thesis, the author has, in this volume, undertaken the first comprehensive study of the primary system since 1926.

April, 1967 *304 pages* *about $2.50*

AMERICAN FEDERALISM

A View from the States

Daniel J. Elazar, Temple University

Though federalism is a concept integral to the American system of Government, it is, nonetheless, not often fully understood. At a time when national programs in such important areas as education, civil rights, welfare, and public improvements carry strong implications for the federal system, it is essential that students of government know what federalism is, and how it relates to today's politics. This penetrating analysis views the federal system from the vantage point of the states, the basic components of the federal union.

1966 *288 pages* *$2.50*

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY
201 Park Avenue South New York 10003

Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior: Essays and Studies

NEW: Edited by Edward Dreyer, San Diego State College, and Walter Rosenbaum, University of Florida. 1966. 506 pages. 6 x 9. Paperbound.
"A collection of almost uniformly important articles. Tied together with interpretative comments of conceptual clarity and unity—a very rare accomplishment for a book of readings."—Bernard C. Hennessy, Pennsylvania State University

Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform

NEW: By Roger Davidson and David Kovenock, Dartmouth College, and Michael O'Leary, Syracuse University. 1966. 224 pages. 5⅝ x 8⅜. Paperbound.
"... this manuscript is the most sensible discussion of Congressional reform I have read. At last someone has sought to make the value judgments underlying various reform proposals explicit, and to clarify systematically the alternative roles Congress might play in the American political system."
—Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina

Just published: **Political Television**

By Bernard Rubin, Boston University. 1967. 208 pages. 6 x 9. Paperbound.

Political Modernization

Readings in Comparative Political Change edited by Claude Welch, SUNY at Buffalo. 1967. 384 pages. 6 x 9. Paperbound.

Also of interest: **Public Opinion**

By Bernard Hennessy, Pennsylvania State University. 1965. 384 pages. 6 x 9. Clothbound.

Comparative World Politics

Readings in Western and Premodern Non-western International Relations edited by Joel Larus, New York University. 1964. 6 x 9. 286 pages. Paperbound.

For review copies write to box APSR-1
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.
Belmont, California 94002

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

PRAEGER

Two outstanding books on Italian politics by NORMAN KOGAN

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR ITALY

The author, Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, analyzes the major political and economic events of the past two decades, including the establishment of Italy's first Center-Left government and the "economic miracle" that has transformed northern and central Italy. He also explores why—despite improved economic conditions—the political stability of the country remains precarious. 252 pp. $6.00 clothbound

THE POLITICS OF ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This penetrating book undertakes to show that the key objective of Italian foreign policy is to protect the domestic social structure. "A useful, worth-while study."—*Library Journal.* 190 pp. tables, index. $5.00 clothbound

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers
111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS
Selected Documents
Edited by John D. Lewis, *Oberlin College*

Documents concerning the famous debate over the adoption of the Constitution in 1787-1788. The arguments of the defenders of the Constitution are drawn chiefly, but not exclusively, from *The Federalist*, by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. The anti-Federalist arguments are from various sources.

Approx. 320 pp. *paper approx.* **$3.50**

GARRISONS AND GOVERNMENT: Politics and the Military in New States
Edited by Wilson C. McWilliams, *Oberlin College*

A survey of the political role of military organizations in developing countries, set in a broad comparative and historical framework, designed to help the reader understand the influence of the military on politics in new and old nations.

Approx. 330 pp. *paper approx.* **$2.50**

THE LAW OF THE POOR
Edited by Jacobus tenBroek, *University of California,* Berkeley and the Editors of *California Law Review*

The purpose of this symposium was to provide a critical review of the rules and procedures, doctrines and presuppositions of the law of the poor. Sponsored by the Center for the Study of Law and Society, it included scholars from the fields of law, social science, and social work.

704 pp. *paper* **$4.95,** *cloth* **$10.00**

CHANDLER PUBLISHING COMPANY
124 Spear Street, San Francisco, California 94105

MARX'S ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS

by Fred M. Gottheil

During the course of his creative years (1843–83), Marx produced a large quantity of economic, political, and historical books, essays, pamphlets, addresses, and correspondence. Dispersed among these writings were many prophecies, both abstract and specific. *Marx's Economic Predictions* evaluates over 150 of his predictions as logical derivatives of his theoretical system.

xv + 216 pages $7.50

THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY

Criminal Procedure and Converging Constitutional Doctrines

by Walter V. Schaefer

In *The Suspect and Society,* the author deals with the legal problems that cluster about police interrogation of persons suspected of having committed crimes; he considers the constitutional doctrines that bear upon this practice as it has been conducted in the past; and he discusses the model code of procedure advanced by the American Law Institute. The proposals offered in this book should be of interest to everyone concerned with the application of our constitutional ideals to our legal institutions.

100 pages $3.50

PERSPECTIVES ON THE COURT

by Max Freedman, William M. Beaney, and Eugene V. Rostow

During the past twenty years the Supreme Court has been involved in reformulating our fundamental law as it relates to civil rights, separation of church and state, reapportionment, and criminal procedures. Here, the Court's performance is viewed by three eminent men from the vantage points of journalism, political science, and law.

120 pages $3.50

APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

R. Barry Farrell, editor

In this volume, twelve internationally respected political scientists analyze the relationship between national and international politics. These scholars are Karl W. Deutsch, James N. Rosenau, Carl J. Friedrich, George I. Blanksten, Pablo González Casanova, Norton E. Long, R. Barry Farrell, Vernon V. Aspaturian, Roland Young, Chadwick F. Alger, Raoul Naroll, and Oliver Benson.

368 pages cloth, $9.95 paper, $3.95

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

Evanston, Illinois

**HOUGHTON MIFFLIN PAPERBACKS
IN CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT . . .**

THE GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLICAN ITALY, Second Edition. John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile. 251 pages, 1966, $2.50.

BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, Second Edition. Sydney D. Bailey. 281 pages, 1966 Impression, $2.50.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND. George Arthur Codding, Jr. 174 pages, 1965 Impression, $2.50.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CHILE. Frederico G. Gil. 323 pages, 1966, $2.95.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL. Oscar Kraines. 246 pages, 1961, $2.50.

CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. Theodore McNelly. 228 pages, 1963, $2.50.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN MALAYSIA. R. S. Milne. 259 pages, 1967, $2.75.

THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. L. Vincent Padgett. 244 pages, 1966, $2.75.

THE INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. Norman D. Palmer. 277 pages, 1961, $2.50.

CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY. Elmer Plischke. 248 pages, 1964 Impression, $2.25.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN. Khalid B. Sayeed. About 300 pages, Spring 1967.

SOUTH VIETNAM: Nation Under Stress. Robert Scigliano. 227 pages, 1963, $2.50.

NORWEGIAN DEMOCRACY. James A. Storing. 246 pages, 1963, $2.50.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

Boston Atlanta Dallas Geneva, Ill. New York Palo Alto

New

THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1920-1966

Robert A. Scalapino

In this authoritative account of the evolution of the Japanese Communist Party from its beginnings nearly half a century ago to its present situation, an acute student of Asian society provides an arresting portrait of a political party that, by orthodox Marxist criteria, should have risen to first importance but never did. While according most attention to domestic developments both within and outside the party, Mr. Scalapino also relates them meaningfully to their international context. His account of the inability of the party to draw lasting political advantage from the opportunities that have presented themselves over the years is notable for its grasp of Japanese political realities. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources, written with a sense of the dramatic qualities of the story, and demonstrating a mastery of its subject, this book represents a milestone in the study of Asian politics.

A publication of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies **$6.50**

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

James R. Townsend

The first systematic study of mass political participation in Communist China, a crucial aspect of its political development. Mr. Townsend discusses the Chinese Communist style of participation, relating it to historical precedents in the pre-Communist setting, Soviet Marxism, and the experience of the Chinese Communist Party. He then considers how the Chinese Communist concept of participation has been implemented since the establishment of the present government.

A publication of the Center for Chinese Studies. **$5.50**

CALIFORNIA SLAVIC STUDIES: Volume IV

N. V. Riasanovsky and **Gleb Struve**, Editors

This series presents articles broadly representative of the field of Slavic and East European affairs. Vol. IV contains articles by Kathryn B. Feuer, Waclaw Lednicki, Edward Chmielewski, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Xenia Gasiorowska, George Gomori, and Henrik Birnbaum. **$5.00**

from California

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley 94720

POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS FROM PRENTICE-HALL

AMERICA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Edited by Dankwart A. Rustow

This new series is the work of eleven distinguished authors whose specialized knowledge and practical experience are applied to a broad and diversified coverage of the fields of American foreign policy and international relations.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

Africa and United States Policy, Rupert Emerson, Harvard University. Emerson maintains that Africa remains the continent of least concern to the United States, but the Congo and southern Africa hold the threat of becoming major global trouble centers. April

Foreign Aid in International Politics, John D. Montgomery, Harvard University. Montgomery explains political and economic tactics used to promote stability and encourage development, viewing many phases of foreign aid. But the nature of our commitments is the main concern of the book. January

FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION:

The Burden of Decision: American Foreign Policy Since 1945, by Charles Burton Marshall, Johns Hopkins University

Latin America and United States Policy, by Kalman H. Silvert, Dartmouth University

The Making of United States Foreign Policy, by William C. Olson, Columbia University

The Web of Interdependence: The United States and International Organizations, by Ernst B. Haas, University of California, Berkeley

Asia and United States Policy, by Wayne A. Wilcox, Columbia University

Cold War and Coexistence: Russia, China, and the United States, by William E. Griffith, Massachusetts Institutes of Technology

Europe and United States Policy, by Stanley Hoffman, Harvard University

Military Strategy in World Politics, by Walter Goldstein, Brooklyn College

The New Setting of World Politics, by Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University

Books in the series are in an attractive, uniform format of 6" x 9", approximately 128 pages each, paperbound $1.95, cloth $4.50

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

Edited by Robert A. Dahl

The aim of this series is to provide a collection of texts that will integrate the major aspects of modern political science, making available to the beginning student the fruits of the most recent empirical and theoretical studies in political science.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

Comparative Government, Dankwart Rustow, Columbia University. This book offers a comparison of political dynamics of democracies, totalitarian dictatorships, and the developing countries. The author emphasizes such universal themes as modernization, the formation of nation states, and the recruitment of leadership.

International Relations, Karl W. Deutsch, Yale University. Dr. Deutsch briefly and systematically introduces the major analytic concepts and basic data of world politics, with the aim of helping the student test his opinion against evidence.

Public Administration, James Fesler, Yale University. This volume combines three objectives: administration's relation to society and the political system; the institutional arrangements for large-scale administrations; and the motivation and behavior of individuals who participate in the administrative process.

Interest Groups, by Graham Wootton, Oxford University

Systems of Political Science, by Oran Young, Princeton University

To supplement the series:

Readings in Modern Political Analysis, Edited by Robert A. Dahl, Yale University, and Deane E. Neubauer, University of California, Irvine

PUBLISHED TITLES IN THE SERIES

The Age of Ideology, by Frederick M. Watkins, Yale University

The American Party System and the American People, by Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University

Congress and the Presidency, by Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University

Modern Political Analysis, by Robert A. Dahl, Yale University

Perspectives in Constitutional Law, by Charles L. Black, Jr., Yale University

Politics and Policies in State and Local Governments, by Herbert Kaufman, Yale University

Public Opinion, by Robert E. Lane, Yale University and David O. Sears, University of California, Los Angeles

To supplement the series:

Readings in American Political Behavior, Edited by Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University

Each of the volumes in the series is designed in a uniform 6" x 9" format, approx. 128 pp., paperbound $1.75, cloth $4.50

COMPARATIVE ASIAN GOVERNMENT SERIES

Edited by Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis

This series provides a comparative and functionally oriented analysis of twenty-one contemporary Asian political systems including Japan, India, the Chinese People's Republic, eight Southeast Asian and ten Southwest Asian countries.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

India's Political System, Richard L. Park, University of Michigan. This book provides an introduction to the modern political system of India with stress given to the historical, social, and economic background, plus an emphasis in analysis given to political behavior. Fall 1967

Japan's Political System, Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan. Ward views the Japanese political system as a distinguishable but interrelated segment of the total Japanese social system and goes to unusual pains to clarify the ways in which Japanese politics are shaped and affected by such factors as social structure, values, history, and economics. May 1967

Southeast Asia's Political Systems, Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The principal focus of this study is on comparative patterns of modernization in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia in this sense is seen as providing a laboratory for distinguishing different patterns of modernization. June 1967

Southwest Asia's Political Systems, Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University. This book aims to provide an accurate, objective, and up-to-date description and comparative analysis of the Southwest Asian political systems in accordance with an organizational framework that will make these data meaningful for comparing the Southwest Asian political systems to other political systems, including our own. Forthcoming

China's Political Systems, by Allen S. Whiting, Former Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, Department of State, 1962-66. The author examines the struggle of China to achieve political and economic modernization. Forthcoming

All volumes in this series approx. 128 pages, paperbound $1.95, cloth $4.95.

FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Edited by Wallace S. Sayre

The Foundations of Public Administration Series explores recent developments in the field including the lineage between public administration and the political system, the sociological and social-psychological aspects of public administration, and the attempts to develop cross-cultural concepts of administration.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

The Politics of Administration, by Wallace S. Sayre, Columbia University

The Politics of Bureaucracy, by Francis E. Rourke, The Johns Hopkins University

PUBLISHED TITLE

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, by Ferrel Heady, University of New Mexico. 1966

FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION

THE ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, by Harvey Mansfield, Columbia University

NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION (author to be announced)

The volumes in the series are in a paperbound format of 6″ x 9″, approx. 128 pp., each volume $1.95

THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY SERIES

Edited by David Easton

This new series in political science is devoted to empirically oriented theory. The primary objective is to serve as in impulse in the direction of further elaboration and enrichment of theoretical thinking.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND POLITICS: THE THEORIES OF TALCOTT PARSONS, William C. Mitchell, University of Oregon. Although Parsons has become one of the most controversial sociologists of his time, the author claims his importance is not limited to sociologists alone. Mitchell provides a detailed study of Parsons' writings synthesizing them from a political perspective. January 1967, 240 pp., cloth $5.95

PUBLISHED TITLES IN THE SERIES:

A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS, edited by David Easton, University of Chicago. 1966, 143 pp., cloth $5.95

VARIETIES OF POLITICAL THEORY, edited by David Easton, University of Chicago. 1966, 192 pp., cloth $5.25

FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION

INTERNATIONAL THEORY, by Arthur L. Burns, Australian National University
MODERN THEORY OF EQUALITY, by Wendell Bell, Yale University
MODERN THEORY OF REPRESENTATION, by John C. Wahlke, University of Iowa
TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL COMPETITION, by Heinz Eulau, Stanford University
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, by J. David Singer, University of Michigan

OUTSTANDING BOOKS TO BE PUBLISHED IN 1967

TODAY'S ISMS; COMMUNISM, FASCISM, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, 5th Edition, 1967 by William Ebenstein, University of California, Santa Barbara

The new 5th Edition of this classic study offers an up-to-date overview of the world's major political systems: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, and Socialism. The basic approach treats these four important *Isms* as ways of life rather than as specific governmental, economic or social institutions.
March 1967, Approx. 272 pp., paperbound $3.75

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 4th Edition, 1967 by Winston W. Crouch, University of California, Los Angeles; Dean E. McHenry, University of California, Santa Cruz; John C. Bollens, University of California, Los Angeles; Stanley Scott, University of California, Berkeley

Four noted authorities whose combined experience includes teaching, research, and public service over many years provide an inside view of the politics and problems of the most populous state in the nation. The emphasis is on current issues and political techniques with proper attention to the day-by-day operations of state and local governments. March 1967, approx. 336 pp., paperbound $3.75

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 4th Edition, 1967 by Robert E. Lane, Yale University; James D. Barber, Yale University; Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University.

This revised edition presents concrete case studies of government in action, which focus attention on significant political concepts and issues. The volume stresses the student's own role in developing and testing generalizations about political behavior and appraising political processes and policies. March 1967, approx. 385 pp., paperbound $5.50

FOREIGN POLICY IN WORLD POLITICS, 3rd Edition, 1967 Edited by Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University

Introducing the student to the problems of foreign policy in the context of existing world relations, the Third Edition focuses upon ten contemporary national states and probes the factors that determine their foreign policy. The attitudes, purposes, and motivations which are peculiar to each of these nations, as well as the national characteristics which they have in common with other nations, are examined in relation to the mutual political and economic interests common to all nations. Each chapter is written by a specialist on the background, temperament, and foreign policy of the nation discussed. April 1967, approx. 416 pp., paperbound $4.95

The Government of the United States, by Ernest B. Fincher, Montclair State College
By using a quantity of factual information and anecdotal material the author underscores the dynamic character of American government and its relationship to the lives of ordinary citizens. The text covers in depth major aspects of national government such as political parties; interest groups, federal courts, and the presidency. January 1967, 320 pp., paperbound $3.95

Foreign Policy of the American People, 3rd Edition, 1967 by Charles O. Lerche, Jr.
The completely revised Third Edition bases its analysis upon the role of the "American people" in foreign affairs and examines the responses of the United States to the challenges of an unstable world. Emphasis is on the broader scope of considerations in national foreign policy and Soviet-American confrontations. January 1967, 387 pp., $8.25

Parties and the Governmental System: A Book of Readings, by Garold W. Thumm, Bates College, and Edward Janosik, University of Pennsylvania
Composed of articles from scholarly journals and excerpts from important political science books, Parties and the Governmental System is a new and refreshing anthology that brings together selected materials dealing with the theory and practice of political parties—their nature and functions, their organization, their operations, and their ecology. May 1967, approx. 320 pp., paperbound $3.95

Function and Policies of American Government, 3rd Edition, 1967 by J. W. Peltason, University of California, Irvine, and James M. Burns. Williams College
Functions and Policies of American Government describes comprehensively what American government does and what its specific policies are. It discusses governmental policies, functions, and programs against a background of history and politics, which encompass events as recent as those in the Johnson administration. May 1967, approx. 464 pp., $6.95

International Politics, by K. J. Holsti, University of British Columbia
Offers an integrated framework for analyzing the behavior of states, with emphasis on the systemic and domestic sources of external political goals, the bargaining methods used to achieve or defend objectives and interests, restraints on policies, and behavior and procedures conducive to the resolution of international conflicts. May 1967, approx. 512 pp., $8.95

Issues of Political Development, by Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, Crawford Young, all of the University of Wisconsin
Here is one of the first genuinely comparative studies of the politics of developing nations. The common and distinctive experiences of the emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America are examined to show both common features and subtle shades of differences in the way these nations confront critical problems of political development. The authors explore such crucial themes as national integration, political order, and the problems of finding a workable idealogy of development. May 1967, approx. 280 pp., paperbound $3.95

For approval copies, write:

Box 903
Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs
New Jersey 07632

Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861 February 13 to May 1

Edited by George H. Reese
Head, Historical Publications Division, Virginia State Library
liv, 3155 pp. 6⅛ × 9¼, 4 vols., Boxed. $60.00 the set

Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861: February 13 to May 1 brings together for the first time the complete texts of Virginia's historic "secession debates."

An authoritative introduction is included along with a synoptical guide of each day's proceedings—a valuable aid in following the progress of the sessions.

To all intents and purposes, Virginia's official withdrawal from the Federal Union on May 23, 1861, was a mere formality. The actual drama took place at the Convention, and all the turmoil and excitement of that crucial decision has been recaptured in these speeches. These four volumes provide the standard text for one of the most important legislative sessions ever held in this country.
Published by the Virginia State Library
Distributed by the University Press of Virginia

Annexation in Virginia

The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries

Chester W. Bain
Olin D. Johnston, Professor of Political Science,
University of South Carolina
xiv, 258 pp., 6 × 9¼, index, L.C. 66-12468, $6.00

Unique to the state of Virginia is complete reliance on judicial procedure for readjusting municipal boundaries. Chester W. Bain, in *Annexation in Virginia,* gives a critical analysis of this procedure and its applicability to other states.

The General Assembly of Virginia adopted a statute in 1904 transferring the responsibility for annexation from the political realm to the judicial and established a special court of law presided over by judges selected from the state's judicial system to handle the cases. Mr. Bain closely examines legislative history from 1904 to June 30, 1965, with attention to the forces that have influenced the adoption and amendment of the statute. The issues and questions that have arisen under the statute are presented, and the way in which the courts have decided the issues is evaluated. *Annexation in Virginia* was published for the Institute of Government of the University of Virginia.

University Press of Virginia Charlottesville

OUTSTANDING McGRAW-HILL TEXTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Second Edition

By **Charles R. Adrian,** *University of California, Riverside.* Available Winter.

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE, Second Edition

By **Carlton Clymer Rodee, Totton James Anderson,** *and* **Carl Quimby Christol,** *all of University of Southern California.* Available Spring.

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: Second Edition

Edited by **Reo M. Christenson,** *Miami University* **Robert O. McWilliams,** *Eastern Michigan University.* Available Spring.

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.

Elements of American Government, Seventh Edition. 512 pages. $7.95

The American Federal Government, Ninth Edition. Coming this spring.

The American System of Government, Ninth Edition. Coming this spring.

All three by **John H. Ferguson,** *The Pennsylvania State University; and* **Dean E. McHenry, *University of California at Santa Cruz.***

THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN GOVERNMENT

By **Eugene J. Meehan,** *Brandeis University;* **John P. Roche,** *Brandeis University; and* **Murray S. Stedman, Jr.,** *Trinity College.* 450 pages, $7.50

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS

By **Charles R. Adrian,** *University of California, Riverside; and* **Charles Press,** *Michigan State University.* 756 pages. $7.95

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Joseph P. Harris, *Consulting Editor*

Revisions and additions have been made to keep this series up to date and to enlarge its scope, but its purpose remains the same as it was on first publication: To provide a group of relatively short treatises dealing with major aspects of government in modern society.

Andrew Hacker: *The Study of Politics: The Western Tradition and American Origins*

C. Herman Pritchett: *The American Constitutional System,* Second Edition

Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney: *Politics and Voters,* Second Edition

Rowland Egger: *The President of the United States*

Joseph P. Harris: *Congress and the Legislative Process*

John J. Corson and Joseph P. Harris: *Public Administration in Modern Society*

Charles O. Lerche, Jr.: *America in World Affairs,* Second Edition

Charles R. Adrian: *Governing Our Fifty States and Their Communities,* Second Edition

H. Frank Way, Jr.: *Liberty in the Balance: Current Issues in Civil Liberties,* Second Edition

AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, Third Edition

By **Hugh A. Bone,** *University of Washington.* McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. 700 pages, $8.95

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA, Third Edition

By **Henry A. Turner,** *University of California, Santa Barbara; and* **John A. Vieg,** *Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School, Calif.*

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: Perspectives and Analysis

By **William P. Gerberding,** *University of California, Los Angeles.*

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. 400 pages. $7.95

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

330 West 42nd Street, New York, N. Y. 10036

PRAEGER

New Paperbacks in International Relations

IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER

U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations

Revised Edition

By RICHARD N. GARDNER. Introduction by Harlan Cleveland. Now thoroughly updated: "An admirable guide to the intentions and hopes of the United States in the United Nations. . . . Lucid, readable, and authoritative." ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, in *The New Republic*. 281 pp. U-616 $2.25

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Edited by EVAN LUARD. Ten distinguished authorities—among them, Sydney D. Bailey, Geoffrey Goodwin, Inis L. Claude, Jr., and Andrew Shonfield—trace the history, structure, and functions of the most important international bodies, including the U.N. and the World Bank. "The approach is fresh and unique."—*Library Journal* 342 pp. notes, bibliog., index. U-620/ $2.95

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

By LEONARD BEATON. The Well Known Consultant at The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, explores what the world's leaders have learned, or failed to learn, from the Cuban missile crisis, from Vietnam, and from each of the other crises of recent years. 118 pp. P-220/$1.45

WORLD POLITICS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION

By JOHN W. SPANIER. "A text that is outstanding for its clarity, its style, and its comprehensiveness in dealing with the revolutionary events of our time. The author confronts major problems directly; in doing so, he provides the student with information he can bring to bear upon the issues of politics and the problems of theory that the author so sharply identifies."—KENNETH N. WALTZ, Professor of Politics, Brandeis University. A Praeger Paperbound Text. 488 pp. bibliog., index. $3.95

THE COMMUNIST STATES AND THE WEST

Edited by ADAM BROMKE and PHILIP E. UREN. "This collection of twelve essays . . . describes and evaluates change in the Communist world in terms of East-West relations. . . . It will succeed admirably in revealing 'something of the new international reality' to the interested layman and the beginning student of foreign affairs."—*Library Journal.* 253 pp. U-619/$2.25

THE HARD AND BITTER PEACE

World Politics Since 1945

By G. F. HUDSON. An illuminating study of the international scene from the end of World War II to the present, by the author of *The Far East in World Politics* and *Europe and China.* With a chronology of significant events in great power relations, 1945-65. 319 pp. bibliog., index. U-594/$2.50

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers

111 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10003

Presenting

Van Nostrand Political Science Series. General Editor: Franklin L. Burdette.

CONDUCT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Third Edition

By Elmer Plischke, University of Maryland. **Just Published.**

The Third Edition of this widely acclaimed reference and text for Foreign Service candidates and students of American diplomacy has been completely revised and updated.

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, Third Edition

Edited with introductory notes by Samuel Hendel, The City College of the City University of New York. **Available Summer, 1967.** Approximately 600 pages; about $4.95 (paper).

Soviet society—its premises, achievements, failures, and prospects—is examined in this rich and skillfully balanced collection of writings.

DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Readings and Documents

Edited with chapter introductions by Martin C. Needler, University of New Mexico. 1966; 384 pages; $4.75 (paper).

United States foreign policy of the present, the recent past, and the future, is the theme of this timely collection of readings.

LIBERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM: The Continuing Debate in American Government: Key Readings

By Willmoore Kendall, University of Dallas; and George W. Carey, Georgetown University. 1966; 464 pages; $4.50 (paper).

This collection of dynamic readings by key thinkers offers a balanced presentation of conservative and liberal thinking on the American political system for today's student of American government.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Second Edition

By William G. Andrews, Tufts University. 1966; 608 pages; $4.95 (paper).

"This is an excellent and well selected collection of articles, speeches, and documents. It makes a most useful supplement to the usual textbook of comparative European government. I intend to prescribe the new edition as I did the old."—E. Feit, University of Massachusetts.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA: The Governing of Restless Nations

By Charles W. Anderson, University of Wisconsin. **Just Published in paperback.**

Here is a dynamic approach to the study of Latin American politics, focusing on the most important problem of that continent—the struggle for economic and social change.

ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS AND POLITICAL ANSWERS

Edited by Claude E. Hawley, The City University of New York, and Ruth E. Weintraub, The City University of New York (Hunter College). 1966; 616 pages; $5.95 (paper).

The text is comprised of outstanding articles that focus on the major trends and ideas in the field over the past twenty-five years and indicates how administrative agencies have adapted to their political environment.

New Perspectives in Political Science
General Editor: William G. Andrews

MARXISM: A Re-Examination 13

By Irving M. Zeitlin, Indiana University. Available May, 1967. Approximately 200 pages, about $1.95. In this four-part study of the social and political theory of Karl Marx, the author explains the nondogmatic character of Marx's work, what constitutes nondogmatic marxism, and how the theory is affecting and will affect social science research.

THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 14
American Political Theory, Volume I

By Neal Riemer, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Available May, 1967. Approximately 256 pages, about $2.45.

The creative spirit of our forefathers coupled with their rare ability to function as philosopher-statesmen helped to guide the creative democratic experiment in reconciling liberty and authority in a large state is the main theme of this study.

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN EUROPE 15
Four Case Studies

Edited by **Ronald Bunn,** Louisiana State University; and **William G. Andrews,** Tufts University. Contributors: **Michael Gehlen, Jerome King, Geoffrey Marshall, Ronald Bunn.** Available May, 1967. Approximately 256 pages, about $2.45.

Civil liberties problems in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union are described and analyzed in this casebook by four key specialists.

Send for your on-approval copies. Write to the College Department,

Van Nostrand

120 Alexander Street
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Scott Foresman College Division

New Spring Titles

THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Readings in Constitutional Law

MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, University of California, Irvine

This substantive collection of readings, designed to survey the most important current cases, doctrines, and issues in the area of constitutional law, focuses on what the Supreme Court has done and ought to do about current issues. Topics examined in depth include freedom of speech, freedom of religion, reapportionment, Negro civil rights, expatriation, and the rights of accused persons. While a certain amount of necessary technical discourse is included, most of the materials deal with important general questions of public policy. The editor has written chapter introductions and selection headnotes and has added a brief section on research methods and problems at the end. *Ready in late Spring, approx. 256 pages, softbound, prob. $3.75*

CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION

Issue 4

JAMES FINDLAY, DePauw University

A collection of essays on the world in the mid-sixties, this book can be used as a basic text in a current affairs course, as one element in a social science survey, or as supplementary material in a political science course such as American Institutions or International Relations. While the selections are completely different from those appearing in the previous editions of the book, they represent a wide range of institutions and areas of special interest. Instead of separate chapters on the Soviet Union and Communist China, a single essay on the Communist world as a whole is included. The new essay on Africa considers the Middle East, and a new chapter on religion increases the coverage given to contemporary socio-cultural areas. Two of the authors, Vera Dean and Holland Hunter, appeared in *Contemporary Civilization: Issue 3;* the remaining eleven contributors are new and include Soviet expert Donald Zagoria, sociologist Robert Nesbit, and critic Robert Ellman. The essays are generally political in emphasis but include consideration of social problems, science, religion, and the arts. A preface by Henry Steele Commager and a separate section of readings from current journals and magazines provide additional perspective. Issue 4 contains four maps, 50 photographs, and a chronological chart of significant events since 1945 which has been updated and keyed more directly to the essays. *Ready in April, approx. 320 pages, softbound, prob. $3.50*

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY College Division

Glenview, Illinois　Atlanta　Dallas　Palo Alto　Oakland, N.J.

The POLITICS of ESCALATION in VIETNAM

By FRANZ SCHURMANN, PETER DALE SCOTT, REGINALD ZELNIK

"A most important and revealing history, and a clear demonstration of what is wrong with the strategy of escalation."—*John Kenneth Galbraith.* "THE POLITICS OF ESCALATION IN VIETNAM is probably the best single investment anyone can make in the literature on Vietnam. . . . It is a work which I would like to see seriously and thoughtfully debated by Administration advocates."—*Bernard B. Fall, New York Review of Books.*

A Fawcett Premier paperback book, 160 pp., 60¢

VIETNAM: History, Documents and Opinions on a Major World Crisis

Edited, with an Introduction by MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN

Here are materials on which statesmen and policymakers rely and which will enable the reader to understand our involvements. Selected writings of historians, statesmen, and journalists which illustrate the key events and major epochs in the evolution of Indochina. A rich collection of basic documents—some available nowhere else in this country—including statements of governments, international agreements, and monitored radio broadcasts.

A Fawcett Crest paperback book, 448 pp., 95¢

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE ERA OF LENIN, A Documentary History

By HELMUT GRUBER

This volume provides a concise and stimulating narrative framework into which the texts of the most significant doctrinal statements, manifestoes, analyses, tactical decisions, and polemics of the movement have been interwoven. The contents highlight the outstanding events in communism's heroic period and illuminate the growth of the national communist parties against the background of the developing Communist International.

A Fawcett Premier paperback book, about 512 pages, May 95¢

Education Dept., Desk FD

FAWCETT PUBLICATIONS, INC.

67 West 44 St., New York, N.Y. 10036

Peaceful Coexistence

International Law in the Building of Communism

By Lt. Col. Bernard A. Ramundo

This study explores the Soviet position on basic questions of international law and contemporary international legal problems. The purpose throughout is twofold: to determine the manner in which the Soviets utilize international law to support policy objectives, and to decide whether, and to what degree, the Soviet approach to international law differs from that of other countries. The Soviet Union, Dr. Ramundo contends, has outgrown its earlier role as an "outlaw State," and now manifests an acute sensitivity to the need to demonstrate legal propriety in international relations. The law of peaceful coexistence has been devised to fill this need in the interest of the realization of Soviet foreign policy objectives. $6.95

Northern California's Water Industry

The Comparative Efficiency of Public Enterprise in Developing a Scarce Natural Resource

By Joe S. Bain, Richard E. Caves, and Julius Margolis

The provision of fresh water is a highly complex undertaking, involving independent local public agencies, regular departments or bureaus of government, private companies, and individuals who have their own wells. Most previous studies have emphasized the activities of state or federal water agencies; this book analyzes in great detail the whole operation of water supply in a large area—the "water industry" of Northern California. Although this study deals specifically with Northern California, its "industry study" approach might well serve as a pattern for other areas.

Published for Resources for the Future, Inc. $15.00

NAACP

A History of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Vol. I, 1909-1920

By Charles Flint Kellogg

This is Volume I of a projected two volume series which is likely to become the definitive history of the NAACP. Professor Kellogg, who has drawn heavily on the previously unavailable Spingarn and Du Bois papers, traces the development of the NAACP from its founding in 1909 by Oswald Garrison Villard, W. E. Du Bois, and the Committee of Forty to its acceptance by Negroes as the most effective organization in the United States working for political and social equality. $8.75

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Available This Spring

ON CAPITOL HILL: Studies in the Legislative Process

JOHN BIBBY, *University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee*
ROGER DAVIDSON, *Dartmouth College*

Based entirely on the original research of the authors, here is a series of descriptive and analytical studies designed specifically to illustrate and illuminate certain aspects of Congressional operations and the environment in which the legislator works. Each of the studies is complete within itself, and can be adapted to a variety of teaching techniques or approaches.

January 1967 288 pp. $3.25

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY, Second Edition

JACK C. PLANO *and* MILTON GREENBERG,
both of Western Michigan University

Over 1100 terms are carefully defined in a paragraph setting forth both the historical and current significance of each. Every entry has been revised to some degree in this new edition, and seventy-five new lexical terms have been added. With few exceptions, each chapter has four sections, the first and longest section in each case being an alphabetical listing of terms. Cross references are given for similar or closely related entries.

March 1967 416 pp. $4.50 paper (tent.)

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA: A Reader

PETER G. SNOW, *State University of Iowa*

This distinctive collection of readings—taken from the writings of political scientists, as well as historians, journalists, sociologists, anthropologists, and economists—provides a review of the cultural background, governmental and political systems, and major political issues of present-day Latin America.

March 1967 560 pp. $8.50 (tent.)

UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION, Fourth Edition

By the late EDWIN S. CORWIN, *and*
JACK W. PELTASON, *University of California, Irvine*

This book provides a clause-by-clause explanation of the articles and amendments of the Constitution and a discussion of the practical significance of its most important provisions as they are interpreted and applied today.

March 1967 192 pp. $2.95 paper (tent.)

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017

An Atlas of Russian History

Eleven Centuries of Changing Borders

by Allen F. Chew

This atlas, which combines thorough scholarship with the most practical features for use, will become an indispensable supplement to texts on Russian affairs. Large in format (8¼ x 10¾ inches), with a spiral binding which allows the maps to lie flat, the book contains thirty-four maps which show how Russia's boundaries have changed from the formation of Kievan Rus in the ninth century to the most recent revisions resulting from World War II. Each map is accompanied by concise, descriptive text. **$3.95**

Poverty amid Affluence

edited by Leo Fishman

Written by eminent social scientists and public leaders, the eleven papers presented here were originally delivered in May 1965 at the West Virginia University Conference on Poverty amid Affluence. "Must reading."—*Publishers' Weekly.* **cloth $6.00; paper $1.95**

Greek Political Reaction to American and Nato Influences

by Theodore A. Couloumbis

Traces recent controversies that have entwined internal and international politics in Greece, and finds evidence to support the hypothesis that U.S. aid and influence facilitated the Conservative hegemony from 1952 to 1963. **$7.50**

The Trauma of Decolinization

The Dutch and West New Guinea

by Arend Lijphart

In demonstrating that the motives behind Dutch reluctance to let go of West New Guinea were subjective and psychological, the author challenges economic explanations of colonialism. Yale Studies in Political Science, 17. **$7.50**

New Yale Paperbounds

Arms and Influence

by Thomas C. Schelling

"This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing."—Gordon A. Craig, *New York Times Book Review.* **$1.95 (cloth $7.50)**

The Lawmakers

Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life

by James David Barber

"Clearly one of the most significant studies of American politics written since the advent of behavioral studies in political science."—*Western Political Quarterly.* **$1.95 (cloth $7.50)**

Children and Politics

by Fred I. Greenstein

"The first book-length empirical treatment of the political socialization of American elementary school children."—*American Political Science Review.* ***late spring*** **$1.75 (cloth $5.00)**

available through your bookstore
Yale University Press
New Haven and London
in Canada: McGill University Press

INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

Allyn & Bacon, Inc. 262, 263
American Book Company 244, 255
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 252, 253
Audio-Visual Research 4
Blaisdell Publishing Co. 266
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 281
University of California Press 298
Chandler Publishing Company 295
University of Chicago Press 256, 257
Congressional Quarterly 288
Thomas Y. Crowell Company 293
Dodd, Mead & Company 292
Dorsey Press 272, 273
Doubleday & Company, Inc. 245, 289
Exposition Press 291
Fawcett Publications, Inc. 308
Free Press 274, 275, 276
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 278, 279, 288
Harper & Row 1, 248, 249, 250
Harvard University Press 290
D. C. Heath & Company 284
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 310
Houghton Mifflin Company 297
University of Illinois Press 267
Johns Hopkins Press 309
J. B. Lippincott Company 280
Little, Brown & Company 258, 259, 260, 261
McGraw-Hill Book Company 304
Macmillan Company 264, 265
Northwestern University Press 296
Oxford University Press 240, 241, 242, 243
Frederick A. Praeger 295, 305
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 246, 299, 300, 301, 302
Princeton University Press 254, Cover II
Rand McNally & Company 238, 239, 251, Cover IV
Random House 268, 269, 270, 271
Ronald Press 277
St. Martin's Press, Inc. 283
Science Research Associates 285
Scott, Foresman & Company 307
Charles Scribner's Sons 282
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association 247
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 306
University Press of Virginia 303
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. 294
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 286, 287
World Politics 291
Yale University Press 311

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS

BRUSSELS, SEPTEMBER 18-23, 1967

Information on the Congress, Travel Grants, and Charter Flights

General Information

The International Political Science Association will meet September 18-23, 1967 in Brussels. There will be both a series of meetings on general topics and a series of specialist meetings; attendance at the latter will be by invitation or by application to the scholar in charge. Registration fee for members of IPSA will be $10.00; for others $15.00.

Travel Grants

The American Political Science Association has a grant from the National Science Foundation to assist Americans who are participating in or attending the Congress. Funds are limited and applications will be reviewed and grants made by an Association committee.

Charter Flights

The Association has arranged for two charter flights at reduced rates. Flight 1 will be on Pan American leaving September 15 and returning September 25. Round trip cost: $331.00. Flight 2 will be on Pan American leaving September 9 and returning September 24. Round trip cost, $250.00 plus $70.00 worth of ground accommodations arranged through the Association.

Full information about the Congress, travel grants and charter flights can be obtained from:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:

Conflict and Consent

ROBERT A. DAHL • Yale University

This basic textbook traces the development of American democracy and introduces the student to an original political philosophy of American government.

The text is organized around an historical analysis of conflict and consensus within a pluralist democracy. After describing the formation of the American pluralist democracy, Dahl discusses the political institutions and how they contribute to that democracy, examines American pluralist democracy as it functions in conflict, and finally assesses the influence which an individual can have on a pluralist democracy.

Throughout the text Dahl integrates theories and findings of behaviorally oriented studies wherever relevant, refers to traditional sources, and quotes extensively from classical writings. His analysis of the behavior of a pluralist democracy in the presence of conflict gives an innovative dimension to the book. His development of this facet is supported by case studies and theoretical analyses.

In his smoothly flowing writing style, Dahl adopts the mood and tone of a scholar talking directly with his readers. His use of personal references and frequent asides promotes a rapport and involvement on the part of the student. Dahl encourages personal analysis by offering penetrating questions about the formation, principles, and applications of pluralist democracy.

Part I. How and Why a Pluralist Democracy Emerged on the American Continent

1. Conflict and Consent
2. A Republic—If You Can Keep It
3. The Silent Revolution: Proof of the Impossible

Part II. How American Political Institutions Evolved; How They Contribute to Pluralist Democracy

4. The Presidency
5. The Congress
6. The Supreme Court
7. The Other Ninety Thousand Governments
8. The Political Parties: Origins and Characteristics
9. Political Parties: Contributions to Democracy

Part III. How a Pluralist Democracy Behaves in the Midst of Conflict and Cleavages

10. Conflict and Conciliation
11. Comprehensive Change and Severe Conflict
12. Political Polarization and Civil War
13. The Conditions of Moderate Conflict
14. Overlapping Cleavages—Low Polarization

Part IV. How Political Activists Can Exert Influence in a Pluralist Democracy

15. Influencing the Conduct of Government
16. Four Cases of Political Action
17. Alternative Strategies for Political Activists

1967

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY
The College Department • Box 7600 • Chicago, Illinois 60680